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P R E F A C E 
(This preface is subject to modification in the 
event.of publication.) 
The subject of this work was originally su7gested to me a short time 
before I graduated. At first my intention was to collect material 
for a biography of Williams,. but I abandoned this idea almost 
immediately, and decided to confine my attention to the diplomatic 
side of his activities. This was the only aspect of his career which 
really interested me, and there was, as I soon discovered, ample 
material for its study in the Public Record Office and the MS. Depart- 
ment of the British Museum, where I worked during the first of my 
postgraduate years. 
The material collected there during that first year and many later 
visits to London, after the perusal of hundreds of volumes of letters, 
despatches, and other private and official papers, forms the basis of 
this work. It has, however, been supplemented to a considerable 
extent by the results of two visits to the Archives de la Ministére 
des Affaires Etrangeres at Paris, and of a visit to the Newport (Mon.) 
Public Library, which possesses a MS. collection including, so far as 
can be ascertained, practically all Williams's official papers as a 
British minister, as well as the private diary which he kept at Berlin 
and some other private papers. Permission to examine another part of 
Williams's papers, which is at present in the possession of Mr T.F. 
Fenwick, Thirlestane House, Cheltenham, was refused. 
As my knowledge of the authorities and the scope of this study in 
European diplomacy gradually widened, Williams inevitably ceased to be 
the central figure, and was merged in the European background. I 
would gladly dismiss him altogether from my work, but his career 
is the only thread on which my account of Britain's diplomatic 
relations with certain continental states can be hung. No one can 
be more conscious than I of the obvious weakness of the method of 
treatment which circumstances have forced me to adopt in PartI. 
As Williams moves about from Dresden to Berlin, Warsaw, Grodno, and 
Vienna the chapters are necessarily disconnected in their subject 
matter. This difficulty is not present to the same extent after 
Williams has settled down at Petersburg, and Part II deals with a 
single theme - the action and reaction between Petersburg and 
Europe during the Diplomatic Revolution and the opening of the 
Seven Years war. 
Although the narrative is based throughout on the original sources, 
1 1 
whether in MS. or in print, the secondary authorities have not been 
2 
neglected. Only the necessity of reducing the bulk of notes has 
prevented me from giving much fuller references to them, and dis- 
cussing more frequently and more at length interesting but minor 
controversial points. I may venture to claim that this thesis is 
a pioneer work, certainly so far as Britain is concerned. Apart 
from isolated articles there has been hardly any attempt in this 
country to treat European diplomacy from the end of the Austrian 
Succession war to the opening of the Seven Years war on an adequate 
scale. There are monographs in French, German, and other languages 
in plenty, but no satisfactory study of the whole period from the 
diplomatic aspect exists, except the work of Arneth published more 
1 See Appendix A for a complete list of primary authorities. 
2 See Appendix B for a list of the principal secondary 
authorities cited in the foot notes. 
than half a century ago. 
e_tle_f k fr 
I declare that this thesis is my unaided work. No part of it has 
been submitted for any degree of any other University. Chapter II 
was offered to the English Historical Review and will appear in 
January 1929. 
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The British diplomatic service in the Eighteenth 
Century - Sir Charles Hanbury "Jilliams - Reasons 
for his entering the diplomatic service - His 
relations with Fox and Pelham - His appointment 
as envoy to Saxony. 
The British diplomatic service in the mid- eighteenth century was 
recruited in the same haphazard fashion as the rudimentary Home 
Civil Service. Patronage flourished, but merit, always provided 
that its claims were backed by powerful recommendations, carried 
more weight in the diplomatic than in the home service, because 
few diplomatic posts were mere sinecures. The lower posts were 
normally filled by . men of humble origin who had found means to 
secure the backing of a powerful patron. Solomon Dayrolle, resident 
at the Hague, is said to have owed his position to his complaisance 
towards his wife's intrigue with a former British ambassador to 
the States General. Others again, such as George Cressener at Liége, 
began as unofficial spies and secured the rank of Resident or 
Minister as a reward for their dangerous service to the British 
government. More frequently, however, these posts were filled by men 
with quite good connections who lacked the spur of ambition and were 
content to settle down with a comfortable salary and nominal duties 
in the congenial society of a minor capital. The best known of these 
sinecurists is Horace Mann, the most favoured correspondent of Horace 
Walpole, who represented Britain at the Tuscan court from 1737 -79. 
f y- 
His record period of office is closely approached byAthe envoy at 
Copenhagen, Walter Titley (1729 -67). More interesting, since their 
careers illustrate the peaceful penetration of England by ambitious 
and impecunious Scots, are the Scotsmen who secured a footing on 
the lowest rungs of the diplomatic ladder and steadily climbed up. 
They may be said to take the place of those professional diplomatists 
of foreign origin, such as Sir Luke Schaub, who played a prominent 
part in British diplomacy in the early part of the eighteenth 
century. 
2. 
The chief posts,however,in the diplomatic service were normally 
filled not by men who had made diplomacy their profession, but by 
titled amateurs, who owed their position to their influential 
connections. Such were Sandwich at the Hague and Albemarle at 
Versailles. Not infrequently however some of these posts, always 
excepting the French embassy, were filled by humbler men who had 
worked their way to the top - Keene at Madrid, Robinson at Vienna, 
Guy Dickens at Petersburg. The secretaries of state were not infre- 
- quently chosen from the ranks of these successful diplomatists e.g. 
Harrington, Chesterfield, Holdernessiand Robinson. The higher ranks 
of the diplomatic service therefore normally included a few men who 
regarded it as a means of entry to the Cabinet. 
Although it had certain advantagesjthe defects of this method - or 
lack of method - in the recruitment of British diplomatists 614-t 
evident to the eyes of the twentieth century; some of these weak- 
-nesses are clearly revealed by the appointment, and still more the 
retention in the service after his failure at Berlin, of Sir Charles 
Hanbury Williams. Williams did not enter the diplomatic service 
until he was nearly forty years of age, when his character and 
habits of life had long been formed. A younger son of Major John 
Hanbury of Pontypool, he received the orthodox education of an 
English gentleman at Eton, where he was a contemporary of Fox and 
Pitt.1After making the obligatory grand tour of Western Europe, he 
inherited the estate of his god- father, Charles Williams, and 
settled down in England. His time was divided between politics, 
literature,and society. In the Commons he was for long one of Wal- 
-pole's docile, silent voters. Outside of the House, he gave 
1 Jesse Selwyn I 179; Williams Pitt I 33. 
3 
Walpole much more effective support by writing venomous lampoons 
against the opposition leaders. He was rewarded for his political 
services with the office of Paymaster of the Marines and discharged 
the duties of this office in the most perfunctory way j Greater 
success attended his cultivation of the Muses and his verses were 
rapturously applauded by the coteries to which he belonged. Some 
critics, including that arbiter elegántiarum Horace Walpole, pro- 
-fessed to regard him as the greatest English poet of the gener- 
-ation. In society his satirical bent and inordinate appetite for 
scandal made him many enemies, while his colossal conceit was a by- 
word even among his friends. However gratified he was by this real 
or assumed admiration of his verses, he felt even more deeply his 
failure to obtain high political office, for which he quite wrongly 
believed himself to be admirably equipped. 
If his own account could be accepted, Williams at the beginning of 
his diplomatic career would belong to the amateur class of British 
diplomatist. "I am here" he wrote from Dresden to Robinson, British 
minister at Vienna, "a good deal retired and in a melancholy way 
which I have been in ever since the death of my friend Mr. 
Winnington2in whom my country lost a useful citizen and I the man 
upon earth I loved the best. 'Twas upon his death I begged the King 
to send me abroad and resigned a very profitable employment to come 
out of a country where I missed an object that I esteemed and 
honoured very highly and where everything daily put me in mind of 
him ".3 
In this letter Williams is very careful to say nothing of the pub- 
lication of his notorious ode on the marriage of the duchess of 
1 Harris to Williams (undated) in Newport Papers: "Here's 
the devil to pay about the marines no subsistence 
issued since 24th ult. nor a man of them voted in Parliament': 
cf. Harris to Williams 29 January 1746 (Newport Papers). 
2 April 1746 (Walpole Letters II 190 -1). 
3 in Add. MSS. 32825 f 198. 
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Manchester, which brought down upon him the wrath not only of the 
friends and relations of the newly married couple, but of numerous 
irascible Irish gentlemen who resented an insult offered in the ode 
to their nation; 
"Nature, indeed, denies them sense 
But gives them legs and impudence 
That beats all understanding "? 
To escape,it was said, from a series of duels: Williams fled to 
mouth Wales. His enemies, who were many, called his flight coward - 
3 
-ice; his friends, who were few, vainly urged him to return to 
London and refute the imputation. 
The death of Winnington and this incident were however not the 
cause but merely the occasion of Williams's entry into the diplom- 
service. As early as 1737 Walpole had proposed to send 
Williams on a special mission to Don Carlos to give him formal 
recognition as king of Naples, but Newcastle, secretary of state 
for the southern department, had objected and secured royal nom- 
4 
-ination for another candidate. Horace Walpole (senior),however, 
encouraged Williams in his ambitions: "I am glad" he wrote "to find 
that you are willing to turn your thoughts to business...I am no 
less pleased that you have hinted your mind to [Sir R.Walpolel, 
which I would advise you to do by your frequent visits and add- 
-resses. Your person and manner cannot, considering your merit and 
your circumstances, be impertinent or importunate and believe me, 
among ye number of candidates that have or that think they have 
merit, being constantly in the way is of great service, and often 
by surprise and as it were against the will of the person in power 
gets ye better of greater merit that is modest and backward ".5 
1 The composition of this ode is attributed by Lady Wortley 
Montagu to Williams's resentment at the action of the 
duchess of Manchester in urging Williams's wife not to tol- 
erate his ill treatment of her:- Letters (ed. Wharncliffe) 
II 367. 
2 Williams Works I 93. 
3 e.g.Jesse Selwyn I 115,154. 
4 Horace Walpole (senior) to Williams 10 September N.S. 1737 
in Newport Papers; Hervey Memoirs of George II, II 452 -4. 
5 Horace Walpole (senior) to Williams 10 September N.S. 
cf.Walpole s letters of 4 October N.S. 1737 and 3/14 August 
1739,all in Newport Papers. 
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Williams was neither modest nor backward in pressing his claims 
upon the "person in power" and at last in 1744 on the ground of 
1 
"what had passed in Lord Orford's time" he was given the red ribband 
of the Order of the Bath, but this did nothing to satisfy his desire 
for office. By this time, however, Williams's dearest friend, Winn- 
-ington, was Paymaster of the Forces, while the third member of the 
trio, Fox, was closely associated with the premier, Henry Pelham, 
and did his best to win his favour for Williäms.2 Williams's ser- 
-vices to Fox in the latter's runaway match with Lady Caroline 
Lennox3 nearly cost Williams his knighthood, but cemented a friend- 
-ship which was to be the basis of his diplomatic career. Fox's 
relations with Pelham steadily improved,4 and when, in May 1746, he 
became secretary at war he was at last able to gratify the desires 
of his friend. Williams would have liked the envoyship to Turin,5 
and at one time it was reported that he would be sent to Berlin; 
6 
but ultimately on 23 December, 1746,7 he was appointed envoy extra- 
-ordinary to the elector of Saxony,8 Augustus II, who was also as 
Augustus III king of Poland. At the commencement of his diplomatic 
career, Williams probably intended to remain abroad only for a year 
or two, but very soon he acquired a taste for the easy life of a 
continental capital with a mIdicum of business. His brother's 
failure to secure his re- election to Parliament in 1748 removed one 
main reason for a speedy return to England.9 Thenceforth Williams 
1 Pelham to Williams 14 May (1744) in Newport Papers. 
2 Ilchester I 92. 
3 Williams to Fox 9,15 May 1744 in Liechtenstein Holland House 
T 60 -66; Fox to Williams 9 October 1744 in Newport Papers; 
Walpole Letters II 22 -3. 
4 Liechtenstein Holland House I 66. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 2 February 1747 in Add. MSS. 32710 f 150 - 
a letter which indicates that Williams was at this time the 
follower of Pelham. cf. Williams Works III 79. 
6 Walpole Letters II 255 -6; Gray's Letters (ed. Tovey) I 180. 
7 Pelles General Posting Book in P.R.O. (E. 403.2678). 
8 Chesterfield to Williams "Sunday morning" in Newport Papers. 
9 Williams to Rev.Mr. Birt 5 July 1748 in Works III 74. 
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nust be grouped with the professional diplomatists, rather than 
with the amateurs, and his ultimate aim was to join the select 
band of foreign ministers who had found in diplomacy a back door 
to the Cabinet. 
CHAPTER II. 
Saxony in the War of. the Austrian Succession. 
Union of Saxony and Poland in 1697 - Polish policy of the Saxon 
Kings - Hostility of Prussia to Saxony- Poland - Prussian 
invasion of Saxony - Saxon attempts to mediate b -,tween Austria 
and France - Treaty of Dresden and subsequent friction between 
Austria and Saxony - Saxony renews her attempts to reconcile 
Austria and France - Briíhl decides to obtain subsidies from 
France and rejects offers of the Maritime Powers - Maurice de 
Saxe intervenes to secure France's acceptance of Brühl's 
demands - Terms of the Franco -Saxon treaty of subsidy - Effects 
of the treaty on Saxony's relations with the Maritime Powers 
and the Imperial Courts - Divergent views of France and Saxony - 
Marriage of the Dauphin and Maria Josepha, daughter of Augustus 
III - Rivalry of Prussia and Saxony for the favour of France - 
Conclusion of the treaty of the two :Empresses - Saxony is 
invited to accede to the treaty - Saxony's difficult and 
dangerous position. 
In 1697 the election. of Augustus I of Saxony to the Polish throne 
transformed Saxony from a German principality into an European_ 
power and opened a new period in Saxon history. For the next 
seventy years, until the final collapse of Saxon hopes in 1764, 
the policy of Saxony was determined by the desire to perpetuate 
the union of Saxony and Poland and to consolidate the combined 
state as a great power in the centre of Europe. But the resources 
of Saxony proved insufficient for the task of exploiting the grow- 
ing anarchy in Poland in the interests of the house of Wettin. 
The attempt merely distracted Saxony's attention from imperial 
politics and exhausted her resources. 
If Europe had remained in the political condition of the seven- 
teenth century Saxony might have been successful, but the rise 
of Prussia and the westward advance of Russia rendered her attempt 
to turn a precarious tenure of the Polish throne into a complete 
control of Polish resources an impracticable dream. Russia and 
Prussia shared a secular tradition of hostility to Poland and 
were agreed upon the necessity of preventing the consolidation of 
Saxony -Poland. Russia was content in the first half of the 
eighteenth century to support the house of Wettin on the Polish 
throne, while vetoing any attempt to strengthen the monarchy -and 
increasing her own hold over the factious nobility which dominated 
the unhappy country. Brandenburg- Prussia on the other hand was 
from the first diametrically opposed to the union of Saxony and 
Poland. Within the Empire Brandenburg and Saxony had long been 
rivals, but had retained the habit of co- operating in religious 
matters. The elector of Brandenburg was jealous of the elevation 
1 It is true that the rise of Prussia increased the cordiality 
of the relations of Austria and Saxony -Poland. But since 
1726 Austria had been the ally of Poland's other enemy 
Russia - and in any case could not be counted upon to give 
resolute support owing to her preoccupation with her major 
interests in Western Europe. 
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of the Wettins to the kingly rank in 1697, and managed to secure 
the title of King in Prussia for his own house in 1701 as a reward 
for assisting the Emperor against France. The duchy of East 
Prussia, from which the title was taken, was an insignificant pro - 
:vince in comparison with the enormous extent and great traditions 
of Poland. The Hohenzollerns, however, had an hereditary title, 
the Wettins merely an inferior elective kingship. Moreover, to 
secure the Polish title the elector of Saxony had had to become a 
Roman Catholic. His headship of the corpus evangelicorum became 
a glaring anomaly, and, in spite of his efforts to retain his 
position, effective leadership of Protestant Germany passed graduali 
to Brandenburg. The secular and ecclesiastical rivalry of Branden- 
:burg and Saxony, confirmed and strengthened by the conflicting 
claims of Prussia and Poland, made Brandenburg- Prussia the arch 
enemy of Saxony- Poland. 
Frederick II's unprovoked attack in 1740 upon Austria and his 
victory at Mollwitz placed Saxony at the parting of the ways. 
Count Brühl, since 1738 the favourite of Augustus II and director 
of Saxon policy, hesitated. Saxony had claims to the Austrian 
succession, but it was very doubtful whether it would pay her 
better to assert these claims in concert with Maria Theresa's 
other rivals or to support Maria Theresa against them in return 
for substantial concessions. Common hostility to Prussia, a 
disinclination on Saxony's part to follow the lead of her success - 
:ful rival,and the influence of the Electress - an Austrian Arch- 
:duchess - tended to draw Austria and Saxony together, but in the 
end Frederick II adroitly secured the accession of Saxony to the 
anti- Austrian coalition by the tempting offer of Moravia and Upper 
Silesia, which would unite territorially Saxony with Poland. 
Saxony however proved a very half -hearted and incapable ally and 
withdrew from the struggle by the treaty of Dresden (7 September 
3. 
1742) without securing any tangible gains. Her rapprochement with 
Austria was accelerated by Prussia's annexation of Silesia, which 
hemmed Saxony in on the north and east, shattered Saxon hopes of 
connecting Saxony and Poland, and made Prussia indisputably the 
leading German state after Austria. When France and Prussia re- 
newed their insidious proposals in the summer of 1744 before be- 
:ginning the second Silesian war they were rejected, even although 
the death of the Emperor Charles VII on 18 January 1745 allowed then 
to offer Augustus the additional bribe of the Imperial crown,' and 
Saxony entered the struggle as the ally of Austria. Henceforth the 
essential aim of Saxon policy was to crush Prussia - her successful 
rival in Germany and the main obstacle to Saxon schemes in Poland. 
[The Austro -Saxon alliance secured the pecuniary support of the Mari 
:time Powers by the treaty of Warsaw (January 1745), which brought 
Saxony into intimate relations with Britain for the first time. Th( 
allied offensive in Silesia however, completely broke down, and the 
Austrians were defeated at Hohenfriedberg and Sohr. A Prussian arm; 
entered Saxony, defeated the Saxons at Hennersdorfland advanced on 
Dresden. Frederick II, hoping to break off the Austro -Saxon alli- 
:ance, then offered to make a separate peace with Saxony on the 
basis of the status quo in accordance with the convention of Hanovea 
which he had just concluded with Britain (August 1746). This offer 
was refused by the Saxon cabinet in spite of the threatening miïi- 
:tary situation, because it now saw a chance of crushing Prussia by 
an alternative policy, which it had been tentatively pursuing since 
the end of 1744. This scheme was nothing less than to destroy the 
"old system ", which had given Prussia her opportunity for self- 
aggrandisement, by reconciling the houses of Bourbon and Habsburg,2 
whose rivalry had for centuries determined the political system of 
1 Memoires de Frederic II, I 272 -3. 
2 See Broglie, Maria Theresa 1744 -46: cf. Borkowsky, Die 
Englische Friedensvermittlung im Jahre 1745 46 ff. 
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Europe. Saxon mediation had had no chance of success so long as 
France insisted on the inclusion of Prussia in the proposed under - 
:standing, since Maria Theresa only desired peace with France to 
allow her to concentrate her forces against Prussia. 
Frederick's conclusion of the convention of Hanover made the French 
Ministry willing to conclude, jointly with Spain, a separate peace 
with Austria Negotiations were secretly opened at Dresden but had 
little prospect of a successful conclusion. On the one side, 
despite her pique at Prussian desertionlFrance had no intention of 
ecb 
sacrificing Prussia, which would have strengthened Austrian dominion 
in Germany, the weakening of which had been France's chief gain in 
the ware On the other, peace with France had no attraction for 
Maria Theresa except as the indispensable preliminary to the recovery 
of Silesia. 
While Brühl, Harrach, the Austrian special enemy at Dresden, and 
Vaulgrenant, the French minister there, were negotiating, Saxony 
was overrun by the Prussians. Brühl had now no option but to ac- 
:cept the Prussian terms. Harrach vainly tried to restrain him by 
lavish promises of compensation at Prussia's expense, and by assur- 
:ances that Austria, with the assistance of Russia and Hanover, was 
bound to crush Prussia in the next campaign. Maria Theresa then 
decided that to preserve the Saxon alliance, which was essential 
either for offence or defence against Prussia, and would be useful 
in restoring the Austro- Russian alliance, she must make peace with 
Prussia along with Saxony. The Austro -Saxon alliance was therefore 
in appearance preserved by the signature of the treaty of Dresden by 
both states on 25 December 1745, but Austria resented the feebleness 
of Saxon resistance to Prussia, which had forced her to abandon the 
attractive possibility of peace with France to the exclusion of 
1 A. Loss to Bruhi, 14 November 1745 quoted in Becker 11 n. 1. 
2 "Quelque sujet de mécontentement que le Roi puisse avoir du 
"Roi de Prusse ... S.M. ne veut absolument point entendre 
"parler, qu'il soit question de stipulations tendantes de lui 
"enlever la Silésie ou á lui causer d'ailleurs aucun préjudice." 
(A.E. Saxe Despatch to Vaulgrenant, 22 September 1745). 
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Prussia for the much less attractive separate peace with Prussia 
and the confirmation of Prussia's hold on Silesia. 
Other causes gravely weakened the cordiality of the Austro -Saxon 
alliance. Each party blamed the other for the disasters of 1745. 
Brühl, having failed to deprive Prussia of her gains in the first 
Silesian war, demanded compensation from Austria for the aggrandise 
:ment of Prussia and a reward for his assistance in 1745, while 
Austria absolutely refused to surrender an inch of territory to 
Saxony. 
Another cause of friction was Maria Theresa's proposal to Saxony 
of a new treaty of alliane against Prussia to which Russia and 
Hanover were to accede. Brühl, in whom fear had temporarily 
triumphed over hate of Frederick II 
2 
rejected the proposal. 
Economic reconstruction and the restoration of the finances made 
it essential for Saxony not to run the risk of a new war. Brühl's 
position, gravely weakened by the disasters of 1745, was threatened 
by an opposition party,headed by Count Hennickejwhich denounced hi, 
anti- Prussian policy; but even had he been willing Brühl could hard 
:ly have dared to sign the proposed treaty. Characteristically he 
softened his refusal by expressing, or at least professing, com- 
plete sympathy with the aims of the proposed alliance and offering 
to join once Russia and Hanover had been secured. Harrach admitted 
that Brühl had done his best,3 but Maria Theresa was none the less 
dissatisfied. 
A third cause of friction was the Emperor's efforts to secure the 
1 Becker analyses the draft treaty (42 -3) and gives the text 
in appendix III. 
2 "Il faut ... éviter soigneusement ce qui pourrait donner le 
"moindre nouvel ombrage au Roi de Prusse ". Brühl to Ch. Loss 
14 January 1746. Cf. Carlyle VII 3 [To Harrach's proposals] 
"Brühl, hardly escaped from the pangs of death and still in a 
"very pale -yellow condition, had answered in effect 'Hah, say 
"'you so? one's hatred is eternal; but that man's iron heel! 
"'Wait a little; get Russia to join in the scheme:' and hung 
"back ... like a famishing dog in sight of a too dangerous 
"leg of mutton ... His hatred is fell but he would fain es- 
":cape with back unbroken." 
3 Harrach to Ulfeld, 9 February 1746, quoted in Becker 51 n.2. 
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assistance of an Imperial army for the Empress Queen against 
France. An Imperial Kornmissionsdekret, confidentially communi- 
:cated to Saxony before publication on 17 January 1746, summoned 
the states of the Empire to join in the war against France. The 
Saxon privy council in its refusal plainly showed its resentment 
of this fresh demand from an ally, who had contemptuously ignored 
Saxony's claims to compensation for previous losses on her behalf. 
la spite of these causes of friction with Austria, hatred of 
Prussia remained the guiding motive of Saxon policy after the 
treaty of Dresden. The frontal attack on Prussia had failed. 
BrAhl now concentrated on the alternative policy, already tenta- 
1 
:tively pursued since 1744, of reconciling Austria and France.2 
Recognising the difficulty of the task he began by an attempt to 
undermine Prussian influence at Versailles. If the Franco - 
Prussian alliance could be loosened, Saxony hoped to effect a 
reconciliation of Austria and France with herself as mediator, 
which would afford good prospects of success to the joint Austro- 
Russo- Saxon- Hanoverian attack upon Prussia. Therefore in entering 
into intimate relations with France, Saxony had no intention of 
3 
breaking off her old alliance with Austria. Nevertheless Austria 
was suspicious of the new policy especially in view of the friction 
1 "Notre but est toujours a travailler 'à un accomodement entre 
"les cours de Versailles, de Londres, de Francfort, de Madrid 
"et de Vienne ". Bruhl to A. Loss 16 September 1744. Cf. 
Arneth III 404, n. 2, and Receuil des Instructions: Autriche 
ed. Sorel 316. 
2 "Le projet- récuperer la Silésie et de faire rentrer, le Roi 
"de Prusse dans ses anciennes limites est premature et veut 
"etre compassé aux circonstances. La Cour de Vienne en 
"précipitant cette entreprise risque de s'embarquer dans de 
"nouveaux dangers. Si l'Imp [ératrice] était bien consultée, 
"elle songerait auparavant à sortir d'affaire avec la France. 
"La guerre entre cette couronne et l'Imp [ératrice] ayant 
"cessé, il y sera plus aise qu'aujourd -hui d'ouvrir les yeux 
rra la France sur l'aggrandissement du Roi de Prusse et de 
"detacher dans la suite la France des interéts de ce Prince 
"pour parvenir au but que la Cour de Vienne se propose ". 
A. Loss to Brúhl, 22 May, 1746, in Becker 131 -2. 
3 Saxony was represented at Vienna by the able diplomatist Ch. 
Loss from 1745 -49; on his career see Lippert CLXIX -CLXXV. 
His brother, A. Loss, was Saxon minister (later ambassador) 
at Paris. The two brothers co- operated to effect the recon- 
ciliation of Austria and France. 
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between herself and Saxony. 
Saxony's rapprochement with France had much more serious effects 
upon Saxon relations with the Maritime Powers. The close co- 
operation of Britain and Saxony, due to Carteret's policy and 
culminating after his fall in the treaty of . "larsawl(8 January 1745), 
was shortlived. The Pelham ministry drifted rapidly towards an 
understanding with Prussia, impelled by the growing conviction 
that the Austro -Saxon generals and forces were incapable of re- 
conquering Silesia. The convention of Hanover revealed the 
divergence2of Britain and Saxony; and the resulting coldness was 
intensified by Briihl's resentment at the failure of the Maritime 
Powers to fulfil the obligation of the treaty of Warsaw to help in 
the defence of Saxony against the Prussian invasion, and at their 
lukewarm support of Saxon interests in the negotiation of the 
treaty of Dresden? The growing intimacy of relations of Britain 
and Prussia in the early months of 1746 
4 
naturally increased the 
coldness between Britain and Saxony and caused Brühl to suspect 
that Britain was trying to make peace with France under Prussian 
mediation.5 This rivalry of Prussia and Saxony as peacemakers 
intensified their hostility, but the rapprochement of Britain and 
Prussia increased Brúhl's hopes of breaking the Franco -Prussian 
alliance, When the Maritime Powers on 19 January 1746 claimed 
the 10,000 troops promised by the sixth article of the treaty of 
Warsaw on payment of £90,000, Brühl attached to his acceptance 
conditions which he knew were unacceptable to the Maritime Powers. 
These ':exorbitant demands, put forward when Brúhl was openly de- 
claring that Saxony absolutely required subsidies,6 prove that he 
had already decided to drive a bargain with France. 
i Wenck, II 175 -6. 2 Droysen V 2, 546, Becker 59. 
3 Droysen V 3, 243 n.1: Geheimnisse, I 107. 
4 See Flemming's despatches from London in Geheimnisse and 
Becker, 60 -1: cf. Pol. Corr. V 15. 
5 Becker 60. 
6 "La Saxe avoue qu'elle ne peut pas se passer de subsides," 
Vaulgrenant to Argenson, 25 January 1746 (A.E. Saxe 34 f. 46). 
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Apart from his great project for reconciling Austria and France, 
Brúhl had excellent reasons for preferring France to the Maritime 
Powers. He believed, as the event proved correctly, that France 
would be a more generous paymaster and would not require the des- 
:patch of a Saxon contingent. The Maritime Powers would only pay 
him for fighting, since a Saxon attack on Austria was inconceivable: 
France would pay him to remain neutral, The Saxon army was in 
great need of a period of quiet for reorganisation after the dis- 
:asters of 1745. It is characteristic of Brühl's methods' that, 
although he had decided already in favour of France, he continued 
the negotiations with the Maritime Powers until the day on which 
ratifications of the Franco -Saxon treaty of subsidy were exchanged, 
partly as a means of extorting better terms from France, partly to 
conceal as long as possible his desertion of the Maritime Powers 
so as to have an alternative if his negotiation with France broke 
down. 
On 4 February 1746 Brühl opened negotiations at Dresden for a sub- 
sidy from France and Spain.2 Argenson, the French foreign 
minister, welcomed the overture. The defection of Bavaria and 
Prussia excluded France from Germany and drove her back upon the 
defensive. "The military superiority of France in Germany was 
"lost and could only be restored by negotiations, i.e. by money ".3 
Austria, no longer engaged on a double war, was free to turn her 
whole strength against France. Argenson remembered that the in- 
vasion of Alsace had followed Prussia's previous desertion in 1742. 
He feared that the release of Austrian troops employed against 
Prussia would have similar results in 1746 and was therefore eager 
to secure Saxon neutrality, especially as Saxony held the balance 
1 "Il est de la prudence d'avoir plusiers cordes á son arc ". 
Brühl to Ch. Loss, 30 December 1746, in Becker 112 n. 2. 
2 Vaulgrenant's despatch of 4 February 1746 (A.E. Saxe 34 f.94) 
Geheimnisse, I 107, wrongly attributes the initiative to France. 
3 Argenson; quoted in Zevort, Le Marquis d'Argenson, 123. 
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in the Diet of the Empire. France had already purchased the 
neutrality of the Palatinate, Trier, and Köln, while Prussian 
assistance was practically certain. The purchase of Saxony would 
assure to France not only Saxon neutrality but the neutrality of 
the Empire. Further the winning of Saxony -Poland was essential 
to the success of Argenson's great "Northern system ", because it 
would link up Prussia and Sweden, France's clients in the north, 
with Turkey, and provide the pivot of a great coalition which would 
hold Russia and Austria in check. 
Yet it spite of the eagerness of both parties a deadlock was reached 
between France and Saxony early in March, chiefly on two points. 
(1) Brühl demanded four times more by way of subsidy than France 
would offer. (2) Was Saxony to be bound to neutrality only in 
regard to the war in the Netherlands? Or was she to exert herself 
to prevent the Empire going to war with France? And if the Empire, 
despite Saxony's exertions, declared war on France was Saxony still 
to be bound to neutrality? But after all, Brühl's adroit use of 
the offers of the Maritime Powers, and the intervention of Maurice 
de Saxe,1 natural half -brother of Augustus III and Marshal of France 
whose victories in the Netherlands gave him great influence at the 
French court, secured a compromise favourable to Saxony, in spite 
of the opposition of Argenson who believed that more could be gained 
from Saxony in exchange for a smaller subsidy.2 
The Franco -Saxon secret treaty of neutrality and subsidy was signed 
on 21 April 1746. 
3 
France (Art. II) accepted Saxon mediation to 
secure peace on terms to be concerted by France and Saxony. She 
(Art. III) agreed that the treaty was not to interfere with the 
obligations of the King of Poland as a member of the Empire, nor to 
modify the existing alliances of Poland unless they were expressly 
contrary to the Franco -Saxon treaty. She (Art. VI) expressly 
1 A.E. Saxe 34 f. 163, f. 198. 
2 Argenson, III 135. 
3 Text in Becker, appendix V. 
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recognised the duty of the King of Poland to send his contingent 
to the imperial army if the Empire declared war on France, end 
agreed that this should not prevent her paying the subsidy of two 
million$ livres per annum for three years (Art. VII). France also 
promised (Art. IX) to use her good offices to procure a Spanish 
subsidy for Saxony, and a preliminary Spanish -Saxon Convention_ was 
i 
actually concluded on 13 May but was never ratified. Finally she 
promised (Art. XIII) to assist Saxony, if attacked in consequence 
of the treaty, with all her forces until Saxony received full com- 
pensation. In exchange for these valuable advantages Saxony 
merely promised neutrality in the war outside of Germany (Art. IV), 
and agreed (Art. V) not to enter into any alliances contrary to the 
treaty of friendship, or which might disturb the peace of Europe - 
a promise so vague as to be almost worthless.2 France in fact 
was paying Saxony to pursue the policy she would have followed in 
any case. 
The first result of the conclusion of the treaty was to intensify 
the coldness between Saxony and the Maritime Powers. Briihl tried 
to keep the treaty secret, partly in order to preserve the appear - 
:ance of impartiality necessary in a would -be mediator between the 
belligerents. But the terms of the treaty were known in London 
before 10 May, and the British ministry bluntly rejected the Saxon 
offer of mediation between France and Britain. British ministers 
wrongly regarded the Franco -Saxon treaty as the accession of Saxony 
to the Franco -Prussian alliance. Brühl1 on the contrary wrote to 
his confidant A. Loss: "We should do wrong to tie our hands and 
"offend our old friends for the scanty subsidies which France offers 
"us."3 There was indeed a momentary coldness between Dresden and 
1 Farges II, 93 -95 
2 "Par notre traite de subsides le Roi de Pologne ne promettait 
"rien de positif. Il s'y reservait meme la liberte d'obeir 
"aux resolutions de la diéte de Ratisbonne." Argenson III 
136 -7. 
3 Becker 109 n. 4.(Transikted) 
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the two imperial courts, especially Petersburg,1 but this was re- 
:moved by the Saxon communication of the treaty. Br-íh1 emphasised 
its harmless character, pointed to Article III which expressly re- 
:served Saxony's obligations as a member of the Empire and of the 
Austro- Russian alliance, and succeeded in maintaining unaltered 
his understanding with the imperial courts. He was even able to 
represent his refusal to send troops to the assistance of the Mari- 
:time Powers as a service to Russia, since he thus forced the Mari- 
:time Powers to begin negotiations for a corps of Russian auxili- 
:ary troops. 
It was soon apparent that the difficulties which had appeared in 
the Franco -Saxon negotiations had not been removed by the con- 
clusion of the treaty, which had been signed by France and Saxony 
with radically divergent ideas of the use to be made of it. 
Argenson desired2 to break the Austro -Saxon alliance, and to re- 
:con_cile Saxony with Prussia under the auspices of France in order 
to check Austrian influence in the Empire. Brizhl's aim was not to 
join the Franco -Prussian alliance, but to win the adhesion of France 
to the anti -Prussian coalition. His first step after the conclu- 
:sion of the subsidy treaty was to urge France to resume her nego- 
tiations for peace with Austria4 under Saxon mediation. Argenson 
disbelieved in the sincerity of Austria, and only accepted Brühl's 
mediation in order to confirm Saxony in her neutrality - a necessary 
quality in a would -be mediator - and thus lessen the intimacy of 
Austro -Saxon relations.5 
France on her side made little progress towards separating Saxony- 
Poland from Austria and Russia. Argenson realised clearly that 
1 Geheimnisse I 118 -23: Vitzthum 89 n. 
2 See his instructions to Issarts the Ambassador designate at 
Dresden dated 31 July 1746 in Farges II, 64 ff. 
3 Farges II 78 -9. 
4 "La négociation de notre traite avec la France étant heureuse - 
":ment terminée, la matière principale sur laquelle j'aurai â 
"m'entretenir dorénavant avec V, E. sera celle d'un accomode- 
":ment á moyenner entre les Cours de France et de Vienne ". 
Bruhl to A. Loss, 9 May 1746, in Becker, appendix VII. 
5 Farges II 97. 
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Brühi could not surrender without an equivalent the Austro- Russian 
alliance, which alone enabled Saxony to maintain a precarious hold 
upon Poland. France and Prussia must abandon their traditional 
policy of opposition to the house of Wettin in Poland, which merely 
drove the Saxon kings into closer dependence on Russia and Austria, 
and support the king of Poland so energetically that he could dis- 
pense with Austro- Russian support.' Argenson had already taken 
during the negotiation of the subsidy treaty his first step in this 
direction by offering to support the Saxon candidate for the Polish 
throne on the death of Augustus III. 
But France was powerless in Poland unless supported by Prussia. 
Hence the Prusso -Saxon alliance was in Argenson's view essential 
not merely to weaken Austrian influence in the Empire, but to free 
Saxony from dependence on the imperial courts in Poland, and to 
make Saxony -Poland the fixed pivot of his "Northern system ". Since 
the treaty of Dresden Frederick. II had vainly attempted to win the 
friendship of Saxony,2 and Argenson fully appreciated the diffi- 
culties which stood in the way.3 The main stumbling block was 
Saxony's inveterate jealousy of Prussia and her desire to avenge 
the humiliations of 1745. Brühl and Frederick II were personal 
enemies,4 and, as long as Brìihl saw the slightest possibility of 
reconciling Austria and France, he was determined to reject all 
Prussian proposals of alliance.5 Frederick II on his side was 
not prepared to pay dearly for an alliance with Saxony, and Argensor 
had good reason6 to doubt his readiness to support the election of 
one of Augustus III's sons to the Polish throne. 
The alliance therefore speedily proved rather disappointing to both 
1 Farges II 82 -3, 88. 
2 Farges Il 84: Pol. Corr.YLeeo passim. 
3 Fa'ge s II 8376. 
4 Mémoires de Fred4ric Il 399 -400. 
5 Farges II 86 -7. 
6 "Nous n'entrerons [pas) dans aucune liaison avec [le Roi de 
"Prusse] tant que nous pourrons espérer d'effectuer un ac- 
":comodement entre les maisons de Bourbon et d'Autriche ". 
Brîáhl to A. Loss 21 April 1746, in Becker, appendix VI. 
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parties,1 but both cherished hopes that their ultimate object might 
still be realised, and eagerly seized an opportunity to turn a 
limited political understanding into a family compact. On 27 July 
1746 Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip V of Spain and wife of the 
Dauphin, died without male issue. Louis XV and his intimates were 
bent on securing the succession to the throne as soon as possible.2 
From this point of view a daughter of Augustus III, one of a family 
of fourteen and a grand- daughter of Augustus "the strong ", was an 
excellent candidate for the hand of the Dauphin. Physiological 
arguments were backed by political reasons.3 France hoped by the 
marriage to complete the work begun by the treaty of subsidies, and 
insisted that a good understanding between Prussia and Saxony was 
essential, but hinted that in the meantime some show of friendly 
relations would be sufficient.4 
Augustus III was dazzled by the prospect of a brilliant marriage 
for one of his daughters. Brühl believed that the marriage would 
guarantee French support of the Saxon house in Poland, and would 
raise the Saxon influence at Versailles at the expense of Prussia,5 
and thus enable Saxony to pursue her fundamental aims without of- 
:fending her old allies. Saxony-readily accepted the few political 
stipulations made by France, which included the maintenance of 
1 Farges II 78 -9. 
2 "Tout ce que je souhaite a M. le Dauphin c'est une Princesse 
"aimable, saine de corps et d'esprit, et qui puisse donnera 
"la France un bon nombre d'enfants máles, robustes et bien 
conditionnés". Noailles to Louis XV in Rousset, Correspon- 
:dance de Louis XV et du marechal de Noailles,II 241. 
3 Maurice de Saxe to Aligustus II 12 October 1746, in Vitzthum 
50 -1. 
4 Maurice de Saxe to Augustus III, 27 October 1746, in Vitzthum 
63 -5. 
5 Briul never abated his campaign against Prussia at Versailles. 
In a letter to Saxe of 8 November 1746 he makes an interesting 
forecast of the Diplomatic Revolution (printed in Vitzthum 
89 -90): "Le Roi de Prusse pourrait fort bien, apres que la 
"France se serait de plus en plus épuisée, lui jouer un nou- 
":veau tour, plus sanglant encore que les précédents e... en 
"se tournant tout -á -fait du côte des puissances maritimes et 
"de leur allies; par oú la France se trouverait fort em- 
":barrassée de sa situation, pendant que le Roi de Pruss,e "obtiendrait par là, la plus forte garantie pour la Silesie 
"et peut -titre encore d'autres nouveaux &vantages." 
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friendly relations with Prussia and the exertion of Saxon influence 
to preserve Imperial and Russian neutrality towards France. On 25 
December 1746 the Duc de Richelieu, one of Louis XV's intimates, ar- 
:rived at Dresden to represent the king of France at the preliminary 
ceremonies, and to conduct Maria Josepha, the selected daughter of 
Augustus III, to Versailles where the marriage was celebrated on 9 
February 1747. But although the marriage undoubtedly increased the 
intimacy of Franco -Saxon relations, it did nothing to remove the 
fundamental divergence of French and Saxon policy. Brühl continued 
before and after the marriage to press France to inform Saxony in 
confidence of the terms on which she would make peace with Austria.' 
He believed2that Argenson, the prussophil3foreign minister, was the 
chief obstacle to a Franco- Austrian rapprochement and urged Saxe to 
procure his dismissal. The exertions of the Saxon party at Versailles 
secured secret instructions to Richelieu to request Saxony's mediaticen 
between France and Austria, Brühl once again pressed France for her 
ultimatum which he would communicate to Vienna as his own idea of 
peace terms. When Argenson objected to negotiations taking place at 
Dresden, he was dismissed on lOnlanuary 1747.4 Saxe boasted5that 
Argenson's successor, Puysieuix, was his friend and was inclined to 
abandon the tradition of hostility to Austria resolutely upheld by 
his predecessor. The indirect negotiations with Vienna through Dres- 
den were, however, concealed from the new minister and entrusted by 
the King to Saxe and Richelieu, who had been completely won over by 
Brühl. Ch. Loss believed that if Vienna sincerely desired peace Saxon 
mediation would at last be crowned with success.7 Saul, Brüh1's ame 
1 Brühi to Maurice de Saxe, 8 and 16 November 1746, 
in Vitzthum 89 and 93. 
2 Vitzthum 93. 
3 Argenson III, 92 &c.; Vitzthum 130 &c. 
4 See on the intrigues leading to Argenson's dismissal 
Rousset, II 252 -276. 
5 Maurice de Saxe to Brühi, 12 February 1747, in Vitzthum 165. 
He might have been less satisfied with the new minister had 
he heard his "friend" say to Chambrier at one of their first 
interviews "Prussia's interests are ours" and then promise to 
do everything in his power to secure Prussia in possession of 
Silesia at the general peace. ( Droysen, V 3, 300. 
6 See his letters to Brùhl in Vitzthum 252 -4; cf. Pol. Corr.V.343. 
7 Vitzthum 151. 
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damnee, was despatched to discuss the French offer with the empress - 
queen and her ministers, and discovered that the fourth of the seven 
points of the French offer' was quite unacceptable to them. Saxon 
hopes were dashed and, although negotiations continued, they had no 
real chance of success, and practically ended after the opening in 
August of direct Franco -British peace negotiations between Marshal 
Saxe and General Ligonier, which were later continued by Sandwich 
and Saint Severin. 
While Saxony was trying to undermine Prussian influence at Ver- 
:sailles and to reconcile France and Austria, France was exerting 
all her newly acquired influence at Dresden to promote the alliance 
of Prussia and Saxony. Throughout 1746 Frederick II remained 
genuinely desirous of a defensive alliance with Saxony2 - an in- 
valuable bulwark against Austrian hostility. But by the beginning 
of 1747 he was convinced that so long as Brühl remained in control 
of Saxon policy the proposed alliance was impracticable.3 When 
therefore during his stay at Dresden, Richelieu made a fresh attempt 
to conclude the Prusso -Saxon alliance he got little assistance 
either from Prussia or Saxony. Brìhl fully justified Frederick 
II's suspicions. He dared not openly reject the Prussian proposals 
supported by France and the opposition party under Hennicke at 
Dresden' 4 so he intimated that, under existing treaties between 
Russia and Sqxony, Russia's consent was necessary to the conclusion 
of any new treaty of alliance . 
5 
Frederick's resentment was in- 
1 Printed in Geheimnisse, I 143. The fourth point demanded 
"an establishment for Don Philip either in Italy or the 
"Netherlands at the option of the Court of Vienna ". This 
was the point which lay nearest to Louis XV's heart because 
Don Philip had married his favourite daughter. 
2 Instructions to Klingräffen in Pol. Corr. V 12 -20 dated 30 
January 1746 and later despatches (especially ibid 283 -7). 
3 Pol. Corr. V 297, 310. 
4. Pol. Corr. V 329. 
5. Pol. Corr. V 332. Russia would of course give the answer 
Brahl desired: ibid 334. 
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creased by Saxon intrigues against Prussia at Versailles and by 
Saxon mediation between France and Austria.' Gentle measures 
having failed to win the friendship of Saxony, Frederick began 
to apply relentless pressure2 for the payment of Saxon debts to 
the king of Prussia and his subjects, which soon reduced Brühl 
to desperation and Saxony to bankruptcy. He began also a counter- 
offensive to Brühl's intrigues at Versailles, and lost no oppor- 
:tunity of impressing upon French ministers the duplicity of his 
rival.3 Henceforth the rivalry of Prussia and. Saxony was intensi- 
:fied by unscrupulous competition for the favour of France, which 
was forced to recognise the impossibility of reconciling her two 
German clients. 
French dissatisfaction with Saxony was increased by the continuance 
of close relations between Saxony and the two Imperial courts. The 
outstanding diplomatic event of 1746 had been the conclusion of the 
treaty of the two Empresses, due mainly to the final victory of 
Bestuzhev over Voronzov,4 and to Frederick II's invasion of Saxony 
which Russia regarded as a client state, in 1745. The treaty5 
marked the restoration and strengthening of the Austro- Russian 
alliance of 1726, which had been broken off by the Botta conspiracy. 
The articles of the main treaty established6 a close defensive 
alliance between Austria and Russia to which Saxony -Poland and 
Hanover were to be invited to accede. Five separate and secret 
articles were attached to the treaty, the second of which regulated 
l He was fully informed of this secret negotiatioln and predicted 
its failure. "Tandis que la cour de Dresde negociera la paix 
"avec la France et Vienne, je n'en serai point embarrassé, parce 
"que je suis sûr que cela ne produira rien." Pol. Corr. V 393. 
2 Ibis 363 -5. 3 Jbid 300, 356. 
4 Solovev, History of Russia, XXII 48 ff. 
5 Printed in Martens I 147 -178. 
6 On the restoration of good relations between Austria and 
Russia see Archives Voronzov, VI passim. 
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Austrian assistance if Sweden attacked Russia, and Russian assist- 
ance if Austria were attacked by France after the conclusion of 
the Austrian succession war, which was expressly excluded from the 
casus foederis. 
The fourth separate and secret article gave the alliance practically 
an offensive character against Prussia. It is true that Austria 
and Russia expressly declared their intention of maintaining the 
treaty of Dresden. But if the king of Prussia violated the treaty 
and attacked the empress -queen or the Tsaritsa or the republic of 
Poland, then Maria Theresa's rights to Silesia and Glatz were to 
be fully restored 'and included in the forma. Russian guarantee of 
the Habsburg dominions. Moreover, to avert the common danger of 
such an attack, the contracting parties promised to take counsel 
together, to communicate confidentially to each other everything 
which they could discover concerning hostile views or projects 
against either party, and to hold in readiness near their frontiers, 
in Bohemia and Moravia, and Livland and Esthonia respectively, a 
corps of 30,000 men each in order to give the stipulated assistance 
more quickly and effectively in the event of a Prussian attack 
against either party. Further, since 60,000 men would not be 
sufficient in such an event to repulse the attack, recover Silesia 
and Glatz, and to assure the general tranquillity for the future, 
the contracting parties agreed to provide 60,000 men each and to 
bring that number of troops as far as practicable into the border 
provinces. After making more detailed provision for the joint 
military operations in the event of a Prussian attack, the Tsaritsa 
declared that she would not retain any conquest she might make, and 
the empress -queen promised to pay, within a year after the recovery 
by Austria of Silesia and Glatz, two million Rhenish florins to 
the Tsaritsa in return for her assistance. 
A great step had been taken to build up the anti- Prussian coalition 
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for. which Maria Theresa had schemed ever since the treaty of 
Breslau. Saxon accession was vital to the success of the 
alliance. Saxony would help to shield Austrian territory from 
Prussian attack and would be invaluable for an offensive in 
Silesia, while Poland would give Russia free access to central 
Europe across the plains of the Vistula, and assure the predom- 
:inant influence of the Austro- Russian allies in Germany.1 
Saxony had refused to join openly the anti- Prussian coalition 
in January and February 1746,2 but the two Imperial Courts did 
not take this refusal seriously and in March 1747 formally invited 
Saxony to accede to the treaty of the two Empresses. Bri 1 
referred the proposal to the Saxon privy council1which gave its 
opinion3 on 15 April. The existing treaties with Austria and 
Russia were sufficient from the Saxon point of view. To enter 
into new engagements would arouse the suspicions of France, and 
might lead to the stoppage of subsidies and the loss of French 
support for Saxon claims at the general peace. The privy council 
was especially alarmed by the fourth secret article. If Frederick 
II discovered its contents and learned that Saxony had acceded to 
it he might prefer praevenire rather than praeveniri, and would 
then attack and ruin Saxony - an interesting anticipation of 1756. 
They therefore suggested that the negotiation ought to be'spun out 
as much as possible, and raised a number of objections which could 
be used to delay matters. Brúhl was in complete agreement with 
these conclusions,4 and on 23 May sent full powers to the Saxon 
ministers at Petersburg with instructions to take everything ad 
1 Broglie, Maurice de Saxe et le Marquis d'Argenson, I 303 -4. 
2 supra p. 5. 
3 Extracts printed in Geheimnisse, I 149 -160. 
4 See his despatch to VitzthumT Saxon minister at Petersburg) 
in Geheimnisse, I 147 -8, dated 31 March 1747. 
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referendum. 
Puysieulx at once declared that Saxon accession to the treaty of 
the two empresses would mean a breach with France, and hinted at 
the withdrawal of subsidies.1 Brúhl in reply sent a copy of the 
treaty (but without the secret articles) to Versailles to prove 
that it in no way affected Saxony's relations with France. If 
Saxony refused to negotiate, a complete rupture would follow 
between her and the imperial courts, which would destroy all 
possibility of success in the mediation of peace which she had 
undertaken in the interest of France. With this answer and a 
formal declaration that the secret articles contained nothing 
more with reference to the interests of France than the main 
treaty the French Government professed itself satisfied. 
Henceforth Brhl was in a position of unstable equilibrium between 
his old allies and his new paymaster. Every act of complaisance 
towards the one would provoke an indignant chorus of protest from 
the other. Brühl knew only too well that he was in danger of 
falling between the two stools. All his genuine ability in 
diplomacy and his unblushing mendacity would be required to main- 
tain his footing in both camps until he could secure his object - 
the creation of a great coalition for the partition of Prussia 
with the connivance of France. The difficulty of his task was 
increased by the arrival at Dresden of an energetic but inexperi- 
*6 
:enced minister from the King of Great Britain -Sir. Charles Hanbury 
Williams. 
1 A. Loss to Briihl, 3 May 1747, in Geheimnisse, I 163. 
-: 
CHAPTER III 
Apprenticeship of Williams at Dresden (1747 -9) 
"It is on this Romish -King and other the like chimerical 
errands, that witty Hanbury, then a much more admirable man 
than we now find him, is prowling about in the German Courts, 
off and on, for some ten years in all, six of them still to 
come. A sharp eyed man, of shrewish quality; given to in- 
:triguing, to spying, to bribing; anxious to win his Diplo- 
:matic sane by every method, though the stake (as here) is 
oftenest zero; with fatal proclivity to Scandal, and what 
in London circles he has heard called Wit. Little or nothing 
of real laughter in the soul of him, at any time; only a 
laboured continual grin, always of malicious nature, and much 
trouble and jerking about, to keep that up. Had evidently 
some modicum of real intellect, of capacity for being wise; 
but now has fatally devoted it nearly all to being witty, on 
these poor terms: A perverse, barren, spiteful little wretch; 
the grin of him generally an affliction at this date." Carlyle 
Frederick the Great Book XVI, chapter V. 
Objects of Williams's mission to Dresden - The Saxon Court - 
Augustùs III - Brúhl and his assistants - The diplomatic corps 
at Dresden - Williams's début - Prolongation of Franco -Saxon 
treaty of subsidy - March of the Russian troops through Poland - 
Saxony continues her mediation between France and Austria - De- 
parture of the Saxon court from Dresden for Warsaw - Williams 
remains at Dresden - Continued hostility of Saxony and Prussia - 
Their rivalry for the favour of France - Prussian claims upon 
the Steuer under the treaty of Dresden (1745) - Changes in the 
diplomatic corps at Dresden - Austro -Saxon relations - Williams 
appointed to Berlin - Marshal Saxe's visit to Dresden - Williams 
returns to England - He proposes to secure the peace of Europe 
by electing a king of the Romans - Growing intimacy of Williams 
and Newcastle. 
f 
The envoyship at Dresden was a post of the second rank; but owing to 
the competition of the rival leagues for. the Saxon alliance in the. 
Austrian succession war it had for a time during Villiers' tenure 
of the office been of first rate importance. The treaty of Dresden 
which ended the war in Germany had restored more normal conditions; 
and when Chesterfield, the secretary of state for the Northern 
Department, told Andrie, the Prussian secretary at London, that 
the appointment of Williams was entirely due to personal considera- 
:tions,l he did not deviate very far from the paths of truth, since 
the British government attached no great importance to the Mission.2 
British ministers however were alarmed at the diplomatic successes 
of France in 1746. France had renewed her defensive alliance with 
Denmark, had overthrown the dominant Anglo- Russian party at Stock- 
:holm, and had considerably strengthened her position in Germany. 
Britain feared that the marriage of the Dauphin with Maria Josepha 
would complete the transference of Saxony to the French camp, and 
give France a decided superiority in the Empire. The chief object 
of Williams's mission was therefore to assist the two imperial mi.ri- 
::i_sters at Dresden in holding Saxony to the Anglo- Austrian alliance. 
The restoration of cordial relations between Britain and Saxony 
was desirable also in view of the military successes of France in 
1746 in the Netherlands, which proved that the inferiority of the 
allied troops, even after the end of the Jacobite rebellion and the 
second Silesian war, could only be remedied by securing a large 
l Pol. Corr. V 304, 351. 
2 Chesterfield to Williams 13 January 1747 O.S. in Newport 
Pa ers; "Everything shall be ready if you come ever so soon 
"Lto London] and everything may wait without the least dis- 
"advantage if you should think it necessary to stay some 
"time longer in the country." 
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corps of auxiliaries. The employment of Russian troops was a 
probability and they would have to march across Poland. The 
restoration of cordial relations between Britain and Saxony, which 
had been impaired by the British rápprochement with Prussia and 
Saxony's intimacy with France, would greatly facilitate the march 
of the Russian auxiliaries to the Netherlands. 
Williams left England on 24th April 1747,1 travelled through Holland 
and Westphalia,2 and arrived at Dresden on 20 May. The extrava- 
:gance and elaborate ceremonial of the lesser German courts in the 
eighteenth century has attracted the notice both of contemporaries3 
and of historians. The court of Dresden under Augustus II (as 
Elector of Saxony) and III (as King of Poland) was perhaps the 
most brilliant of all. Saxony was already on the verge of bank - 
:ruptcy,4 but the expenses of the court were the last thing 
Augustus III and his Minister -Favourite thought of curtailing. A 
good father, a connoisseur and patron of art and literature, and 
a mighty hunter, Augustus III throughout his reign showed little 
interest in, and less aptitude for, the art of government. He 
was content to pursue his private interests and pleasures and left 
the task of government in the hands of his favourite. Brühl had 
succeeded to the post of Minister -Favourite in 1738 on the fall of 
Sulkowsky - Augustus II's first favourite,5 Henceforth he exer- 
:cised almost unlimited power in Saxony until the death of his 
master twenty -five years later. The security of his position 
was increased by his conversion to Roman Catholicism. The com- 
:bination of the functions of minister and favourite was not the 
least of the resultant evils. To retain his hold on Augustus III 
1 All dates in the text are N.S. 2 Add. MSS 34731 f. 63. 
3 Newcastle was greatly impressed by the "truly royal" court 
of Hanover (Cope, Pelham Administration I 429) Cf. Williams 
to Dayrolle in Add. MSS 15869 f. 1377 
4 Pol. Corr. V 388. 5 Bóttiger II 412. 
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Brìh1 had to devote most of his time to keeping his royal master 
amused, and the work of government could not be efficiently per- 
formed in his spare time. 
[Cot Brühl'sj "attendance at court and other occupations" successive 
British envoys complained "scarce allow him an hour in a day for 
"business. The only time to catch him is of an evening as he runs 
"through his assembly room to get to his card table and he takes it 
"very ill if you stop him without having something particular to 
sayer .1 
Bruhl lacked not only time but capacity for statesmanship although 
he showed some ability as a diplomatist. In the fiscal and 
financial sphere he reduced the flourishing electorate of Saxony 
to economic ruin by the imposition of an enormous and badly adjusted 
burden of taxation, the proceeds of which were expended in the 
gratification of the luxurious tastes of the King and his family 
and in the purchase of estates for himself and his relations.2 
Under Brühl even the administration of justice was a means of 
extortion and became hopelessly corrupt.3 Second in influence 
to Bruhl alone and working in close cooperation with him, was 
Guarini, the King's confessor and a consistent Francophil.4 Saul, 
Brühl's confidential secretary, who shared the secrets of his chief 
and frequently acted as the intermediary between Brúhl and the 
diplomatic corps, was an advocate of the Anglo -Imperial alliance. 
The routine work of internal administration was delegated by Brühl 
to Count Hennicke,5 the leading member of the Saxon privy council, 
who, unlike Guarini and Saul, sometimes opposed the prime minister 
i Stormont to Newcastle in Add. MSS 32866 f. 24. Cf. Williams. 
to Newcastle 13 September N.S. 1751. 
2 Böttiger II 440 -8; Pol. Corr. VIII 413, 420 -1. 
3 Böttiger II 446 -7. 
4 A.E. Saxe 34 f. 152 - Durand's despatch of 14 March. 
5 Adelung's Life of Count Brühl (Eng. tra .s1.) 60 et sea. 
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and was regarded as a rival rather than as an assistant. 
The leading member of the diplomatic corps at Dresden was Count 
Michael Bestuzhev, brother of the Russian Great Chancellor. This 
relationship strengthened the customarily predominant authority of 
the Russian minister at Dresden. As in the case of many other 
Russian ministers, Bestuzhev's great aim at this time was to avoid 
returning to Russia.' He therefore did his best to keep on good 
terms with Brúhl, even at the price of occasionally disobeying his 
instructions. Bestuzhev's rival at Dresden was the French ambassa- 
:dor, the Marquis des Issarts,2 who was still in his twenties and 
owed his appointment to the favour of the Prince de Conti and the 
good opinion of Argenson.3 The Austrian minister, Count Esterhazy 
was only a few years older than Issarts, but had already resided 
five years at Dresden. Although disliked there 4 he was a capable 
and energetic minister ;but left Dresden very soon after Williams's 
arrival as the result of one of those squabbles over precedence 
which are so common in eighteenth century diplomatic history. 
Joachim Wilhelm von. Klingräffen, the Prussian minister and one of 
the ablest of Frederick II's diplomatists, was preparing to leave 
1 Bestuzhev had an additional reason to remain at Dresden as 
he wished to marry "a [,Saxon] widow with a pretty good for - 
":tune whose name is Haugwitz" although his first wife was 
still alive in Siberia. (Laurence to Chesterfield 15 Novem- 
:ber 1747 S.P.F. Prussia). 
2 Farges II 63 ff. . Cf. Williams's letter of 30 May N.S. 1747 
in S.P.F. Poland. "The French ambassador is very little 
"of a Frenchman for he is fat and his wig is uncombed and he 
"has nothing unnatural or affected about him ". 
3 Memoires III 137. 
4 Lippert CXXXVIII; Vehse VIII 88 -93; Pol. Corr. VI 41. 
5 Keene to Newcastle 25 July 1752, Private in Add. MSS 32838 
f. 302, "In a word Esterhazy is a worthy good -natured gentle- 
man ... His inclinations are good towards the common cause, 
"No tracassier - you will do no great stroke with him - he 
"will keep close to his instructions - will be sometimes a 
"little unintelligible to your grace and I will not answer for 
"him that he always understands himself ". 
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Dresden to avoid the expense of the Prince Electoral's wedding.1 
The Papal nuncio, the Spanish, Sardinian and Neapolitan ministers, 
and representatives of the lesser German courts completed the 
diplomatic corps at Dresden.2 
Within a few weeks of his arrival at Dresden Williams had given 
clear proof of his main weaknesses - inability to hold his tongue 
and a tendency to rash action. Apparently he failed to realise 
that his every utterance would be regarded as ministerial, reported 
by other ministers to their courts, and carefully scrutinised as an 
indication of British policy. Williams's close connection with 
Fox and his proneness to boast of it, although Fox had at this time 
no influence on British foreign policy, made caution in airing his 
views doubly necessary. Yet we find him expressing the opinion 
that it was impossible for Maria Theresa to be popular in England, 
condemning the overbearing manners of the Austrian ministers, and 
denouncing the ingratitude and selfishness of the Austrian sovereign 
and ministers.3 These opinions of Britain's ally would doubtless 
have been received with applause in the House af Commons, but it 
was extremely foolish for a British envoy at a court where his 
chief business was to support the Austrian minister to give public 
expression to them. More important results followed from his 
casual suggestion, made in ignorance of the Franco -Saxon treaty of 
neutrality, that the Dutch might hire 10,000 Saxon troops in order 
to take Saxony out of the hands of France and at the same time 
strengthen the Allies in the Netherlands.4 The ever watchful 
Prussian minister reported to his master that Williams had proposed 
a subsidy treaty to Saxony, and Frederick at once passed on "the 
"news" to the French government in order to discredit Brïhl.5 The 
1 Williams to Chesterfield 30 May 1747; Pol. Corr. V 376, 388. 
2 Calkoen, the Dutch minister since 1744, had been recalled to 
go as ambassador to Paris, but finally returned to his old 
post. On him V Archives I, 28 &c; Pol. Corr. V 401, 481 
&c' Becker lOs. 
3 Droysen V 3 364. 4 Williams to Chesterfield 28 June. 
5 Pol. Corr. V 412 -13. 
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result was a coldness between Brühl and the French ambassador, who 
did not believe Brtihl's protestations that the story had no founda- 
:tion in fact. Williams then showed another weak spot in his 
diplomatic armour - a belief that petty intrigue was the surest 
road to success in diplomacy - by trying to increase this coldnessl 
In the event it was neither Frederick II nor Williams who profited 
but Count Brühl, whose ostentatious cordiality towards the British 
envoy was probably assumed to alarm France. Brühl was successful 
in securing the prolongation2 of his subsidy treaty with France 
for two additional years in exchange for the renewal of his pro - 
:mise to preserve the neutrality of the Empire.3 Brühl refused 
to promise not to accede to the treaty of the two empresses, but 
agreed at least to postpone his accession.4 Rumours of the con- 
:clusion of the treaty reached Dresden, and Williams secured Father 
Guarini's admission that they were correct although the French 
ambassador was still roundly denying the existence of the treaty.5 
Brühl had then no option but to tell the truth, and explained to 
Williams that he had asked France to prolong the treaty in order 
to be certain of receiving subsidies even if a general peace 
should be concluded. Williams had fancied that his intimacy 
with the King and Brühl would soon bring Saxony back to the old 
system,6 and was deeply chagrined by the conclusion of the treaty. 
"I am afraid" he wrote to Chesterfield? "I shall be able to do 
1 Williams to Chesterfield 2 August. 
2 Pol. Corr. V 468; Geheimnisse I 190 -1; Böttiger II 451. 
3 Cf. Memorandum in A.E. Saxe Supplément 2 f. 150: "L'electeur 
"de Saxe tant en sa qualité de Roi qu'en celle d'electeur ne 
"peut etre d'aucune utilité pour les affaires de la France.,e 
"Tout le service que ce P. auroit pu rendre à la France eut 
"été de lui engager ses voix dans les collèges de l'empire 
"pour s'oposer â le declaron. d'une guerre générale du Corps 
"GermTle. contre cette Puissance et ce service etoit l'objet 
"naturel d'un Traité de subsides." 
4 Droysen V 3 370 n. 
5 Williams to Chesterfield 27 September: Pol. Corr. V 517. 
6 Williams to Robinson,30 July and 3 September 1747,+4.Add. MSS 
23825 f. 276, and 23826 f. 3. 
7 30 September. 
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"very little service to His Majesty for the future, this court 
"having now completed their scheme of politics which is to sit with 
"their arms before them and take money from the first bidder ". 
Williams's resentment was increased1when he learned that Saxony 
was trying to arrange a separate peace between Austria and France. 
He was now finally cured of any belief he may have had in his 
ability to sway the court of Dresden by his personal influence. 
Henceforth he insists that Russian influence alone can move the 
Saxon Court. 
Williams soon discovered that his business at Dresden was small in 
amount and unimportant in character, He spent the greater part of 
his time in the summer and autumn of 1747 in trying to secure the 
restoration of normal diplomatic relations between Saxony and 
Austria,2 and in reporting to his home government on the designs 
of the King of Prussia. These reports were from the beginning 
strongly biased against Frederick II, and indicate that Williams, 
in spite of his dissatisfaction with the conduct of Austria, was a 
stout advocate of the Austrian alliance. 
Rather more of his time was occupied in trying to secure repayment 
of a private loan3 made by George II to Saxony in 1744. Frederick 
II hoped by egging Williams on to create a breach between Britain 
and Saxony.4 Klingräffen was also instructed to use the common 
interests of Hanover and Prussia in the Saxon finances to worm his 
way into Williams's confidence in the hope of securing 'indis- 
:cretions'. Neither plan succeeded, because Williams, although a 
novice in diplomacy, was an old hand at its less reputable sister - 
back stairs intrigue - and had had experience already of the use a 
1 Droysen V 3 364, 394 n. 
2 See his correspondence with Robinson in Add. MSS 23825 and 
23826. 
3 Williams to Robinson 20 October,Add. MSS 23826 f. 112. 
This being a purely Hanoverian matter, though transacted 
by a British minister, there are no papers referring to it 
in the P.R.O. 
4 Pol..Corr. V 496 -7, 499. 
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Prussian minister would make of his conversation. A Hanoverian 
minister, Baron Wedel, was soon sent to Dresden, and K1ingräf fen 
transferred his attention to the new arrival.' 
The conclusion at Petersburg on 19 November of a convention2 for 
the employment of 30,000 Russian troops in the Netherlands gave 
Williams his first important negotiation at Dresden. Article II of 
the convention bound the Maritime Powers to secure a free passage 
for the troops through Poland and the Empire. On 19 December at the 
request 
3 
of the British ambassador at Petersburg, Lord Hyndford, 
Chesterfield instructed Williams "to make requisition in form as 
"well to the King as to the republic of Poland" for the passage 
of the troops. For this purpose Williams had to be specially ac- 
:credited to Augustus III as King of Poland and also to the Republic 
of Poland and the adjustment of the terms of his credential and re- 
:quisitorial letters in accordance with precedents was a matter of 
some difficulty. This incident illustrates the difficulty of 
working the personal union of. Saxony and Poland - two states of 
diametrically opposed character and with partially divergent in- 
:terests. Williams had already sounded Saul,4 and after receiving 
news from Hyndford of the conclusion of the convention,5 he approach- 
: ed Brúhl replied unofficially that the King of Poland 
would do nothing to hinder the march of the troops, but dared 
not openly facilitate it, since this would be considered by France 
as an unfriendly act and would give Prussia an opportunity- to stir 
up the disaffected Poles.6 Accordingly when Williams, after 
the adjustment of his new credentials, made his formal requisi- 
:Lion he received from the King the non -committal reply: 
1 Pol. Corr. VI 28. 
2 Martens IX (X) 147 -165. 
3 Hyndford to Chesterfield 7 November O.S., Add. MSS 18384 f.330. 
4 Williams to Chesterfield 6 December. 
5 Hyndford to Williams Add. MSS 11384 f. 430. 
6 Williams to Chesterfield 14 and 19 December. 
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"I cannot say anything to the passage of the troops. It does not 
"depend upon me for I alone can neither grant nor refuse them a 
"passage through the Kingdom of Poland, and the other parts of the 
"government are not now assembled. No answer therefore can be 
"given to your requisition till there is a diet." 1 
As a diet could not meet before the Russian troops had crossed 
Poland, Brúhl, who controlled his master's Polish policy as 
absolutely.as he ruled in Saxony, although he had no constitutional 
position in Poland, could avoid committing himself. 
Meantime Issarts and Castera, the French resident at Warsaw, with 
the assistance of a special envoy from France, Colonel de la Salle, 
were doing their utmost to hinder the march of the troops. Once 
again Briihl was placed in an awkward dilemma between his French 
paymaster and his old allies. He adopted his customary method of 
speaking fair to both parties2 and allowing things to take their 
course. Saxony could not possibly oppose the march of the Russians 
by force,3 and Williams was justified in his conviction that so far 
as it could the Saxon Court would facilitate rather than hinder 
their march. French attempts to hinder the Russian advance by 
creating disturbances in Poland naturally roused resentment at 
Dresden4 which Williams eagerly fostered.5 But his efforts to 
improve the relations of Britain and Saxony were rendered useless by 
the renewed rapprochement of Britain and Prussia,6 marked by Legge's 
special mission to Berlin. After the requisitorial letters had 
been adjusted,7 Williams had no business at Dresden except to report 
the painfully slow progress of the "tardigated Russians ". Through 
1 Williams to Chesterfield 6 January 1748; Williams to Hyndford 
6 January 1748, in Add. PASS 11385 f. 15. 
2 While Loss at Versailles was assuring France that they would 
do everything in their power to delay the Russian troops, 
Flemming told W. Bentinek that "Le Roi ne pou$oit as 
"l'[le passage] accorder publiquement, mais qu'il [pie] favor - 
":iseroit sous main" (Archives I 129). 
3 Pol. Corr. V 515. 4 Droysen V 3, 431. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 3 April. 
6 Williams to Chesterfield 25 February: Pol. Corr. VI 141 -2: 
Droysen V 3 477 n. 
7 Williams to Chesterfield 3 March: Williams to Robinson 
18 April, ' Add. MSS 23827 f. 351. 
10. 
Count Perron, the Sardinian minister, Williams established a con- 
nection with the Princes Czartorski, the heads of the Russian 
party in Poland, and received detailed reports from them to be for- 
warded to London. 1 
Brbhl on this question showed the first signs of reaction from his 
Francophil tendencies. Saul remarked to Williams2 that "Perhaps 
"the French demanded more from the King of Poland by virtue of the 
"treaty of subsidies than that treaty obliged the King of Poland 
"to perform ". Nevertheless Brtihl continued his mediation between 
France and Austria after the end of the 1747 campaign, but the old 
obstacle - France's refusal to sacrifice Prussia - made success 
impossible.3 Williams's vigilance is proved by his discovery of 
these negotiations. Early in February he suspected the truth, and 
on 14 April he reported that the Saxon ministry believed that they 
had made some progress in mediating an Austro- French peace. The 
conclusion of Franco -British preliminaries of peace at Aix ended 
for the time Saxon hopes of reconciling Austria and France, but 
ultimately Austrian resentment at Britain's "desertion" was to con- 
. :tribute to the diplomatic revolution which Saxon diplomacy had 
vainly atternptecl, to effect since 1745. 
Williams had only consented to go to Dresden as a pis aller instead 
of Turin, and a few months stay at Dresden confirmed him in his 
preference.4 After months of wire pulling he appealed on 1 and 2 
May to Newcastle for a transfer to Turin, or, if that were imprac- 
:ticable, begged to be allowed to remain at Dresden instead of 
1 Williams had acted throughout the affair without consulting 
the Russian ambassador "in anything wherein secrecy is 
"required" (Williams to Chesterfield 27 January) in direct 
contradiction to his instructions and in the teeth of warnings 
from Hyndford (Hyndford to Williams Add. MSS 11385 f. 73) . 
Bestuzhev's complaints to Petersburg (copies annexed to Hynd- 
:ford's lettersto Newcastle of 8 and 16 March O.S. S.P.F. 
Russia) brought upon Williams a reprimand from his court. 
2 Williams to Chesterfield 13 February. 
3 Geheimnisse I 192 -4. 
4 Horace Walpole Letters II 298: Williams to Fox 22 March 1748 
Add. MSS 32811 f. 372: Fox to Williams 17 February O.S. in 
Coxe, Pelham Administration I 392: Williams to A. Stone 2 May 
1748, in ibid I 430. 
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following the Saxon court on its biennial pilgrimage to Poland in 
order to hold a diet which persistently refused to be held. Saxony' 
and Russia however, were urging upon the British government that 
the presence of Williams at Warsaw was essential, because he was 
the minister who had made the requisition for the passage of the 
Russian troops which would be violently attacked by the Franco- 
Prussian party in the diet. Williams was therefore instructed3 
to proceed to Warsaw, and Newcastle replied to his request on i May 
by a curt note, which merely assured him that he would have leave 
to return to England before the winter.4 Williams had already 
heard with chagrins that his successor at Dresden had been chosen,6 
and that there was in the meantime no other court to which he could 
be sent. In defiance of official instructions, though possibly 
with the private assent of Newcastle, he remained at Dresden through- 
:out the summer in harassing uncertainty about his future.7 He 
spent the leisure which the departure of the court afforded, in 
compiling a "History" of Poland up to 1382,8 transmitted in instal - 
:ments to Fox, but "worthier of Goody Two -shoes than of the Right 
10 
"Hon. Henry "9 and in quarrelling with a certain Frederick Laurence, 
formerly secretary to Hyndford, British minister at Berlin, who had 
1 Williams to Newcastle 9 June. 
2 Hyndford to Newcastle 29 March 0.S. ,,,Add. MSS 11385, f. 374. 
3 Newcastle to Williams 13 May O.S. 
4 Newcastle to Williams Private 20 May 0.S.,u,Add. MSS 32812 f.217 
5 Williams to Fox 22 March in Add. MSS 32811 f. 372, "I like the 
"employment of a foreign minister ... and I have been as dill - 
":gent in that office as anyone can be." 
6 Sir James Gray (Williams to Newcastle Private 9 June Add. MSS 
32812 f. 261.) 
7 Williams to Robinson 4 September Add. MSS 23829 f. 355. 
8 Printed in his Works III, I- LXXXI. 
9 Carlyle VI 172. 
10 See Sir Richard Lodge's article in Trans. Royal Historical 
Society, 4th series, vol. IX 63. Laurence's despatches are 
in S.P.F. Prussia with a full account of the quarrel. 
Williams treated Laurence as one of his servants, Laurence 
insisted that he had an independent position. Laurence's 
chronic indebtedness (although he drew £300 sterling a year 
from the exchequer) caused his letters to be sent with 
Williams's mail. This Laurence explains to Villiers (Add. 
MSS 32811 f. 374) "is equally burdensome to him and disagree - 
":able to me as he thinks fit to open them in too coarse and 
"too perceptible a manner ". After the quarrel Laurence re- 
mained at Dresden, but had no further intercourse with 
Williams or with the Saxon ministers. 
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become disagreeable to Frederick and had been sent on to Dresden. 
At last at the end of November Williams received his letters of 
revocation with permission to return to England, if his health 
required it, without waiting for the return of the Saxon court 
from Warsaw. 
Brut l's reaction towards his old allies, first manifest at the time 
of the Russian march through Poland, continued during the summer of 
1748 while the court was in Poland. Bwio.hl attributed the rupture 
of the Polish Diet to the intrigues of France' and Prussia, and his 
reproaches provoked a personal quarrel between the French ambassador 
and himself .2 Although Bruhl was dissatisfied with the change of 
French policy in Poland, the rivalry of Saxony and Prussia for the 
favour of France continued. Frederick exploited the march of the 
Russian troops through Poland to discredit Saxony at Versailles 
and to reduce still further the chance of a Franco -Austrian peace 
negotiated by Saxony at the expense of Prussia.4 Bruhl retorted 
that Prussia was trying to prolong the war in her own selfish in- 
:terest,5 and attempted to use Prussia's rapprochement with Bri- 
:tain to sow distrust of Prussia at Versailles. Although the 
treaty of Aix slightly eased the rivalry of Prussia and Saxony for 
the friendship of France, it left Saxony with an additional griev- 
:ance against her consistently successful rival, who had secured an 
European guarantee for Silesia, whereas Saxony had failed to obtain 
the inclusion in the treaty of the provisions she desired" - notably 
a formal recognition of the House of Wettin's right of succession 
to the Austrian dominions in default of Maria Theresa's line - and 
1 Farges II 101 -4. 2 Pol. Corr. VI 299 -300. 
3 Pol. Corr. . V 462, 516, VI 24, 28, 3 O. 
4 Pol. Corr. V 474, VI 125. 
5 Cf. Pol. Corr. V 459: "Je n'aurai guere á craindre de la 
"mauvaise volonté de la cour de Vienne, si elle est obligee de 
"continuer encore deux ans la guerre présente." (Frederick II 
to 0. Podewils, 11 August 1747). 
6 See Newcastle's apologetic letter dated 24 October /4 November 
in S.P.F. Foreign Ministers 36. 
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had failed likewise to effect the reconciliation. of France and 
Austria. 
But the main cause of friction between Prussia and Saxony after 
the treaty of Aix continued to be Prussian claims upon the Saxon 
Steuer. The SteuerI was the public bank of the estates of the 
electorate of Saxony. Individuals who lent money to the bank 
received in exchange negotiable bills bearing interest for a term 
of years payable at the fairs of Leipzig. The Saxon finances 
were however ruined by the extravagance of the court and the 
expenses of the unsuccessful wars of 1741 -45. Steuer bills 
consequently depreciated and were bought and sold for considerably 
less than their face value, and the credit of the bank declined 
still further when the King, as an indirect method of taxation, 
took over its management from the estates and thus became the 
debtor of all the holders of Steuer bills. Many of these bills 
were held by the nationals of foreign states, especially of the 
United Provinces and Prussia, and Frederick had secured the inser- 
:tion in the treaty of Dresden of an article providing for the 
payment of Prussian creditors of the Steuer "without fail ". The 
interpretation of this clause was henceforth a continual source 
of dispute between Prussia and Saxony. Frederick contended that 
it meant that his subjects should receive full and immediate satis- 
faction of their claims, both in regard to principal and interest, 
without regard to the claims of the other creditors of the Steuer.2 
Frederick as usual was claiming more than his due, and then threat- 
, 
:ening to enforce his claim by the sword. Bruhl made hall- 
hearted efforts to cut down expenditure and raised new loans at 
exorbitant rates, but he was still unable to pay the full interest 
i 
1 A.E. Saxe Supplement 2, f. 209 and f. 215; Böttiger II 
441 -6; Droysen V 3 425 -7. 
2 Pol. Corr. V 503. 
14. 
on, and repayments of, Steuer bills at Michaelmas 1747 and Easter 
1748. Frederick II's complaints became more and more bellicose. 
Bri`ahl's fear of bankruptcy was intensified by dread of a Prussian 
invasion, and at last he took measures in the summer of 1748 to 
stave off both dangers. Although it was said at Dresden that 
Br`(6111 and Hennicke knew so much to the disadvantage of each other 
in the administration of the Saxon finances that they dared not 
quarrel, Bruhl planned to dismiss Hennicke and throw the whole 
blame for the impending national bankruptcy on his shoulders. 
Plans were also prepared for the reduction of the Saxon army to 
16,000 men,1 and some feeble attempts made to reduce the extra- 
:vagance of the court. But these measures were insufficient and 
Brühl appealed first to France2 and then to Britain3 for a loan, 
which both governments refused. Saxon defalcations and Prussian 
threats continued therefore to embroil the relations of Saxony 
and Prussia. 
The return of the Saxon court from Poland to Dresden was followed 
by changes in the diplomatic corps. Williams's closest friend, 
the Sardinian minister, was transferred to London. Count Michael 
Bestuzhev went to Vienna and was succeeded by Count Keyserling.4 
The good disposition of the new minister is indicated by his 
request that the British government would urge Russia to send 
him instructions to cooperate with Williams at Dresden. Williams 
was delighted with the change, partly because of his quarrel with 
Bestuzhev but mainly because the new minister lacked the personal 
1 Pol. Corr. VI 111, 330, 344; VII 250, 259. Böttiger II 444. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 16 January 1749: Pelham to Williams 
28 February 0.S. in Coxe Pelham Administration II 76. 
3 Williams to Newcastle 19 March; Pol. Corr. VI 562 -3. 
4 Keyserling had been for 15 years Professor of Public Law at 
Koegnigsberg (Droysen V 3 314). Since January 1747 he had 
been Russian minister at Berlin. During his diplomatic 
career "his favourite and daily occupations" were logic and 
mathematics (Poniatowski 36). Subsequently he developed 
religious mania which led him to support Prussia against the 
Catholic league of Austria and France (Archives Voronzov 
V 49, 58) . 
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weight of the great chancellor's brother, and would not therefore 
completely overshadow his British colleague. Shortly afterwards 
on 12 April 1749 the long expected Austrian minister, Count 
Sternberg,1 arrived at Dresden, where Austria had been unrepresented 
since June 1747. 
The long interruption of Austro -Saxon relations was due partly to 
Austria's offended dignity, but chiefly to her conviction that 
Saxony was too far committed to France to be worth courting, while 
Saxon hostility to Prussia and the influence of Russia at Dresden 
could be relied upon to prevent Saxony slipping away altogether 
from the Austro- Russian alliance.2 The end of the war reduced 
Saxony's value to France and the change of French policy in Poland 
in 1748 weakened BAt?l's attachment to France, and offered Austria 
a good prospect of recovering her influence at Dresden. This was 
indeed essential after Maria Theresa's famous decision to hold fast 
to the old system, because Saxony was an invaluable link between 
the Austro- Russian allies. The real object of Sternberg's mission 
was therefore to renew the negotiation, which had been allowed to 
lapse, for Saxony's accession to the treaty of the two empresses. 
Meantime Fox was fighting an uphill struggle in the ministry to 
secure for Williams a future in the diplomatic service, if necessary 
by a general shuffling of posts. "Sir Charles Williams" Horace 
Walpole wrote on 26 December 17483 "is the great obstacle to all 
'arrangement: Mr. Fox makes a point of his going to Turin; the 
"ministry, who do not love him, are not for his going anywhere ". 
1 He was a wealthy Bohemian magnate, who had been Bohemian 
minister at the Regensburg Diet (1745 -48). The whole weight 
of affairs, it was believed at Dresden, would rest upon his 
wife, Maria Leopoldina von Stahremberg, a close personal 
friend of Maria Theresa. Lippert CXLIV -CIL; Pol. Corr. VII 
102. 
2 Robinson to Williams passim especially 12 July and 23 August 
1747 in Add. MSS 23875: Williams to Chesterfield 5 September 
1747: Pol. Corr. V 404, 450 -1: also extracts from inter- 
cepted Austrian despatches in Droysen V 3 347 -9. 
3 Walpole: Letters Vol. II 354. 
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In the end an unfortunate compromise was arranged. Williams was 
to receive the additional pay of plenipotentiary and to go to Berlinl 
Although Williams's promotion was due mainly to the necessity of 
doing something for the bosom friend of Fox, he had, even in the 
eyes of the unsympathetic king and ministers, certain qualifica- 
:tions for the Berlin envoyship. He had given close attention to 
Prussian affairs in the previous two years.2 More important, 
George II was determined that the envoy to Berlin should not become, 
like Legge, an advocate of the Prussian alliance. Williams's 
anti- Prussian bias was well -known, and he had the additional advan- 
tage that his appointment would not "give any jealousy to the 
"king's alliesr3 as Legge's appointment had done. Contrary to 
expectations the "king's allies" did their best to prevent Williams's 
mission or at least to deprive it of any prospect of success.4 
Williams's return from Dresden to England before taking up his new 
appointment was delayed, at first by his investigations of a cock 
and bull story that the young Pretender, recently expelled from 
France under the provisions of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, was 
in Poland. Shortly after he received instructions6 to wait at 
Dresden until he could find out the real object of Marshal Saxe's 
visit to his half -brother, the king of Poland. The British govern- 
ment feared that he had instructions to overthrow Brii1l and prolong 
1 Formal letter of appointment dated 18 April 0.S. Locke(Hanbury 
Familypsäys the ap ointment was a reward for Fox's remaining 
secretary at war. 200 Coxe (Historical Tour in Monmouthshire 
II 273) attributes the appointment to the express desire of the 
King. 
2 Legge expressly acknowledged his indebtedness to Williams for 
information of the state of the Prussian army, finances, etc., 
(Legge to A. Stone 18/29 June 1748, Add. MSS 32812 f. 308.) 
3 Newcastle to Williams 18 April 0.S. 
4 Hyndford reports details of Frederick II's intimacy with the 
Jacobites (manufactured by Gross at Berlin) and adds that this 
"will save His Majesty the trouble of sending Sir Charles Han - 
":bury Williams or any other minister to that perfidious court ". 
19 June Add. MSS 11387 f. 444. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 1 May &c. 1749: Lang's Pickle the Spy 
53 -60. 
6 Newcastle to Williams 19 May 0.S. 
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the Franco -Saxon treaty of subsidy. The political, as distinct 
from the personal, objects of Saxe's mission are clearly stated in 
the following extract from a despatch to Issarts.1 
"Quelque amitié que le Roi puisse avoir pour le Roi de Pologne S. 
"Mt e consentira difficilement a faire avec ce Prince un nouveau 
"traité de subsides dont elle ne retirera pas plus d'utilité que 
"de celui qui subsiste actuellement, mais nous entendrons ce que 
"M. le Mal de Saxe nous rapportera, ... avant que d'en. venir. á une 
"resolution_ finale sur cet article ... si [Saxe] pouvoit parvenir 
"á mettre plus d'harmonie entre [les cours de Berlin et de Dresde) 
"il feroit un excellent ouvrage ..." 
Williams reported however, that Saxe's visit was due chiefly to his 
"desire to see his native country, which he loves and where he is 
"much beloved, attachment to the King of Poland, and perhaps an 
"inclination to receive the flattery of his own countrymen upon 
"his late success ... for .I never saw any man so ple^.sed with the 
"coarsest adulation as Saxe is2 ... he is more vain than. any French- 
"man he ever commanded and his whole discourse, public and private, 
"turns upon the late campaign in Flanders, always endeavouring to 
"show that the French would not have beat the allies had he not 
"commanded.3 He speaks of French officers with the greatest con - 
":tempt and says they will not take the pains to understand their 
"trade and have not courage to execute their General's orders " - 
a significant comment in view of the total military collapse of 
France in the Seven Years War.4 
Saxe's main object was neither to overthrow Brïahl nor to prolong 
the treaty of subsidies, but, as Williams discovered, to prepare the 
way for his election to the Auchy of Courland 5 - fief of Poland 
which had been occupied by Russian troops since the death of the 
last of the native dukes. "Saxe is tired of fighting for other 
"people his ambition is to become a sovereign ".6 For 
success he needed at least the support of Prussia backed by France 
and Saxony - a most improbable combination - and in any case he 
1 A.E. Saxe Supplément 2 f.,,154, dated 2 July 1749. 
2 Cf. Maurice de Saxe to Bruh1 10 December 1746 i Vitzthum 108 -9 
"je vous assure entre nous que s[i les Francaisj ne m'avaient 
Upas, ils ne sauraient ou donner de la tete. Hommes, argent, 
rien ne leur manque aber sie wissen es nicht einzurichten 
3 Cf. Poniatowski 12 -13. 
4 Another remark of Saxe's shows how the wind was blowing towards 
the Diplomat:i.c Revolution which preluded the Seven Years War: 
"If the King of Prussia continued in his present way of proceed - 
":ing all the chief powers of Europe would find themselves ob- 
":lied. to fall upon him and bring him to reason" . Cf . Puysie- 
:ulx s remark to Yorke "si le Roi de Prusse troubloit le premier 
"le repos la France se declareroit contre lui ". S.P.F. France. 
5 Although Yorke at Paris (4/15 March. 1749 to Bedford Add. MSS 
32816 f. 205) reported that Saxe's object was to assert his pre- 
: tensions to the Auchy of Courland, Williams was left to dis - 
:cover this for himself - one of the many illustrations of the 
lack of connection between th.e Northern and Southern departments 
e Williams to Newcastle '30 July. 
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would be resolutely opposed by Russia. Brill and Frederick III 
however both gave more or less indefinite assurances of their 
support. After Saxe had left Dresden Williams was free to return 
to England. He stopped at Anspach for a few days to invest the 
Margrave with the Order of the Garter,' and at the Hague,2 where 
his meddlin_g3 with Count Gronsfeld in the business of the subsidy 
to Cologne aroused the hostility of Holderness, the British ambassa- 
:dor. 
Immediately after his return to England Williams drew up three papers 
on foreign affairs. In the first4 he develops, in accordance with 
Newcastle's instructions at their first meeting, an elaborate scheme 
for subsidising the leading German princes, weighs the advantages in 
each case, and concludes that the scheme would raise a new spirit in 
the Empire and render France and Prussia powerless for harm there. 
This paper placed Williams on Newcastle's side in the struggle which 
o-w 
he was waging single handed in the Cabinet or,,the question of sub - 
:sidy treaties in time of peace.5 
Another memorandum drawn up by Williams proposed the solution of the 
controversy over subsidy treaties which was taken up by Newcastle and 
ultimately accepted by the Cabinet. Williams suggested that the real 
object of these treaties should not be as Newcastle had originally 
proposed, to secure troops for use if war broke out, but to secure 
the election of the Archduke Joseph as king of the Romans which would., 
he contended, prevent the outbreak of a general European war.6 
Not content with forging the weapon which gave Newcastle a victory 
over his colleagues in the Cabinet and enabled him to execute his 
1 Williams to Newcastle 26 August: London Gazette No. 8879. 
2 Holderness to Newcastle 29 August September S.P F. Holland 
449; London. Gazette No. 8881. 
3 S.P.F. Holland 449; Add. MSS 32818 f. 210, f. 239. 
4 S.P.F. Poland dated 11 September O.S. 
5 See Chapter V and relevant documents in Appendix C. The Newport 
Papers contain a MS in which Williams resolutely opposes the giv 
:ing of subsidies and supports most strenuously Pelham's "oecon- 
:omous measures ". From internal evidence this (undated) document 
must have been composed during Williams's leisure at Dresden in 
1749. Apparently he decided that it would pay him better to take 
up Newcastle's side. Hence these three papers were left by him 
in the Secretary of State's office and the earlier document was 
allowed to remain uncompleted among his own papers. 
6 V article in E.H.R. July 1927 by the present writer. 
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plans for a system of subsidy treaties with the German princes, 
Williams drew up a third paperl designed to convert the opponents 
of subsidy treaties in Parliament and the country. Obviously he 
could not make public the proposed secret preparations to elect the 
eldest Archduke, so he fell back on other arguments. He began by 
attacking the inevitable reaction in England at the end of an ex- 
hausting war against close association with continental affairs. 
Commercial and colonial development requires the maintenance of 
peace, and this can best be guaranteed by the payment of subsidies, 
which will give Britain a stable system on the Continent. Suppose, 
Williams argues, a war breaks out with France when we have no con= 
:tinental allies. Even if we gain 
"considerable advantages over France we could neither keep them nor 
"push them to that degree which in other circumstances we might do, 
"because being unprovided with sufficient strength upon the Continent, 
"France would not fail to revenge her losses in America upon those 
"powers in Europe which England could never see destroyed`. 
When war breaks out, Williams continues, there will be a popular 
outcry against the Government for not adopting the unexpensive method 
of subsidy treaties to prevent the exorbitant expenses of war and 
"that danger and confusion [the Jacobite Rebellion] into which a 
'state of war has so lately brought these kingdoms ". 
By these three papers Williams had burned his boats.2 Originally 
3 
his attachment had been to Pelham and hitherto he had tried to keep 
on equally good terms with Pelham 4" and with Newcastle. Henceforth 
Pelham regarded him with aversion, but he had won the good will of 
Newcastle - the indispensable basis of a successful career in the 
diplomatic service. 
i S.P.F. Poland dated 21 October 1749. 
2 Supra p. 18 n. 5. 
3 Supra chapter I p;s, 
4 Williams to Fox in Works III 79. 
CHAPTER IV 
Williams's Mission to Berlin (1750 -51). 
"Son pere Grederick William Iiavoit logé á Potzdam dans une 
"vilaine maison; il [Frederick II] en fit un Palais. Pot - 
"zdam devint une jolie ville; Berlin s'agrandissoit; on 
"commen9oit á y connoitre les douceurs de la vie que le feu 
"Roi avoit tres neglig3sees. Quelques personnes avoient des 
"Meubles: le plupart même portaient des chemises; car sous 
"le règne précédent on ne connoissoit guère que les devants 
"de chemises qu'on attachoit avec des cordons et le Roi 
"regnant n'avait pas ¿te" eleve autrement. 
"Les choses changeoient á vue d'oeil. Lacedemone devenoit 
"Athènes" 
Voltaire Memoires (Londres 1784) pp 59 -60. 
"[Frederick II] is great in great things and little in little 
"things." 
Williams's correspondence quoted in Walpole: George II 
I 452 -61. 
Williams at Hanover - Newcastle fails to secure Pelham's 
approval of subsidising Saxony - Tension between Britain 
and Prussia revealed in Williams's instructions - Han- 
overian influences on British foreign policy - Williams 
is coldly received at Berlin - The Tartar "envoy" - Wil- 
liams goes to Warsaw - His success - Reversal of Saxon 
policy - Frederick ostracises Williams and requests his 
recall - The election negotiations increase tension bet- 
ween Britain and Prussia - Williams recalled from Berlin 
- His failure due partly to the mutual hostility of Bri- 
tain and Prussia but chiefly to his own folly. 
I 
Williams spent the winter and spring of 1749 -50 in England and did 
not reach Hanover, on the way to take up his post at Berlin until 
the end ofMay.l There he remained for a month in close contact 
with Newcastle who was chiefly occupied in securing the proposed 
election of a king of the Romans - Williams's child which Newcastle 
had adopted as his own. While at Hanover Williams advocated 
securing the votes which had secured the election of the Emperor 
in 1745. He then advised Newcastle to offer Prussia the Imperial 
guarantee of Silesia as the price of the Prussian vote, at the same 
time intimating that, if the offer were refused, the election would 
be proceeded with and Prussia would get nothing. This scheme 
might have proved successful, but the division in the British 
cabinet and divergences between Britain and Austria prevented its 
adoption. As the nextAstep towards the carrying through of the 
election Williams advocated the giving of a subsidy to Saxony.2 
He succeeded in convincing Newcastle, but failed to convince the 
King, who was annoyed with his defaulting debtor, the elector of 
Saxony. Newcastle, as a last resort, was forced to appeal to 
Pelham. "The scheme of making a King of the Romans" he wrote 
"is as I said before talked of though covertly as a solid system 
"for the Empire and as what will eterniser the King's honour.... 
" Sir Charles Williams says, do that and Harry Fox will 
"approve of subsidies; no subsidies are proposed but upon that 
"principle; and I really think the news from America shows the 
"necessity of making ourselves as strong in Europe as possible... 
".... I should be glad of Saxony. They (sic) may I am convinced 
1.E easily and cheaply had: and they may be necessary to fix and 
"secure the great object " 
But Pelham proved as obstinate as the King, and Newcastle was 
forced to report his failure to Williams: 
"All my letters from England" he wrote4 "and all my discourse in 
"the closet at Hanover convince me of the impossibility of giving 
"subsidies to the King of Poland ...... I have often told Flemming 
"when my master was on my side I could differ with my colleagues; 
"and when I agreed with my colleagues I could humbly presume to 
"make representations in hopes of altering His opinion:- but against 
"master and colleagues it was impossible to attempt anything ". 
1 H.V. Jones to HardWicke 20/31 May in Add. MSS 35410 f. 213. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 22 July in Add. MSS 32822 f. 153. 
3 Newcastle to Pelham 9/20 June in Coxe: Pelham Administration 
II 345. 
4 Newcastle to Williams 18/29 July in Add. MSS 32822 f. 225. 
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The views of the King and of Newcastle in sending Williams to 
Berlin were clearly stated by Newcastle in a despatch to Keith:' 
"In the present situation of things and in order to procure the 
"best intelligence of the true state of them [referring to the 
"Northern crisis] His Majesty has been pleased to order Sir Charles 
"Hanbury Williams to set out ...... to Berlin. His orders will be 
"to hold with firmness the same language upon the affairs of the 
"North as has been used to the Prussian ministers here and at Vienna" 
This forecast was entirely confirmed by the "secret instructionsr2 
drawn up for Williams at Hanover, which bear evident marks of the 
strained relations between Britain and Prussia and show little dis- 
position on the British side to improve them. Williams was to 
inform His Prussian Majesty of George Ii's "desire and intention 
"to live in perfect friendship and good correspondence with [him] 
and to maintain our treaties subsisting with him ", but was never 
to forget the "strict union and concert" existing between Britain, 
Austria, Russia, and the United Provinces. The rest of the in- 
:structions reduced his róle at Berlin to that of an official spy. 
He was to find out the number and condition of the Prussian troops, 
the state of the finances, the disposition of Frederick II as to 
peace or war, his intentions as to Sweden, his intrigues in the 
Empire, in Poland, with the Ottoman Porte, and with the Jacobites. 
Finally Williams was op tiered to go to Warsaw to attend the Polish 
Diet, and do his utmost, in close concert with the king of Poland, 
to defeat the intrigues of France and Prussia. 
These instructions show how during Newcastle's secretaryship the 
Hanoverian influences over British foreign policy, against which 
Walpole had fought with success, were again in the ascendant. 
Pelham alone of the directors of British foreign policy seems to 
3 
have desired a rapprochement with. Prussia and, in ignorance of 
Williams's instructions, cherished some faint hope of improvement 
i Separate and very secret 6 April O.S. in Add. MSS 35468 
f. 197. 
2 Dated 20 June /1 July in S.P.P. Prussia. 
3 Coxe Pelham Administration I 442 -3. 
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in the relations of Britain and Prussia. 
"I am glad to find" he writes sarcastically to Newcastle,) "that 
"the great northern minister, Sir Charles Williams is gone to Berlin, 
"where he has my good wishes for a long continuance. His fertile 
"genius can do no hurt there; and if he writes as many odes as the 
"King of Prussia can read I shall grudge him neither his wit nor his 
rrapplause" 
. 
Unfortunately political and personal divergences prevented the 
realisation of Pelham's vision_ of two kindred poetasters eagerly 
reading their bad verses to each other. 
The British government dreaded that Williams's mission would impair 
the cordiality of their relations with the two empresses; Frederick 
II feared that it would give umbrage to France.2 From the moment 
of his arrival at Berlin3 the atmosphere was tense with mutual 
suspicion - especially since the warlike preparations of Russia4 
had again brought the protracted northern crisis to a head. 
Williams's audience of the King was as formal as possible and 
5 
"lasted exactly five minutes and a half ". From the first the new 
envoy, whom Frederick had stigmatized as a "dangerous intriguer" and 
whom he was determined to punish for George II's coldness towards 
Klingr.ffen,6 was treated with. a "distinguished shyness 117 by the two 
dummy foreign ministers, Podewils and Finkenstein. Williams there - 
F.. 
fore found himself in a difficult position, and not unnaturally was 
nervous and ready to see slights even if none had been intended. 
Offended by the coolness of his reception he ostentatiously paraded . 
his intimacy with the ministers of Prussia's enemies, Count Puebla, 
the Austrian minister, and Gross, the Russian Minister, the latter 
8 
of whom was especially obnoxious at Court . Williams soon gained . 
an ascendancy over Puebla and Gross, but by dethroning Bülow, the 
1 Coxe Pelham Administration II 350 (2/13 July). 
2 Pol. Corr. VIII 16. 3 On 7 July N.S. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 11/22 July. 
5 Extract of Williams's Report of it printed in Walpole's 
Geor'e II I 449 -50, and in Carlyle VI 170 -1. 
6 Po . torr. VI 549, VII 178. 7 Williams to Newcastle 1 August. 
8 Pol. Corr. VI 427, 488; VII 161, 199, 204 etc; VIII 61 -2 etc. 
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Saxon minister, from his leadership of the anti- Prussian diplomatic 
corps he made a powerful enemy at Berlin,1 who did him all the harm 
in his power. 
The arrival at Berlin of a mysterious Tartar2 gave Williams his first 
opportunity to perform his duty as a spy. It was officially given 
out that the Tartar had come to claim some Tartar soldiers who were 
serving in the Prussian allay. This was the truth, but Frederick 
knew that in diplomacy if one told the truth one was usually dis- 
believed. In order to throw suspicion on his own story he treated 
the envoy with "much ridiculous respect`' in order to alarm Russia 
with the bogey of an alliance between Prussia and Turkey,3 and 
restrain her from making the threatened attack upon Sweden, which 
Prussia was bound to support by the defensive alliance of 1746. 
Williams received instructions on 31 July to go to Warsaw and he set 
out the next day, arriving on 6 August, just in time to be present at 
the dissolution of the Diet on the following day. The ostensible 
reason for his journey, which he had formally intimated to the Prussian 
ministers,4 was to be present at the Diet as Britain had not yet ap- 
pointed his successor at Dresden. The real reasons5 were to inform 
Broil of the steps so far taken in the election of the king of the 
Romans; to try without promising a subsidy to win his concurrence in 
the election; to smooth over Saxony's natural resentment at the pre- 
ference given to Bavaria, which was to receive a British subsidy 
1 His suspicions of Billow's disloyalty to his own Court and still 
more to the "good cause" are supported by Frederick's comments 
on Bìilow especially in Pol. Corr. VI 449; VIII 404. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 25 July; London Gazette No. 8975. The 
affair is finally cleared up in Porter to Williams (appended to 
Williams!Kto Newcastlea 8 December) Cf. Porter to Bedford 23 Novem- 
:ber in Add. MSS 3285 f. 102 and Williams to Keith 18 August 
1750 in Add. MSS 35469 f. 130. Full details in the Berlin 
Journal (in Newport Papers) and Pol. Corr. VIII 38, 60, 79, 132, 
142. 
3 Pol. Corr. VIII 24, 29, 35. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 1 August; Pol. Corr. VIII 40. 
5 Newcastle to Williams private 18/29 July. Cf. Geheimnisse I 
210 -11. 
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to find out if Saxony's irritation would lead her to try and renew 
her former subsidy treaty with France, and to prevent it if possible. 
To these manifold tasks Williams added the elucidation of the mys- 
:tery of the Tartar envoy, who had traversed Poland on his way to 
Berlin. The unexpected dissolution of the Diet robbed Williams 
of the ostensible object of his mission, but he remained at Warsaw 
and carried out with unexpected ease the commissions entrusted to 
him. His first step was to make a bargain with the heads of the 
Czartoryski faction in Poland, whose support, in view of Franco - 
Prussian intrigues, seemed essential to the maintenance of the 
Polish crown in the Saxon family. They promised to use the 
influence upon Brühl which this position gave them against the 
renewal of the Franco -Saxon treaty of subsidy. Williams agreed 
in exchange to use his influence over Brühl to secure for the 
followers of the Czartoryskï all the vacant offices in Poland. 
With this additional strength they would be more than a match for 
the Franco- Prussian party, and hoped to be able, with Brühl's co- 
operation, to restore some measure of order and good government to 
their distracted country. 
Williams, having prepared the ground, then had an interview with 
Brühl in which he repeated the stock arguments against a Franco- 
Saxon treaty. Alliance with France left Saxony at the mercy of 
France's ally Prussia, "because France was too interested and too 
"ambitious and too political a power not to decide every dispute 
"that happened between two of her allies in favour of the strongest ". 
If the French alliance was dangerous to the elector of Saxony, it 
was suicidal for the king of Poland, whose throne was endangered 
by the intrigues of France and Prussia.l Williams summed up his 
arguments thus: 
1 On these see Pol. Corr. VII 341, 381, 397 -9, etc. 
VIII 7, 47, 52 -3, etc. 
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"The consequences of going on in the hands of France were first the 
"continuation of Prussian insults and tyranny in Saxony, second, the 
"acquiescing under the insolent intrigues of France in Poland, cal - 
":culated to destroy all the present and future views of His Polish 
"Majesty in that Republic, third, the absolute loss of the confidence 
"and assistance of the ancient and natural allies of Saxony ". 
Bruni, annoyed at France for her dilatory payment of the subsidies 
due to Saxony, and furious at the dissolution of the Diet which he 
attributed to Franco -Prussian intrigues,1 agreed in principle with 
Williams, but pointed out that if France preferred Prussia, Britain 
had given a visible preference over Saxony to Bavaria. Williams 
replied that it was necessary to bring Bavaria into the old system, 
Saxony was already an integral part of it. He added adroitly that 
the present elector of Bavaria had never once "squinted towards 
"France" and had restored his finances by economy, leaving Brühl to 
draw the conclusion that if he followed the Bavarian example he 
Eight be similarly rewarded. Williams then demanded as a guarantee 
of Saxony's good faith a promise that she would not renew her expir- 
:ing treaty of subsidy with France. Briihl was apparently impressed 
and soon summoned Williams to a second conference, at which Keyser - 
:ling was also present. He began by demanding once again that 
Britainsiould compensate Saxony for the loss of French subsidy. 
Williams interrupted him and declared categorically that Britain 
could not at present pay any subsidy to Saxony. 
2 
Keyserling then 
supported Williams's demand for a guarantee of Saxony's loyalty to 
the old system. Williams proposed an expedient, which he previously 
agreed upon with Keyserling, and which Brìihl accepted on the spot. 
'The king of Poland was to declare upon his royal word that he would 
enter into no further pecuniary engagements with France, but would 
return with the utmost cordiality to his ancient and natural allies. 
11 
The King made the required declaration severally to Keyserling and 
1 Berlin Journal 8 and 9 August. 
2 This incident bears marks of being concerted in advance with 
Brùhl, so as to disarm the suspicions of Pelham mentioned in 
Hardwicke's letter to Newcastle of 5 July O.S. 1750. 
ÍAdd . MSS 35410 f. 268) . 
to Williams, but requested that the assurances he had given should 
be kept secret from Austria, because "the time might come when he 
"might do considerable services to the House of Austria an the 
"election question] and would then have some things to ask of that 
"court ". 
Williams boasted that even without the subsidy he had taken Saxony 
out of the hands of France' and greatly strengthened the Austro- 
Russian alliance. His success, partial though it was, was much 
relished in London. 
"Sir Charles Williams" Horace Walpole wrote,2 with his usual 
sprightly exaggeration, ".... is the present ruling star of our 
"negotiations. He has met the ministers of the two angry Empresses 
"and pacified Russian savageness and Austrian haughtiness.3 He is 
"to teach the monarch of Prussia to fetch and carry, unless they 
"happen to treat in iambics or begin to settle the limits of 
"Parnassus instead of those of Silesia." 
Williams made no attempt to account for his unexpectedly easy 
success except to remark that the elector of Saxony believed ''the 
"CzarinaEàs] his best refuge against Prussian insults ", leaving it 
to be inferred that the main reasons, apart from Russian influence 
at Dresden, were the cogency of his arguments and his personal 
ascendancy over Count Brúhl and the King. 
More fundamental causes of the sudden reversal of Saxon policy are 
not hard to find. Briihl had always insisted that Saxony's finan- 
:cial position required a subsidy from whatever power would give 
one. The Saxon finances were worse in 1750 than in 1747 - the 
difference was, as Brüh1 himself had foreseen, that France after 
the treaty of Aix -la- Chapelle was no longer willing to subsidise 
1 He knew that this was a gross exaggeration. The Berlin Journal 
13 revea],s attempt to explain away his assurances by altering the 
protocol of the conferences. The main point in dispute seems 
to have been the insertion of some assurance of subsidies, 
which Williams had probably given privately, but dared not 
allow to appear in an official document. The struggle over 
this point accounts for Williams's long stay at Warsaw and 
proves the instability of his success. Unless Britain paid 
a subsidy it could only be temporary, and within a few weeks 
there were rumours of renewed subsidy negotiations between 
France and Saxony. 
2 Walpole to Mann 20 September 1750 in Letters ted. Toynbe e III 
17. Cf. ibid 20. 
3 There appears to be no foundation in fact for this sentence. 
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Saxony for doing nothing. Brúhl had failed to secure the prolonga- 
tion of the French treaty of subsidies;) Britain therefore must be 
courted as the only other power which might conceivably give Saxony 
a subsidy. When he heard that Britain was bringing forward the 
election of a king of the Romans he saw that his chances of getting 
a subsidy were greatly improved; and when, shortly before Williams's 
arrival at Warsaw, the elector of Cologne began to make difficulties 
about giving his vote2 it became almost a certainty that the Saxon 
vote would ultimately have to be bought. 
Williams doubtless told Briihl of the controversy in the Cabinet, 
assured him that Newcastle was already converted, and that the sur- 
:render of the remaining ministers would follow in the natural course 
of events. He hinted that all that was required was for Brahl to 
stop "squinting at France ", and Briih_I was ready to make the experiment 
Even more important in Brizhl's eyes than the receiving of subsidies 
was the formation of the great anti- Prussian coalition. The strained 
relations of Saxony and Prussia increased Saxony's need either of 
subsidies to pay off the Steuer debts to Prussia, or of a powerful 
coalition to protect her from Prussian threats. Just as in 1746 
Brühl had combined the two policies by taking subsidies from France 
and trying to reconcile France and Austria at Prussia's expense, so 
now he hoped to get subsidies from Britain`s and use his influence to 
accentuate the anti- Prussian bias of British policy. He was perfect- 
ly willing to sacrifice in the meantime his intimacy with France if 
it proved necessary to attain his new object, because the task of 
reconciling Austria and France, which he had undertaken during the 
1 Newcastle to Williams 18/29 July 1750. 
2 Cf. Major General Borck to His Majesty, 8 August, Add. MSS 32822 
f. 287. 
3 The financial stringency affected the reversal of Saxon policy 
in another way, since Augustus III dared not offend George II, 
when the repayment of the money he had borrowed from the elector 
of Hanover was being discussed (Williams to Newcastle very pri- 
:vate 2, 23 September.) 
9. 
Austrian succession war, was now in the able hands of Kaunitz, the 
newly appointed Austrian ambassador at Paris. 
An important contributory cause of Brízhlts decision was the situation 
in Poland - where the influence of the Saxon house was steadily 
declining owing to the lack of attention given by Brühl to Polish 
affairs, and, since the subsidy treaty of 1746, to the vacillation 
of the court between the French and Russian parties in Poland. The 
growing anarchy in the republic of Poland alarmed Brühl, who regarded 
it as a possible refuge if he were driven from Saxony.1 Moreover 
the advancing years of the King made it desirable to arrange the 
Polish succession in advance2 - as far as this could be done in view 
of the Polish constitution - and thus prevent on this occasion the 
war of the Polish succession which usually followed each election. 
Irritated by the intrigues of France and Prussia, which had pre- 
vented the preliminary steps for strengthening the monarchy from 
being even discussed at the Diet of 1750, and finding that these 
preliminary steps had the support of the Czartoryski, Brühl had an 
additional reason for breaking off the French connection and resum- 
ing the closest connection with Russia, which had placed Augustus 
III on the throne and whose adherents in Poland were alone willing 
to strengthen the authority of the executive - the indispensable 
preliminary to the realisation of the Saxon plans.4 For the first 
time since Augustus IIIts accession all the important offices were 
given to the Czartoryski faction,5 thus cementing the alliance of 
the court with the Czartoryski and strengthening, as Brühl hoped, 
the royal power. Williams, the close ally of the Czartoryski, 
1 Williams to Newcastle 23 September 1750. 
2 France and Frederick II were beginning to concert measures 
(Pol. Corr. VIII, 97, 112.) 
3 V.Issarts!. instructions for the 1750 Diet in Farges II 105 -7. 
4 Williams communicated to Brizhl news of French designs to secure 
the Prince of Contits succession which confirmed Brühlts fears. 
(Williams to Newcastle 12 August 1750; Berlin Journal 8 August.) 
5 Williams to Newcastle 22 August and 23 September 1750. 
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shared Br hhl's hopes that such "steady measures well pursued would 
"bring this Republic into some form in a short time ". 
Flushed with triumph and full of self importance1Williams returned 
to his post at Berlin after six weeks absence. His reception in 
July had been cold, but on his return in September2 it was glacial. 
3 
"Since my return" he reports 
"alteration in His Prussian 
"his levee on Monday last he 
"except myself, whom he affe 
"before him". 
"from Poland there is a very visible 
Majesty's behaviour towards me. At 
spoke to every foreign minister present 
cted not to see though I stood directly 
The ministers no longer treated him with a "distinguished shyness ", 
but refused to discuss business with him at all. On Williams's 
own showing they were fully justified since, to take one example, 
he records on 27 October in his diary (kept with the intention of 
proving the propriety of his conduct!): "Told Podewils all our 
"differences with Spain were settled in order to vex him ". 
Soon Williams found himself an outcast not only at Court but in 
Berlin society4 - a position which cut his pride to the quick, the 
more so because, in the first weeks of his residence at Berlin, he 
had fancied that he was cutting a fine figure in society. His 
especial favourites at court had been the Queen Mother - George 
II's sister - 
same coin. 
"conversation 
and Princess Amalia, who repaid his flattery in the 
The Queen Móther^ assured him on one occasion that his 
was so agreeable that she did not know how to rise 
"from table." Doubtless Frederick did his best to ostracise 
Williams,5 but the conduct of the British envoy was not such as 
1 Berlin Journal 6 September. 
2 On 9 September, not as Satow states "in October" (Satow 33). 
3 Williams to Newcastle 3 October. Cf. Berlin Journal 10 Novem- 
:ber, etc. 
4 Berlin Journal 1 January 1751. Cf. Williams to Keith 5, 16 
January, in Add. MSS 35470 ff 116, 143. 
5 Cf. Frederick's action towards Weingarten. (Pol. Corr. VI 162). 
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to make him a favourite in Berlin society. Thus he records in 
the Berlin Journal on 15 September: 
"Went to Count Podewils for dinner where there were twenty people 
"at table and the company consisted entirely of persons with whom 
"I do not live: the late Lord Marshal among them. So I put on 
a sullen dignity, eat (sic) my pudding and held my tongue. I 
"went away very soon after dinner to see Celia."' 
Williams had only himself to blame when on New Years Day 1751 he 
"went to the opera, spoke to nobody, and nobody spoke to ahiml ".2 
As the attitude of Frederick II and his ministers practically pre- 
:vented Williams from performing the work of an envoy, he flung 
himself eagerly into his work as a spy, chiefly with a view to 
finding out the extent of Frederick's connection with the Jacobites 
These attempts had no result except to irritate Frederick still 
further. Finding that Klingräffen's recall did not lead to 
Williams's departure, Frederick II instructed5 Michell to complain 
of Williams's conduct in making "discourses at Berlin by no means 
"proper for preserving the good correspondence between the two 
"Courts ".6 Newcastle naturally asked what was the nature of 
these discourses, and as Michell could give no information on this 
pointhe advised Williams to find out from the Prussian ministers 
what were the exact charges against him. 
1 Celia was Williams's inamorata of the moment. Cf. his extra- 
:ordinary entry in the Journal of 14 September ".... sent some 
"larks to Celia, broke off entirely with Kesselia ... thought 
"of Celia all dinner time but not enough to hinder my eating 
"a good deal. Went to the play to meet Celia. From the play 
"I came home. Celia and some of the Queen's Maids of Honour 
"and a great deal of company supped here. Celia looked charm - 
":ing ... and staid here till one o'clock in the morning. Went 
"to bed and dreamt all night of Celia." 
2 Williams to Newcastle 17 October. 
3 Lang: Pickle the SPY 108, 117 -118. 
4 Pol. Corr. VÌITT57T Michell on 26 October had reported 
(ibid 138) that Williams had represented Frederick II's Emden 
Company and everything else in Prussia in the worst light. 
5 Newcastle to Williams 27 November O.S.; Frederick to Michell 
19 December 1750 "J'aimerais bien qu'on m'envoyát un autre 
'bujet moins prévenu et mieux intentionné que celui -ci, ou qui 
" "a moins saurait mieux se cacher que lui. (Pol. Corr. VIII 
195 A second complaint was lodged by Michell on 30 December. 
NeW castle, Michell reports demanded proofs and "ne me para pas 
"convaincu et nous nous sep arámes de la sorte" (ibid 226 -7). 
6 The Prussian ministers refused to give him any satisfaction. 
Williams to Newcastle 26 December). 
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When he found that Michell's complaints did not procure Williams's 
recall, Frederick changed his tactics, abandoned the charges against 
him, and ordered Michell to solicit the recall as a mark of George 
II's friendship towards the king of Prussia,' adding the threat that 
he might forbid Williams to appear at court.2 His request was 
therefore granted, especially as it was obviously useless to keep 
Williams at Berlin when neither the King nor the ministers would 
transact business with him.3 Henceforth the British government's 
sole idea was to get Williams away from Berlin without a grave 
diplomatic incident. Newcastle's evident anxiety led Mirepoix, 
the French ambassador at London, to offer his services in securing 
Williams's audience of leave. This offer was not accepted any() 
make certain that no incident would occur, Williams was instructed 
to quit Berlin without taking leave,4 as his colleague Gross had 
done a few months earlier, unless Podewils would promise that he 
would receive civil treatment. 
Before Frederick heard of Williams's recall, he had manifested his 
resentment against the British government by making (in a Note com- 
municated to the Austrian court extraordinarily strong reflections 
upon the action of the "youngest elector of the Empire" in negotiat- 
:ing clandestinely and contrary to the Golden Bull for the election 
of the Archduke Joseph without regard to the rights and dignity "of 
'the most important and most venerable electors." This was to touch 
the King and Newcastle at their tenderest point. Williams naturally 
made the most of this offensive declaration in his despatches,6 and 
1 Newcastle to Williams 11 January O.S. 1751( a very material and 
"comforting letter" Berlin Journal 31 January). Cf. Pol. Corr. 
VIII 273. 
2 Pol. Corr. VIII 226 -7. 
3 Cf. Berlin. Journal 6 December; "The Prussian ministers have quite 
left off speaking to me and I to them and I believe we shall 
never say anything more to each other but by express command 
of our masters ". 
4 Newcastle to Williams 11, 22 January O.S. 
5 Printed in Pol. Corr. VIII 233 -6 and in Preuss. Staats. II 351 -7. 
The original draft had been previously modified and approved by 
Tyrconnell (Pol. Corr. VIII 236 -8). 
Cf. Droysen V 4 241. 
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probably exaggerated what he had done when conversing with his 
friends at Berlin. Frederick II, alarmed by Williams's talk,1 
was afraid that Britain and Austria would take up the matter 
strongly. He repented of his hasty action2 and appealed to France 
not to disapprove of the words used in the Note.3 After some 
hesitation the British government did not demand an apology from 
Prussia,4 but contented themselves with sending a despatch to 
Williams, couched in Newcastle's loftiest style, which was not 
put into cipher so as to make certain5 that it would come to the 
eyes of Frederick II. "We are so used" Newcastle wrote "to such 
"flights from Berlin that the best answer is to pass them over in 
"indifference and contempt ".6 The despatch then attributed Fred- 
:erick's aspersions to his fear that he would have to concur after 
all in the election, lest he should lose the Imperial guarantee of 
Silesia. 
In this sultry atmosphere Williams had his audience of leave,7 
which probably constitutes a recórd in diplomatic insincerity and 
most undiplomatic brevity. 
"Sir ", said the departing envoy, "the King *my master has ordered 
"me to deliver this letter to your Majesty; to assure you of the 
"continuation of His friendship; at the same time humbly to take 
"leave of your Majesty ". To which the king of Prussia answered 
"Make my compliments to the King your master; and assure Him of 
"the continuation of my friendship ".8 
1 Pol Corr. VIII 244. 249 and note. 
2 Pol. Corr. VIII 293. 
3 Frederick II to Tyrconnell 6 February in Add. MSS 32826 f. 141 
(printed in Pol. Corr. VIII 249); Tyrconnell to Puysieulx 
9 February f. 139. 
4 They interpreted the declaration favourably that Prussia would 
acquiesce in the election on certain not impracticable condi- 
tions, and were therefore the less inclined to quarrel with 
its form. (Newcastle to Williams secret 8/19 February 1751). 
In any case they had no desire to make relations with Prussia 
still worse since this might lead to war. (Bedford to Albemarle 
31 January 0.S. 1751 in S.P.F. France 240(1). 
5 Newcastle to Williams 8 February 0.S. 
6 Newcastle to Williams 5 February 0.S. Cf. Newcastle to Keith 
1 February 0.S. in Add. MSS 32826 f. 209. 
7 4 March (Pol. Corr. VIII 286.) 
8 Williams to Newcastle 6 March. 
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The main responsibility for this disastrous termination of 
Williams's mission to Berlin rests with Williams himself. It 
is true that any British minister would have met with the same 
reception as Williams received at the opening of his mission.1 
Frederick cordially detested his uncle George II, and the end of 
the Austrian succession war, coupled with the corisoiidation of 
the Franco -Prussian alliance, enabled him to display his antipathy 
with impunity. He believed, or at least pretended to believe, 
2 
that Britain was supporting Russia in the Northern crisis and en- 
:couraging her to involve Prussia in war by making an attack on 
Sweden.. He was furious at Britain's refusal to pay compensation 
for the Prussian ships seized during the Austrian succession war. 
And in November 1750 Britain acceded to the treaty of the two 
empresses,3 which Frederick had always suspected was directed 
against Prussia. He knew also of the beginning of a negotiation .
for a subsidy treaty between Britain and Russia, designed "to keep 
"Prussia in awe ", 4 and was furious at the attempt of the British 
government to rush through the election of a king of. the Romans 
without consulting Prussia.5 
Quite apart from Hanoverian influences,6 the British government 
was in no conciliatory mood. Prussia was the intimate ally of 
1 V. on Anglo- Prussian relations at this time Lodge 77 -9. 
2 Probably his belief was sincere because Frederick II never 
understood. British constitutionalism and greatly exaggerated 
the influence of the king upon British foreign policy. 
3 Full accounts of the negotiation in O.S. II 39 -57. Britain 
did not accede to the secret articles, i.e. to the anti - 
Prussian core of the treaty. 
4 Pol. Corr. VIII 183, 205, 215. 
5 ".... On m'a n4gligg au point de ne pas me donner la moindre 
"ouverture de l'affaire Sting of the Romans, ni d'en toucher#. 
"mot envers mon ministre le sieur de Klingräffen, tout comme 
"si j'étais pour rien dans tout ceci" Pol. Corr. VIII 286 
(2 March 1751). 
6 The purely Hanoverian- Prussian sources of friction were of 
old standing. Firstly,George II's suppression of George I's 
will, by which he was supposed to have left a legacy to the 
dowager queen of Prussia (Pol. Corr. I 37 &c). Secondly,the 
Prussian seizure of East Friesland in 1744, to which the house 
of Hanover had claims which it tried to assert in the imperial 
law courts (Preuss. Staats. II 382 ff). Lastly,Hanover had 
occupied certain bailiwicks of Mecklenburg in contravention 
of Prussia's eventual claims to the Duchy. 
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Britain's arch enemy, France, and acted as her agent in the Empire.' 
George II and Newcastle resented Prussia's refusal to abandon France 
and return to the old system- 2 Frederick kept alive this resent- 
ment by a series of actions, which bitterly offended the British. 
government, when he tried. to establish commercial companies which 
would compete with British trading companies, 
3 
refused to pay the 
Silesian 1.oan,4 posed as a champion of Jacobitism,5 and exulted 
in the failure of George II's attempt to bribe the elector of 
Cologne.6 
The relations of Britain and. Prussia being in this condition, 
Frederick's treatment of Williams in the first weeks of his mission . 
may be attributed to his habit of venting his spite against a 
foreign power by neglecting and insulting its diplomatic repro- 
: sentative at his court. Williams's position therefore was un- 
:doubtedly difficult; but the more difficult it was the more 
careful he ought to have been to avoid making it worse, especially 
as Prussia's ally France would readily seize any opportunity to 
intensify the friction between Britain and Prussia, while Britain's 
own allies, especially Saxony, were eager to involve her in their 
hostility to Prussia. Instead of proceeding with caution and 
reserve, Williams showed a complete lack of self- control. He 
flung himself headlong into the arms of Frederick II's bate noir. 
Gross, and together they followed a policy of espionage and intrigue. 
Wgrse still, Williams could not conceal the hurt inflicted on his 
vanity by the little notice which was taken of him at court. His 
pique led him to behave, according to his own confession, in a way 
entirely unsuited to his official position. To take one example 
1 Waddington 418 -9, 423 -4. 2 Pol. Corr. VI 562. 
3 Williams to Newcastle eg. 3 October 1750 Cf. Add. MSS 32823 
f. 212. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 8 December; Satow 37 -42. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 26 December 
6 Frederick II to Klingraffen (intercepted) 17 October in Add. 
MSS 32824 f. 149. 
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Williams mentions in his diary on 30 July that the Tartar envoy 
"in his dirty boots" was placed at the upper end of the table. 
Williams promptly seated himself, at the foot, explaining in a loud 
voice that he did not wish to associate with canaille. 
"The respect of the Prussian ministers to his Tartar Excellency" 
he continues "put me in mind of the ceremony of making a Mamamouchi 
"in Molisre's Bourgeois Gentilhomme. I immediately communicated 
"my thoughts to Count Puebla, who, in company with his neighbours, 
"immediately burst out into a fit of laughter, which laughter accord - 
":ing to the best of my observation made Count Podewils rather angry 
"than merry to my no small satisfaction". 
Williams's imprudence did not end even there, for there can be no 
doubt, it spite of his denials,1 that he made grossly improper 
remarks about the court of Berlin. and Frederick's government of 
Prussia.2 In his official despatches, in order to pander to 
George II's hatred of his nephew, Williams lost no opportunity of 
representing the court and government of Frederick II in the worst 
light, although he took care not to overstep the bounds of diplo- 
:matic phraseology. His private correspondence3 and the diary he 
kept at Berlin are much less reticent, and it is impossible to 
believe that Williams, in the galling position which he occupied 
at Berlin would keep even the amount of control shown in his written 
comments over his spoken utterances. And the least slip of the 
tongue would be passed from mouth to mouth and magnified tenfold 
1 Williams to Newcastle 19, 26 December 1750. 
2 The most definite statement of Frederick's charges is given 
in his letter to Tyrconnell in Pol. Corr. VIII 279; "Les 
"raisons des plaintes que j'ai eues contre lui, sont de ce 
"qu'il a tenu dans de grandes tables des propos injurieux 
"contre mon gouvernement, le traitant de misérable et de 
"ridicule, tournant tout du mauvais cat et ajoutant qu'il 
"aimerait mieux étre un singe de file de Borneo que ministre 
"prussien, ajoutant beaucoup d'autres indecences traitant le 
"gouvernement de tyrannique et montrant partout de la mauvaise 
"volonte contre ce qui regarde moi et mes interets. Puebla 
told Williams he was accused of saying that "a man might as 
well make his court to a parcel of hogs as to the court of 
Berlin." (Berlin Journal 13 December). 
3 V the extracts undate printed in Walpole: George II, I 
452 -61 "His ministers at every court are the scum of-rhe 
'éarth and have nothing but the insolence of their master to 
'support them... I think Hamlet says in the play 'Denmark is a 
'prison'; the whole Prussian territory is so in the literal 
'sense of the word ". 
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before it reached Frederick II, whose spies had been watching 
Williams almost from the beginning of his residence at Berlin. 
1 
Williams's mission to Warsaw was the last straw. Frederick was 
2 
fully justified in resenting the despatch of Williams, within a 
few weeks of his arrival at Berlin, to the court of Prussia's 
bitterest enemy with express orders to oppose at Warsaw the envoy 
of the Prussian court, to which. he remained accredited. Williams's 
activity there, on his own responsibility and without instructions, 
in discovering the real object of the Tartar's mission3 and enlighten- 
:ing the Russian court (which might otherwise have been restrained 
in its preparations against Sweden by dread of an alliance of Prussia, 
Sweden and Turkey) gave Frederick II an additional grievance and 
turned his growing dislike and dissatisfaction into bitter enmity. 
Thereafter Williams's continuance at Berlin was plainly impracticable. 
Indeed Williams ought never to have been sent tO Berlin, but the 
same influences which had secured him the appointment prevented him 
from being reprimanded for his outrageous conduct. The King's 
enmity to Frederick II grew daily stronger and he was not sorry to 
break off diplomatic relations. Newcastle to some extent shared this 
resentment, and moreover did not wish to offend Fox by censuring his 
intimate friend. Thanks to these influences Williams's diplomatic 
career did not come to an untimely but well merited end in February 
1751. To avoid giving even the appearance of censure to his recall, 
Williams was sent straight from Berlin to Dresden to undertake the 
negotiation for securing the Saxon vote for the election of a king 
of the Romans. 
1 Pol. Corr. VIII 35. 
2 Pol. Corr. VIII 54, Frederick's resentment was the greater 
because he greatly exaggerated Williams's success at Warsaw. 
(Pol. Corr. VIII 169, 252, 265; Cf. A.E. Saxe 41 f. 9). 
3 Williams to Newcastle 18 August 1750. 
CHAPTER V 
Dresden: the subsidy treaty of 1751. 
Debates in the British cabinet on peace subsidies - Brih1 
anxious to secure a subsidy from Britain - Failure of 
British attempts to secure the Saxon vote for the Archduke 
Joseph without a subsidy - Repudiation of the treaty of 
Neuhaus by the elector of Cologne - Division of opinion in 
the British cabinet as to continuing the election negotia- 
tions - Newcastle sounds Saxony - Preliminary difficulties 
between Britain, the United Provinces, and Austria - Open- 
ing of negotiations at Dresden - Exorbitant demands of 
Saxony - Newcastle and Bentinck decide to continue the 
negotiations with Saxony - Bedford removed from the cab- 
inet by Newcastle's intrigues - Granville and Holderness 
enter the cabinet as Newcastle's supporters - Flemming 
arrives in London with moderate demands from Brithl - 
Newcastle's conversion of the King and the Premier - Flem- 
ming's negotiations with the British government - United 
Provinces approve the draft treaty drawn up at London - 
Bruhl's tactics - Williams signs the treaty as altered by 
Brúhl sub spe rati - Increased importance of the treaty in 
Newcastle's view - Williams's signature causes further con- 
flict in the cabinet - Victory of Newcastle - His instruc- 
tions to Williams - Williams secures a compromise acceptable 
to the British government - Reasons for BrLhl's acceptance 
of British demands - Ilis relations with France - Satisfaction 
of Newcastle and the Dutch ministers with the treaty - Dissat- 
isfaction of Pelham - Debate on the treaty in Parliament. 
Foreseeing the difficulties which the restoration of peace would 
place in the way of the renewal of his subsidy treaty with France, 
Brühl, ever since the treaty of Aix -la- Chapelle, had been paving 
the way for the revival of his former subsidy treaty with Britain. 
In this task he was greatly assisted by Count Flemming,1 the able 
Saxon minister at London, who stood on particularly good terms 
with Newcastle and was believed by Newcastle's colleagues to exer- 
:cise an undue influence over the British foreign secretary. 
By the summer of 1749 Newcastle had reluctantly reached the con- 
:elusion that the old system could not be maintained without paying 
subsidies to certain continental states. Pelham - a zealous 
advocate of peace and retrenchment - was intent on reducing the 
debt charge and had no eyes for the continent. Like his prede- 
:cessor, Walpole, he was content to leave foreign policy to his 
brother - provided no additional demands were made on the Treasury. 
Hardwicke, the third member of the triumvirate, took more interest 
in foreign affairs than Pelham; but his legal mind and insular 
outlook left him at a disadvantage in the world of high diplomacy, 
although he showed on many concrete points the shrewd commonsense 
which distinguished him in home affairs. Pelham and Hardwicke 
remained unconvinced by Newcastle's arguments and Newcastle was 
compelled on. 14 November 1749 to tell Flemming that no subsidy, 
nor even assurances of subsidies for the future could be given.2 
The struggle in the cabinet on the question of subsidy treaties 
continued throughout the winter 1749 -50.3 Finally in the spring 
y . 
1 W. Bentinck describes him as "un homme trés pénétrant, d'un 
"sens fort droit, qui quoique ministre de Saxe pense comme un 
"homme totalment indépendant; il a la confiance du Roi et des 
"I,Tinistres, surtout du Duc de Newcastle" (Quoted by Beer in 
Archiv fur Oester. Gesch. 44394. At Dresden however he was 
called Flemming l'Anglois "(Williams to Newcastle, private, 
3 July in Add. MSS 32837 f. 278). 
2 S.P.F. Foreign Ministers 36. 
3 V. Appendix C. 
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of 1750 Newcastle won a victory in principle, but Pelham and 
Hardwicke would only give subsidies sufficient to bribe one German 
elector. In spite of Briihlis enlistment of Russian support of 
Saxon claims 
1 
the preference was given to Bavaria, which as the 
traditional ally of France had been of great assistance to her 
in her campaigns in Germany, both in the Spanish and Austrian 
succession wars. Bavaria would therefore be a notable acquisi- 
:tion to the old system; Saxony was already part of the old system, 
but its policy was unreliable and its finances in disorder. The 
British government feared also that the parliamentary opposition 
would attack a subsidy treaty made with Saxony on the ground that 
it was concluded to enable Saxony to pay the interest on George 
II i s private loans to the elector of Saxony.2 BriiL1. and Flemming 
were naturally offended at this preference of Bavaria, but were 
not discouraged. Saxony had gone, in/1746 -50, as far as she pos- 
sibly could to meet the wishes of France, but France had remained 
dissatisfied. Saxe and Issarts had alike failed to secure the 
renewal of the subsidy treaty, and Saxe's death. on 30 November 1750 
notably weakened Saxon influence at Versailles.3 BAhl therefore 
promised Williams that he would not renew the subsidy treaty with 
France and actually sent instructions in this sense to his minister 
at Versailles.4 This was no sacrifice since France had refused 
his overtures, partly on the ground of her financial embarrassments 
1 Holderness to Keith 27 February N.S. 1750 "Czernicbew has orders 
to press our court to grant a very considerable subsidy to that 
"of Dresden: sure they imagine guineas grow in our streets ": in 
Add. MSS 35468 f. 40. Cf. Sternberg to Bernes (intercepted) 
Pol. Corr. VII 208; Newcastle to Guy Dickens 22 December 0.S. 
in Add. MSS 35467 f. 173 b. 
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke 2/13 September 1749, in Add. MSS 35410, 
f. 140; Pelham to Newcastle 26 April 0.S. 1750, in Coxe, Pelham 
Administration II 335 &c. 
3 A.E. Saxe Supplément 2, especially f. 174, f. 178; Pol. Corr. 
VII, 220; Bdttiger II, 455. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 26 September. 
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but chiefly because BriThi was devoted to the enemies of France and 
she believed that it was impossible to change him.1 
Promises, however, sat lightly on Briáhl, and within a few weeks the 
Saxon minister at Versailles was inviting French proposals for a 
renewal of the treaty of subsidies,2 but the conditions attached 
by France, especially co- operation with her in the Empire and the 
giving of offices to the French party in Poland, were unacceptable 
to Brühl. Nevertheless he continued to negotiate with France until 
the actual ratification of the subsidy treaty with Britain, in order 
to extort better terms from Britain, and at the same time to keep 
open a line of retreat should his negotiation with the Maritime 
Powers miscarry.3 
When late in 1750 the elector of Cologne showed signs that he would 
not accept Newcastle's interpretation 
4 
of the subsidy treaty of Feb- 
:ruary 1750 between Cologne, Hanover, and the United Provinces, it 
became practically certain that Britain, if she. persevered in the 
election, would have to buy the Saxon and Palatine as well as the 
Bavarian vote.5 Newcastle had at first tried to secure the Saxon 
vote by the exertion of Austrian6 and Russian7 influence at the 
1 A.E. Saxe Supplément 2, f. 162. f. 168. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 2 January 1751; Pol. Corr. VIII, 169, 171 
Cf. A.E. Saxe 41, f. 58, Despatch to Boyer 15 February, 1751: 
"Le R9i fait un cas infini de l'amitié du Roi de Pologne mais 
"sa M croit en même temps qu'elle lui est due .... et qu'elle 
"ne doit pas toujours la payer surtout quand 1P. sienne et son 
"alliance peuvent etre a chaque instant de la plus grande utilite 
"It sa Mte Polonaise et contenir ceux qui voudroient l'inquieter 
"injustement." 
3 Williams to Newcastle 21, 28 March; Yorke to Holderness 4/15 
September in S.P.F. France 241; A.E. Saxe 41, Boyerb despatches 
of 27 January, 7 February, etc. 
4 Newcastle to Hardwicke 11/22 July 1750 in Add. MSS 35410, f. 273 
5 Newcastle to Hardwicke 26 September /7 October 1750, in Yorke 
II, 26. 
6 Newcastle to Keith 21 July /1 August, 15/26 September 1750, 
11/22 September and 14/25 December 1751 in Add. MSS 35469 f.109, 
f. 229, 32823 f. 268, and 32825 f. 230 respectively. 
7 Newcastle to Dickens especially 30 November and 14 December O.S. 
1750, in S.P.F. Russia; A.E. Saxe 41, f. 66, Boyer's despatch 
24 February 1751. 
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Saxon court, but already he intended to offer the Hanoverian and 
Dutch subsidies if they were rejected by Cologne, either to Saxony 
or to the Palatinate.) 
Brühl at last saw his object within his grasp, and hastened to 
cultivate the good disposition of the Maritime Powers by giving a 
favourable, although non-committal, reply2 to the Emperor's request 
for the Saxon vote for the eldest Archduke. Disputes between 
George II and the elector of Saxony, over repayment of George II's 
loans and the conditions on which Saxony would obtain another loan, 
disturbed the harmony between Britain and Saxony,3 but this source 
of friction was soon removed by a settlement which satisfied both 
A 
courts.` The terms were so favourable to George II that Frederick 
II had believed that Saxony would never accept them. This com- 
:plaisance on Brúhl's part would go far towards removing George II's 
disinclination to have anything to do with Saxony,5 which Newcastle 
had noted in the autumn of 1749, and which had doubtless contributed 
to the British government's choice of Bavaria as the first object 
of their bounty. Flemming took the opportunity to urge over again 
the old arguments for giving a subsidy to Saxony.6 Newcastle's 
vague reply 7 he complained was "too mysterious and too obscure ", 
and on 9 March he wrote again to Newcastle pressing for definite 
assurances of subsidies.8 If these were not forthcoming Saxony 
would be forced to return at once to the French alliance. 
1 Newcastle to C. Bentinck 19/30 September 1750 in Add. MSS 32824 
f. 25. Pelham to Newcastle 5/16 October in Coxe Pelham Adminis- 
: tration_ II 399 . 
2 Arnett. ÌV 297. 
3 Add. TOSS 32824 f. 308: Pol. Corr. VIII 180, 297. 
4 Flemming to Newcastle 26 November in Add. MSS 32825 f. 69; 
Pol. Corr. VIII 159, 180; A.E. Saxe 41, ff 6 and 18. 
5 Newcastle to Hardwicke 2/13 September 1749 in Add. MSS 35410 
f, 140. 
6 Flemming to Newcastle 28 December in. Add. MSS 32825 f. 253. 
7 4/15 January in Add. MSS 32826 f, 17. 
8 Flemming to Newcastle 9 Marcb in. Add. MSS 32826 f. 325. 
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At this point Williams arrived to take up his old post at Dresden 
after shaking the ungrateful dust of Berlin from his feet. The 
disservice he had rendered to Prusso -British friendship made him 
more popular than ever at Dresden;' and despite his failure at 
Berlin, he still enjoyed the confidence of Newcastle. Before 
leaving Berlin, Williams received the usual formal instructions, 
his real instructions being in the form of a "secret" letter.2 
He was to obtain the Saxon vote for the Archduke Joseph by the 
offer to use British influence at Vienna to secure a double marriage 
of the Austrian and Saxon houses,3 by a less definite promise to 
support the Saxon candidate for the Polish throne at the next vacancy, 
and by an offer of good offices at Vienna to procure "any little 
f! practicable douceurs" for. Saxony. Newcastle was encouraged to hope 
that the Saxon vote might be had without a subsidy by misleading 
despatches from Guy Dickens at Petersburg4 to the effect that Saxony 
had promised the empress of Russia to give her vote without subsidies. 
Williams was therefore to stir up Keyserling (and also Sternberg) to 
further exertions at Dresden. Finally, should these offers fail, 
the British government, for the first time in the offici_si corres- 
:pondence, accepted in principle the Saxon demand for a subsidy in 
the almost certain contingency of the treaty of Neuhaus with Cologne 
being repudiated. It was obviously a delicate matter to inform 
1 A.E. Saxe, 41, f. 84: Boyer's despatch 3 March. His failure 
at Berlin also made him a favourite al Vienna. Keith to 
Williams 24 February N.S. in Add. MSS 35492, f. 48 "You are 
'bonsidered at this court as a sort of martyr for the common 
"cause and the Empress herself spoke of you the other day at 
"my audience in the most obliging and gracious terms ". 
2 Newcastle to Williams 8/19 February. 
3 This scheme had been mooted by Flemming in the autumn of 1750. 
(Flemming to Newcastle 28 December in Add. MSS 32825 f. 253). 
4 S.P.F. Russia 56, especially Dickens's despatch of 5 March 0.S. 
Saxony made certain. of Russian support against Britain by making 
a British subsidy a condition of her accession to the treaty of 
the two empresses (Böttiger II 455) and all Newcastle's endea- 
:yours (Newcastle to Dickens secret 5 July O.S.) to make Bestuz- 
:hev change his mind were fruitless. 
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Saxony tha 1 if another prince finally rejected George II's subsidies) 
then and nEt till then, they would be offered to her. Newcastle 
therefore left it to Williams's discretion either to make use of 
this information or to keep it to himself. 
With.:i_n a few days of his arrival at Dresden Williams was convinced . 
that the exertion of Russian and Austrian influence to secure the 
Saxon vote was a "broken reed ".l Keyserling and. Sternberg both 
insisted that only a subsidy from Britain could gain the Saxon vote 
and bring Saxony back completely into the old. system. Williams's 
first conference with Brizhl was equally unsatisfactory. The Saxon 
minister was profuse in assurances of Saxony's desire "to throw 
"itself into the arms of the King [of Great Britain ", but the 
internal condition. of Saxony, and still more the insatiable demands 
of Prussia on the Steuer, forced him to demand subsidies; if these 
were not forthcoming from Britain, Saxony must accept French offers, 
especially as the conditions attached to these could give no offence 
to Saxony's old allies. When Williams asked how Russia would 
regard a renewal of the Saxon rapprochement with. France in the midst 
of the Northern crisisBrühl pointed out that Russia, and also 
Austria, were supporting Saxon claims to a British subsidy and 
would be offended by Britain's refusal. If Britain would give a 
subsidy it would be used to form a camp of 20,000 men,2 which would 
strengthen the prestige of the allies in the Empire. Williams drew 
the correct conclusion from the interview: 
"I cannot believe that with such good dispositions on the one side, 
"and the fear of losing the friendship of Russia on the other, 
"[Saxony will ever be brought to enter into a new subsidy treaty 
"with France, though it is impossible to be answerable that Count 
"Bruhl will not in some immediate distress for money sign a treaty 
"with France in a moment ". 
BrìahlItherefore held the whip hand and as the negotiations proceeded 
the "good dispositions" of Saxony tended to recede into the back- 
1 Williams to Keith. 5 April in Add. MSS 35471 f. 7. 
2 On these chimerical Saxon projects I'f. Pol. Corr. VIII 329 -30. 
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ground, while the threat of a Franco -Saxon treaty was more and more 
nakedly revealed. 
The final repudiation of the treaty of Neuhaus1 made it possible for 
the British government to transfer the "leavings of the elector of 
"Cologne"2 either to Saxony or to the Palatinate. Some ministers 
both in Britain and the United Provinces were inclined to drop the 
election of the king of the Romans and with it the whole policy of 
subsidy treaties. But the prevailing feeling was that of W. Ben - 
:tinck: "How the election negotiation] will end God knows. But 
"it is gone too far to be dropped. I don't like the present ap- 
":pearance but it must not be made worse by letting it fall. "3 
This feeling was strengthened by the insolent Prussian memorial of 
January .1750.4 As between Saxony and the Palatinate the weight 
of opinion in the British cabinet was at first in favour of the 
Palatinate, but ultimately Saxony secured the preference. "L'on 
"penchoit ici pour traiter avec le Palatine" Richecourt reported 
"et les avis étoient réunis II- dessus. Mais je crois qu'on penchera 
"maintenant vers la Saxe. Si bon convient avec elle, on aura en- 
":suite a meilleur marché le Palatine si on peut l'avoir ".5 This 
inclination was confirmed by the influence of W. Bentinck, who wrote 
to Newcastle: -6 
"Elsacher said to me he had heard that there was now an inclination 
"or disposition in England to repair the loss of Cologne by regain - 
":ing the Elector Palatine. At present that the Prince of Orange 
"has determined his thoughts upon Saxony and has secured into his 
"way of thinking those he most wants to carry the thing through I 
"hope nothing will be started that can anyway thwart this measure 
.... besides that it would most certainly put everything back and 
"damp the present spirit consider that the pretensions of the Pala - 
":tinate are such that proposing to negotiate on them is enough to 
"start insuperable difficulties .... Pray then my lord let us drive 
"the nail that will go: and stick to Saxony .... our liaisons with 
"Saxony will certainly be very agreeable to Russia ". 
1 Newcastle to Williams 29 March /9 April: Holderness to 
Newcastle 2 April, in Add. MSS 32827 f. 126. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 6 April. 
3 W. Bentinck to Keith. 26 January, N.S. in Add. PISS 35470 f. 153. 
4 Supra Chapter IV p. 12 "Whatever party[i ing of Prussia] may 
"have had in England (and he certainly had one in opposition to 
"the Duke of Newcastle's measures more than from any other 
"reason) he himself has broke their backs". (W. Bentinck to 
Keith. 26 January, N.S. in Add. MSS 35470 f. 153) . 
5 Richecourt to Kaunitz 29 March /9 April in Add. MSS 32827 f. 156. 
6 W. Bentinck to Newcastle 13 April, in Add. MSS 32827 f. 175. 
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The participation of the United Provinces in the new subsidy was 
essential,1 and on 20 April Newcastle asked Holderness to inform 
the Dutch ministers that he was making preliminary enquiries as 
to the practicability of a subsidy treaty with Saxony. 
At the outset two difficulties stood in the way: (1) !the treaty 
of Neuhaus had been concluded by George II in his electoral capa- 
:city and both King and ministers insisted that the projected 
treaty with Saxony should be on the same footing.2 The Dutch 
absolutely refused to take any part in the proposed negotiations 
unless in conjunction with the king of Great Britain.3 (2) Mat 
share of the proposed subsidy was to be paid by the United Pro - 
:vinces ? "His Majesty" Newcastle wrote "will certainly as Elec- 
":tor not exceed the sum he gave to Cologne, so that if. the King 
"of Poland insists upon the same subsidy, vizt: £40,000, the fourth 
'part must be made up either by the Republic paying the same propor- 
":ti.on as Hanover, or by the court of Vienna's contributing one 
'fourth as they did to Bavaria ". The Dutch ministers decisively 
rejected the suggestion that they should contribute one half of 
the subsidy,5 and the court of Vienna also lost no time in refus- 
ing to pay the quarter share proposed by Newcastle.6 
Meantime Williams had learned from Holderness that the elector of 
Cologne had signed a treaty with France. He immediately went to 
1 See Newcastle - Holderness correspondence in S.P.F. Holland 
(April) and their private letters in Add. MSS 32827 ff 126, 
139, 150, 177, 187. 
2 Newcastle to Holderness private 9 April 0.S.: Newcastle 
to Williams "very secret" 12 April 0.S. 
3 Holderness to Newcastle 27,30 April in Add. MSS 32827 ff 259, 
267: W. Bentinck to Newcastle 30 April f. 274: "The Repub- 
":lic will readily engage in measures (necessary for the 
"maintaining of the liberties of Europe &c) with the Crown of 
"Great Britain because the risk ... would be shared by Eng- 
":land ... the Republic, though glad to have the additional 
"weight of the electorate, will not engage with the elector - 
":ate alone ". Cf. Bentinck's Journal in Egerton MSS 1732, 
13/24 May and also f. 129. 
4 Newcastle to Holderness private in Add. MSS 32827 f. 205. 
5 Holderness to Newcastle 23 April in Add. MSS 32827 f. 237. 
6 Keith. to Williams 10 May in Add. MSS 35492 f. 53 b. 
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Brúhl and held out the prospect of a subsidy in the hope of conceal- 
ing that the subsidy which he assumed would now be offered to Saxony 
was the "leavings of the Elector of Cologne ".1 This manoeuvre shows 
tact and ability to appreciate the Saxon point of view, but Brúhl 
discovered a few hours later that Cologne had slipped out of the 
hands of the Maritime Powers and naturally decided to raise his 
price. When on 2 May Williams received Newcastle's "very secret" 
letter of 12/23 April authorising him to sound Brïahl he .found that 
his adroitness had availed him nothing. 
The first point on which Newcastle insisted was that the treaty must 
be with George II as elector. Secondly, Williams must find out the 
minimum which Saxony would accept by way of subsidy. George II 
would not contribute more than 100,000 German crowns, and Newcastle 
suggested that Saxony should be satisfied with three -quarters of the 
Cologne subsidy of 200,000 crowns, unless Holland and Austria would 
make up the deficiency. "You will from hence" Newcastle added "see 
"that your business at present is only to learn; to engage for 
"nothing but give reason to hope that a satisfactory answer upon 
"these points might produce a good effect ". Finally,Newcastle 
communicated to Williams further details of Conti's schemes to 
secure the succession in Poland2 in the hope of facilitating the 
conclusion of the treaty by arousing Brúhl's suspicions of France. 
Brúhl must have been delighted when Williams's overtures showed that 
the British government was at last coming to the scratch, but he 
allowed no sign of his jubilation to appear. The matter,he told 
Williams was so important that it must be referred to the privy 
i Saxon sensitiveness on this point was later increased by 
Prussian insinuations (Pol. Corr. VIII 352). 
2 The information came originally from Vienna (Keith to Newcastle 
very secret, 13 February 0. S., 6 April. 0.S. 1750, in Add. MISS 
35468 ff 35, 197); Pol. Corr. VIII 387 gives the usual dis- 




- Brühl's favourite device to drag out a negotiation. 
Nevertheless he hastened to despatch Flemming to his old post at 
London 
2 
in order to influence Newcastle and to study la dessous 
des cartes. 
Williams extracted from Brühl a clear and prompt, but not over 
satisfactory, answer to Newcastle's questions. Br%ihl stipulated 
that the proposed treaty must be made between the king of Great 
Britain and the king of Poland as elector of Saxony; that it must 
be purely defensive with the object of preserving the tranquillity 
of the Empire; and that it must contain a guarantee of Saxony's 
territory and security. Finally,Brizhl, hinting that Britain had 
never, under the terms of the treaty of Warsaw, compensated Saxony 
for the damage done by the Prussian invasion of Saxony in 1745, 
demanded a subsidy of r60,000 per annum for six gears. This was 
practically twice the sum offered by Newcastle and considerably 
more than France was offering to Saxony, although Briihl had repeat- 
:edly assured Williams that he would rather take a smaller subsidy 
from Britain than a larger from France. Brúhl now denied that he 
had made any such statement. 
These exorbitant demands are plainly due in some part to Saxon 
pride. Saxony regarded herself among the German states as second 
in dignity to Austria alone, and it was ridiculous to expect her 
to take a lesser subsidy than had been offered to Cologne. More - 
:over Brüh1 was well aware that after the defection of Cologne he 
was Newcastle's best, if not only, chance of carrying the election, 
and he was determined to press this advantage to the uttermost. 
Newcastle was disgusted at his "very extravagant demands115 but was 
1 Williams to Newcastle 5 May. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 10 May. 
3 Dated 13 May, in S.P.F. Poland. 
4 Frederick believed that Saxony demanded £100,000. (Pol. Corr. 
VIII 378) and thought the subsidy actually accepted by Saxony 
miserably small. (ibid VIII 429) . 
5 Newcastle to Keith in S.P.F. Germany (Empire) 10 May O.S. 
Cf. Newcastle to Williams 10 May 0.8. 
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encouraged by the news that Flemming was returning to London, by 
Williams's assurances that Fleming's instructions would be more 
moderate than Brdhl's first demands,1 and by Keith's opinion that 
the court of Vienna might after all be persuaded to contribute to 
the subsidy.2 He was satisfied that the British negotiations 
would prevent the conclusion of a Franco -Saxon subsidy treaty in 
the meantime, but the repeated postponements of Flemming's departure 
for England soon made him suspicious.3 He had never been very hope- 
ful of success at Dresden4 ands after consulting W. Bentinck, who 
was on a visit to England, he wrote to Keith to propose that Austria 
should start negotiations with the Elector Palatine so as to keep 
the affair of the election active. "Examination of pretensions" 
he wrote "can do no harm and may do good, and the more unjustifiable 
"these pretensions are the less inconvenience can arise to the court 
"of Vienna from their examination ". If Brïihl could choose between 
Britain and France, Newcastle hoped to be able to choose between 
Saxony and the Palatinate. But Austria's response6 to Newcastle's 
despatch of 31 May was not encouraging and no serious negotiation 
with the Palatinate resulted. 
Meantime Newcastle and Bentinck discussed the general situation 
7 
and decided definitely to go ahead with the Saxon negotiation. 
Bentinck insisted once again that the treaty must be made by Great 
Britain; and the King, when Newcastle broached the subject to him, 
would not hear of giving subsidies in his electoral capacity to any 
German state except Cologne, in which he had a special interest 
1 Williams to Newcastle 14,19 May. 
2 Newcastle to Keith 31 May O.S. very secret. in Add. MSS 32828 
f. 61. 
3 Newcastle to Williams 31 May 0.S.: Newcastle to Dickens 5 July 
O.S. in Add. MSS 32828 f. 179. 
4 Newcastle to Holderness 9 April O.S. in Add. MSS 32827 f. 205: 
"Upon the whole I think we shall begin the negotiation and that 
"will have its effect whether it shall ultimately succeed or 
"not." 
5 "Very secret" 31 May 0.S. in Add. MSS 32828 f. 61. 
6 Dated 24 June in S.P.F. Germany (Empire). Cf. Bartenstein's 
remarks quoted in Pol. Corr. VIII 371, 374. 
7 See Bentinck's Journal in Egerton MSS 1732, especially 13/24 
May. 
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owing to his desire to secure the election of the duke of Cumber - 
:land to the coadjutorship. It therefore became necessary to 
extort the consent of Newcastle's colleagues, and especially of 
Pelham, to a second British subsidy in order to carry the election. 
In the parliamentary debates on the Bavarian treaty Pelham had 
virtually promised1 that it would be the only one, and it was the 
more difficult to go back on this promise because the defection 
of Cologne had partially destroyed the popularity of the election. 
"Now that Cologne had been lost, they [the ministers] mocked at 
"everything that had been done, saying that whatever was done in 
"Germany was simply flinging money away because France would offer. 
"more money and traverse the British negotiation. "2 
The first step towards securing the adoption of the Newcastle - 
Bentinck programme was to get rid of Bedford,3 the Secretary of 
State for the Southern department, a staunch "little Englander" 
and long a thorn in Newcastle's delicate side. Pelham was averse 
to alienating one of the greatest Whig landowners and the King 
refused to dismiss him.4 But the death of the prince of Wales 
destroyed the kernel of the parliamentary opposition, and made 
the Bedfordites in opposition comparatively harmless. At last 
on 13 June Bedford's ally,Sandwich, was dismissed from the Admir- 
alty. Bedford's resignation followed next day and was accepted 
with some reluctance by the King, who showed his dissatisfaction 
with Newcastle by refusing to speak to him for over a month.5 
Newcastle however consolidated his victory by securing the 
1 Coxe: Pelham Administration II 208. 
2 Bentinck's Journal-TT-Egerton MSS 1732) 13/24 May 1751. 
3 On the whole course of this protracted intrigue see Walpole, 
George II 185 -194: Yorke II 40 -42 (and relative correspond - 
:ence); Pol, Corr. VIII 348 -9, 364 -6, 396, 401, 406. 
4 Yorke II 40. 
5 Bedford Correspondence II 96. Cf. Coxe Pelham Administration 
II 401 -2. 
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admission to the Cabinet, as Lord President of the Council, of 
Lord Granville, carefully chosen' to support Newcastle's meddlesome 
continental policy, and of Holderness as Secretary of State for the 
Southern department, a creature of Newcastle's, who would prove a 
useful subordinate in carrying out this policy.2 Newcastle had 
already begun the conversion of the Lord Chancellor and was power- 
:fully assisted by Bentinck,3 whom Hardwicke did not wish to offend 
when the sending of his son Joseph Yorke to the Hague was under 
discussion.4 The British government now began to consider the 
treaty with Saxony seriously and Dickens was ordered to secure 
effective Russian intervention to lessen Saxon demands.5 This 
was the more necessary because Austria finally refused to make any 
contribution to the purchase of the Saxon vote.6 
Newcastle's suspicions of Saxony's double dealing naturally in- 
:creased by the visit to Dresden of a former French agent at Warsaw, 
Durand, and by the approaching return of Loss to Versailles,--were 
temporarily removed by Flemming's arrival in London at the beginning 
of August. Flemming immediately submitted Saxony's demands to New - 
:castle8, who found them not unacceptable as a basis of negotiation. 
They were identical with the forecast made by Williams at the begin- 
ning of June - a subsidy of £50,000 per annum for six years and a 
British guarantee of the hereditary dominions of the Saxon house. 
In exchange the elector would give his vote for the Archduke and 
promise to accede to the treaty of the two empresses if "no new and 
i Bentinck's JournalEgerton MSS 1732 f. 120. Cf. Yorke II 
42,101. 
2 Coxe: Pelham Administration II 387. 
3 Newcastle to Holderness 9 July 0.S. in Add. MSS 32828 f. 210. 
4 Egerton MSS 1732 f. 123b. 
5 Newcastle to Dickens 5 July 0.S. in Add. MSS 32828 f. 179. 
6 Keith to Newcastle private 19 July in Add. MSS 32828 f. 204. 
7 Newcastle to Williams 16 July 0.S. 
8 Newcastle to Williams 26 July 0.S. Flemming's memorial is 
in S.P.F. Foreign Ministers 46. 
9 Holderness to W. Bentinck 26 July 0.S. "Flemming is still 
"pretty high in his demands, but I think there is all imagin- 
able reason to believe that the affair will end well ". 
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"dlnerous obligations" were required of him and the imperial courts 
guaranteed him against any damage "en haine de cette accession ". 
Newcastle had already secured the approval of the leading ministers 
except Pelham, and even he, although averse, had not actually refused 
to acquiesce.' On 7 August Pelham's conversion was carried a stage 
further by Newcastle, supported by "Mylord Granville who behaved 
"very well ", with the result that when Flemming's memorial was com- 
municated to him "he gave more into it or opposed it less than we 
"could imagine ".2 In great glee Newcastle went to court, where he 
had hardly dared to show himself since Bedford's retiral, and "was 
"the first spoke to at the levee, although the duke of Bedford was 
"there and was most graciously spoke to afterwards ". 
"When I came into the closet" Newcastle continues, "I told the King 
"that I had something to lay before him that I hoped would be to his 
"satisfaction, that I had had a great deal of discourse with Count 
"Flemming whom I found very reasonable. That I had also had some 
"discourse with my brother and then I said no more but produced 
"Flemming's paper and explained it. His Majesty seemed pleased but 
"wanted toile Court of Vienna to contribute,3 which I said was impos- 
":sible. That whatever we did with Saxony required the utmost 
"despatch as Count Loss had returned to Paris and if the Dauphiness 
"had a son she would be able to procure any conditions from France 
"for the King her father. This made an impression. I said that 
"I found my brother less objective than I expected; that he thought 
"this an immaterial object, but that he had seemed disposed even to 
"give a subsidy to Russia if we could make a grand alliance with 
"Spain, which would really curb France, and I extolled my brother's 
"noble way of talking on that subject as indeed it deserved. I did 
"not intend to mention my Lord Granville but the King of himself 
"immediately said This is the effect of Granville's coming in. He 
"supports you or your way of thinking, with something like a hint 
"as if. I wanted that support before and that this had produced the 
"alteration. I then thought it proper to own to the King (in con - 
":fidence) that I had desired Ld. Gr [an.villel to talk to my brother. 
"I am sure I was right for that showed it to be in concert with me. 
"The King seemed highly pleased the whole time. I then in my free 
"way (a stile I have not lately used) said if your Majesty would tell 
"my B [rother] you think this treaty with Saxony useful and necessary 
"I realy (sic) think my B [rother] would agree to it. The King 
"answered I can't go so far at first: I must first see what abate - 
" :ments Flemming will make and reduce the sum to German crowns. I 
"have sent to Flemming for that purpose but I despair of his going 
"lower than 47,500 pds for four years only. Upon the whole I never 
1 "He seemed to think Saxony an immaterial object ". Newcastle to 
Hardwicke 27 July O.S. in Add. MSS 35411 f. 291. 
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke 27 July O.S. in Add. MSS 35411 f. 291. 
3 Newcastle accordingly wrote (2 August O.S.) to KeithCin Add. MSS 
32829 f. 15b), representing the negotiation on the verge of rup- 
:ture unless the court of Vienna would contribute. 
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"saw such change of behavior in my life .... I went afterwards to 
the Lady [Yarmouth) to whom in general I communicated what had 
"passed and shewed great satisfaction at ye appearance of success 
"in our great foreign negotiations. She seemed in high good humour, 
"[añd assured Newcastle that the King was fort content, remarking 
"'vous avez beau jeu tant dedans que dehors'. I said'bu.i, si le 
"'roi est contents.... This is the substance of the whole. Business 
"has done the whole and business must preserve it." 
Pelham's conversion was presumably completed) on the following 
Tuesday when Hardwicke, Pelham, and Newcastle dined without other 
company, and the approval of the Council later in the evening would 
be a mere formality when the leading ministers were in agreement. 
Although the quantum and duration of the subsidy still remained to 
be definitely fixed Saxon demands and British offers were near 
enough for Newcastle and his secretaries to draw up a draft treaty 
on the model of the Bavarian treaty of subsidies,2 along with a 
secret declaration regarding the Saxon vote. The gravest obstacle 
to agreement was that Flemming was "expressly ordered by his Court 
"not to engage for any troops whatever, lest it should draw on him 
"[Saxony the resentment of Prussia ", and Newcastle adds "and I 
2 
"suppose of France ". As it was impossible to announce publicly the 
real reason why Britain was bribing Saxony, this would remove the 
sole justification of the treaty which the ministers could give to 
the House of Commons. Another difficulty was George II's insistence 
on Saxon reciprocity for the proposed British guarantee of the here- 
:ditary Saxon dominions, which Flemming could not accept. Flemming 
objected also that the draft treaty contained no "acknowledgment" 
from the court of Vienna for the Saxon vote, and on 18 August in 
a formal Note handed to Newcastle he asked for a promise that 
British influence would be exerted at Vienna to secure the coveted 
double marriage, or, failing that, some other convenance. Newcastle 
1 It was never more than 'bare acquiescence and not a conviction 
"as to the utility of the measure" (Newcastle to W. Bentinck 
2 August 0.S. in Add. MSS 32829 f. 46). 
2 Newcastle to W. Bentinck "very secret" 2 August 0.S. in Add. 
PISS 32829 f. 55 (printed in Archives II 152 -6). 
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1 2 
accepted the Note on the express condition that the proposed 
treaty was not to depend In any way for its validity on the success 
of these representations at Vienna. Things were now far enough 
advanced for the draft treaty to be communicated to the Dutch minis - 
:ters and sent on to Williams with instructions to try and reach a 
settlement with the Saxon court on the outstanding differences. 
Newcastle was in high spirits - bubbling over with generous self - 
congratulation and naively wondering how he had managed to do so 
much in so short a time. 
"To have been able to suppress the very mention of concluding this 
"treaty in the electoral capacity: not to have said one word to 
"you [Holland] to exceed the proportion of one third nor to the 
"court of Vienna to contribute one quarter and 'yet to have agreed 
"with Count Flemming both as to the quantum and duration - and this 
"all to be negotiated and sent away in s than three weeks would 
"be a surprise to those who know how we thought here upon these 
"subjects: and be thought some merit in those who have had the 
"principal if not the sole hand in doing it .... If the King will 
"support me here and my allies not be vexatious .... I will venture 
"to answer that in time [and perhaps soon] we will still have some 
"ground to stand upon on the Continent." 
The prince of prange and W. Bentinck were less optimistic than New - 
:castle, but equally impressed by the necessity for the Maritime 
Powers) of concluding the proposed treaty.3 They had been the 
first to propose the election of the Archduke Joseph;4 they had 
likewise been at the beginning advocates of the subsidy treaty with 
Saxony; their objections as to the form of the treaty at first pro- 
posed by Newcastle had been removed, and their share in the subsidy 
had been satisfactorily adjusted. On this question therefore the 
Maritime Powers were in complete agreement - an increasingly rare 
1 He had already (2 August O.S.) sent "measured orders" to Keith 
(Add. MSS 32829 f. 15 b) . Newcastle himself was favourable to 
the proposal since it would make'h consistent system in the 
"Empire ". Newcastle.to W. Bentinck in Add. MSS 32829 f. 113 
9 August very private :but he adds "The King (entre nous) isn't 
much for it". . 
2 Written (in French) on the margin of Flemming's Note. Cf. New- 
:castle to Williams 9 August O.S. 
3 W. Bentinck to Newcastle 19 August - before he had received 
the draft treaty - in Add. MSS 32829 f. 94. 
4 En lisp. Historical Review XLII, 364; Archives II, 101. "J'ai 
"et le premier, d -dés l'an 1747 á proposer .... qu'on 
"songeait une fois serieusement a l'election] ". ( Prince of 
Orange to W. Bentinck 24 May 1750 
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1 
phenomenon. Newcastle's draft was approved and full powers to 
conclude the treaty sent to Calkoen, the Dutch minister at Dresden. 
The Saxon tactics are unmistakeable. Flermning's mission to London . 
was designed to delay matters, when every week's delay made it more 
essential for Newcastle,if he was to keep the election negotiation 
alive at all, to secure the Saxon vote. Secondly, by giving his 
personal approval to Newcastle's demands and still leaving his 
government uncommitted, Flemming was to involve Newcastle so deeply 
in the subsidy negotiation, that Newcastle's withdrawal would. 
destroy Britain's credit on the Continent, already gravely impaired 
by the success of France in the subsidy competition. with Britain 
which Newcastle's policy had inaugurated. 
"The negotiation" W. Bentinck wrote3 "must go on and must now be 
"speedily perfected guovi.s modo for if, after our misfortune with. 
"Cologne, we should happen to lose or not gain Saxony, upon my 
"word we are all prostituted and lost for ever and we shall be 
"ridiculed abroad and at home ". 
Lastly,Brühl adroitly made certain that the final settlement would 
take place at Dresden.4 Williams, driven by the exhortations of 
Newcastle and by his ovan vanity to conclude the treaty without 
further delay, and dreading that Brihl might conclude with France 
if he proved obstinate on the outstanding questions, would be at a 
fatal disadvantage in negotiating, v =4h s Brühl's handling 
of this threat was masterly. If Williams touched on his relations 
with France he, with every appearance of candour, told Williams 
that France was making good offers, but that he would not accept 
them, although the privy council was in favour of them. Brúhl, 
1 Fagel to Newcastle 23 August in Add. MSS 32829 f. 135 
2 Fagel to Newcastle 23 August in Add. MSS 32829 f. 135: W. 
Bentinck to Newcastle 27 August in. Archives II, 160. 
3 W. Bentinck to Newcastle 19 August N.S. in Add. MSS 32829 1.94. 
4 Flemming, in addition to the impracticable nature of his 
instructions was not given a full power. Cf. Newcastle to W. 
Bentinck "ver 
 
y secret2 August O.S. in Add. MSS 32829, f. 55. 
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with his richly deserved reputation for duplicity, knew well that 
the best way to mystify Williams was to tell the truth, while 
encouraging Williams's suspicions of his veracity by the appearance 
of a negotiation with France.' 
Thus when the scene shifted to Dresden and Williams posed in the 
limelight for a brief hour, Brúhl played the leading r ie, Williams 
that of "brilliant second".2 His instructions were in general to 
secure a settlement in favour of Britain on the vital questions 
left unsettled by Newcastle and Flemming, although Flemming on 
practically every point had professed that he was convinced by 
Newcastle's arguments and had thus induced Newcastle to count much 
too confidently on success. 
The first question was the quantum of the subsidy. Newcastle 
offered either £45,000 for four years or (preferably) £40,000 for 
six years in place of £48,000 for four years, which was Flemming's 
minimum and which Williams was finally to accept if necessary. 
As to the time of the payments Williams must get rid of the stipu- 
:lation of six months in advance, since no money could be paid 
until the treaty had been sanctioned by Parliament. Secondly, 
Newcastle insisted upon a clause placing a corps of Saxon troops 
at the disposal of the Maritime Powers in the event of war; pre- 
ferably, as was the case in the Bavarian treaty, even if Britain 
were the aessor, or in a modified form if Saxon fears of Prussian 
1 The return of Loss to his old post at Versailles (Williams 
to Newcastle 1 August; Yorke to Holderness 4/15 Sept. (1) 
S.P.F. France 241) and the particular audience openly accorded 
at Dresden to Durand (Williams to Newcastle 11 August, A.E. 
Saxe 41, f. 307, f. 336). 
2 Calkoen was content to follow Williams's energetic lead 
(Calkoen to Fagel 14 November 1751 in Add. MSS 15872, f. 295; 
A.E. Saxe 41, f. 292, Boyer's despatch of 23 July), and was 
therefore pe_rsona grata to Williams. He was personally.inter- 
:ested iné conclusion of treaty of subsidies as he had 
bought a large amount of Steuer bills, towards the payment of 
which part of the subsidy would be.applied (A.E. Saxe 41, f.139, 
Boyer's despatch of 7 April). 
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resentment made this unacceptable.' Thirdly, Newcastle absolutely 
rejected the demand for a guarantee of the Saxon dominions, offer- 
ing in its place an emphatic promise "to use their [the Maritime 
"Powers' utmost endeavours to procure satisfaction for any damage 
"or injury done on account of this treaty ... by any Power or on any 
1 
"pretence whatsoever ". Fourthly, the Saxon vote which was not 
mentioned in the treaty, was to be secured by a "secret declaration" 
by the elector. Newcastle also attempted to introduce into this 
proposed declaration an entirely irrelevant section2 by which Saxony 
was to promise formally to accede "on the foot of former engagements "'!' 
to the body of the treaty of the two empresses as Britain had al- 
:ready done. Finally, Newcastle insisted that the execution of 
the treaty and declaration must not depend in any way on future 
negotiations between Dresden and Vienna, since it was obvious that 
Austria would never consent to the double marriage proposal.3 
Brìthl showed no haste to discuss Newcastle's propositions; but 
Williams, counting too much on his intimacy with Brizhl and the 
King, gave Newcastle his opinion that it would be very difficult 
Se+. 
for Brühl to back out now that Britain was so generous. Then 
Brühl returned from the royal hunting party, Williams soon discover- 
ed his mistake.4 Although on his own responsibility he removed 
1 Newcastle to Williams 9 August O.S. (Newcastle's italics); but 
a guarantee and a mere promise of this kind, no matter how 
strongly worded, differ completely in character. 
2 The one objection made by the prince of Orange to Newcastle's 
instructions to Williams was the insertion of this section. 
(Fagel to Newcastle 23 August in Add. MSS 32829, f. 135). 
3 Keith to Williams 24 November in Add. MSS 35492 f. 61; Dickens 
to Newcastle 26 October O.S. and 28 December O.S. in S.P.F. 
Russia. 
4 Williams communicated Newcastle's project to Brühl on 1 Septem- 
ber. Brühl's counter- project was handed to Williams on the 5th 
Both projects were discussed at a conference between Brühl, 
Williams, and Keyserling on the 7th, which was so unfavourable 
to Williams that he decided (Williams to Newcastle 8 September) 
not to sign the treaty even sub spe rata, but merely to forward 
it to Newcastle. The chief difference between the protocol of 
7 September and the treaty and declaration of 13 September is 
that the protocol definitely makes the giving of the vote depend 
upon the success of Austro -Saxon negotiations. The protocol of 
7 September also asserted that even the 6000 Saxon troops would 
not be sent to the assistance of the Maritime Powers without a 
previous convention, whereas the treaty was ambiguous on this 
point. 
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the paragraph. regarding Saxon accession to the treaty of 1746 from 
the secret declaration and made no attempt to reduce the subsidy 
below £48,000 for four years, Brühl refused to accept the article 
about the 6000 troops in either form, attempted to restore the 
1 
guarantee of the Saxon dominions to the treaty and insisted that 
the secret declaration must be merely a "verbal" one.2 
Too late Williams realised the difficulty of his position. A com- 
plete deadlock had apparently been reached between the British and 
Saxon negotiators, Keyserling tried to arrange a compromise. He 
proposed that, to enable the British government to throw dust in 
the eyes of Parliament, should admit the article concerning 
the 6000 troops, but that the British government should give a 
private assurance that it would never actually ask for the troops.5 
Williams naturally rejected this proposal) and Keyserling then exert - 
:ed all his influence to persuade Williams and Calkoen to sign the 
treaty as it stood sub spe rati. Keyserling's advice would not 
have had much weight with Williams, but it was enforced by the hard 
logic of facts. Brühl was apparently wavering; the rest of the 
Saxon privy council, headed by the redoubtable Hennicke, who, Wil- 
:liams believed, was gaining ground at Brúhl's expense,4 were solid- 
:ly Francophil and their attitude was stiffened. by French threats 
to hand Saxony over to the resentment of Prussia if she concluded a 
subsidy treaty with the Irlaritime Powers.5 After Hennicke the most 
influential members of the privy council were the brothers Loss, who 
1 Williams to Newcastle 5 September. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 8 September. Cf. Sternberg to Puebla 
(intercepted) 18 September in Pol. Corr. VIII, 459. 
3 Sternberg to Puebla (intercepted) 18 September in Pol. Corr. 
VIII 459. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 13 and 19 September. Cf. however Pol. 
Corr. VIII 453 -4. But Brííhl's success in appointing his brother 
as Vice President of the Chamber and thus depriving Hennicke of 
his undivided control of finance would make Hennicke all the 
more hostile to the policy of his successful rival. Williams, 
however, certainly exaggerates Hennicke's influence, either be- 
:cause he was deceived by Brühl or in order to explain the 
intractability of Brizhl. 
5 A.E. Saxe 41, f. 2641 Despatch to Boyer i July. 
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"make no secret of their wishing to see this Court in a strict 
"alliance with that of Versailles. They talk of it publicly and 
"the reason they give is that France is the only power that can 
"defend them against Prussia, and four years experience to the con - 
":trary has not been able tc convince them of this error ". 
Count Rex was the only member of the privy council who was not 
undoubtedly pro -French.' On the other hand the electoral prince 
and princess2 supported the subsidy treaty with Britain, but they 
had little influence on affairs. The court was leaving Dresden 
for a round of hunting parties on 14 September, and no business 
could possibly be settled after that date for at least a month; 
while Williams had received emphatic orders to bring the Saxon 
negotiation to a conclusion one way or the other without further 
delay. 
3 
Rumours were already rife at Dresden that Loss had persuaded France 
to reopen negotiations for renewal of the former treaty of subsidies, 
and they revived Williams's fears that Br'ahl was playing with him it 
1 These details are based on Williams's letters to Newcastle, 
7,4,,4) dated 23 June,Aand to Keith dated 11 June (in Add. MSS 35471, 
f.125). 
2 Williams to Newcastle 13 September. 
3 Newcastle to Williams 9 August O.S. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 13 September: Newcastle to Williams 3 
September O.S.; Pol. Corr. VIII 389. See also the memorandum 
endorsed "September 1751" in A.E. Saxe Supplement 2, which 
states the objections to subsidising Saxony only to sweep them 
aside. France could demand (7_) Saxon assistance to prevent a 
war of the Empire against France and (2) Saxon support in op- 
:position to the election of the Archduke. These conditions 
would be of use to Prussia as well as to France and are much 
less burdensome to Saxony than the English demands. They would . 
have therefore a good chance of being accepted by Saxony. 
"Enfin si l'on considère les avantages de cette all par 
"rapport au Roy, on trouve que S. Mte. encouragera par ce- 
"ses allies, qu'elle aura la pluralité dans le college Ela? -. 
"tant pour empecher la cour de Vienne de faire declarer contre 
"luy une guerre de l'Empire que pour empecher l'accroissem.. 
"de la Puissance de la Mon. d'Autre.... et que sa consideron. 
"augmentera a proportion de ce que les cours de Vienne et de 
"Londres perdront de la leur ...." Cf. Yorke to Holderness 
(S.P.F. France 241) 4/15 September (1); 21 September /2 October 
"[The French Court] pretend still to have some hopes of succeed 
":ing at Dresden] and it is certain that M. Loss presses it as 
"much as he can ". When the French government learned that Sax - 
:ony had actually concluded the subsidy treaty with Britain 
they were naturally dissatisfied with Saxony (A.E. Saxe 41, 
f. 396 - Despatch to Boyer 1 October), but publicly declared 
that theyudid not think it prudent to purchase so dear a court 
"upon which no dependence could be made on account of its un- 
":limited and constant attachment to Russia ". Scheffer to 
Wynantz 9 October N.S. (intercepted) in Add.. MSS 32830 f. 238. 
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order to bring France up to the scratch. The most serious obstacle 
to a renewed Franco -Prussian rapprochement was Prussian influence at 
Versailles,) but this was on the decline owing to the death of 
Chambrier, 
2 
Frederick's envoy extraordinary to France, the quarrel 
3 
between Puysieulx and the Prussian minister Ammon, and the retirai 
of Puysieulx.4 To crown all the confinement of the Dauphiness was 
daily expected, and if she gave birth to a son she would amid the 
national rejoicings almost certainly be able to procure the renewal 
of the Franco -Saxon treaty of 1746, which would give Saxony a larger 
subsidy than that offered by Britain.5 
In this, the second great crisis of his diplomatic career, Williams, 
although he was never able to distinguish between necessary activity 
and mere fussihess,6 showed to much greater advantage than in the 
better known episode of his quarrel with Frederick the Great. Bri -rl, 
although vastly inferior to Frederick in all the elements of great - 
:ness, was no mean antagonist7 in a diplomatic battle of the wits 
and he held nearly all the trumps. Williams played such cards as 
he had well, pressed Brìhl as far as he dared, threatened to refuse 
to sign the treaty, and thus obtained certain modifications which 
Keyserling's influence was apparently unable to secure. He then 
decided to make the best of a bad job by signing the treaty sub spe 
rati. The wisdom of this step is open to doubt. Williams believed 
1 Yorke to H.V. Jones 17/28 October in Add. MSS 32831 f. 25. 
2 Pol. Corr. VIII 381. 
3 Pol. Corr. VII 455, 457. 
4 Pol. Corr. VII 455. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 13 September. Cf. Sternberg to Puebla 
(intercepted) in Pol. Corr. VIII 459. 
6 "M. de Williams ne m'a jamais paru si occupe. Il ne cesse de 
"parler affaires avec Mme. de Sternberg bien plus qu'avec M 
"son mari ... Enfin [ill ne perd pas un moment de vide Qrühlj 
"et il s'en empare le plus souvent et le plus longtems qu'il 
"peut ". Boyer's despatch of 23 July (A.E. Saxe 41). 
7 On the difficulties of negotiating at Dresden cf. Marteville 
to Fagel 15 July 1749 (appended to Holderness's letter to New- 
castle of 21 July /1 August 1749 in S.P.F. Holland 449) "La 
"maniere extraordinaire dont les affaires sont ici traitées 
"n'est pas á dire: on change de pensée à toute heure. Au- 
"iourd'hui l'on parle d'une façon, demain d'une autre et le lan- 
"iguäge que l'on tient varie autant c'ue les mensonges que l'on 
"debite partout sont en grand nombre". 
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that he had tied Brühl to the terms of the treaty without in any 
way committing his own government.) This was legally correct, 
but he had in reality dragged Britain a step further into the 
morass into which Newcastle, at Williams's instigation, had reck- 
lessly ventured in the summer of 1750. In practice, although 
not in law, he had compromised the British government, and made 
it more difficult for Newcastle to drop the Saxon negotiation 
(and with it the election) without fatally ruining British credit 
on the Continent at a time when war with France in the colonies 
was already threatening, Moreover the gain he believed he had 
made by signing the treaty was in large part imaginary. Brízhl 
regarded himself as no more bound to Britain than he had been 
2 
before the signature of the treaty. If, however, the British . 
government decided to go on with the negotiation, it was certainly 
of some value to have tied Brúhl down to definite terms acceptable 
to Britain on some points at least. 
The alternative which a professional diplomatist would probably 
have taken was to have sent Brihl's version of the treaty to 
London unsigned to be discussed there by Newcastle and Flemming. 
This course had serious disadvantages. It was vain to expect 
Brìhl to send to London full powers and instructions satisfactory 
to the British government; so that, after the loss of several 
weeks, the negotiation would have had to be referred back to Dresder 
and there entered upon practically ab initio. And meantime France 
would probably, as at Copenhagen in 1749, and Bonn in 1750, have 
seized the opportunity to inflict another humiliation on Britain 
by taking Saxony out of her hands. Williams's signature preserved 
1 Williams to Newcastle 13 September. 
2 Boyer's despatch of 15 September in A.E. Saxe 41, f. 374; 
Maltzahn's reports in Pol. Corr. VIII, 458, 460. There is, 
however, some truth in Williams's analogy between Saxony and 
a Tory in the English Parliament "who after having given one 
"vote with the Court .... has been so abused by his party for 
"so doing that it made it impossible for him ever to return to 
"his old friends again ". Williams to Newcastle private 14 
September in Add. MSS 32829, f. 290. 
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at least the illusion of progress, and the ultimate success of the 
negotiation went far to justify his action. It is not without 
significance that Calkoen, who had long experience at the Saxon 
court, signed along with Williams. 
The signed treaty sent by Williams to Newcastle differed in vital 
points from Newcastle's draft. Williams was successful in obtain - 
:ing postponement of the payment of the first half year's subsidy 
until 25 March 1752, and in rejecting Brühl's attempt to extend 
Britain's good offices to secure compensation for Saxony into a 
guarantee of the Saxon dominions. But he failed to secure more 
than a promise of Saxon neutrality in the event of a general war 
except in two contingencies:- (1) If Russia or Austria were at- 
:tacked' Saxony would at once send the stipulated succours under 
existing treaties (9000 men in the case of Russia and 6000 in the 
case of Austria) (2) If Great Britain or the United Provinces were 
directly attacked 6000 troops would be sent to their assistance, 
but not until an ad hoc agreement had regulated the conditions of 
their service and payment. Further,Newcastle's article obliging 
Saxony to follow the Hanoverian lead on all German questions was 
altered to place Saxony on an equal footing with Hanover, and pro- 
vided merely for consultation and co- operation so far as possible 
in conformity with the laws and constitutions of the Empire. The 
cumulative effect of these alterations was practically to transform 
the subsidy treaty proposed by Newcastle into a treaty of defensive 
alliance. 
Williams had also to accept a "verbal" promise of the Saxon vote, 
but the declaration was made by the king of Poland to Calkoen, 
Keyserling,and Williams in turn and could hardly be repudiated. It 
was however qualified by the insertion of the words "selon les lois 
"et constitutions de l'Empire". Bruhl on his side made a. formal 
declaration to Calkoen and Williams' that necessary instructions and 
1 Appended to Williams's letter to Newcastle of 13 September. 
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full power for Saxony's accession to the treaty of 1746 had already 
been sent to Petersburg, accepted Williams's declaration that the 
execution of the treaty and giving of the vote were independent of 
any Austro -Saxon negotiations,I acquiesced in Williams's refusal to 
make Britain liable for the United Provinces' share of the subsidy 
in case of default, but refused to send full powers to Flemming for 
the obvious reason that this would be equivalent to an announcement 
that he was prepared to make further concessions to the British 
demands. 
Williams's despatch announcing Saxony's refusal to give more than a 
verbal promise of the electoral vote was well received at London. 
The news of the birth of the duke of Burgundy on 13 September made 
Newcastle3 and Hardwicke dread a Franco -Saxon rapprochement; ands 
although Hardwicke was still eager to secure something on paper, 
4 
they decided that the proposed treaty with Dresden should not be 
suffered to fail and that the proposed verbal declaration would 
"do the business" as well as written engagements, especially as on 
a subject "of so secret a nature" even if the declaration "was in 
"writing it could not be produced ". Frederick II's appointment 
of the Lord Marshal as his ambassador to France filled the timorous 
British ministers with unreasoning dread.6 Prussia, they thought, 
had 'thrown off the mask" and Jacobitism would acquire a new lease of 
life. Prussia, Newcastle argued, could be held in check only by 
giving a subsidy to Russia and the Jacobite bogey would be useful in 
securing popular approval for the Russian subsidy, long a favourite 
scheme of the King and dear to Newcastle's heart, although he had 
1 This is Williams's contention but there is no mention of it 
in either of the protocols of 7 and 13 September. 
2 Vitzthuun 210 -211. 
3 Newcastle to Hardwicke 6 September 0.S. in Add. MSS 32725 f 128. 
4 Hardwicke to Newcastle 7 September 0.S. in Add. MSS 32725 f 148. 
5 Pol. Corr. VIII 397, 4 01, 408, 423 -4, 438 -9 &c. 
6 Newcastle to Hardwicke 6 September U.S. in Coxe Pelham Adminis- 
: t_ration II 403. 
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after much hesitation placed it after the election of the king of 
the Romans. The more serious consideration of this old project 
gave Saxony additional importance in the eyes of the British king 
and ministers owing to her intimate connection with Russia and 
vaunted influence at Petersburg. 
"Without the treaty" Newcastle wrote "I think all thoughts of a 
"system upon the Continent must be laid aside for .... Russia alone 
"when the Empire and Poland are lost would signify little and 
"therefor this measure is necessary, even with a future view to 
"Russia ". 
The British government no longer desired the treaty merely as a 
step towards the election and were therefore inclined to demand 
as little as possible from Saxony. 
But soon news2 of further difficulties at Dresden and an intercepted 
letter from Loss to Briihl, which showed that Brúhl was not merely 
"knocking at two opposite doors at the same time, but that he would 
"take with both hands ",3 aroused Hardwicke's ire: 
D3riihl hopes to be able toi "swear to France that he has only taken 
our money and engaged for nothing. And their now so late agree - 
":ing to accede to the treaty of 1746 whereby certain contingents 
"of troops are, by reference to former treaties, stipulated in cer- 
" :tain events is, I believe, mainly to enable him the better to 
"parry the article about the troops. I know you must conclude 
"this treaty but when it comes over (as it will now signed sub spe 
"rati) for God's sake (my dear Lord) make Count Flemming agree to 
"something in writing in some shape or other for otherwise it will 
"be a subsidiary treaty on our part without any reciprocity at all 
"and what will you say to this in Parliament ? By ye way will 
"Sir C. be so wild as to sign sub spe rati without anything in 
"writing either about the troops or the vote ? If he does it must 
"be for ye vanity of signing a treaty though he puts you here under 
"the greater difficulty .... [Re king of the Romans prudent as it 
"was at first and as much as I was for it I begin almost to wish it 
"had never been started .... conclude immediately with Saxony in 
such a manner as to make it decent ".4 
At last on 28 September the eagerly awaited treaty 
5 
arrived and as 
in every crisis in the long drawn out election negotiationsa split 
in the Cabinet promptly followed: 
i Newcastle to W. Bentinck 2 August O.S. in Add. MSS 32829 f. 46. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 8 September. 
3 Hardwicke to Newcastle 10 September O.S. in Add. MSS 32725, 
f. 170. 
4 Add. MSS 32725 f. 170, partly printed in Coxe Pelham Adminis- 
tration II 410 -11. 
5 In S.P.F. Treaties 384: printed in Wenck II 593 ff. 
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Phe King was impatient) Newcastle reports 
1 
,i'to know out thoughts 
I upon ye treaty but seemed himself quite of opinion that it would 
"do. When I came in today I found His Majesty in very good humour 
"but by no means satisfied with ye condition selon les lois de 
"l'Empire or disposed to yield to it. I told him your notion and 
"mine of the necessity of concluding this treaty from the conse- 
":quences which would necessarily attend the miscarriage of it. I 
"made your court extreamly by only relating the truth of what passed 
"between us upon ye subject of Russia .... I then acquainted His 
"Majesty that I had this morning complained much to Count Flemming 
"of the condition above mentioned upon which terms both France and 
"Prussia had at times declared they would be for the election and 
"also of what was inserted in the protocol relating to the troops 
"which took off quite the force of ye engagement in the Treaty. 
"In the latter he said we must adhere and insist upon the treaty 
and as to ye condition explain it in a way to answer our end and 
"that it was impossible for his Court not to agree to our way of 
"understanding les lois et constitutions de l'Empire in this respect. 
"Upon which I immediately drew up draft of a declaration which he 
"approved. I shewed it to the King who ordered me to speak to 
"Munchausen upon it. (who by the by had a little altered His 
"Majesty's way of thinking) and we have made it a little stronger... 
"EFlemmingg is positive the Court of Saxony will accept such a 
"declaration signed by Sir Charles Williams and even thinks they 
"will give such a one themselves, that is as to the interpretation 
"of the words les lois et constitutions de l'Empire but I must doubt 
"it and fear our plans will miscarry at last. The worst of all is 
"my brother is more displeased than ever, calls the treaty dis- 
":honourable, contemptible, a subsidy given for nothing, and is 
"persuaded there is some connection with France at the same time.... 
"He complains of his having been illused in this affair: in short 
"wants to lay hold of this pretext to get rid of the treaty. He 
"was more violent today than I have seen him for some months past."2 
In reply3 Hardwicke took up his usual line - the via media. He 
fulminated against the "gross alterations" in the signed treaty, 
and censured Williams's signature because it "may possibly have 
"laid you under greater difficulties than you would have met with 
"from Flemming here at least as to some of the expressions ", but 
then expressed his agreement with Newcastle as to the necessity of 
keeping a hold on Saxony and concluded by approving Newcastle's 
very moderate instructions to Williams. 
These instructions are the best justification of Williams's signa- 
ture of the treaty since they show that in the main he had correct- 
ly guaged the attitude of the predominant faction in the British 
1 Newcastle to Hardwicke 17 September 0.S. in Add. MSS 35412 f 34. 
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke 17 September O.S. in Add. MSS 35412 f 34: 
It was presumably at this stage that Pelham threatened to op- 
:pose the passing of the treaty in the House of Commons (Coxe 
Lord Walpole II 410 -i1). 





It mattered little to Newcastle on what conditions 
Saxony provided 6000 badly equipped troops so long as he had some 
return for the subsidy to show to Parliament. He cared as little 
whether Saxony was merely to concert action in Imperial affairs 
with Hanover instead of blindly following Hanover's lead; the one 
essential was the vote. Newcastle wrote to Williams: - 
1 
"The next and great point of all is the electoral vote .... that 
"is the only thing to justify the treaty and if it is not clear we 
"are all undone. Clear up that point so that Mr. Pelham may say 
"in the House of Commons that we have a satisfactory security for 
"that and all will yet be well; but without that I can answer for 
"nothing .... if this treaty miscarries everything in my opinion 
"is at an end. If this point of the vote is not fully cleared up 
"to unwilling understandings you and I shall pass our times un- 
":pleasantly. My Honour, my reputation is concerned not to be the 
"dupe of Count Briàhl. I am sure they are safe in your hands. 
"Don't lose the treaty and yet don't accept of a slight security 
"for the vote". 
But even it regard to the vote Williams's inadvertence had permitted 
ambiguity or worse to enter, for the king of Poland's verbal declar- 
:ation was "accompanied with the very condition that those powers 
"who have determined to oppose the election have invented on purpose 
"to defeat it, vizt:- pourvu que cette election se fit conformement 
aux lois et constitutions de 1'Empire';I: Williams had apparently 
overlooked the significance of these words - the more unpardonably 
because Br the 's whole conduct showed a desire to get a subsidy and 
evade doing anything in exchange. 
Newcastle therefore ordered Williams to declare either to Erííhl or 
to the king of Poland that, as a cond.iti_on of the exchange of rati- 
:ficationsjthe king of Great Britain insisted (1) that Brühl would 
abandon the protocol of 7 September so far as it related to the 
6000 troops and (2) that the elector of Saxony would declare that 
he understood the qualification in his verbal declaration in the 
sense given to it by the supporters of the election 2 Further as 
1 Newcastle to Williams private 20 September 0.S. in Add. MSS 
32830 f. 125. 
2 i.e. that a majority of electors was sufficient etc. 
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no mention was made in the protocols of the declaration by Williams 
that the execution of the treaty and the giving of the vote were to 
be independent of the success of British good offices at Vienna, 
Williams, before exchanging ratifications, was to hand this declara- 
tion in writing to Count Brihl and inform him of the cold reception 
of Keith's overture regarding the double marriage. These instruc- 
:tions were confirmed by a second despatch, apparently written part - 
:ly to satisfy Newcastle's disgust at Brúhl's tricks,2 but chiefly 
to soothe Pelham,3 which commented strongly upon the court of Dres- 
:den's proceedings but left the instructions of 1 October unaltered. 
The Dutch ministers heartily approved of the British decision to 
ratify the treaty after receiving satisfactory assurances from Count 
Brühl, and Calkoen was therefore instructed to continue to act in 
concert with Williams. 4 
After the usual delay Brúhl invited Williams to Hubertsburg (a royal 
shooting box) where he had a conference with Brúhl on 20 October and 
secured his acceptance of the part of the declaration relating to 
the troops.5 A few days later, after stormy conferences 144.4.01-W+ _ 
the question of a written declaration, the king 
of Poland made verbally the declaration regarding the words "loss et 
ff 
"constitutions de l'Empire" required by Newcastle.6 Bruhl also 
accepted Williams's declaration regarding the execution of the treat 
being independent of Austro -Saxon negotiations; and on 31 October 
1 Keith to Newcastle 11 September (enclosing the Austrian reply - 
a civil refusal). 
2 Newcastle in his letter to Keene (private) of 3 Octdi er 0.S. 
in Add. MSS 32830 f. 186 refers to Brizhl's "little dirty fetches 
"to keep terms with France and defend himself from the King of 
"Prussia's resentment ". 
3 "Phey were necessary from the Thinz and the disposition of 
"persons here ". Newcastle to Hardwicke 27 September O.S. in 
Add. MSS 32725 f. 220. Hardwicke entirely approved: Hardwick( 
to Newcastle Add. MSS 32725 f. 231. 
4 Dayrolle to Williams 241 September/8 October in Add. MSS 15882 
f. 96. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 20 October. 
6 Williams to Newcastle 24 October. 
30. 
Williams reported that everything was in effect settled,1 and 
ratifications would be exchanged as soon as the Dutch ratifications 
arrived. This delay, in spite of Newcastle's urgent letter to 
Dayrolle,2 was due partly to the constitution of the United Province; 
but chiefly to the sudden death of the prince of Orange. As soon 
as the Dutch ratifications arrived on 9 November the whole transac- 
:tion was settled without further difficulty and the ratifications 
exchanged on 11 November. 
Brühl's surrender on the vital point is not difficult to explain. 
To refuse the explanation demanded by Newcastle would be equivalent 
to a confession that he had never intended to fulfil his side of the 
treaty. Williams intimated that in this event he had orders to 
communicate the whole negotiation to Bestuzhev to prove Saxony's 
bad intentions. Williams attributed his success chiefly to this 
threat,3 but much weightier motives dictated Brúh1.'s surrender. 
Brühl had all along decided to prefer a subsidy treaty with the 
Maritime Powers to one with France because, although he wished to 
keep on good terms both with France and the imperial courts, if 
compelled to choose between them he would prefer the Eastern Powers. 
Special circumstances had enabled him in 1746 to take subsidies 
from France without seriously compromising his relations with Russia, 
although, even in 1746, there had been a coolness between Saxony 
and Austria. Now the European situation had changed. The alli- 
: ance of Austria and Russia was firmly consolidated, and influential 
politicians in both countries were already planning a war against 
Prussia, which would certainly be supported by France. 
1 Flemming's letters of revocation were despatched on 29 October 
along with instructions (Add. MSS 32831 f 29) to give the verbal 
declaration regarding the vote and to ask for Williams's continu- 
ance at the Saxon court at least until after its next journey 
to Poland. 
2 17 September O.S. appended to Newcastle's letter to Williams of 
that date. 
3 Williams to Newcastle 12 October N.S. When Guy Dickens informed 
Bestuzhev of the obstacles raised by Saxony "he was downright 
"angry" and "told [Guy Dickens he would speak very plainly to 
"the Saxon resident ": (Dickens to Newcastle 21 September O.S. 
in S.P.F. Russia 56). 
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Secondly, even in 1746 it had required the whole weight of Marshal 
Saxe's influence to secure subsidies from France on conditions which 
enabled Brühl to preserve his alliance with Russia. It was unlike- 
ly that the Dauphiness's influence, even at the moment of the birth 
of the duke of Burgundy, would secure terms which would satisfy 
either the Austrian court, with which in 1751 Saxony intent on the 
double marriage and the Polish succession,was determined to keep on 
good terms, or the Chancellor Bestuzhev, more critical now that he 
was firmly in the saddle and intent on dragging Saxony into his 
anti -Prussian coalition. 
Thirdly, even in the more favourable conditions of 1746 -49 the 
French. alliance, apart from the substantial subsidies received, 
had been rather a failure from the Saxon pint of view. No appre- 
ciable progress had been made towards reconciling France and the 
imperial courts; by making the attempt Saxony had earned the dis- 
trust of both parties and had provoked the relentless hostility 
of Prussia. In following this grandiose aim'Saxony had sacrificed 
much smaller but more tangible advantages which she might possibly 
have made by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. And even Brúhl must 
have repented at times of his decision in 1746 to walk the tight 
rope between France and the imperial courts with his mortal enemy, 
Frederick of Prussia, adroitly tugging at the rope and waiting to 
pounce upon him if he fell. Thanks to his own dexterity Br%zhl had 
averted a catastrophe, but he can hardly have welcomed the prospect 
of another nerve racking performance on the tight rope. 
Finally, France, after a momentary change of policy in Poland in- 
:spired by Argenson, had reverted to her anti -Saxon policy there. 
The uncertain health of Augustus III raised the question of main- 
taining the connection of Saxony with Poland, which was even more 
fundamental to Saxony than the reconciliation of Austria and France. 
And the only possible prospect of preserving the personal union of 
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Saxony and Poland lay in a close understanding with the imperial 
courts, backed if possible by the subsidies of the Maritime Powers. 
Bruhlts conduct therefore throughout the negotiation was designed . 
to secure the maximum from the Maritime Powers and to give the 
minimum in exchange. Flemming discovered at London the maximum 
Newcastle could give. Brithi at Dresden forced Williams to take 
even less in exchange than he knew the British government could 
accept, and thus discovered the British ultimatum. He had then 
no hesitation in ratifying the treaty, with the alterations insist - 
:ed on by Britain, since he was well content with the terms. By 
making a subsidy from Britain a condition of his accession to the 
treaty of 1746 he had enlisted Russian and Austrian support at 
London, and had then tricked Britain by pretending that the conclu- 
:sion of the subsidy treaty alone delayed Saxonyts accession to the 
treaty of 1746. 
A few days after the exchange of ratifications Bri hl gave Boyer, 
the somewhat sceptical French chargé dtaffaires at Dresden, a dis- 
:ingenuous account of the treaty and declarations,1 representing 
them as they stood before the declarations insisted upon by the 
British government as the price of ratification. He asserted that 
the despatch of. the 6000 troops was conditional on a subsequent 
convention, that Saxony was in no way bound to accede to the treaty 
of 1746, and that the verbal declaration in regard to the Saxon 
vote contained nothing contrary to the imperial constitution.2 
These assurances he hoped would enable him to maintain friendly 
relations with France, since the same device had allowed him to 
keep on good terms with the imperial courts after the Franco -Saxon 
treaty of 1746. 
1 Boyerts despatch 15 September in A.E. Saxe 41, f. 374; 
Pol. Corr. VIII 554. 
2 Boyer to Havrincourt 16 November (intercepted) in Add. MSS 
32831 f. 223. Similar assurances were given by Bülow to the 
Prussian ministers (Pol. Corr. VIII 536). 
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Newcastle, George II, and the Dutch ministe.rsI were ignorant of 
these assurances and shared Brizhl's satisfaction with the treaty.2 
It was true that Saxony's military resources were negligible, and 
that she could exercise little influence on the European balance - 
all the less because of BrAhl's determination to stand as well as 
possible with both sides. But the Maritime Powers were intent on 
the election and towards that end the promise of the Saxon vote was 
an important step. They had partially effaced the memory of the 
Cologne fiasco, secured six votes in the electoral college, and now 
had hopes even of recovering Cologne.3 Once again Albemarle was 
instructed4 to sound the court of France in regard to the election 
in the hope of securing its acquiescence. But whether this was 
obtained or not, Prussia had still to be reckoned with, and New - 
:castle was already devising ways and means of securing Russia by 
subsidies 
5 
in order to bridle Prussia, encourage the bribed but 
wavering electors,6 and secure a quiet election.? Pelham was far 
from sharing his brother's satisfaction, and must bitterly have re- 
:gretted his original blunder in not vetoing the scheme of the elec- 
:tion. He had been partly cajoled and partly nagged into accepting 
the Newcastle election project on the assurance that a trifling 
subsidy to one elector was all that would be required from the 
1 Dayrolle to Williams 9/20 November 1751 in Add. MSS 15882, 
f. 101 b. 
2 Newcastle to Albemarle private 14 November 0.S. in Add. MSS 
32831, f. 263 b. Newcastle, who had at first defended Williams 
against the censures of Hardwicke and Pelham, changed his mind 
when he discovered how easily Williams had secured the changes 
in the treaty desired by the British government. "I think" he 
wrote to Holderness on 20 October O.S. "our Dresden affair will 
"do, and would have done sooner if [Williams] had not been so 
"much in haste to have the air of signing a treaty. "(Add. MSS 
32831, f. 58). 
3 Newcastle to W. Bentinck,very private, 28 November O.S. in 
Add. MSS 32832, f. 32. 
4 Holderness to Albemarle 12 December O.S. in Add. MSS 32832, 
f. 191. 
5 Newcastle to Hardwicke 6 September 0.S. in Coxe Pelham Adminis- 
:tration II 406 -7: Newcastle to W. Bentinck 28 November O.S. 
priñted'in Archives II 166 -81: Newcastle to Albemarle, private 
1.4 November O.S. iñ Add. MSS 32831, f. 263 b. 
6 Newcastle to Yorke 24 December, very private, in Add. MSS 32832, 
f. 297. 
7 Newcastle to W. Bentinck, very private, 28 November O.S. in 
Add. MSS 32832, f. 30. 
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Treasury. Step by step, the consummation of the election receded 
before them; every step towards it meant an appreciable drain on 
the Exchequer, an undignified squabble in the Cabinet,1 and a bitter 
attack on the government in Parliament. 
In the debates on the Saxon treaty in the two Houses,2 Bedford was 
its most determined and influential opponent and lost the King's 
favour as a result of his opposition. "Old" Horace Walpole spoke 
at great length against it and then concluded with the remark that 
he would nevertheless vote in favour of the treaty out of loyalty 
to the King. Williams's bosom friend Fox spoke in mild approval 
of it.3 The treaty was passed in both houses by enormous majori- 
:ties to the delight of Newcastle, who hastened to inform his con- 
:fidant, Joseph Yorke, of the ministerial triumph.4 t'In short we 
"had a great day. But the folly of the Court of Vienna, the weak- 
":ness of the Republic; and our own want of steadiness may bring 
"all this to nothing ". 
1 "S'il ne tenait qu'au duc de Newcastle il donnerait tête- baissée 
"dans les idées de son maitre; mais....le sieur Pelham, qui tient 
"les cordes de la bourse et qui gouverne son frère aussi despo- 
"tiquement que le Parlement .... empeche qu'on n'y songe seri- 
":eusement et se contente de la laisser tenir en haleine pour 
"faire plaisir au Roi" Michell to Frederick 9 November, in 
Poi_ . Corr. VIII 538. 
2 Walpole George II II 240 -54; Coxe Lord Walpole_ II 326 -40 and 
Pelham Administration II 208 -14; S.P.F. Poland (circular des - 
páfches of 24, 2G-ST January, 1752). 
3 Ilchester. I 170 -1, where Lord Iichester makes the statement that 
Williams as minister at Dresden had the negotiations in hand" 
for the Bavarian (sic) subsidy. 




Dresden (November 1751 - March 1753). 
Negotiations for Saxon accession to the treaty of the two 
Empresses - Coldness between Austria and Saxony - Newcastle 
proceeds with the election project - Hyndford's visit to 
Dresden - Arrangements for the election of the Polish Diet - 
Williams's visit to Hanover - Election negotiations there 
Saxony loyally supports Britain but in vain - Effect of Saxon 
support on the election negotiations - Cordial relations of 
Britain and Saxony - Brühl expects payment for his support - 
Question of the succession in Poland - Williams proposes that 
Britain should support the electoral prince of Saxony to avoid 
danger of another war of the Polish succession - Attitude of 
the British government towards this proposal - Renewal of 
Prusso -Saxon quarrels over the Steuer - Saxony appeals to her 
allies for protection and begs France to restrain Prussia 
Divergence between Britain and Saxony. 
The conclusion of the treaty of subsidy left Williams with no 
serious business to transact at Dresden. In the midst of the 
negotiation he had intrigued busily1 to secure the succession at 
the Hague to Holderness, the new Secretary of State for the South - 
:ern department, but in vain, for the post had been earmarked for 
Joseph Yorke, the rising son of the Lord Chancellor. He had 
therefore to content himself with his present post and his main 
preoccupation became the negotiation for the accession of Saxony 
to the treaty of the two empresses.2 This was eagerly desired 
by the British government3 as a step towards the great defensive 
alliance, which Newcastle without appreciable success had been 
endeavouring to form since 1748. 
Williams might well have spared the pains he took in this matter, 
especially as he was not fully informed of the earlier negotiations 
between Saxony and the two imperial courts. He foolishly accepted 
at their face value Brühl's assurances4 that orders and full powers 
had been sent to Funcke at Petersburg to complete the Saxon acces- 
:sion. Such instructions had indeed been sent, but they were 
still conditional on the imperial courts' acceptance of Saxony's 
accession on the footing of existing engagements and without ac- 
:cepting the secret articles. In addition Brühl,on the advice 
of the privy council insisted on all his former demands, especially 
on the promise of. Austro- Russian support at the next vacancy of the 
throne in Poland and the assurance that if Prussia seized some 
1 Williams to Newcastle private 3/14 May, 11 July; Newcastle 
to Williams 19 July O.S. private, in Add. MSS 32828 f. 1, 
f. 140 and f. 248 respectively: H. Digby to Newcastle 
19 June O.S. in Add. MSS 32724 f. 384. 
2 Geheimnisse I 103 -229 gives full accounts of this negotiation 
wexfracts from Saxon despatches, memorials, &c., Cf. also 
Pol. Corr. IX 359 -60, 376, 394, 461 -2; X 33. The Williams- 
Keith correspondence throws some additional light on it. (Add. 
MSS 35472 and 35492). 
3 Supra Chapter V, p.19. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 24 October 17513 Geheimnisse I 215. 
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district of Saxony as a pledge for payment of the Steuer capital 
and interest, then the imperial courts would regard Prussian action 
as constituting the casus foederis. Saxony's accession to the 
body of the treaty on the footing of existing engagements was hard - 
:ly worth having in Austria's eyes,1 especially as Brill had repeat- 
:edly declared that he regarded the existing treaties between 
Austria and Saxony as remaining in force. And to secure this 
trifling gain she would have to accept the new and onerous obliga- 
:tions insisted on by Brúhl. 
Williams, apparently ignorant of these fundamental difficulties, 
believed the main obstacle was Saxony's failure to make a formal 
reply to the Austrian invitation of 1749 to Saxony to accede. 
He therefore secured 2 from Brthl a declaration that he was ready 
to accede to the treaty on the footing of existing engagements 
and had accordingly sent full powers to his minister at Peters- 
:burg. Just as he failed to perceive the meaning of the words 
"laws and constitutions of the Empire" he did not understand 
the significance of the qualification "on the foot of existing 
"engagements ", and repeatedly expressed surprise that the court 
of Vienna did not return an obliging answer.3 Other differences 
accentuated Austro -Saxon coldness - on the one hand Saxony's 
insistence on the double marriage project and her continued 
complaisance towards France; 4 Ipn the other, Brúhl's discov- 
:ery of the proposed candidature of Prince Charles of Lorraine 
for the Polish throne,5 and Austria's action in the Hohenlohe 
1 Boyer's despatch of 13 June 1751, A.E. Saxe 41 f. 240 b; 
Bdttiger II 455. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 4 October 1751. 
3 Williams to Newcastle 15 December 1751, 9 January, 6 February 
1752. Newcastle was completely *puzzled by the contradictory 
reports received from Petersburg, Vienna, and Dresden (New- 
:castle to Williams 3 March 0.S. 1752) . 
4 Newcastle to Keith 14 February O.S. in Add. MSS 35472 f. 160. 
5 Droysen V 423 -4: on Austria's real attitude see Beer, who 
discusses this question in his introduction and prints ex- 
:tracts from Bernes' despatches from Petersburg. 
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affair' which forced the Protestant electors to co- operate against 
the Emperor. Although Brúhl was for a time successful in conceal - 
:ing from Williams his bad faith in regard to Saxony's accession to 
the treaty of the two empresses, it was soon apparent that Saxony 
would be as untrustworthy an ally to Britain as she had been to 
Trance after the conclusion of the Franco -Saxon treaty of subsidy 
in 1746. The course of the negotiations had impressed upon British 
ninisters a firm conviction of Brúhl's intention to keep on good 
;ems with France, and their fears of Saxon treachery were stimu- 
:fated by the manifest and acute friction between Saxony and Austria. 
Ienceforth Williams's main duty at Dresden was to watch carefully 
axony's relations with France, and, if possible, to induce Saxony 
;o abandon her ménagements for France, to smooth the friction bet - 
ween Austria and Saxony, and to persuade Saxony to enter whole- 
heartedly into the old system. 
1 Williams to Newcastle 13, 16, 27 February. 
2 Keith writes with his usual good sense on Austro -Saxon relations 
at this time:- [If Saxony intends to be successful at Vienna 
she must put her house in order, reduce expenses, restore credit 
make the army effective] "You may easily imagine the low opinion 
they have hitherto had here [Vienna] of the forces, economy, and 
system of the Saxon Court lessens the desire they should natur- 
:ally have to cultivate the friendship and alliance of a neigh- 
bouring state which might otherwise be so useful to them, and 
which might decide the balance of power in Germany and have so 
great an influence upon the general affairs of Europe. But in 
place of considering them in this important light the value 
they put upon them at present is no more than what arises from 
the utility and assistance they can expect from them in case of 
necessity. which I am afraid they esteem at a very low rate. 
You know likewise that in all Courts one finds enemies as well 
as friends; if Saxony then by following the route I have traced 
out for them will strengthen the hands of the well intentioned 
here, there may I doubt not be ways found to stop the mouths of 
their adversaries and to promote the success of their negotia- 
tions. I have reason to think that the ministry here will be 
ready to renew the sane engagements which subsisted between the 
two Courts during the late war for the security of Saxony ro- 
:vided the latter will accede to the treaty of Petersburg 1746] 
after the example of England. It will therefore be necessary 
for them to take this step without hesitating in order to their 
having a title to claim the powerful succours they stand in 
need of to protect themselves against the vexations and oppres- 
:sions of the King of Prussia. This engagement will likewise 
very much facilitate the different views of the Court of Dresden 
in Poland as well as here. I look upon all other remedies ex- 
:cept those I have proposed as insufficient and as mere pallia- 
:tives." Keith to Williams 7 February 1751 in Add. MSS 35492, 
f. 69 b. Cf. Boyer's despatch of 13 June 1751 (A.E. Saxe 41, 
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The first important test of Saxon sincerity was provided by 
Newcastle's decision that the election, now that six votes out 
of nine in the electoral college had been secured, must be carried 
through without further delay. The electors opposed to the elec- 
:tion had been ostentatiously holding conferences at Mannheim 
under the auspices of France and Prussia.' It was obviously 
desirable, if the election was to be carried through, to take 
the preliminary steps towards it before the opposition could or- 
ganise itself effectively and before the tepid zeal of the hired 
electors cooled. Moreover, unless immediate steps were taken to 
carry through the election there might be a popular outcry against 
the subsidy treaties in Britain and the United Provinces, and the 
latter might even fall into arrears in paying their share of the 
subsidies.2 If this happened France would find it easy to step 
in, recover the hired electors, and more than restore her superi- 
:ority in the Empire. 
3 
On 2S January, therefore Newcastle instructed Williams to inform 
the elector of Saxony that it was intended to proceed to the elec- 
tion in the summer and to invite his concurrence in the prelimin- 
ary steps. Illness delayed Williams's execution of these instruc- 
:tions, but when he broached the subject to Brúhl on 28 February 
he received, with a promptitude little short of the miraculous, 
the reply that the king of Poland was "firmly resolved to adhere 
to [his) engagements .... and to exactly conform with the king 
4 
[of Great Britain, through the whole affair of the election". 
Before this entirely satisfactory reply reached London, Newcastle 
had decided to send a special envoy to Vienna to convince the 
1 Newcastle to Williams 17 January O.S. 
2 Newcastle to Hyndford 28 February O.S. in S.P.F. Germany 
(Empire) 188. 
3 Similar instructions were sent to Burrish at Munich and 
Keith at Vienna. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 5 March. 
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Austrian court of the certainty of success and then to arrange 
the necessary preliminaries. The reluctance of Austria to pro- 
ceed with the election was not unnatural in view of the way in 
which Newcastle conducted the negotiation: e.g. he waited for 
eight months before communicating to Vorster, the Austrian envoy, 
the assurances he had obtained for the Saxon vote.l Newcastle's 
self -righteousness is clearly revealed in his own account of his 
motives in sending Hyndford on the special mission to Vienna.2 
"It would have been impossible to go on with the court of Vienna 
"without some friendly expostulation upon their late conduct. 
"Keith is not of weight enough and has suffered himself to be 
"amused by them or at least has not had resolution enough to re- 
":sist or contradict them. I think I can govern Hyndford - there 
"is no fear of his being imperious. He is Austrian a bruler and 
"he is too good a courtier not to do what he is bid. My friends 
"may trust me. I will not break with the court of Vienna - all 
"that I am doing is to be able to support them but they must help 
"themselves ". 
Hyndford was instructed to take Munich and Dresden on his way to 
Vienna, so that he could vouch personally to the Empress for the 
readiness of the two imperial vicars to proceed immediately to the 
election. 
Williams was accordingly warned to expect Hyndford at Dresden, and 
to take any steps necessary to procure for him assurances of Saxon 
co- operation.3 Newcastle's principal fear was that Hyndford, in 
spite of the decided Austrian rejection of the scheme, would be 
importuned to support the Saxon double marriage project,4 which he 
could not possibly do, not only because it would have alienated 
the court of Vienna and male it less likely to go on with the elec- 
tion, but because Britain had already committed herself to the 
support of Bavarian claims to a Habsburg marriage alliance.4 
1 Minute in Add. MSS 35473 f. 113. 
2 Newcastle to Yorke private 14 February, in Add.lSS 32833, 
f. 427. Hyndford's instructions and separate private in- 
":structions" both dated 21 February 1752, .S.P.F. Germantr. 
(Empire) 188. 
3 Newcastle to Williams 14 February O.S., 3 March O.S. 
4 Newcastle to Hyndford, private, 28 February O.S. in Add. MSS 
32834 f. 125. 
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Hyndford arrived on 27 March and spent four days at Dresden.' 
He was completely satisfied with his audience of the King and 
his conference with Brúhl,.KeyserlinfY and Williams. The main 
project raised by Brúhl was to secure the succession to the Polish . 
crown to the electoral prince of Saxony. The Saxon ministers can 
hardly have shared Hyndford's satisfaction with his visit, because 
when Saul in the evening broached the question of the double mar - 
:riage Hyndford records:- "I pull'd out my watch and broke up the 
"meeting upon pretence of some business, and to save appearances 
"Sir Charles went home with me ". This example of Hyndfordian 
diplomacy leaves one with a considerably enhanced respect for the 
ability of Hyndford's colleague at Dresden, who had already excused 
British inaction by pointing out that Saxony had said the double 
marriage proposal came originally from Petersburg, and yet Russia 
had taken no steps to support the Saxon proposal at Vienna. Brill': 
raising of the Polish succession question in preference to that of 
the double marriage shows the extent of his alarm at the Lorraine 
candidature, and probably also his growing conviction that Austria 
would never consent to the proposed double marriage. Hyndford 
was allowed to depart with full assurances of Saxon co- operation 
in the election and without Saxon demands on the court of Vienna; 
all that he was asked to do was to inquire whether the rumours of 
the Lorraine candidature were well founded. 
Valliams believed that Saxony was now firmly won over to the good 
cause and ti^;hen, a few days after Hyndford's departure, Gross, his 
old friend in adversity at Berlin, arrived at Dresden to supersede 
Keyserling, he believed that he and Gross in close co- operation 
would rule the court of Dresden and destroy every vestige of 
1 His report in S.P.F. Germany (Empire) 188, 12 April N.S. 1752. 
Cf. Williams to Newcastle 29 Parch, 2 April. 
French Influence 
Brúhï's conduct continued to be satisfactory and he gave every 
assistance to Williams2 in examining another Jacobite "mare's 
"nest: "3 in accordance with Newcastle's instructions.4 Williams's 
high hopes were soon afterwards confirmed by the death. of Hennicke, 
"the greatest support of French and Prussian intereseat Dresden. 
The only obstacle to Saxony's cordial return to the old system 
seemed to be the attitude of the court of Vienna, which, although 
willing to give a grudging welcome to the prodigal, absolutely 
refused to kill the fatted calf in his honour. Williams had per- 
:force to admit that his "perpetual endeavours" had failed to irn- 
:prove the relations of Austria and Saxony. 6 
The attention of the court of Dresden in the spring of 1752 was 
mainly devoted to the arrangements for the meeting of the Polish. 
Diet. The bulls for the summoning of the Diet had to be issued 
on Polish soiland the king of Poland, therefore, had to make a 
journey, usually in June, to Fraustadt, the nearest Polish town. 
Brúhl was now resolved to prepare the way for the continuance of 
the union. of Saxony and Poland after the death of Augustus III, 
and proposed to send his son -in -law, Count Mtii.szek, a Polish 
magnate, to Hanover, in order, Williams believed, to obtain guar- 
antees of British support from George II and Newcastle. Williams, 
1 Williams to Newcastle 2, 14, 19 April. Combined British and 
Austrian efforts persuaded Bestuzhev that Keyserling should be 
recalled but certain shady intrigues gave Keyserling a hold on 
the Chancellor who dared not openly recall him (Dickens to New- 
:castle 15 June O.S. 1751 in S.P.F. Russia). I-Ie therefore ar- 
ranged that the Greek synod should complain of Keyserling's 
being a Protestant and tried to secure his resignation in this 
way. (Dickens to Newcastle 9 July 0.S. 1751 S.P.F. Russia). 
When this failed he promoted Keyserling to Vienna where he 
would not be liable to the same temptations as at Dresden. The 
whole affair throws a sinister light on the character and 
methods of the Russian Chancellor. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 27, 30 April, 10, 14, 31 May. 
3 Lang Pickle the Spy 135, 183 -4. 
4 Newcastle to Williams 2 January O.S. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 11 June. Cf. Pol. Corr. IX 137. 
6 Williams to Newcastle 24 May. Cf. Yorke to Newcastle, private, 
21 April /2 May (founded on Calkoen's despatches) in Add. MSS 
32835 f. 197. 
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therefore begged permission to come to Hanover to give his views 
on. Polish affairs, to receive instructions for. the Diet, and to 
arrange for his co- operation with the Russian. and Austrian. ministers 
1 
in support of "our party" in Poland. Newcastle was not unwilling 
to have a confidential talk with him, not only on the affairs of 
Poland, but on the great affair of the election, but the king vetoed 
the proposal with the remark: "He wants to come to talk his wit 
3 
"everywhere, and. you CNewcastleJ to have him to talk politics to". 
Newcastle feared that the refusal would be laid at his door not 
merely by the mortified minister, but by that rising politician, 
Mr. Fox.4 This risk seemed so serious to Newcastle that he had 
recourse to his usual ally in effecting a change of the royal mind. - 
Lady Yarmouth, or, as she is frequently called in the confidential 
correspondence of the Pelhh ams and Hardwicke, "the Lady ". After 
"three weeks' solicitations "5 "the king of himself said H. Williams 
'inight come for a week only - that would be sufficient - he wouldn't 
have him running about with his wit any longer ". 
6 
Williams hastened to avail himself of the royal consent 
7 
and arrived 
at Hanover just as the election negotiations, which even Newcastle 
had despaired of in May owing to the "impertinence .... impudence 
"and ingratitude of the court of Vienna "8 and the exorbitant demands 
of the Elector Palatine, took a more favourable turn. Hope sprang 
eternal in Newcastle's breast. If only Britain would pay the dif- 
ference between the demands of the Elector Palatine and the offers 
1 Williams to Newcastle 10 May; Williams to Newcastle private, 
28 May, in Add. MSS 32836, f. 196. 
2 Newcastle to Pelham 3/14 May in Add. MSS 32727, f. 73. 
3 Newcastle to Hardwicke 6/17 May in Add. MSS 35412, f. 89. 
4 Newcastle to Pelham 31 May /11 June, in Add. MSS 32727, f. 307; 
Newcastle to Williams 10/21 May, private, in Add. MSS 32836, 
f. 61. 
5 Newcastle to Ellis 5/16 June in Add. MSS 32727, f. 343. 
6 Newcastle to Pelham 3/14 June in Add. MSS. 35412, f. 125 b. 
7 Newcastle to Williams private 31 May /11 June in Add. MSS 32836, 
f. 391. 
8 Newcastle to Pelham 20/31 May in Coxe Pelham Administration II 
421. 
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of the court of Vienna - a mere trifle of. £60,000 or so - France 
would concur in the election and all would yet go well. While 
awaiting Pelham's reply, Newcastle tried to persuade the court of 
Vienna to consider the Elector Palatine's pretensions) and to ap- 
:prove the convocation of an electoral assembly. Stormy but fruit - 
:less conferences were held between Newcastle and the ministers of 
Austria, Hanover, Bavaria, Saxony, and Mainz, at which "the Saxon 
"and Bavarian [ministers] as ministers from courts that are well 
"paid were obliged now and then to give their nods of approbation 
"to My Lord Duke's arguments and at the same time to swallow many 
"a reproach in the heat of the conference ".2 Newcastle was pre- 
:pared to go on with the election even without the Palatine vote, 
and to trust that France and Prussia would not proceed to extremi- 
:ties; but the covert threats of Vergennes, the French minister, 
and the objections of the court of Vienna, notably weakened the 
resolution of his allies. Count Rex, the Saxon minister, in accord- 
ance with his latest instructions,3 gave Saxon approval to the 
summoning of an electoral assembly, but with the reservation that 
in the meantime events might show that it would be undesirable to 
Proceed to the actual election. Moreover, on the other great point - 
the satisfaction of the Elector Palatine's claims - he had received 
lo instructions and could not sign, although he approved, the ojet 
5e protocol of 16/27 June,4 which laid down a plan for proceeding 
Immediately with the election, and urged the court of Vienna to make 
the necessary concessions to the electors. 
Villiams while at Hanover was fully informed by Newcastle of what 
vas going on, and was now sent back to Dresden to obtain the king of 
1 See paper given to Vorster dated 16/27 June in Add. MSS 32837, 
f. 206. 
2 Stadion to Elector of Mainz (intercepted) 28 June N.S. in Add. 
MSS 32837, f. 174. 
3 21 June N.S. in Add. MSS 32837 f. 94. 
4 In Add. MSS 32837 f. 206. 
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Poland's unconditional acceptance of the ro'et de protocol. He 
left Hanover on 28 June, reached Dresden on i July, and carried out 
his instructions without difficulty. Orders were immediately 
despatched to Rex to sign the protocol and co- operate in everything 
relating to the election with the British ministers.1 The king 
declared also that in order to facilitate the election he would 
postpone to a more suitable occasion the assertion of any claims 
he had against the court of Vienna.2 
Williams's success gave the election negotiations, which had once 
again been on the point of collapse, a new lease of life.3 The 
Saxon example had considerable influence upon the wavering electors, 
and Newcastle hoped that it might even induce the court of Vienna 
to come heartily into the election upon the basis of the protocol of 
4 
16/27 June. These hopes were however doomed to disappointment for 
the court of Vienna promptly submitted a counter protocol, which 
insisted inter alla upon securing a majority in the college of 
princes and providing "for security both within and without the 
"Empire" before proceeding to the election. Encouraged by this 
"unintelligible, inconsistent, impracticable pr.otocol"5 ',ranee and 
Prussia were confirmed in their opposition and their menaces "suc- 
h 
":ceeded with everyone but the King of Poland ". 
The rapprochement of Britain and Saxony, which had gone on spas- 
modically since Williams's arrival in Dresden in 1747, reached its 
closest point at this time.7 Saxony's behaviour in the election 
1 Williams to Newcastle 2, 3 July; Williams to Newcastle, private 
2, 3 July in Add. MSS 32837 f. 276, f. 278. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 14 July. 
3 Newcastle to Pelham 15/26 July in Add. MSS 32728 f. 207: "in 
"short we are upon our legs again;'G`,H.V. Jones to Williams 
28 June /9 July in Newport Papers. 
4 Newcastle to W. Bentinck "very private and for yourself" 
24 June /5 July in Add. MSS 32838 f. 12; Newcastle to Williams 
28 June /9 July; Newcastle to Keith and Hyndford 28 June /9 July 
in Add. MSS 35473 f. 143; Newcastle to Holderness private 
24 June /5 July in Add. MSS 32728 f. 83. 
5 Newcastle to Keith private 19/30 July in Add. MSS 32838 f. 337. 
6 Newcastle to Holderness 15/26 July in Add, MSS 32839 f. 14. 
7 It is curious that Frederick repeatedly speaks of coldness 




question, although. Newcastle praised its "disinterestedness" in 
the hope of arousing rivalry in the other electors, was quite the 
reverse. The quarrels of Saxony and Prussia over the Steuer 
still continued and not less violent were the squabbles of George 
II, both as king and as elector, with Frederick of Prussia. Common 
antagonism to Prussia naturally drew George II and Augustus III 
together, especially at a time when the relations Of Austria and 
Saxony were seriously strained. The election might be regarded 
as a duel between George II and. Frederick II with Maria. Theresa 
and Louis XV as reluctant seconds, and Augustus III naturally 
supported George II. 
Brüh ,however had no intention of intensifying Prussian hostility 
to himself, and probably knew that the attitude of Austria and the 
lukewarmness of the bribed electors would save him from performing 
what he had so readily promised. And in exchange for the mere 
appearance of support he counted on securing substantial advantages 
in addition to the British subsidy. His first demand was for the 
prolongation of the subsidy treaty, although only the first of 
eight instalments had yet been paid. This, of course, was polite - 
:ly shelved.2 He then asked for and secured British good offices 
at Vienna for the marriage of the Archduke Joseph to'a Saxon prin- 
:cess and for Austrian support of the Saxon candidate for the Grand 
Mastership of the Teutonic order. 
But Brühl's main object was to secure British support for the Saxon 
candidate for the crown of Poland on the death of Augustus III. If 
Austria, as Brühl feared, was supporting Charles of Lorraine, the 
basis of Saxony's precarious hold on Poland was gone. Russian 
3 
1 [T3rihl] "ne peut parler de Sa Mte Prussienne sans animosité" 
(A.E. Saxe 41 f. 239 b - Boyer's despatch of 13 June 1751). 
2 Newcastle to Williams 28 June /9 July. 
3 Newcastle to Williams 28 June /9 July and 19/30 July; Williams 
to Newcastle 7 August: orders sent to Keith and Hyndford 
20 June /1 July 2nd Apart in Add. MSS 35473 f. 136. 
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military assistance could still be counted on; but, failing that 
of Austria, the diplomatic support of Britain would be of great 
value, especially as British influence at Vienna might even win 
back Austrian favour for the Saxon candidate. Williams had al- 
:ready promised Briihl to do his utmost to secure British support 
and used once again in his despatches to his government the argu- 
:ment which had proved so effective in inducing it to adopt his 
scheme for the election of a king of the Romans. A vacancy in 
the Polish throne, he argued, would almost certainly lead to a 
general war in Europe, and therefore, as soon as the election of 
the king of the Romans was accomplished, Britain ought to take 
steps to assure in advance the Polish succession and thus prevent 
the outbreak of war on the death of Augustus III, which would 
render nugatory Britain's success in electing the king of the 
Romans.' This argument was supported by another calculated to 
appeal both to the King and to Parliament, though for widely dif- 
ferent reasons - the suspected designs of Frederick of Prussia 
upon the independence and integrity of Poland. "These designs" 
Newcastle, inspired by Williams, writes to his brother,2the Premier, 
fl are generally thought to be not only to make a king of Poland; 
"but to procure Dantzig and. Polish Prussia for himself shereb 
"he might become a considerable Maritime Power in [the Baltic, 
and would be able to distress and ruin all the commerce of other 
"nations there; and particularly that of the Maritime Powers. 
"And this is a very serious consideration for the Dùtch and us ". 
As early as the end of 1751 Williams's projects were widely 
known in Poland, 
3 
and while he was at Hanover in June 1752 
he submitted a cut and dried plano for securing the Polish 
succession during Augustus III's lifetime, and discussed it 
and. the Saxon project submitted by Rex, fully with Newcastle.5 
1 Williams to Newcastle private 28 May, in Add. MSS 32836, f.196. 
2 12 October 1752 N.S. in Add. MSS 32730 f. 78. 
3 A.E. Pologne 236 - Cast4ra's despatch of 28 December. 
4 Endorsed R. June 16/27, 1752 ", in S.P.F. Poland. 
5 Newcastle to Williams 28 June /9 July and 17/28 July. 
} 
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In his scheme Williams relied chiefly on the support of the 
Czartoryski. He argued that the less the Saxon minister had to 
propose the better the plan would be, because Bri'lhl's intervention 
would not only provoke the opposition and give them. a handle to 
defeat the election, but would arouse the distrust of the best 
intentioned Poles who suspected his selfish. aims and knew him too 
well to rely upon his promises. The ministers of the Tsaritsa 
and her allies alone could give courage to the well- intentioned 
Poles. Russia, Gross was positive, would "support the election of 
the Prince Royal of Poland in preference to all other persons and 
next to him the Prince Czartoryski"; and, if the king of Prussia 
should attack Poland "upon account of any legal measures that the 
"principal Poles might take for preserving the peace and tranquil- 
lity of their country ", Russia would support the "Polish liberties 
"totis viribus" and attack the king of Prussia. Williams then 
urged his government to persuade the court of Vienna to disavow 
the Lorraine candidature, and follow Russia's lead. 
"As to the part which the English minister must act in this affair 
"I think with all humble submission that it would be suffieient for 
"him to be Instructed to declare to the king of Poland that His 
"Majesty approves the measure of placing the Prince Royal upon the 
"throne of Poland at his present Polish Majesty's death and. that 
"the king will use his endeavours and employ his good offices to 
"dispose the Poles to enter into His Majesty's views in favour of 
"the electoral Prince of Saxony which the King looks upon as a 
"measure necessary for the continuation of the present tranquillity 
"and that His Majesty will second and support that election as far 
"as is consistent with the laws and liberties of the Republic: that 
"His h[ajesty also will endeavour to prevent as far as in him lies 
"that the kingdom of Poland or its members should either be molested 
"or attacked on account of any legal act they may do for the pre - 
":servation of their interior peace, for the better securing their 
"laws and liberties, and the placing in due time the Electoral 
"Prince of Saxony upon the throne of Poland. This will be suffi- 
":cient to satisfy the court of Dresden and this declaration repeat - 
":ed to the Poles will give there satisfaction at the same time as 
"it leaves His Majesty free from any engagement that might beget 
"dangerous consequences ". 
These proposals were not unfavourably received by Newcastle, but 
they went far beyond anything he could possibly accept in a question 
which was still a mere contingency and in which his allies were much 
more directly interested than. Britain. Pelham had taken the alarm 
14. 
at Williams's first reference in his despatches to the necessity 
of making preparations for the next vacancy in Poland1 and remained 
unconvinced by his brother's half -hearted advocacy of the scheme. 
Newcastletheref_ore, contented himself with giving his informal ap- 
:proval to the Saxon candidature. Williams's summary of his in- 
structions makes this clear:- 
"I shall hear what the Poles have to say; I shall examine their 
"placards and .... make a faithful report of the whole to Your 
"Grace. All that I think myself at liberty to do is to tell two 
"or three of the chief and best intentioned Poles that I know His 
"Majesty's wishes and inclinations are to see the Prince Royal suc- 
":ceed the King his father on the Polish. throne. "2 
This did not go nearly far enough to satisfy Brih 1, and Rex con - 
:tinued to press3 for a formal British declaration that she would 
do her utmost, in agreement with Russia, to secure in advance the 
Polish succession to the Saxon candidate and would invite the ac- 
:cession of the court of Vienna to the declaration.4 Williams 
was therefore instructed to - 
"acquaint Count Brúhl that, however disposed the King is to favour 
"any view of His Polish Majesty, which may not be attended with 
"hazard and expense, in return for the king of Poland's exemplary 
"conduct upon the present great occasion, and particularly however 
"material His Majesty may think it for the parties most nearly con - 
":cerned to take early measures to prevent any disturbance in case 
"of the vacancy of the crown of Poland, and to secure the succession 
"of the Prince Royal of Saxony, the King cannot take any active part 
"in it; much less begin and originally make a proposal relating to 
"it. When you are in Poland you will be able to see and judge of, 
"the inclinations of the Poles; and the measures which may be pro - 
":posed by the well intentioned. You will also have opportunities 
"of frequently conferring with Count Br`úhl upon the situation of 
"things there and the temper of the Poles. And it is His Majesty's 
"pleasure that you should make a report of the whole to the King, 
"upon which His Majesty will then be able to judge how far and. in 
"what manner he may be of use in forwarding or supporting any reso- 
":lution which the Poles may be disposed to take in concert with 
"the Empress Queen and the Empress of Russia. But you are express - 
":ly to avoid laying the King under any engagement whatsoever. His 
"Majesty's inclination and good wishes you very well know. But in 
"the present circumstances the King does not think proper to give 
"any assurances before His Majesty knows the extent of what may be 
"proposed and the consequences that may attend it .... I Q ewcastle] 
"told Rex at first and repeated it yesterday that the failure of the 
"great and publick object of the election of the Archduke (if it 
"should happen) would necessarily make all other measures founded 
"upon the same principle much more difficult". 
O.S. 
1 A. Stone,to Newcastle 19 June in Add. MSS 32728 f. 55. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 2 August. . 
3 Newcastle to Williams 28 June /9 July and 17/28 July. 
4 Direct attempts to secure Austrian support were being made by 
Saxony at Vienna (Pol. Corr. IX 45). 
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Before these instructions arrived, Williams had already secured 
Brúhl's assent to the postponement of any declaration of British 
policy until after the return of the Saxon court from Poland.' 
During the residence of the court in Poland the long simmering - 
quarrel between Saxony and Prussia over the Steuer came to a new 
and more acute crisis,2 and indirectly created another point of 
divergence between Britain and Saxony. Brúhl appealed to his 
allies, and especially to Russia,3 for assistance in the event of 
a Prussian attack, and he also begged France to induce Prussia to 
reduce her claim to a sum within Saxony's ability to pay. Britain 
supported Saxony's instances at Versailles and instructed Guy 
Dickens6 to invite Bestuzhev to make "very serious representations" 
1 Williams to Newcastle 14 July. 
2 Pol. Corr. IX passim especially 417 -8 which gives the kernel 
of the whole controversy; A.E. Saxe Supplement 2, f. 209 
( ";Iémoir. e sur l'affaire de la Steuer" 14 July 1752) and f. 215 
( "Précis de l'affaire de la Steuer" October 1752.) The rights 
and wrongs of the Steuer controversy are beyond the scope of 
this work, but there is much to be said on each side. Frederick 
II had set the example to his subjects of buying Steuer Bills 
at a discount from non- Prussian creditors whose governments 
were less able or less willing to terrorise the Saxon govern- 
ment, and had then by threats of a military execution forced 
Saxony to pay up in full. This example his subjects hastened 
to follow and there developed a large and lucrative but quite 
illegitimate trade in Steuer bills (e.g. the well -known story 
of Voltaire's transactions with the Jew, Hirsch). The Saxon 
government naturally protested against this sharp practice, and 
tried to limit their obligations under the treaty of Dresden 
to bills which had been the bona fide property of Prussian sub - 
:jects, either before the date of the treaty or at some subse- 
:quent date to be settled in agreement with Prussia. On the 
other hand Saxony could easily have economised on court expenses 
and thus found money to pay her creditors. In the spring of 
1753 for example Williams reported that the carnival at Dresden 
had been celebrated in the most lavish style by the Court 
(Williams to Newcastle 7 February 1753). Bríihl undoubtedly 
exaggerated the disorder of the Saxon finances, partly in order 
to frighten importunate creditors by the spectre of bankruptcy, 
and partly to justify his demanding subsidies with fine imparti- 
ality from any court which seemed likely to take the hint. 
3 Add. MSS 35474 f. 173 -200 (copies of Saxon and Russian papers) 
Cf. Pol. Corr. VIII 567, IX 6, 316 -8, &c. 
4 A.L. Saxe 41 f. 198 Despatch to Boyer it May 1751 &c; 
Farges II 113. 
5 Rex's memorial 9 October N.S. 1752 in S.P.F. Foreign Ministers 
36; Newcastle to Albemarle 12, 18 October O.S. in Add. MSS 
32840, f. 305, f. 343. 
6 Newcastle to Dickens 22 October O.S. in Add. MSS 32840 f. 377. 
r 
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to the king of Prussia and thus prevent him from breaking the 
peace. Bestuzhev regretted the end of the Northern crisis in 
1751, and eagerly seized the new pretext for keeping Prussia in 
constant dread of Russian attack. He induced Guy Dickens to ex- 
ceed his instructions by agreeing to his (Bestuzhev's) project of 
a declaration to be made at Berlin jointly by Russia, Austria, and 
3ritain, to the effect that if Saxony were attacked by Prussia they 
would at once fulfil the defensive engagements between themselves 
and Saxony. Bruhl was in great good humour when a copy of the 
)roposed declaration reached Dresden and "wanted words to express 
ais gratitude" to George II. He was deeply chagrined when the 
3ritish government hastily disavowed Dickens's action on the ground 
that Great Britain had no general defensive engagements with Saxony, 
end therefore could not be a party to the proposed declaration.2 
'his rebuff was the more felt at Dresden, because Russia refused 
;o make the declaration'except in concert with her allies, and 
Lustria, although she had defensive engagements with Saxony, like- 
wise refused3 to be a party to it.4 
lilliams, realising that Newcastle could not possibly ratify 
)ickens's conduct, had done his best to prepare Brizhl for the 
_nevitable.5 He pointed out that the making of the joint declara- 
tion at Berlin would tend to unite France and Prussia and might 
Sven provoke a general war, the brunt of which would fall upon 
;axony. Saxony's best policy, he argued, was to enlist French 
.ntervention in her favour at Berlin and reduce the friction 
)etween the rival leagues. Briihltherefore' was not entirely 
,urprised when the British government disavowed Dickens's conduct, 
1 See the relevant papers in Add. MSS 32841 ff. 113 -139. New- 
:castle was furious:- "As to Guy Dickens he has acted like a 
"madman" Newcastle to Yorke private 9 January 1753, in Add. 
MSS 32833 f. 107 (misplaced in the volume for 1752). 
2 Newcastle to Williams 12 January 1753. Cf. Pol. Corr. IX, 
352, 367 -8. 
3 O.S. II 61. 
4 Pol. Corr. IX 333, 352, 367 -8; Geheimnisse I 219. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 24 January. 
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but he wasoffended by Newcastle's remark to the Saxon secretary 
at London that he wished Guy Dickens had been as circumspect as 
Pretlach, the Austrian ambassador at Petersburg, who had loudly 
disapproved of giving Saxony any assurances whatever and was a 
notorious opponent of Saxon influence at Petersburg.1 
Moreover St. Contest, the new French foreign minister, unlike his 
predecessor Puysieulx,2 had made a serious effort to get Prussia to 
accept the Saxon contention in the Steuer dispute3 and remained un- 
:shaken by Prussian attempts to convert him.4 Brühl therefore 
pointed to the declaration of Prussia's ally, France, that she would 
not look with an indifferent eye upon any enterprise Prussia might 
make against Saxony, and urgedBritain to make a similar declaration. 
Newcastle bluntly refused this request since the relations of 
Britain and Prussia were already so strained that such a declaration 
might be interpreted at Berlin as a virtual declaratión of war. 
Differences were thus arising between Britain and Saxony. The 
cordial relations which had been established after the subsidy 
treaty of September 1751, and which had led to Saxon co- operation 
with Britain in the election negotiations of 1752, were obviously 
not to be of long duration. 
1 Williams to Keith 29 December 1752, in Add. MSS 35474 f. 153; 
Pol. Corr. IX 342. 
2 A.E. Saxe 41 f. 189 and f. 198. 
3 Pol. Corr. IX 349 -50, 352. 
4 Pol. Corr. IX 378, 385, 409. 
5 Newcastle to Williams 20 February 1753. 
CHAPTER VII 
Poland: Williams's mission of 1752. 
General character of the Polish- Lithuanian State - Its 
precarious position in central Europe - Its constitution 
and institutions - Domination of the great nobles - The 
Czartoryski - Their plans of reform opposed by the 
Potocki - The Diets of 1742 to 1750 - Ascendancy of the 
Czartoryski and their alliance with Brühl - Attitude of 
Britain and the Imperial Courts to the succession ques- 
tion - French and Prussian policy in Poland - The Diet 
of 1752 - Rulhiere's version of its proceedings - Ab- 
sence of documentary evidence for Rulhiére's narrative - 
An alternative version - Rupture of the Diet - Partial 
success of Broglie Czartoryski approaches to Britain 
- Conclusion. 
Poland in the eighteenth century was almost as good an example of 
the non -national state as the Dual Monarchy in the nineteenth cen- 
:tury. In the first place it was a composite state consisting of 
the kingdom of Poland and the grand duchy of Lithuania, united since 
1386 by the marriage of the grand duke of Lithuania to the heiress 
of Poland. Each state, however, retained its own traditions, insti- 
tutions, and social conditions, although various attempts had been 
made, notably the Union of Lublin in 1569, to consolidate the two 
sections of the Polish state. There is little actual evidence of 
divergence between the two parts in the eighteenth century, but a 
complete staff of separate officials survived for each part, 1 and 
there was never, either in fact or in law, a real incorporating 
union. 
Five distinct peoples were included in the Polish -Lithuanian state - 
Poles, Lithuanians, Russians (in the Eastern provinces conquered_ by 
Poland mainly in the seventeenth century), Germans (in West Prussia), 
and Jews (the predominant element in the few considerable towns). 
These racial divisions were accentuated by religious hostility 
between the different peoples. The Poles and Lithuanians were 
strongly Roman Catholic, the Germans Protestant, and the Russians 
Orthodox. The Jews, as in every country where they form a con- 
siderable section of the population, were equally envied and de- 
:spiced by the other sections. The dominant Roman Catholic majority 
kept alive the spirit of bigotry which was dying out elsewhere in 
Europe by building up in the seventeenth and early eighteenth cen- 
:tury a harsh system of persecution and repression of the religious 
minorities, which in consequence became disaffected and gave the 
neighbouring states an excellent pretext for interference in the 
internal affairs of Poland. 
1 Only Lithuanian landowners could hold Lithuanian offices 
and similarly in Poland. See for an example of this rule 
Farges II 174 -5. 
2. 
With the exception of Russia, which was still struggling for 
recognition as a member of the European system of states, Poland 
was the largest European state in the middle of the eighteenth 
century. It stretched from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea 
and from the Carpathians almost to the Dneiper. Apart from the 
Carpathians on its south -western frontier, this enormous extent 
of territory was one vast plain with some minor undulations hardly 
of sufficient eminence to be dignified by the name of. hills. It 
was however, very sparsely populated and lay open to invasion on 
all sides (again excepting the Carpathians). 
Its geographical position and past history made the republic of. 
Poland the natural enemy of its neighbours. In its heroic age 
Poland had annexed large sections of Russian territory which the 
Tsars were bent on recovering. Later Poland had become tile head- 
:quarters of the Counter Reformation in eastern Europe; Russia 
was the upholder of the claims of the Greek Church. Finally the 
hostility of Poland and Russia was intensified by Peter the Great's 
policy of westward expansion, which made Poland the main bulwark 
of Europe against the aggression of. Russia. 
With the Turks and Tartars on the southern steppes Poland waged 
an unending border warfare, and, even in the middle of the eight- 
eenth century, its frontiers in that direction remained indeter- 
:minate, chiefly because of the nomadic life of the inhabitants 
of this "debateable land ". But the growing menace of Russia both 
to Poland and. Turkey in the eighteenth century gradually broke down 
this hostility, and forced Pole and Tartar to make common cause 
against the common enemy. This remarkable evolution in Polish 
foreign policy was greatly facilitated by the clever diplomacy of 
France. 
Poland in the seventeenth century had also been largely occupied 
i 
1 Including Lithuania. 
3. 
145,, wars with Sweden, partly owing to religious hostility, partly 
to rivalry for control of the Baltic. The crushing defeat of 
Sweden by Peter the Great removed one formidable enemy to Poland; 
but the increased power of Russia after the treaty of Nystg.dt was 
a still more serious threat to Polish independence, and Sweden's 
place was soon taken by Brandenburg- Prussia, which already possessed 
a secular tradition of enmity to Poland, dating back to the exploits 
of the Teutonic knights of the fourteenth century who had forcibly 
converted and enslaved the Slav dwellers along the Baltic coast of 
Lithuania. 
Of the neighbouring states Austria alone had a tradition of friend- 
ship towards Poland, but Austria since 1726 had been the close ally 
of Russia - Poland's most dangerous enemy - and her vital interests 
were bound up with the maintenance of this alliance. True, Austria 
had an instinctive fear that her. ally Russia would be an uncomfort- 
:able neighbour and desired to preserve Poland as a buffer between 
herself and her too powerful and invulnerable ally. But she could 
not be counted upon to give resolute support because her major i.n- 
:terests in western Europe might compel her to support Russia in 
Poland in order to preserve the Russian alliance. 
The only other power which took a serious interest in Polish affairs 
was France, but the unreliability of French support had been abun- 
:dantly proved in the crises of 1697 and 1733, when France had made 
no real effort to preserve Poland from Russian dictation and, after 
encouraging the Polish "patriots" in their opposition, had left them 
to their fate. This was particularly glaring in 1733, when the 
candidate for the Polish crown supported by France and the immense 
majority of Poles had been Louis XV's father -in -law. Poland there- 
:fore in the eighteenth century was well -nigh surrounded by danger- 
ous enemies - Russia, Prussia, and the Tartars of the steppes, 
while her friends were half -hearted and engrossed in conflicting 
4. 
and (to them) more important interests. 
The accession of the Saxon house and the resulting loose personal 
union of Saxony and Poland., further weakened Poland's international 
position. Polish resentment at the King's obvious preference for 
his electorate, and fears that he wished to transform the personal 
union into a real union by making the monarchy as powerful in Poland 
as it was in Saxony, kept Poland in continual ferment and forced the 
King, who ought to have taken the lead in opposition to Russia, to 
rely upon Russia to support him on his precarious throne. Moreove 
at least after 1745, Prussian hostility to Saxony intensified Prus- 
sian enmity to Poland and drove Augustus, both as king and as 
elector, into still closer dependence upon Russia. 
The prospect of successful resistance to these pressing external 
dangers was gravely weakened by the defective constitution of 
Poland. After the death of the last male of the great house of 
Jagellon in 1572, the monarchy became elective in practice as well 
as in theory, and the nobles were able to strip successive kings 
of their prerogatives. Each election was preceded by a contract 
between the electors and the king elect - known as the pacta con - 
:venta - and thus each king to secure election had to abandon some 
prerogative of his predecessor. By the early eighteenth century 
the only important prerogative left to the King was the right of 
appointment to all high offices in Church and State, and also to 
the lesser but still influential and lucrative offices which sur- 
vived from the feudal epoch - palatinates, castellanies, and 
starosties (respectively duchies, governorships of castles or 
towns, and military benefices).) This patronage put great power 
into the King's hands in appearance but not in reality, because 
once appointed these officials held office for life, subject to 
removal by decision of the Diet, and could defy the King who had 
I See Rulhire I 15 -16. 
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appointed them. Moreover, at every important vacancy, the rival 
great families massed their forces and intrigued against each other 
and set the kingdom in uproar. Whichever candidate the King chose, 
he offended one great party without any guarantee that his decision 
in favour of their candidate had won the support of the other for 
the future. It was very doubtfuljtherefore)whether the retention 
of patronage was a real advantage to the monarchy. 
The actual government of the country was mainly in the hands of the 
great officers of state. The Great General of the crown of Poland 
had almost unfettered control of the army and frequently carried on 
a foreign policy of his own in opposition to that of the King.1 If 
a royal decree was unacceptable to the Great Chancellor he refused 
to affix his seal without which the decree was invalid. The Great 
Treasurer had similar powers in finance. And in Lithuania the Great 
General, Gfeat Chancellor and Great Treasurer of the grand duchy had 
the like powers. The Senate, whose constitutional function was to 
advise and assist the King in the task of government was composed of 
the archbishops, bishops, palatins, castellans, and certain of the 
great officers of state.2 Its actual importance, however, in this 
period was slight. 
Theoretically the supreme power, alike in legislation, taxation,and 
administration, was vested in the biennial diet which met either at 
Warsaw, the Polish capital, or at Grodno, the Lithuanian capital. 
Members of the Diet were elected3 by the whole body of the nobility 
in local "dietines ", which gave binding instructions to their dele- 
gates and met after each diet to receive reports from them. The 
1 It is reported that Augustus II when he carne to Poland said that 
he would have applied for the office of Great General instead of 
that of King had he known in time. Cf. Porter to Williams 2 
April 1755, in Add. MSS 35499, f. 15 "The crown eneral unfor- 
"tunately has more credit here [fit Constantinople, than the King 
of Poland." 
2 Ruihiére 119. Lists of members of the Senate at each diet in 
A.E. Pologne (for 1752 Tom 237, f. 329.) 
3 Elections had to be unanimous. The dietines performed other 
functions, chiefly the appointment to numerous judicial and 
administrative offices. 
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diet was thus "a congress of mandatories of local assemblies only, 
"each of them limited by the instructions of those who sent him; not 
legislative body of unfettered representatives of the nation at 
'713.rge ".1 This assembly in the seventeenth century had gradually 
stripped the monarchy of its powers; in the eighteenth century it 
proved its utter incapacity to exercise the powers it had usurped. 
The impotence of the Diet, both in legislation and in administration, 
was due chiefly to the gradual development in the later seventeenth 
century of the liberum veto, which enabled a single deputy to sus - 
:pend its proceedings on all questions by entering a formal protest 
against One of its decisions. The great officers of state there- 
:fore became independent both of King and Diet, and the local offi- 
cials secured almost unlimited powers in their own districts - 
limited in practice only by their ability to enforce ;their decisions 
by the strong hand.- The liberum veto was supplemented by the 
liberum conspiro. Any party which disliked any measure of the 
government possessed the legal right of forr:!i_r!g an armed confed.era- 
:tion and resisting its application by force. Since these con - 
:federations acted on the decision of a majority, while the Diet 
could act only on an unanimous vote, the opposition it has been 
said was always organised and the government disorganised. 
The nobles under this anarchic constitution held a monopoly of 




every noble, rich or poor, prince or squire, was equal. In fact 
the Polish. nobility was sharply divided into two classes (1) a 
select group of ancient families2 possessing enormous landed wealth 
known as the panowie or magnates and (2) the remaining nobles 
(schlatza) numbering about 1, 500, 000, ignorant, superstitious 
bigoted, and incapable of self government. Most of them had 
1 Dyboski Outlines of Polish. Históry 69-70. 
ii2 Potocki, P.adzi_wil, Sapieha, Lubomirsk]., Czartoryski. 
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insignificant possessions and depended upon one or other of the 
great families .l Their watchword was "Poland stands in and through 
"her anarchy ", because constitutional reform would deprive them of 
part of their political power and consequently of their income.2 
The magnates had in practice an exclusive claim to high and lucrativ 
offices; 
3 
they lived in feudal state with small armies of retainers 
and troops of servants; their "protection" as in fifteenth century 
England was the only guarantee of law and justice for humbler men; 
their power in the land was far greater than that or the crowned 
king at Warsaw, whom they had, chosen and whom if it pleased them 
they could overthrow. They were not merely the "kingmakers" but 
the real rulers of the land - and well they knew it. At the diet - 
:fines the magnate of the district appeared with hundreds (sometimes 
thousands) of armed followers, and tried to secure by intimidation 
and cajolery the undisputed return of his candidate either to the 
Diet or to the Petrikau tribunal, which was the supreme court of 
justice. The elections to the tribunal were the most fiercely 
contested of all,because whichever party secured a majority on the 
supreme court had an effective weapon to further its own interests 
and damage those of its opponents with the appearance of legality. 
Where two or more great families had lands in the same district. 
competition between them was naturally acute in the dietines, which 
frequently broke up in disorder and bloodshed. Similar scenes 
were occasionally seen at the Diet itself, and a fierce contest 
between rival factions prevented the establishment of the tribunal 
at Petrikau in 1749,4 thus depriving Poland of its supreme court 
of justice for the next twelve months.5 
1 Dyboski Polish History 70. Comparison might be made in some 
points between Poland and the Scottish Highlands in the eight - 
:eenth century. Panowie correspond to the chiefs and schlatza 
to the clansmen.. 
2 "La petite noblesse ne se conduit pas par .... raisons; il faut 
" la toucher par un endroit qui lui soit personellement sensible" 
A.E. Pologne 238 f. 21 - Despatch to Broglie 5 October 1752. 
3 Dyboski Polish History 314. 
4 Only in five cases was the validity of the election of the 
deputies undisputed: the quorum was seven. 
5 Poniatowski 26 -28; Roepell 78. 
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Under this anarchic constitution the history of Poland in the 
first half of the eighteenth century is the struggle of the great 
families amongst themselves for power and office, hardly affected 
by the spasmodic efforts of the Saxon kings to recover the control 
which had slipped from their grasp. Kings die, party leaders 
change, but the appeals of both for foreign help against their 
opponents never cease. The Prussian vulture hovers uncertainly 
on the northern frontier, and over all broods the slowly advancing 
shadow of Russian despotism. 
Head and shoulders above the other party leaders in this doomed 
and distracted land stood the two Princes Czartoryski, 
1 
Michael 
Frederick and his younger brother Augustus Alexander. The Czar- 
toryski were one of the oldest Lithuanian families, but it was 
the marriage on 1.1 June 1731, of the younger brother, after years 
of service with the Knights of St. John in Austria, to the widow 
of the Palatin Dehnhof of Poloczk - the wealthiest "match" of the 
generation - which first placed the family on an equal footing 
with the leading Polish families. The elder brother, Michael, 
thanks to the support of his brother -in -law the elder Stanislas 
Poniatowski, and of Field. Marshal Flemming, Augustus II's trusted 
minister, at the early age of 38 received the office of Vice Chan- 
cellor of Lithuania. A few months after his marriage the younger 
brother was given the office of palatin of Russia, which was of 
great value to him as most of his wife's possessions lay in this 
province. Both princes supported Stanislas Leczinski in the 
crisis of 1733, but, thanks to Russian intervention, were speedily. 
received back into favour by Augustus III, completely cured of the 
belief that French support would enable them to carry out the con - 
:sti.tu.tional reforms which Poland so greatly needed. Thanks to 
1 Rulhjere gives lifelike but not altogether reliable portraits, 
I 224 ff. Cf. Poniatowski 16 -18, 50 -55; Farges II especially 
147; Roepell 50 ff. 
2 Lelewel Géschiohte Polens 205 -6. 
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court favour, their capacity for organisation, and their politic 
conciliation of the schlatza, they were soon recognised as the 
most influential of the Polish magnates.' The older families 
bitterly resented the growing power of what they regarded as a 
parvenu family and tended to draw together in opposition to them. 
But the influence of the Czartoryski grew steadily. While the 
other great families plunged deeper and deeper into debt, the 
wealth of the Czartoryski steadily increased, thanks to good . 
management of their estates and to the shower of offices which 
court favour gave to them and their adherents. Moreover they 
found means, by lucrative bribes, which their influence with Brúhl 
enabled them to offer, and still more by marriage alliances, to 
detach from the opposition some of its ablest leaders.2 
It would however be false to represent the party struggles in 
Poland as due merely to selfish interests and the spirit of fac- 
:tion. The majority of the old families headed by the Primate 
and the Great General of the crown, both members of the house of 
Potocki, realised hardly less clearly than the Czartoryski the 
urgent need for constitutional reform.3 But they feared that 
the limitation of the liberum veto would enable the crown to con- 
trol the Diet by judicious exercise of patronage.and thus establish 
despotism on the ruins of Polish liberty. Before consenting to 
the limitation of the liberum veto, they wished to transfer the 
1 All important questions were settled in a family council of 
the two brothers and the elder Poniatowski along with his wife 
and the mother of the two princes. (Poniatowski 51 -53). Boyer 
testifies to the success of this organisation (A.F. Saxe 41, 
f. 329 - 29 August 1751), "Les Czartor3hski auront [toujours] 
"avantage..tant qu'ils agiront comme ils font par sisteme et 
manire si bien combinée ". 
2 Thus Prince Michael Sapieha was married to a daughter of the 
Vice Chancellor of Lithuania: John Clement Branicki, Grand 
General of Poland, to.the elder Poniatowski's daughter: Prince 
Lubomirski to the daughter of the palatin of Russia. 
3 Rulhiere 1 218 -21. 
e 
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exercise of patronage from the King to a standing council of nobles. 
A tentative proposal in this direction was easily defeated in the 
Diet of 1742. Henceforth the Potocki contented themselves with 
thwarting the reforming schemes of their opponents, although they 
continued to hope for a favourable opportunity to carry out their 
projects with the support of France and the concurrence of Prussia. 
While the conservative Potocki despite the warnings of the past two 
crises continued to follow the obsolete policy of dependence on 
France, the Czartoryski looked towards the rising power of Russia. 
They recognised frankly that the fate of the republic of Poland 
lay in Russia's hands. Their immediate object was to make Poland 
a strong constitutionally governed state. Their ultimate objects 
no man can tell, but they were apparently Slavopb.ils before their 
time. Probably from the very beginning they intended to set a 
member of their family on the throne of a reformed. Pola.nd, which 
would preserve an autonomous and prosperous existence by acting as 
11 
a Russian outlook tower into Europe. But since court favour was 
essential to enable them to carry out their schemes for constitu- 
:tional reform, they carefully concealed these designs and made 
common cause with Count Brühl. 
The first plan of reform put forward in 1744 by the Czartoryski 
centred on the strengthening of the army in numbers, discipline, 
and equipment. The Prussian system was proposed as a model. To 
raise the necessary funds a complete reorganisation of taxation, 
and especially the abolition of the exemptions enjoyed by the nobles, 
was proposed. To increase the population available for military 
service marriages were to be encouraged by the State, and the number 
and wealth of religious houses considerably reduced. Finall ,the 
liberum veto should be limited in operation, the law courts and 
1 Pol. Corr. VI 178. 
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administration reformed, pabticularly by payment to all officials 
of adequate salaries which would remove one main cause of corruption. 
The adoption of these reforms would give Poland law and order, cause 
foreign states to seek her alliance, and restore her ancient glory, 
sadly tarnished since the days of John Sobieski.' 
These proposals had no chance of acceptance by thé Diet, and im- 
paired the popularity of the Czartoryski with the lesser nobles. 
In 1745 a duel between the elder Poniatowski and Adam Tarlo, palatin 
of Lublin, in which the latter met his death, further weakened their 
position, and the Potocki gained the upper hand in the Diets of 1746 
and 1748. The Czartoryski could no longer count securely upon the 
favour of the court - once their main asset - because Count Mniszek, 
the Little Marshal of Poland, was insidiously undermining their 
influence with Brúhl,2 in order to oust them from their leadership 
f the court party. In 1750 he strengthened his position by marry- 
ing Brühlts daughter, but at first he was content to share the 
favour of the court with the Czartoryski.3 Brühl himself, on the 
strength of a faked genealogy, had secured naturalisation from the 
corrupt tribunal of Petrikau in 1748; he could now hold lands and 
offices in Poland, and began to keep to himself and his relations 
many of the lucrative offices which he had hitherto sold to the high - 
:est bidder or given away in accordance with the Czartoryskits sug- 
:gestions. Although there was no open rupture till 1754, Brûhlts 
jealousy of his over -powerful allies was patent,4 and even in his 
first visit to Poland in 1750 Williams had found difficulty in media- 
-Kt. 
:tang between Bruhl and Czartoryski. 
1 Farges II 41, 89; The programme is printed in full in Preuss. 
Staats. II 301 -11, under the title 'Letter from a Polish noble- 
man, CStanislas Poniatowski to a friend. 
2 Cf. A.E. Saxe 41, f. 402b and f. 413b. (Brühlts conversations 
with Boyer reported in Boyerts despatches of 6, 18 October, 1751) 
3 Poniatowski 39; Williams to Newcastle 25 November 1752. 
4 Cf. Pol. Corr. IX 66, 85, for reports of growing alienation 
between Brúhl and the Czartoryski (March 1752). 
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The disruption of the Petrikau tribunal, however, made a great im- 
:pression on Brlahl, and he could only hope to carry the much needed 
reforms through the Diet with the assistance of the Czartoryski. 
Williams, already well known to both parties, busied himself with 
the work of reconciliation; but there is no evidence to show how 
far his mediation was responsible for the preservation of the Brúhl- 
Czartoryski alliance. Briahl, however, in the extraordinary Diet 
of 1750 (summoned in August instead of October to deal with the 
rupture of the Petrikau tribunal) for the first time seriously 
supported a programme of reform incorporating some of the points 
of the ambitious Czartoryski plan of 1744. The Diet was to be 
transformed into a confederation, which would enable it to act by 
majority vote, in order to increase taxation and to prohibit the 
use of the liberum veto in fiscal questions' in future Diets. 
These proposals were never even discussed by the Diet, because the 
Potocki party questioned the eligibility of the Marshal of the Diet 
selected by the court on the ground that he was a senator and had 
only resigned p.m forma the office of palatin, which gave him sena- 
2 
:torial rank. One of their adherents then entered his protest 
at the register court of Warsaw against all further proceedings of 
the Diet and fled from the town. The next day the Diet, although 
it could discuss no business, solemnly remained in session in the 
hope that the deputy would return and withdraw his liberum veto. 
Needless to say he did not, and the Diet of 1750, like its predeces- 
:sors, came to an untimely end. 
The deaths in rapid succession of the three leading members of the 
house of Potocki deprived the opposition of its ablest chiefs and 
1 Immediately after the rupture of the Petrikau tribunal the 
Saxon court had vainly tried to secure Austrian approval for 
the abolition, or at least the limitation, of the liberum veto. 
(Beer CXIX). 
2 Williams to Newcastle 23 September 1750; Farges II 118, 141. 
The Potocki naturally seized every opportunity to champion the 
rights of the lesser nobles - one of whom was normally chosen 
as Marshal. 
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left vacant the two leading offices in Poland. The office of 
Great General was given to John Clement Branicki,1 the son -in -law 
of the elder Poniatowski and at this time the ally of the Czar - 
:toryski; that of Primate to Adam Komorowski, one of their trusted 
2 
followers. These and other appointments, including Michael Czar- 
:toryski's promotion to the Great Chancellorship of Lithuania, gave 
the Czartoryski a virtual monopoly of the high offices of state and 
a favourable opportunity to carry out part of their reforming plans 
in conjunction with Brúhl, who regarded these reforms as a neces- 
:sary step towards retaining the Polish crown in. the Saxon family. 
Russian support was already practically assured; British approval 
(and so far as Williams was concerned no line can be drawn between 
approval and support) had been purchased cheaply by the appearance 
of support in the election of a king of the Romans; Austria, even 
although she was on bad terms with Saxony,, would hardly oppose the 
policy of her two allies. Moreover, Austro -Saxon relations had 
considerably improved since Flemming's mission to Vienna, and the 
empress queen listened favourably, although without committing her- 
II 
:self, to the Saxon scheme for securing the continued union of 
however that a definite plan must be elaborated in concert with 
1 
Russia.3 
France and Prussia he=nce had to be reckoned with Frederick 
was fully informed of Saxon schemes, and did not scruple to attri- 
:bute to the Saxon government designs which it had never contern- 
:plated in order to alarm France and thus induce her to take a more 
active part in Polish politics.4 In particular he pressed the 
French government to give energetic instructions to the duc de 
1 Williams t 
2 Pol. Corr. 
3 Pol. Corr. 
to Brahl). 
4 Pol. Corr. 
o Newcastle 2 July 1751 and 11 June 1752. 
VI 178. 
Ix 454 -5 (based on Flemming's intercepted despatches 





one of Conti's intimates, who was destined to play in 
Poland the double part of French ambassador and representative of 
Conti. That the French government saw through Frederick's 
interested advice is proved by their official instructions to 
2 
Broglie. These relate almost exclusively to Polish affairs and 
show a complete reversal in French policy from that of Argenson. 
While in Saxony Broglie's "róle doit, être celui d'observateur 
"éclairé et vigilant ", in Poland he was to prevent the success of 
the Diet, secretly concerting the necessary steps with the leaders 
of the opposition but without taking the Prussian minister into the 
secret. He was to oppose the Lorraine candidature, to assure the 
Poles that France would support any candidate freely elected by 
them, but not to commit his government to the support of any parti- 
cular candidate. His duties as Conti's representative were much 
more arduous. He was to build up the French party, which had sunk 
to a very low ebb, to prepare the way with its leaders for Conti's 
election at the next vacancy, and by repeated exhortations induce 
the French ministers to take a greater and more active interest in 
Polish affairs.3 
Prussian policy in Poland was like the official policy of France - 
primarily negative, but Frederick agreed with Conti that a strong 
opposition should be built up in Poland, His immediate aim was to 
break successive Diets with as little disturbance as possible.4 
Nothing, the Polish constitution being as it was, could be simpler 
and to make doubly sure of success Maltzahn received considerable 
sums to distribute among the Polish patriots.5 Frederick, however, 
was not satisfied with this hand to mouth policy, and was eager to 
involve France more deeply in the affairs of eastern Europe. When 
1 Pol. Corr. IX 93, 111. Broglie's character is best described 
by Poniatowski 209 -10; "C'était un petit homme petri de sal - 
":petre, fier, impérieux, tracassier, inquiet outre mesure .... 
"mais rempli d'ésprit laborieux, quoiqu' aimant le plaisir 
"voulant regenter exclusivement la Saxe et la Pologne ". 
2 Dated 14 July 1752 in Farges II 111 -26: Cf. A.E. Saxp Supple- 
ment 2, f. 199 "Remarques sur l'Instruction pour le C e de 
Broglie" dated 7 June 1752. 
3 See Conti's letter to Broglie in Farges II 127 -33. Cf. Broglie 
Secret du Roi I 38. 
4 Pol. Corr. ÌX "211, 215, 231, 252. 5 Pol. Corr. IX 214 -5. 
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it was suggested to him by Scheffer, formerly Swedish envoy to 
France, that France would welcome a confidential overture from 
1 
him for joint action in Poland, he immediately wrote an autograph 
2 
letter to Louis XV urging him to forestall the Polish designs of 
France's enemies by persuading the Sultan to declare war on the two 
empresses. This would cripple Austria and Russia financially, 
gravely weaken their armies, and might easily lead to coldness 
between the two empresses, such as had followed the campaigns of 
1737 -39. Even if Austria and Russia were successful they could 
gain nothing but the barren kingdom of Serbia, while their finan- 
:cial and military exhaustion would place the balance of Europe in 
the hands of France, establish the liberties of Poland on a secure 
basis, and preserve the peace, of Europe for years to come. This 
chimerical project, based on the two fundamental misconceptions 
that Britain would stand aside and allow France to dominate the 
Continent, and that Turkey was still a match for the two imperial 
courts, was politely shelved by the French government.3 But it 
continued in a modified form to be Frederick's ideal in the follow- 
:ing years, and explains his constant attempts to increase his in- 
fluence over the Porte.4 But the support of France was the basis 
of the whole scheme, and Frederick therefore redoubled his attempts 
to alarm France over the affairs of Poland. While continuing to 
press for a Turkish declaration of war on the imperial courts he 
offered to support any candidate for the Polish throne chosen by 
France.5 Thus Broglie and Frederick II had a common interest in 
urging the adoption of a more active policy in Poland upon the 
French government. Failing to make any visible impression at Ver- 
: sailles by his own exertions, Frederick sought to enlist the support;; 
1 Pol. Corr. IX 219 -20. 
2 Pol. Corr. IX 232 -6, 286 ff. 
3 Pol. Corr. IX 289 -91, 330. 
4 His later attitude was not that Turkey should declare war but 
that by threats Turkey should prevent Austro-Russian domination 
in Poland. Pol. Corr. IX 222: X 426f 441 -2, 468: XI 81, 158. 
5 Pol. Corr. IX 288. 
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1 
of Broglie, who was known to have great influence there, in secur- 
:ing more active French assistance to thwart what he believed to be 
Austro- Russian policy in Poland. 
On their way to the Diet at distant Grodno the Saxon court, the 
foreign ministers,and many of the leading Poles spent some days 
at the Great General's palace near Bialystock. Under the influence 
of Mokranowski, a resolute and enterprising Francophil, Branicki 
was already in close touch with the French party.2 W . illiams hoped 
to make up the differences between Branicki and the Czartoryski and 
prevent him going over entirely to the French party. According to 
Mokranowski Gross and Williams were so foolish as to reveal to the 
Great General the arrangements to be made for securing the succes- 
: sion ;iut,, what ever the extent of the confidences made by Williams 
to the Great General the latter showed no disposition to return 
whole -heartedly to the Czartoryski party. 
Rulhiere's vivid imagination and ability to give verisimilitude to 
his inventions,4 combined with Broglie's love of the dramatic and 
the picturesque,5 has firmly established a wholly misleading account 
of the Diet of 1752. In this version Williams and Broglie appear 
as the principals, intent on winning Polish support for their res- 
pective courts in the'next war. Knowing that the Diet will be 
broken up, Williams arranges with the Czartoryski to form a con- 
federation and carry through their plans by force - establishing 
at a single stroke the effective supremacy of the monarchy in Poland, 
and a firm alliance between Poland, the imperial courts, and the 
Maritime Powers. Everything at first goes according to their plans: 
the Diet is broken and the Czartoryski manifesto establishing a con- 
:federation is signed by the vast majority of the Polish notables, 
1 Pol. Corr. IX 210, 215, 231. 
2 A.E. Pologne 237, Castéra's report of 14 June f. 206; Broglie's 
despatch of 17 September, f. 365. 
3 A.E. Pologne 237, f. 403 - Broglie's despatch of 16 October. 
4 I 238 -53. 
5 Secret du Roi I 36 ff. 
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even by the Great General Branicki, who was still hesitating 
between the Czartoryski and the opposition. Suddenly as crowds 
of the lesser nobles are signing the manifesto, Mokranowski pushes 
through the jostling crowd, seizes the manifesto, rushes with it 
to the French ambassador, and then on the advice of Broglie returns 
to the Great General and convinces him of his mistake in signing it. 
The Great General throws the document into the fire and embraces 
Mokranowski while the crowd of nobles applaud, and Williams and the 
Czartoryski, true to the best traditions of melodrama, slink from 
the chamber vowing vengeance. 
There appears to be no satisfactory documentary evidence for this 
picturesque story. The crux of the matter is the text of the 
mani- festo, and fortunately this document did not perish in the 
flames, but Phoenix -like, has survived to confute the fabrications 
of its destroyers. 
Ministry of Foreign 
verbal differences, 
One copy exists in the Archives of the French 
1 
Affairs; Another copy, which shows merely 
has been printed by Roepell2 from the Prussian 
Archives. Neither copy makes any mention of the formation of a 
confederation. The opening passage runs thus: - 
"Nous considerant que notre patrie demande un secours que la 
"mauvaise issue des diettes ne luy permet pas d'obtenir .... 
"sommes determines á rendre la presente protestation publique 
"afin que les sicles presens et â venir soient instruits de 
"la sincerit4 de nos intentions ", 
and concludes with a peroration about the ancient laws and the 
Roman Catholic religion. The Potocki faction seized upon the 
opening words and interpreted them as meaning the immediate forma- 
tion of a confederation in the hope of discrediting the Czartoryski 
with the schlatza and of increasing the coolness between them and 
Brühl. Broglie at first accepted this story.3 The Czartoryski, 
he says, drew up a manifesto which would have "tout l'effet d'une 
1 A.E. Pologne 238 f. 243. 
2 Appendix IV 235 -7. 
3 A.E. Pologne 238, f. 246 - Broglie's despatch of 28 October. 
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" confederàtion; mais dans lequel cependant le mot de confederation 
"ne se trouveroit pas dans la crainte d'épouvanter le Roi de Pologne 
"... et pour parvenir plus facilement á le faire signer par le plu- 
"part des senateurs ", so as to intimidate the opposition. As soon 
as a majority of senators and nuncios had signed, the confederation 
would have been formed. Subsequently Broglie was driven to qualify 
the undiluted Mokranowski version of the story. Once the paper was 
signed, he says, the Czartoryski could have proceeded to carry the 
alliance with Russia "du moins á la Diette prochaine qui auroit 
"peutetre ete avancee et qui auroit été assemble sous le lien de la 
"confederation" - thus admitting that the danger of a confederation 
was prospective and not actual. Maltzahn's despatchesI confirm 
those of Broglie, but add nothing of importance. 
The readiness of Broglie and Maltzahn to accept the Potocki version 
was very natural, especially in view of the rumours customarily 
raised before each Diet, that the Czartoryski were planning a con - 
:federation in order to carry out their reforms.2 Probably the 
original source of the whole incident is to be found in the schemes 
of the Czartoryski, Brúhl,and Williams for securing the succession, 
which were well known in Poland, and on this occasion gave an air 
of verisimilitude to the customary rumours. But neither the Saxon 
court nor the Czartoryski leaders would have dared to form a con - 
:federation unless assured of the armed support of the imperial 
courts. Negotiations were proceeding with both of the imperial 
courts, but no definite plan of campaign had yet been formed.3 
Quite apart from the tergiversations of Brüh.l and the unwillingness 
of the Anglo- Imperial allies to pledge themselves to the execution 
of the scheme, the Czartoryski leaders themselves had not yet agreed 
4 
upon a definite line of action in the succession question. A 
i Pol, Corr. IX 260 -1, 269. 
2 Pol. Corr. IX 211, 214; A.E. Pologne 237f. 206 b, f. 211 - 
Castera's reports of 14, 24 June. 
3 Pol. Corr. IX 434 -5 
4 See the report of a conversation between Great Treasurer 
Flemming and the Great Chancellor of Lithuania sent by 
Williams to Newcastle along with his paper of 16/27 June 1752. 
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premature attempt to form a confederation would have ruined. 
everything. 
Although it is clear that the Czartoryski plans were not intended 
for immediate execution, Mokranowski may have been perfectly sincere 
in his interpretation of the manifesto at a time when the spirit of 
faction was at its height and distorted rumours of the plans of the 
Czartoryski were current. It is, however, more probable that he 
and some of the other Potocki leaders deliberately misinterpreted 
the Czartoryski manifesto in order to gain party advantages. "Un 
"avantage" Broglie reports 
1 
"bien réel que le parti patriotique va 
"tirer de cet événement c'est de brouiller tout -a-fait le Grand 
"Général de la couronne avec les Czartoryski nand to reduce his con - 
":fidence in the Saxon court ". The perusal of Brogue's despatches 
suggests further that the Potocki leaders had their personal as we1..1. 
2 
as their party advantage in view. On 17 October Broglie reported. 
that Mokranowski had tried to persuade him that the Czartoryski were 
planning to form a Diet of Confederation immediately. Broglie was, 
rightly, sceptical. 
"J'ai beaucoup de peine" he wrote "a le [1!lokranowski) croire, Sa pate 
"Polonoise et son ministre n'ayant pas assez de fermeté pour entre- 
"prendre une chose qui pourroi.t avoir des suites assez serieuses 
"nt.,assez d'argent pour soutenir le parti pour lequel elle se declare - 
t!:ro_it 
". 
Three days later Broglie reported3 a disagreeable conversation with 
another Potocki chief, the palatin of Belz, who was so importunate 
in demanding bribes that Broglie believed he was exaggerating the 
difficulty of breaking the Diet in order to enhance the value of his 
services. Broglie therefore stiffened his attitude towards the 
palatin of Beiz and the other. Potocki. chiefs. What more natural . 
then, in the state of political morality in eighteenth century 
Poland, than that the Potocki leaders should seize the chance offer- 
ed by the Czartoryski manifesto to convince the sceptical ambassa- 
1 Brogli.e's despatch of 28 October (A.E. Pologne 238 f. 246). 
2 A.E. Pologne 238 f. 142. 
3 A.E. Pologne 238 f. 163. 
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dor of the risk of a confederation and induce him to reward their 
services in averting the danger at a high rate ? 
The real story of the Diet of 1752 is drab and uninteresting, but 
typical in both respects of most of the Diets of Augustus III's 
reign. It was evident to Williams weeks before the Diet met on 
1 October, that it would be as fruitless as its predecessors. 
Brühl in spite of his instances at Hanover on Polish affairs, gave 
the Czartoryski no support in their endeavours to exclude their 
opponents from the Diet, and for a time it seemed likely that he 
would give the vacant office of Vice Chancellor of Lithuania to 
the Potocki candidate. 
2 
The Chancellor of Lithuania's threats 
1 
and Williams's mediation brought Brühl to heel, but the discord 
among the King's friends and the presence of énergetic French and 
Prussian ministers acting closely together,3 instructed to break 
the Diet, supplied with ample bribes,4 and armed with the baseless 
story that Gross and Williams had orders to secure Poland's acces- 
:sion to the treaty of 1746,5 insured the rupture of the Diet de- 
:spite the large majority of the Czartoryski. 
6 
The first step in the proceedings of the Diet was the election of 
a Marshal - the only decision in which a majority vote was suffi- 
cient. The Czartoryski nominee was chosen without a division. 
The Potocki faction, according to Williams, did not wish to reveal 
1 Williams to Newcastle 2, 16 September. 
2 Poniatowski 64; Williams to Keith 6 September in Add. MSS 
35474 f. 44. 
3 Pol. Corr. IX 237. 
4 Details in Broglie's despatches, especially Paper A attached 
to his despatch of 21 December in A.E. Pologne 239; Pol. Corr. 
IX 214 -6, 258. Cf. Waliszewski's article in Revue d'histoire 
diplomatique Tom I (1888). 
5 The denials of Briihl, Gross and Williams were naturally dis- 
believed by the opposition, (Roepell 92 -3; Pol. Corr. IX 231): 
even the King failed to convince Broglie that the story was 
without foundation (A.E. Pologne 238 f. 86 - Broglie's despatch 
of 10 October; Pol. Corr. IX 247). 
6 The following account is based chiefly on the semi -official 
"Journals de la Diette" (A.E. Pologne 238 f. 11, f.13, f.15, 
f.17, f.60, etc.), and on the despatches of Williams, Broglie, 
and Maltzahn. 
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their numerical weakness, 
1 
but Broglie explains that he dissuaded 
the Potocki from opposition to the election of the Marshal since 
this might have led to a violent rupture of the Diet and have of- 
:fended the King of Poland. After the election of the Marshal the 
nuncios came up to the Senate and ranged themselves behind the 
chairs of their respective palatins. The King then proposed to 
the Diet the subjects for its future deliberation. In 1752 the 
great controversial proposal of previous Diets - the augmentation 
of the army - was virtually abandoned by the court. The two main 
proposals were reforms in the administration of justice and the 
settlement of various frontier disputes between Russia and Lithuania. 
A more important point than either was the proposal that the unani- 
mous vote of the Diet on each point should have immediately the 
force of law, and its validity should not be impaired by the appli- 
cation of the liberum veto to any question subsequently raised. 
This had been included in the universals (or bulls) summoning the 
dietines,2 but had aroused a storm of opposition, and was therefore 
dropped by the court, although, had the Diet. held, it could have 
been brought up by some follower of the Czartoryski. 
The next step after the hearing of the Royal proposals was the read - 
:ing of the pacta conventa, after which any nuncio was at liberty to 
denounce any violation of the privileges of his house or of his order.' 
Then the nuncios returned to their own house, and, in 1752 as in the 
previous Diet, continued to complain of real or imaginary grievances 
instead of discussing the royal proposals. The activity of the 
Diet was suspended on 16 October by the protest of two deputies 
against the giving of the starosty of Warsaw to Briihlis son - a 
Protestant - and on the 24th another deputy "a person of no sort of 
1 Williams grossly exaggerated the numerical strength of the 
Czartoryski. Cf. the detailed analysis of the sympathies 
of the nuncios in A.E. Pologne 237 f. 396. 
2 Benolt to Frederick II 22 July quoted in Roepell 91. 
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consequence but an immediate dependant on the Palatin of Belz" 
formally broke up the Diet by entering in the register court of 
Grodno his protest against its further proceedings until certain 
1 
grievances detailed in his protest had been redressed. 
Broglie had succeeded in the two points of his official instructions 
- the prevention of Polish accession to the treaty of the two em- 
presses and the rupture of the Diet. But the first point was never 
proposed either by the Czartoryski or by Williams and Gross, since 
it formed no part of their programme. In regard to the second, 
Williams and Briihl attributed the rupture of the Diet to French and 
Prussian bribery and intrigue, but the Potocki party, although they 
eagerly accepted the proffered bribes, would have done what they 
did in any case. Moreover by allowing himself to be unduly influ- 
:enced by the Prussian minister at Grodno,2 by insisting on privi- 
:leges which his predecessors had never claimed,3 and by remaining 
at Warsaw for weeks after the departure of the court, distributing 
bribes to the opposition, Broglie had antagonised Brúhl quite un- 
necessarily and contrary to the spirit of his official instructions. 
In the secret part of his duties the new ambassador played at first 
a very sorry part. Castera, the French secretary at Warsaw, who 
had all the threads of French policy in the east in his hands, died 
suddenly just before Broglie reached Warsaw. 
4 
Now Broglie's secret 
instructions5 (as distinct from the official instructions, which 
made no mention of reorganising the French party in Poland to secure 
1 Copies appended to Williams's letter to Newcastle-of 25 Novem- 
ber and to Broglie's despatch of 24 October (A.E. Pologne 238 
f. 204). 
Pol. Corr. IX 237, 272. 
Williams to Newcastle 25 November. Even the queen of Poland, a 
resolute adherent of France, complained of Broglie's conduct in 
a letter to her daughter (Roepell 97). 
4 Thomelin's despatch in A.E. Pologne 237, f. 341; Broglie Secret 
du Roi I 180; Pol. Corr. IX 209. 
5 The so called secret instructions of 26 September 1752 did not 
reach Brogue until after the conclusion of the Diet. 
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the election of a French candidate) were apparently given by word 
of mouth; Broglie was simply told to depend upon Castéra, up to now 
the sole agent of. the "King's secret" in eastern Europe. Thus 
Castera's death gravely hampered Broglie in the execution of the 
secret part of his mission, since he did not know which members 
of the Potocki party were in the "King's secret ". 
1 
His one im- 
:por.tant success was the conversion, after the conclusion of the 
Diet, of the Great General Branicki, who had hitherto been a half- 
hearted ally of the Czartoryski. He proved equally half- hearted 
in his new alliance, but by reason of his office was a valuable 
recruit. More important than this success was the growing tendency 
towards a rapprochement between Brizhl and the Potocki2 - though here 
Broglie can claim practically no credit since he was personally on 
bad terms with Brúh.l.3 
As British minister Williams's sole duty in Poland was to report on 
the actual position of affairs there, so as to enable his govern- 
ment to form an opinion upon the practicability of securing in 
advance the Saxon succession and preventing a fresh war of the 
Polish succession. He returned from Poland convinced of the 
futility of Brühl's Polish policy. Brúhl had done little to in- 
:fluence elections at the diet:tnes; he and the King had hardly 
concealed their delight at the early rupture of the Diet, which 
enabled the court to return earlier to Hubertsburg for the autumn 
shooting season;4 and so eager were they to get away from Grodno 
that they refused to hold a Senatus Concilium there .5 This refusal. 
1 Cf. Williams to Keith 6 September in Add. MSS 35474 f. 44: 
Castéra's "death will put the new French ambassador under 
"great difficulties who (sic) is entirely referred to him 
"for the state of affairs in Poland and who by his death can- 
:not avoid being very much at a loss how to act ". 
2 Broglie's despatch of 4 December 1752 in A.E. Pologne 239 f.30. 
3 Despatch to Broglie of 18 December 1752 in A.E. Pologne 239, 
f. 59. 
4 Poniatowski 66. 
5 Williams to Newcastle 25 November; A.E. Pologne 239 f. 15; 
Cf. Pol. Corr. IX 271 -2, 276. 
24. 
meant that no minister could be sent to Russia to settle the 
numerous frontier disputes, since only the Senate could appoint 
a minister below the rank of ambassador. The existence of these 
disputes, chiefly over Cossack incursions 
1 
and Poland's refusal to 
surrender Russian refugees, was a weapon in the hands of France 
and Prussia to foment bad feeling between Poland and Russia. Yet 
the Saxon court, although its retention of the Polish throne de- 
:pended on the support of Russia, obligingly left the weapon in 
their hands. Naturally when Brtal had neither time nor inclina- 
:tion to attend to such questions of routine, nothing was done to 
forward the Saxon succession to the crown. Brúhl, in fact, re- 
peatedly disclaimed any connection with the intrigue's of Williams, 
Gross and the Czartoryski, and even censured their conduct as being 
likely to disturb the tranquillity of Poland.2 
Brühl's conduct confirmed Williams in his opinion that if anything 
effective was to be done in Poland it must be in concert with the 
Czartoryski and not with Brúhl. The Czartoryski on their side 
were eager to enlist British support. In the first place British 
influence at Dresden was now at its height; if exerted in their 
favour it would be a valuable asset.3 Secondly/Russia, with her 
corrupt and inefficient government and her preoccupation in the 
Northern crisis, had hitherto given them little effective support, 
and they hoped that British influence at Petersburg would induce 
Russia to pay greater attention to the affairs of Poland. The Czar - 
:toryski were particularly anxious at this time to have British 
influence at Petersburg behind them, since it was by no means certain 
that Bestuzhev left to himself, would support them against the Saxon 
1 Pol. Corr. VIII 334. 
2 A.E. Pologne 237, Broglie's despatch of 16 October f. 43$b. 
The Austrian minister likewise held aloof and expressed dis - 
:approval of their action (A.E. Pologne 239, Broglie's despatch 
of 3 December 1752 f. 15) . 




government in the event of the rupture of their increasingly 
precarious alliance with Brúhl. While Brúh1 was jealous of their 
power, they complained to Williams "bitterly of the weakness, inac- 
":tivity and corruption of their own courtt!2 Britain moreover, 
was negotiating with Russia for the maintenance of a Russian army 
on the frontiers of Prussia. This force would be invaluable to 
the Czartoryski in case of a vacancy in the Polish throne, either 
in preventing Prussian intervention or, if necessary, in resisting 
it.3 Finally they had hopes of direct British support.4 All 
the precedents were against this, but, under Newcastle's impulsion 
and Williams's inspiration, Britain had lately been interfering in 
questions which Walpole had considered entirely out of her orbit, 
and Williams's conversation doubtless encouraged their hopes of 
active British intervention in Polish affairs, such as Newcastle 
and Williams had already brought about in the politics of the Em- 
:pire. Britain since 1749 had imitated the old French policy of 
giving subsidies to the German princes in time of peace. Might 
she not be induced to take a further step in imitation of her 
natural enemy and give protection and even subsidies to Polish 
party chiefs ? The Czartoryski leaders therefore loudly pro - 
5 
:fessed admiration for George II, desire "to lay themselves at 
"His Majesty's feet ", and enthusiasm for the Saxon succession to 
1 Pol. Corr. VII 291 -2. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 25 November. 
3 They "are very uneasy about their future prospects. They 
"dread the King of Prussia getting a further footing in 
"Poland ": Williams to Newcastle 25 November. 
4 See Letter from Flemming, Great Treasurer of Lithuania, on 
behalf of his party, to Newcastle, dated 8 December 1752, in 
S.P.F. Poland: "We hope as our views must be agreeable to 
"England, that we shall have England's support ". (Translated). 
5 It is worth noting that the son of the palatin of. Russia was 
directed by his father to apply to the English ministers at 
all the courts which he visited in his grand tour: (Yorke to 
Newcastle private, 12 January 1753, in Add. MSS 38341 f. 99). 
The young Stanislas Poniatowski behaved in the same fashion 
and Frederick II suspected that his object in visiting London 
was to win British support for the Czartoryski: Pol.. Corr. 
X 47. 
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the Polish crown. 
Although in outward appearance the Diet of 1752 differed in no way 
from previous Diets, the close alliance of Williams with the Czar - 
:toryski and their preparations for the next Diet' on the one hand, 
and the energetic efforts of the French ambassador to reorganise 
and animate the French party in Poland on the other, embittered the 
old feuds and increased the disturbances in that distracted and un- 
:happy land. Williams and Broglie unknown to themselves were serv- 
ing the interests, not of their own courts, still less of their 
Polish allies, but of Russia, Prussia and Austria. Meantime until 
the time came for action the three Eastern courts were content to 
remain spectators, but by no means disinterested spectators, of the 
growing anarchy in Poland. 
1 Williams confesses to Keith (8 November in Add. MSS 35474 f. 115) 
that since coming to Poland he had given himself "much pains to 
very little purpose ". Cf. Broglie's account of his activities 
(A.E. Pologne 237 f. 403 - 16 October) : -- "Il s'gdresse á tout 
"le monde; il est devenu plus caressant qu'aucun italien .... 
"je l'ai vu parler en particulier aux jeunes princes dont 
"l'influence est .... mediocre et jusques aux femmes de chambre 
"de la Reine; il ne neglige rien pour les séduire ". 
CHAPTER VIII 
Williams's Mission to Vienna (1753). 
Williams is sent to Vienna on a special mission - His 
instructions - Increasing hostility between Britain 
and Prussia - The election project - The barrier nego- 
tiations - Necessity of strengthening the bonds between 
Britain and Austria - The Polish succession - Alarm of 
Frederick at Williams's mission - Williams's conversations 
with the Empress Queen and Kaunitz - Futility of his visit 
to Vienna - Decline of the old system - Williams returns 
to England by way of Dresden, Hanover, and the Hague. 
Williams spent the winter of 1752 -3 at Dresden and doubtless found 
life there very dull after the novelty and excitement of his mission 
to Poland. He had long been eager to visit Vienna' and was delight -, 
:ed to receive on 4 March 1753 not only the King's pe rmission to 
make the trip for which he had asked, but also instructions2 to 
undertake a secret mission to the Austrian court. 
Newcastle had long been dissatisfied with Keith, the resident Bri- 
tish minister at Vienna. He believed that Keith, overawed by the 
haughty airs of the Austrian ministers and charmed by "the most be- 
ll:witching natural eloquence "3 of the empress queen, did not press 
the British point of view upon them with sufficient vigour. In 1752 
Hyndford had been sent to impress upon Maria Theresa the necessity 
of making some sacrifice to secure the election of her son as king 
of the Romans. Hyndfórd was chosen because he was autrichien a 
A 
bruler and too good a courtier to say anything which might impair 
the Anglo- Austrian alliance. His gentle remonstrances had complete -¡ 
:ly failed to influence the Austrian court. Newcastlejtherefor e, 
decided to try a combination of Scottish caution and reserve, repre- 
1 
:sented by Keith, and Welsh impetuosity and outspokenness, represent -' 
:ed by Williams, and to enable Williams to speak the more freely he Ìi 
was not given an official character.4 
In a word Williams's mission was to restore to the Anglo- Austrian 
alliance the spirit of cordiality and co- operation which had been 
lacking since the treaty of Aix -la- Chapelle. Newcastle's instruc- 
tions were emphatic on this point:- 
1 Williams to Newcastle 7 August 1752; Williams to Newcastle 
private, 25 January 3.753, in Add. MSS 32842 f. 262. 
2 In the form of a private letter from Newcastle dated 20 Feoru- 
:ary (in P.R.O.: copy sent to Keith, in Add. MSS 35475 f. 42). 
Williams was instructed to act in everything in concert with 
Keith and to avoid giving him the least jealousy. 
3 Keith to Holderness 27 June 1755 in Add. MSS 32856 f. 504. 
4 Newcastle to Williams private, 20 February, in Add. MSS 32843 
f. 28. 
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"Endeavour to establish a thorough confidence with us; but upon 
"the foot of equality. If we are to act upon all occasions in 
"concert, they shall do so also .... The conduct of the Austrian 
"ministers is astonishing. We wish to be well with them. e 
"show it by desiring to do their business; and rather than owe 
"any obligation to us they will obstruct their own business and 
"do that of their greatest enemies France and Prussia: when if 
"we would (as I hope we never shall) follow their example the 
"house of Austria and the common cause would be no more thought 
"of. This is a real truth. I don't know whether my friend 
"Keith has courage enough to tell them so, but if he has not I 
"hope you will. You have a manner when you please; and pray 
"exert it now" .1 
British interests imperatively demanded the restoration of the 
Anglo- Austrian alliance on a sound basis. The old standing quar- 
:rel with Prussia was coming rapidly to a head. Difficulties with 
France in India and America grew daily more threatening. Newcastle 
doubted whether Pompadour pacifism, which he conciliated by a steady 
stream of pineapples from the far famed glass houses of Claremont, 
would triumph over the aggressive policy of France's representatives 
in the colonies and the restiveness of Prussia, alarmed by the en- 
circling policy of the imperial and Hanoverian courts. 
In addition to the herculean task of removing the misunderstandings 
and jealousies which had arisen between Austria and Britain since 
1748, Williams was entrusted with three main commissions. Firstly, 
in regard to the quarrels of Britain and Prussia over the Silesian 
loan and the Prussian ships, he was to secure Austria's approval of 
Newcastle's statement of the British case in refutation of the 
Prussian "exposition des motifs ".2 If these disputes involved 
Britain in war with Prussia or led to a Prussian attack upon Han - 
:over, Williams was to find out what the court of Vienna would do 
and, if necessary, induce them to promise support. If the Austrian 
ministers took the opportunity to urge once again that Britain 
should subsidise Russia, Williams was to insist that Russia, like 
Austria, was bound to assist Britain and Hanover (if attacked in a 
1 Newcastle to Williams private, 20 February, in Add. IMSS 32843, 
f. 28. 
2 Printed by Satow in chapter VII. 
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British quarrel) under existing treaties, but to assure them that 
if Russia reduced her demands to a reasonable figure then the 
British government would consider the practicability of giving a 
subsidy. 
Secondly, there was the perennial election question. Although it 
seemed as likely, as Horace Walpole said, l that they would see a 
king of the Jews, Newcastle still had the election of a king of the 
Romans much at heart, and believed that Keith did not appreciate 
its importance and therefore failed to press it upon the court of 
Vienna as strongly as he ought to have done.2 Williams could be 
trusted to correct this deficiency and to do his utmost to win over 
the court of Vienna. He was instructed to play upon Austria's hos- 
tility to Prussia. If the election was carried through it would 
be a great blow to the king of Prussia and would make him less like- 
ly to disturb the general peace. Austria, once convinced of this, 
could hardly fail to change her conduct and, as the Elector Palatin 
was particularly tractable at the moment, Newcastle still hoped to 
see his efforts crowned with success. 
Thirdly, the negotiations between the Maritime Powers and Austria 
for the re- establishment of the barrier in the Austrian Netherlands 
were not far from a complete deadlock.3 Newcastle dreaded the ef- 
:feet which the loss of the privileges hitherto enjoyed by English 
merchants in the Austrian Netherlands would have upon the approach- 
ing Parliamentary elections. 
4 
On this point also Williams was 
instructed to induce Austria to accept a compromise by exciting her 
hostility to Prussia. 
1 Letters III 148. 
2 íi`éüc° á ale to Keith, very private, 29 December 1752, in Add. 
MSS 32841 f. 40 b. 
3 Newcastle to Yorke 9 March, Newcastle to Keith 9 March, in 
Add. MSS 32844 f. 201 and f. 211 respectively. 
4 W. Bentinck to Prince Louis of Brunswick 24 May 1753, in 
Archives II 283. 
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"The King of Prussia" Newcastle wrote "again flatters himself those 
"disputes must produce a coolness [between the Maritime Powers and 
"Austria,; and on this also his Prussian majesty founds his secur- 
" :ity, and from this .... France will undoubtedly in time and perhaps 
"soon regain their (sic) former influence and authority over the 
"Republic of Holland first and by that means over all Europe after4 
" :wards." 
Williams was entrusted also with numerous commissions of less 
importance. He was to try to restore Newcastle to the Empress's 
good opinion; to appeal to the Emperor to use his influence to 
secure the adoption of Newcastle's policy at Vienna; and to draw 
up a report both on "persons and things" at Vienna, and particularly 
on the character and inclinations of Kaunitz, who had already re- 
:ceived orders to return from the French embassy to Vienna and take 
up the duties of Imperial Chancellor.) Finally, to avoid any 
appearance of direct communication between the British government 
and the Czartoryski party in Poland, the King's reply to Flernming's 
letter was to be handed by Williams to Flemming's brother, then 
Saxon minister at Vienne.2 
"His Majesty" Newcastle explained to Williams "directed that [the 
"reply] should be general; as it would otherwise have been diffri_- 
"cuit on the one hand to avoid giving more encouragement than the 
"King may think advisable or practicable and as on the other, there 
"must be great inconvenience in seeming to dissuade and discou.n.ten- 
":ance a spirit among the nobility of Poland to take such steps as" 
"may best secure the liberties of their own country and prevent them 
"from flinging themselves into the hands of France and Prussia ". 
Williams arrived at Vienna in the middle of March, but found it 
impossible to execute his instructions until Kaunitz returned to 
Vienna, as none of the older ministers were willing to take the 
responsibility of discussing the future policy of Austria until 
the new Chancellor had given them their cue. The first point of 
his instructions was indeed obsolete since both the Empress and the 
1 Williams before going to Vienna suspected. his French tendencies:;¡ 
(Williams to Newcastle, private, 7 March in Add. MSS 32843, 
f. 187). 
2 Newcastle to Williams 20 February secret. Williams was well 
content with the reply which was "sufficient to encourage the 
"well affected Polanders whilst at the same time it leaves His 
"Majesty entirely free from any engagement with them ". Williams 
to Newcastle 7 March. 
5. 
Emperor had already given Keith the strongest assurances that they 
would fulfil their engagements with George II as king and elector 
1 
in the event of war with Prussia. But the question of the best 
method of restraining Prussia was still under discussion between 
the two courts. 
2 
Vienna proposed that Britain should accede to 
the fourth secret article of the treaty of 1746 and should also 
accept the accession of Saxony on the conditions proposed by Briáhl, 
which included a British guarantee of Saxony, and perhaps even of 
Poland, if attacked by Prussia.3 Newcastle stigmatised these pro - 
:posals as Nonsense. 
The urgency of the Prussian question was increased by news4 that 
Frederick intended, as soon as he could secure the support of France 
and induce the Turks to attack Russia or Austria, without waiting 
for the death of Augustus III, to attack Poland and annex Polish 
Prussia.5 Williams and Keith were therefore instructed to find 
out what the courts of Vienna and Petersburg and their allies in 
Poland proposed to do in regard to the Polish succession; to demon- 
strate to the Austrian ministers the impracticability and insuffi- 
ciency of their proposals for restraining Prussia; and to fling 
out the suggestion (but without committing their court) that a gen- 
eral defensive alliance should be formed 
"wherein no particular acquisition or advantages were to be stipu- 
":lated for any one of the contracting parties, though the alliance 
"should have in view the preventing the troubles to be apprehended 
"upon the vacancy of the crown of Poland and any attack to be made 
"by the Turks". 
In effect Newcastle offered the two imperial courts British assist- 
ance to defend their interests in eastern Europe in exchange for 
1 Newcastle to Keith 13 February, 9 March 1753, in Add. MSS 35475 
f. 14, f. 55; Keith to Newcastle 21 February, 9 March, in 
S.P.F. Germany; Satow 135. 
MSS Newcastle to Keith 9 March in Add. 32843 f. 211; Newcastle 
to Yorke, private, 6 April; Newcastle to Williams 30 March. 
3 Pol. Corr. IX 376, 394. 
4 Newcastle to Keith, private and secret, 30 I,Iarch, in Add. 
MSS 
35475 f. 164; Newcastle to Williams and. Keith 20 April; 
New- 
castle to Yorke, private, 6 April, in Add. MSS 32844 f. 54. 
5 Later it was reported. that Sweden was being engaged in the 
coalition. (Newcastle to Keith 22 June, in Add.. MSS 35476 f.82). 
6 This despatch is printed in appendix D. 
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their support of. British interests in western Europe, and, in 
particular, satisfactory Austrian guarantees to defend Hanover 
against Prussia and the Low Countries against France. 
The first result of Williams's mission was to increase the tension 
between the rival leagues. Frederick II. preternaturally suspici- 
ous where his old antagonist was concerned, wondered what new mys- 
:tery of iniquity was hidden beneath the surface 
1 
and jumped cor- 
:rectly to the conclusion that Williams's mission was intended to 
secure Austrian support if an Anglo- Prussian war broke out.2 Then 
he received news of Austrian and Saxon movements of troops° which 
led him for a brief space to believe that ";tilliams was probably 
arranging at Vienna an Austro- British- Hanoverian -Saxon attack upon 
Prussia.4 With characteristic impulsiveness he began military 
counter preparations and appealed to France for support.5 Subse- 
:quent inquiries soon proved that the projected attack was a figment 
of his own imagination.6 This incident although of no consequence 
in itself is significant of the growing tension between the rival 
leagues, due to mutual suspicion and fear. Frederick's armaments 
and his rash actions whenever he scented danger increased the ten - 
:sion, and created an atmosphere in which diplomacy regarded the 
outbreak of a great European war as sooner or later inevitable. 
Meantime Williams remained at Vienna7 awaiting the arrival of 
Kaunitz. He lived in close harmony with Keith and Flemming, cul- 
:tiva.ted the Anglophil Austrian ministers, and officiously advised 
i Pol. Corr. IX 377, 391, 402 -3. 
2 ibid IX 382, 391, 396. 3 ibid IX 402 -5. 
4 ibid IX 4 05, 407 -8. His final version (IX 457 -8) was that 
Austria had demanded subsidies and the negotiation had there- 
fore fallen through. 
5 ibid IX 409: Frederick when he discovered his error, bitterly 
regretted this appeal to France, since it would confirm the 
suspicions of the French government that he was trying to in- 
volve them in war. (ibid IX 424 -5) 
6 ibid IX 417, 419. 
7 Arneth's account of his mission in IV 316 -7. 
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the chief of them, Count Colloredo, to unite himself closely with 
Kaunitz in order to overthrow Bartenstein,1 to whom he, like his 
predecessors at Vienna, attributed the unconciliatory attitude of 
the Austrian court towards Britain. He composed a couple of Latin 
verses in praise of the Empress which attained European celebrity, 
although the greater part of them was not original. But Maria. Ther- 
esa was not the woman to be influenced by flattery in any language 
and Williams's interviews with her were entirely unsatisfactory. 
"It was not difficult" he reported3 "to perceive in the conversations 
"which I had the honour of having with her Imperial Majesty, that her 
"intentions are to live in the strictest union with the King. But I 
"had the misfortune to differ from her Imperial Majesty about the 
"means of cementing that union. Her jealousy of being governed broke 
out very often and particularly in the whole story of the Maritime 
"Powers having signed the preliminaries at Aix without her. Upon 
"this I took the liberty to talk with great freedom to her Imperial 
"Majesty; I recapitulated in the strongest manner the many obliga- 
":tions she had to the King ,... I also told her Imperial Majesty 
that besides all the King had already done for her service, he had 
"been at no time more inclined to continue and improve the strictest 
"union with her Majesty than at present; that the King desired no 
"superiority, but that he insisted upon equality and reciprocity; 
"and that I was sorry to tell her Imperial Majesty that all unpre- 
":judiced persons were convinced that it was owing to some jealousy 
"of this sort, and the want of a due confidence in the best and most 
"powerful friend of the House of Austria that the great affair of 
"the election of a King of the Romans had not been long ago completed 
"and that it was a melancholy consideration for those who were sin_ - 
":cerely attached to the House of Austria to reflect that while the 
"King was taking indefatigable pains and expending great sums for 
"attaining one of the greatest benefits that coula accrue to her 
"Imperial family and to the peace of Europe, the Court of Vienna had 
"rather hindered than forwarded the great work. The Empress Queen 
"was warmed by what I said, and seemed to take it very ill; but I 
"could not depart from what I was convinced was true. Your Grace 
"had ordered me to talk with freedom and I did so. 
1 Williams to Newcastle 11 April. 
2 0 regina orbis prima et puicherrima, ridens 
Es Venus, incedens Juno, Minerva loquens. 
(Walpole Letters III 155 -6) . 
3 Coxe in Pelham Administration II 469 -82 prints this celebrated 
despatch rmost in full. It was obviously designed to please 
the King and Newcastle (Yorke to Hardvricke 7 August in Add.MSS 
35356 f. 171). Yorke was delighted to hear from his father 
(Add. MSS 35356 f. 175) that the despatch was "not to be read 
"by the principal person for whom CVillians] wrote and with a 
"view to pay his court to whom many of the pictures have been 
"particularly heightened ". Not only Coxe in his House of 
Austria chapter CIX, but also Arneth,quote* repeat-e-713-from 
this despatch, and thus afford* convincing proof of the sub- 
:stantial accuracy of Williams's vivid characterisation of the 
Austrian sovereigns and ministers. 
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"Our conversation was still more animated upon the affair of the 
"barrier .... I was resolved to do my utmost to persuade her 
"Imperial Majesty .... of the injustice with which (the Maritime 
"Powers) had been treated. This I did with a decent freedom. 
"But I am sorry to say that I found. her Imperial Majesty so pre- 
": judß.ced in this affair that reason had very little share in all 
"she said. The notion of being the independent sovereign of the 
"Low Countries is so fixed in her that it will be difficult to 
"eradicate it. I took the liberty to tell her Majesty in so many 
"words that she was far from being the independent sovereign of the 
"Low Countries, that she was limited by her treaties with the Mari- 
" :time Powers, which I hoped for the future at least would be no 
"more violated. This her Imperial Majesty seemed also to take very 
"ill; and insisted loudly, so loudly that the people in the next 
"room heard her, that she was the sovereign of the Low Countries 
"and that it was her duty to protect her subjects, who had been too 
"long oppressed by the barrier treaty and deprived of the natural 
"privileges which all other nations enjoy. To this I replied that 
"the treaty of the barrier was still in force, though it had cer- 
":tainl.y been violated by her Imperial Majesty .... I wish I could 
"tell your Grace anything I said upon this subject had made the 
"least impression upon the Empress Queen .... . 
"I believe Your Grace will now be of opinion that I might have made 
"my court at Vienna in a better manner; but my chief object there 
"was a due execution of Your Grace's orders; and, if I have His 
"Majesty's approbation I am very indifferent about everything else." 
Williams's interviews with Kaunitz were still less satisfactory1 
when it came to a discussion of concrete questions, although Kaunitz 
had no difficulty in persuading Williams that he was completely 
cured of his French inclinations. Their discussions turned mainly 
on the question of the barrier. 
"As I look upon that treaty [of the barrier" ."Williams reports "as 
"the cement which unites the Maritime Powers to the House of Austria 
"and which makes the basis of the defence of the liberties of Europe 
"I have employed all the time my health would permit in debating 
that point with Count Kaunitz .... But it is impossible to come to 
rr 
any conclusion where people differ entirely in the first principles. 
" Kaunitz talks as if he was persuaded that we had no longer any right 
to our ancient tarriff; and I am firmly persuaded that the giving 
fup that would be giving up a right which we acquired at a prodigious 
expense, which we have never since forfeited, and which we have now 
"as good a right to as we had the day after the signing the Treaty 
Cçi.emonstrated] to Count Kaunitz the impossibility of our accepting 
"the preliminaries which he delivered to Count Bentinck at the Hague. 
a- aunitz then indicated his readiness to consider favourably any 
"counter proposals made by the Maritime Powers]. After this he 
1 " Kaunitz affected very often to tell me that he was better 
"informed o the subjects upon which we talked than I was. 
"To which sually answered that weak as my arguments might 
"be they w re not to be refuted by bare assertions, and that, 
"though I confessed his superiority of talents and knowledge, 
"yet I could not help thinking that what I said generally 
"deserved an answer". (Williams to Newcastle 15 July 1753 
S.P.F. Poland, part not printed by Coxe). 
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'proceeded to explain the necessity of her Imperial Majesty keeping 
"up a larger body of troops in Flanders than she was obliged to do 
"by the barrier treaty till such time as the fortifications of the 
"barrier towns should be repaired; that her Imperial Majesty had 
"no fund for maintaining the additional number of troops and there - 
" :fore would be obliged to apply to the States of Flanders and Bra - 
":bant for an increase of revenue which there would be little hopes 
"of obtaining unless her Imperial Majesty could show them that she 
"was sure of procuring for them some new and solid advantages in 
"their commerce; and that without something of that sort she doubted 
"very much whether those states would even continue the revenues 
"which her Imperial Majesty enjoyed at present; and without which 
"the Empress Queen would be obliged to reduce her army which at 
"present was so absolutely necessary for the defence of Flanders. 
"I objected to all this that it was not the addition of 6,000 or 
"8,000 Austrians that was to make the defence of the Low Countries, 
"but a solid and indissoluble union between the Maritime Powers and 
"the House of Austria, and whoever was the cause of dissolving that 
"union would be the certain cause of the Austrian Netherlands being 
"soon in the hands of France" .1 
Kaunitz ultimately handed to Williams the draft of two articles2 to 
be inserted in the new Barrier treaty, which was less unacceptable 
to Britain than anything Austria had hitherto offered and these 
articles formed the basis of subsequent barrier negotiations.3 The 
differences between Austria and Britain were however fundamental and 
proved insuperable. Austria regarded herself as the independent 
sovereign of the Austrian Netherlands, while Newcastle insisted on 
regarding "the Low Countries as a kind of common country in which 
"we, the Dutch, and the Empress Queen are all interested ".4 
In regard to the third point of Williams's original instructions - 
the election of a king of-the Romans - Kaunitz appeared to be more 
accommodating, although he had been from the beginning the most 
strenuous opponent of the scheme at Vienna.5 If Austria could be - 
induced to buy off the Elector Palatin, Newcastle still believed 
1 Williams to Newcastle 9 June. 
2 Copy in Add. MSS 32845 f. 45, printed in O.S. II 120 -22. 
3 Newcastle to Keith 14 August in Add. MSS 35476 f. 202 b; 
"Narrative of the negotiations relative to the Barrier" in 
S.P.F. Treaty Papers 116. 
4 On the barrier and commercial negotiations between the Maritime 
Powers and Austria see O.S. II 94 -114; #achard Histoire de 
la 
Be ',give au commencement du XVIII° sicle 506 et seq. 
5 O.S. II 27 &c. 
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that France would acquiesce in the election and was prepared to 
proceed with it. Kaunitz gave Williams some hopes that he would 
make an answer to the last demands of the Elector Palatine which 
would satisfy Britain, but these hopes were not realised.' Similar- 
:ly in regard to the affairs of Poland, Williams could only give 
Newcastle the platitudinous assurance that the court of Vienna was 
"alarmed at the thoughts of seeing a French prince on the throne 
"of Poland and of His Prussian Majesty aggrandising himself by the 
acquisition of Polish Prussia" .2 Finally Kaunitz promised to 
draw up .a draft treaty of defensive alliance to be joined by all 
the well intentioned powers and to submit it to the British govern- 
:ment, but this promise also remained unfulfilled. 
Thus Williams was no more successful than Hyndford in strengthening 
the Anglo- Austrian alliance. This task was indeed beyond the power 
of a single diplomatist and could only have been accomplished by a 
radical change of men, of spirit, and of measures on sides. 
Newcastle's meddlesome and opinionated policy pressed upon Austria 
in imperious and argumentative language, offended Bartenstein,3 who 
was as irritating a controversialist as Newcastle, and was in addi- 
:tion the very incarnation of that stiff necked formalism which has 
in all epochs distinguished the court of Vienna. The relations 
between the two ostensibly allied courts "degenerated into a paper 
"war " 
4 
. And when Kaunitz succeeded Bartenstein there was - despite 
Williams's prophecies - no appreciable improvement in Anglo- Austrian 
relations. Kaunitz may have been momentarily sincere in his assur- 
1 Newcastle was still pressing the election in 1754. Newcastle 
to Keith very private i February 1754, in Add. MSS 32848 f.209: 
"Never let the ministers rest till [the election] is done. I 
"dare not write this by order. But I will never give it up." 
2 Williams to Newcastle 9 June: Cf. Keith to Newcastle 14 
Novem- 
ber in Add. MSS 3284'7 f. 52. As late as 5 July 1754 
Holder - 
:ness complained to Keith (Add. MSS 35478 f. 26) that no parti- 
cular answer had been returned to Newcastle's despatch of 20 
April 1753 to Williams and Keith. rr''II 
3 See on his career Arneth's article in Archiv -ur Oesterr. 
Gesch. 
Bd. 46. 
4 Coxe House of Austria III 350. 
il . 
:ances and in his promises, because he at times feared that the 
reconciliation. of Austria and France would be a task beyond the 
resources of the ablest diplomacy. More probably he was merely 
paying lip homage to Austria's old love until he was securely 
established in the affections of the new, 
1 
Williams accepted the 
counterfeit for the genuine coin,2 and his reports of Austria's 
readiness to defend Britain or Hanover against attack and of the 
new Chancellor's favourable inclinations towards the old system, 
confirmed as they were in both respects by Keith's despatches,3 
helped to prolong Newcastle's residence in a fool's paradise, from 
which he was rudely thrust in the summer of 1755, when Austria de- 
manded impossible terms for assisting Britain to defend Hanover 
and. the Netherlands against France. In fact Kaunitz's abandonment 
of hostility to France, whether he succeeded in detaching France 
from Prussia or not, converted Austria's alliance with Britain from 
the essential foundation of Austrian foreign policy into a dangerous 
burden since at any moment Franco- British hostility might involve 
Austria in war with France. The alliance had virtually lost its 
raison d'étre and there was naturally no disposition on the Austrian 
side to make sacrifices for the "common cause ", since in Kaunitz's 
eyes that cause no longer existed. The only method of restoring 
to the British alliance the value it had lost would have been for 
1 Coxe House of Austria III 354. 
2 Frederick IT-athis time also believed that Kaunitz was Anglo- 
:phil; Pol. Corr. IX 438. Klingräffen wisely refrained from 
committing himself merely remarking that "toutes ses paroles 
it sont douces et emmiellis envers tout le monde ". Pol. Corr. 
IX 439; cf. Arneth IV 352. 
3 Keith swallowed Kaunitz's platitudes with even greater avidity 
than Williams; "Count Kaunitz upon all occasions .... has de- 
:clared in the most explicit terms that he considers the union 
of the house of Austria with the maritime powers .... as the 
only solid basis upon which our whole system can be built .... 
and one day having in talking made use of the word Nous he 
/I 
stopped and said that whenever he made use of that TWW he 
always joined the King with their Imperial Majesties ....Kaun 
-i 
has the worst opinion in the world of the French sincer- 
":ity and is at the same time fully persuaded of their bad 
"disposition towards the House of Austria and her allies 
and 
"this makes him suspect everything that comes from that quarter" 
Keith to Newcastle very private 25 May, in Add. MSS 32844 f. 339 
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Britain to commit herself to Austro- Russian antagonism to Prussia 
9 
and in particular to accede to the fourth secret article of the 
treaty of 1746. This was repeatedly demanded both by Bartenstein1 
and by Kaunitz. Williams's arguments therefore made as little im- 
:pression on Kaunitz as Hyndford's eloquence had made on Bartenstein. 
Such being the attitude of the court of Vienna no real concessions 
could be expected on the definite points of business on which ,,'il- 
:lia_rns was instructed to negotiate at Vienna. His insistence on 
these points merely provoked, as we have seen, heated controversies 
with the Empress Queen and her chancellor. Doubtless his illtimed 
insistence upon the British point of view alienated them still fur- 
ther from Britain and made them more eager than ever to escape from 
galling dependence upon an ally who demanded so much and would give 
so little in exchange. Henceforth Keith remained undisturbed at 
Vienna and by toning down Newcastle's despatches and submitting as 
gracefully as possible to Austrian insolence, contrived to maintain 
the semblance of an alliance which was soon, at the first shock of 
reality, dissolved into its constituent elements. 
Williams's stay at Vienna was much prolonged by illness2 and it was 
not until 15 June that he arrived at Dresden and found awaiting him 
there a formal letter from Newcastle giving him leave to return to 
England. After a month's residence at Dresden, ostensibly to re- 
establish his health, he set out for England, taking with him the 
young Poniatowski, who had assiduously attended him during his ill- 
ness both at Vienna and Dresden.3 At Hanover they remained three 
days and Poniatowski records that "tout Anglais qu'il étoit Williams 
"ne negligeoit pas ce qu'ils appellent: les backstairs. Il 
1 O.S. II 61 ff. 
2 Keith to Newcastle very private 25 May, in Add. MSS 32844 
f. 339; Williams to Newcastle 9 June; Williams to Newcastle 
private 11 June, in Add. MSS 32845 f. 69. 
3 Poniatowski 70 -76. 
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"renouvela soigneusement connaissance avec toutes les personnes 
"des deux sexes et de tout age qui avaient quelque connexion avec 
"my T tad0 Y(irmouth) " .1 
At the Hague Williams remained for a week. Yorke believed that 
his main object was to try and pick up gossip to Yorke's disadvan- 
:tage, which he could use to avenge Fox's defeat by Hardwicke in 
their controversy over the Marriage Act and possibly to secure the 
post of envoy at the Hague for himself .2 Yorke took elaborate 
precautions against these designs and was delighted to find that 
Williams was "suspect and disliked by the Princess Royal and all 
3 
our friends here ". The Pensionary was particularly hostile to 
Williams, who apparently had not paid him the customery visit of 
ceremony when passing through the Hague in 1749. The Bentincks 
also disliked him and blamed particularly his outspoken conduct at 
Vienna, since they believed that Newcastle's treatment of Austria 
and impolitic insistence upon Britain's rights might easily destroy 
the old system.4 
Williams was either unaware, or else contemptuous, of the cabal 
against him, and openly discussed his projects, "of which" Yorke 
5 
records "he is brimming full "with all and sundry at the Hague.6 
1 Poniatowski 75. 
2 Yorke to Hardwicke 13 July and 24 July, in Add. IISS 35356, 
f. 159, f. 167. 
3 Yorke to Hardwicke 17 July, in Add. MSS 35356 f. 165. Cf. W. 
Bentinck to Newcastle 20 July in Add. MSS 32845 f. 377 "Wil- 
":liams is not at all in fashion amongst us ... I don't think 
"i.t will be at all necessary to enter with him into any detail 
"about the affair of Barrier since it is impossible for him 
"with the little knowledge he has of our constitution to judge 
"of what we are doing or of making any just report of it ". 
Williams had asked Newcastle to instruct him to discuss the 
affair with Bentinck. (Williams to Newcastle, private 30 June 
in Add. MSS 32845 f. 209). 
4 W. Bentinck to Louis of Brunswick 24 May 1753 in Archives II 
279 ff; Notes of. W. Bentinck, ibid 286 -7. 
5 Yorke to Hardwicke 31 July in Add. MSS 356 f. 169. 
6 Williams's real business at the Hague and at Amsterdam (Yorke 
to Newcastle private 31 July, in Add. MSS 32845 f. 464) 
was to 
treat with the Dutch creditors of. the Saxon Steuer. 
There 
were already three Saxon ministers at the Hague negotiating 
on 
this point; Williams then appeared with instructions from 
Augustus III to offer a half per cent more than the Saxon 
ministers were authorised to offer as interest on the 
debt I 
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These projects and particularly his "character" of the court of 
Vienna made him less popular than ever at the Hague, because the 
latter "is very free and all our friends here are not in the same 
"way of thinking about the court of Vienna as he is and think too 
"that as they have lived there longer they know it better ".1 Yorke 
shared his friends' belief that had not Bartenst-ein been displaced 
by Kaunitz he "would have made a bad use of the freedom with which 
"Sir Charles spoke and I believe by authority" - an implied and in 
the main just criticism of Newcastle's attitude towards Austria. 
By the middle of August Williams was back in London2 after an ab- 
:sence of more than three years and at once flung himself into the 
3 
Fox -Hardwicke vendetta, which had developed from Fox's violent 
attack on Hardwicke's Marriage Act. 
i Yorke to Hardwicke 7 August in Add. MSS 356 f. 171. 
2 Holderness to Newcastle in Add. MSS 32732 f. 582. Frederick 
II was seriously afraid that Williams might stimulate the 
bellicose element in the British cabinet so as to provoke 
war with Prussia. But Michell, the Prussian secretary at 
London reported that he played an insignificant role in his 
own country although he was so prominent on the Continent. 
Pol. Corr. X 102. 
3 Yorke to Hardwicke 28 August f. 175; 4 September f. 177, 
both in Add. MSS 35356. 
CHAPTER IX 
Poland and Saxony (1753 -56). 
Williams's plan for securing election of the electoral prince 
of Saxony to the Polish throne - Its futility - Reorganisation 
of the Potocki party - Growing alienation of Brúhl from the 
Czartoryski - Broglie seeks to reconcile Brühl and the 
Potocki - Williams postpones his return to Warsaw - The 
ordination of the Ostrog - Danger of civil war in Poland - 
Policy of France and Frederick - Alarm of Britain at the 
growth of French influence in eastern Europe - Importance of 
Saxony- Poland in view of the danger of a general European 
tiúar - Williams sets out for Warsaw with very wide instruc- 
tions on the affairs of eastern Europe - IIis secret negotia- 
tion with Russia - His attempts to reconcile Brühl and the 
Czartoryski fail - The Diet of 1754 - Cham of Tartary inter- 
venes in the domestic affairs of Poland - Sequestration of 
the Ostrog revenues - Folly of Brûhl's conduct - His motives - 
Brühl and the Czartoryski appeal to Russia - Schemes of Brog- 
lie - Divergence of Saxon and Polish policy - Brühl seeks 
renewal of his subsidy treaty with Britain - Britain fails by 
the threat of non- renewal of subsidies to change Brihl's Polish 
policy - Austria and Russia also protest against Brühl's treat - 
ment of the Czartoryski - Brühl again begs the British govern- 
ment to renew the treaty of subsidy - His negotiations with 
France - He refuses to enter completely into the French system 
- His distrust of the Potocki - Frederick II's invasion of 
Saxony reconciles the foreign policies of the king of Poland 
and the elector of Saxony. 
Before leaving Dresden in 1753 Williams had drawn up a Memorial 
giving full details of his project for securing the succession to 
the Polish throne in the lifetime of Augustus III. The revised 
schemeI was based, Williams said, upon his conversations at Vienna 
with the Austrian ministers, who simulated almost total ignorance 
of the affairs of Poland, and on a formal conference at Dresden2 
between Brúhl, his son -in -law Mniszek, Flemming, Williams, Gross, 
and Saul. In reality the essential features of the scheme had 
been agreed upon by Williams and the Czartoryski leaders, especial- 
ly Count Flemming,3 Great Treasurer of Lithuania and brother of the 
better known Saxon diplomatist. In this scheme Williams shows that 
the lessons to be learned from the course of the king of the Romans 
negotiation had not entirely escaped him. He recognised that the 
first essential was an agreed plan approved by the Saxon court and 
the Allies. Once this alliance was formed and the plan of cam- 
paign adopted, Williams believed it would be comparatively easy to 
carry the election. "First the influence and real power the Court 
of Warsaw has in that country is always considerable, and if it was 
well managed it would be irresistible." Faction spirit was less 
heated than it would be during an interregnum, and the long peace 
Poland had enjoyed made the wealthiest and therefore most influen- 
tial Poles desire its continuance. They would readily support 
the proposed election, but no time should be lost as the death of 
the king of Poland would throw Poland into confusion and provoke a 
general European war. External circumstances also demanded imme- 
diate action. "There was never a time (and futurity gives no 
prospect of one) when the three great and well intentioned powers 
lip S.P.F. Poland dated 15 July 1753. 
2 Protocol of the Conference in S.P.F. Poland. 
3 Williams to Keith 29 November 1752 in Add. MSS 35474 f . 
128. 
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"of Europe were better united than at present ",1 while France was 
pacific both by inclination and financial necessity, and Prussia 
dared not venture to begin a war unless assured of French support. 
To delay taking; action until the king of Poland's death would be 
fatal in view of France's notorious schemes to set Conti on the 
Polish throne. Prussian assistance would then be easily purchased 
by the cession of Polish Prussia, and the result would be to shut 
the door to Russian influence in Europe. 
Williams brushed aside the formidable constitutional difficulties 
with the bare assertion that there were three precedents for the 
election of a successor in the lifetime of a reigning King. The 
one difficulty he admitted was that the proposal of the election 
must not be made by the Crown, but by a nuncio, or else by the 
joint action of the three allied ministers at Warsaw. 
The first step was obviously to secure as large a majority as pos- 
sible in the Diet by breaking up the dietines at which opposition 
candidates were likely to be returned. Then the ministers must 
sound the nuncios and see how many could be brought into the views 
of the court either by bribery or intimidation. Iìmîediately after 
the election of a Marshal entirely devoted to the court, the Diet 
must be turned into a confederation which would enable it to act 
by majority vote. The opponents of the court would immediately 
retire and appeal for foreign assistance to form a rival confedera- 
tion. But before the opposition could organise resistance, the 
election of a successor would be proposed and carried in the Diet 
of Confederation and sanctioned by the King. 
"A Diet of Confederation made and conducted in the manner I propose 
"would be begun and enc'ed in less than twenty -four hours and the 
Tlnearest foreign power would hear of the birth and execution of this 
project by the same post and it is upon tme {quickness with which it 
may be executed that I found the chief merit of my plan. .... Your 
"Grace will notice in all I propose that nobody is to interfere in 
1 The blindness of contemporaries to the weakness of the Anglo- 
Imperial alliance is not surprising, but Williams has less ex- 
:Guse since the lessons which his Vienna mission ought to have 
driven home to his mind had evidently escaped him entirely. 
3. 
"fixing the succession of the crown of Poland but the Poles them - 
":selves and whoever invades their country for acts done in their 
" s emblies in exact conformity with the laws and rules of their ca,.,aù- 
tt - must be looked upon as the beginner of en offensive war .... 
"Russia would be obliged to appear with all her force and it is well 
"kmnal His present Polish Majesty is as much afraid. of Russia. as 
"ever his father was." 
Therefore it was extremely unlikely that a general war would result 
j 
and in any case, Britain having no defensive engagements with 
Poland need not intervene. Russia had already begun to build up 
a strong party in Poland and if Britain could induce her to adopt 
Williams's programme its success would be certain, because of 
Russia's almost boundless influence over the Saxon court and the 
best intentioned Poles. As a final argument to induce his govern - 
:ment to accept his scheme Williams appealed to George II's notori- 
:ous hatred of Frederick II. The execution of the plan "would be 
the severest blow to His Prussian Majesty that he has yet felt 
"as it will entirely disappoint his unjust views upon Polish Prussia 
"which has so long been the view of the House of Brandenburg". Thus 
Britain. would risk practically nothing by taking up the scheme and 
its almost certain success would give her great gains - the preser- 
:vation of the general peace in Europe, the strengthening of Britain's 
Continental allies, and the consequent weakening of France and humil 
:iation of Prussia. 
The execution of this grandiose plan depended upon its adoption by 
the imperial courts and they were hardly likely to accept a plan in 
which they were to do all the work, while Britain shared the advan- 
:tages of the successful execution of the scheme without sharing the 
risks of failure. 
Russia's attitude was quite clear.l When the time came she would 
certainly- support the Saxon candidate in preference to any other - 
even to a native piast since the piast would probably accept, 
after 
election, the bribes of France and intrigue with the Ottoman 
Porte, 
whereas Saxon enmity to Prussia would keep the Saxon king at 
a dis- 
tance from France and Saxony had no connection with the 
Porte. But 
l Pol. Corr. X 236 -8 (based on Russian and Saxon despatches). 
4. 
Russia saw no occasion for immediate action since the king of Poland's 
health was good and that or his eldest son bad, and in any case she 
had no intention of undertaking unaided by her allies the whole bur - 
:den of carrying through the election. P?ea_ntime Russia would give 
pensions to the leading members of her party, but Saxony must seek 
the support of her other allies, and especially of Austria, before 
the Russian government could coui it itself to securing the immediate 
election of the electoral prince of Saxony. Austria's attitude was 
much more reserved. She and her allies, Kaunitz declared, were so 
much occupied with other business - for example the Russian subsidy 
negotiation and the election of the king of the Romans - that it 
would be wise to wait and see the result of these negotiations 
before starting a fresh one of such consequence.) 
Quite apart from the natural reluctance of Britain's allies to ac- 
:cept it, Williams's plan presupposed the undisputed ascendancy of 
the Czartoryski over their rivals and their close co- operation with 
Brizhl, Both of these conditions were rapidly vanishing. The 
loss of the Great General after the Diet of 1752 was a serious blow 
to the Czartoryski, and was speedily followed by other defections. 
"The Party" was now attacked from two sides. On the one hand the 
Potocki party, temporarily disorganised by the death of its leaders; 
began to revive under the leadership of the palatin of Beiz - an 
able and unscrupulous politician - who soon acquired an ascendancy 
over the feeble Great General. Broglie remained in Poland for 
some months after the Diet of 1752, working in close co- operation 
with the Potocki leader, promising generous bribes to all proselytes, 
and invoking the aid of the wives of likely converts. He was ably 
seconded,2 and in large part directed, by Mattzahn, the Prussian 
minister, while Frederick II, although he pointed out that the Poles 
i 
were flighty and would always pass from one paymaster to a better 
1 Pol. Corr. X 283. 
2 Pol. Corr. X 57 etc. 
5. 
and that there would always be two parties in Poland,1 was de- 
lighted to have an energetic French minister in Poland and readily 
contributed to a joint Franco -Prussian fund for bribes.2 On the 
other hand Brúhl and his son -in -law iiniszek, encouraged by the 
favourable Russian reply to Brizh.l's overtures regarding the suc- 
cession, redoubled their attempts to build upe court party inde- 
pendent of the Czartoryski, and already a link had been forged 
between the Potocki- Broglie faction and the Bríihl- Iniszek clique, 
because Brizh.l's daughter and Mniszek's wife was one of Broglie's 
converts. She drove on her weak willed and ambitious husband to 
widen the breach between her father and the Czartoryski. 
While Williams had been wrangling at Vienna with the Empress Queen 
and her Chancellor and electioneering in England, 3 the trend of 
events in Poland had escaped his notice, and his election project 
was completely out of date. His rival Broglie had remained, after 
his return to Dresden, in close touch with Polish affairs through 
a succession of subordinate agents in Poland.4 His immediate aim - 
less ambitious but much more practicable than that of 1'dilliEms - was 
to effect a coalition between the party Tmniszek and Brúhl had been 
trying to form and the revived Potocki party. 
The first warning which the British government received of the 
changed situation in Poland came from Calkoen, the Dutch envoy at 
Dresden,5 who informed them of the formation, with the support, or 
at least connivance of Bru lli, of a court party distinct from the 
1 Po]. Corr. X 278. 
2 Broglie appends a list of bribes to his despatch of 21 
December 
1752 (A.E. Pologne 239); Cf. Pol. Corr. X, 57, 109. 
3 Williams to Newcastle 6, 26 November in Add. MSS 32733, f. 
200 
f. 325. 
4 Thomelin La Fayardie Jaubowski, Linau, and Gerault (Targes 
II 
135 -153), 1 
5 Despatches of 5, 26 Octd)er, 9, 19 November, in Add. 
MSS 32846 
f. 395; 32847 f. 11, f. 13, f. 142. 
6. 
Czartoryski and urged that Williams should return at once to 
Dresden,1 not merely on account of Polish affairs, but because 
the settlement of the Steuer controversy on terms extremely favour- 
:able to Saxony2 led him to suspect some secret understanding 
between Saxony and Prussia. Calkoen's despatches alarmed Newcastle 
and he summoned Williams to London with the intention of sending him 
back immediately to Dresden.3 Williams was reluctant to obey, put 
off his journey on the ground of his daughter's illness and later of 
"a prodigious fall of snow " ,4 and did not reach London till about 
19 December. By this time the report of a secret understanding 
between Saxony and Prussia had been proved to have no foundation; 
and, although Colloredo handed in a Note5 giving details of the 
reduction of the Czartoryski faction and of the intrigues in favour 
of Conti's election, Williams was allowed to remain in England. This 
delay was most unfortunate since the situation of the Czartoryski 
party rapidly deteriorated. A personal quarrel between Gross and 
the Grand Carver of the Crown,6 one of the Potocki leaders, inten- 
:sified party strife. Rumours that the Russian troops in Livonia . 
were to be used in Poland7 animated the Polish'oatriots ", while 
Brvhl's attempts to build up an independent court party further 
alarmed them8 and increased the prevailing confusion in Poland. 
Early in 1754 a dispute over the ordination of the Ostrog9 brought 
the party strife to a head and made an open breach between Bruhl 
1 "Il est" Calkoen writes "maitre du secret de cette cour et peut - 
"etre l'unique pour qui le Comte de Brúhl a quelque égard outre 
"que le Roi a beaucoup de consideration pour lui". 
2 Pol. Corr. X 101 -3, 109 -10, 120 -2, etc; Geheimnisse I 224. 
3 Newcastle to Keith in Add. MSS 35476 f.275, 35477 f. 11, f. 34. 
4 Williams to Newcastle 26 November, 11 December, in Add. MSS 
32733 f. 325, f. 419; Newcastle was becoming impatient (Fox to 
Newcastle 18 December in Add. MSS 32733 f. 470). 
5 Dated. 16 January in Foreign Ministers 54. 
6 Pol. Corr. X 116. 
7 Pol. Corr. X 203. 
8 Pol. Corr. X 237 -8. 
9 Despatches of Williams and Broglie; Williams to Keith 20 
Novem- 
ber 1754 in. Add. MSS 35478 f. 145; Orlick to Havrincourt 




gk} and the Czartoryski. Prince Janus Ostrogski had in 1609, 
subject to the maintenance of 600 knights for the defence of the 
Republic, entailed his estates upon the male issue of his two 
daughters, failing whom to the knights of St. John. The Diet had 
sanctioned this arrangement in 1618. In 1673 the last male in 
the direct line died, and, in spite of the protest of the knights 
of St. John, the estates passed to the Lubomirski family, the near- 
est heirs of the last male liferenter. On the extinction of the 
Lubomirski direct male line in 1720, a minor civil war ensued. The 
claims of the knights of St. John were again set aside, but Augustus 
II coveted the estates for the Crown and introduced a new complica- 
Ition by claiming to sequestrate them until the rightful heir had 
proved his claim before the law courts. Lleantime one of the claim - 
:ants, Prince Paul Sangusko, brother -in -law of the last Lubomirski, 
forcibly took possession of Dubno, the chief fortress of the estates. 
and successfully resisted the attacks of the royal army. Finally 
by bribing Augustus II's generals, Sangusko concluded a treaty with 
them which left him in possession of the Ostrog ordination until 
the next Diet could decide the disputed succession. When the Diet 
met in 1'722 it was broken by a friend of Sangusko, and Prince Paul 
had remained since then in undisturbed possession. 
Great as were the revenues of the Ostrog ordination Sangusko's ex- 
:penses were even greater, and after thirty yearsdebaúchery and 
profusion he found himself at the end of his resources. As he had 
no children he hit upon the expedient of breaking up the Ostrog 
ordination and selling it in parcels to the various families who 
had claims upon it after his death, thus raising ready money to 
satisfy the most pressing of his creditors. The contract of sale 
was drawn up on 7 December 1753 between Sangusko and various members 
of the leading Polish families, chiefly the Lubomirski, but also 
the Sapieha and Potocki. The Great Chancellor of Poland, Malachowsk i 
and the palatin of Russia both had shares. This transaction could 
8. 
not be long; concealed. News of it spread like wildfire across 
Poland and roused the excitable Poles to fever pitch. A fierce 
paper warfare at once broke out over the legality of the trans - 
:action, which seems indeed worse than doubtful. Even if Sangusko 
was the true heir to the ordination, he could not legally break up 
an entail which had been established by the Diet without the Diet's 
consent. The Crown was also entitled to object to the breaking up 
of the ordination on the ground that it mi..t in future endanger the 
service of the 600 knights due to the Crown from the estate, although 
provision was made by the contract of sale for the continued mainte- 
:nance of the knights. The knights themselves were loud in their 
protests and were soon joined by a crowd of families which had, or 
imagined they had, as good claims to participate in the succession 
as the parties whose claims Sangusko had recognised. The enemies 
of the Czartoryski seized the opportunity to injure their hated 
rivals. The Great General and Little General1of Poland took the 
lead in protesting against the division of the Ostrog ordination 
and despatched the redoubtable ?.- okranowski at the head of the royal 
troops to take possession of Dubno. The Lubomirski prepared to 
lay siege to Dubno. Civil war seemed imminent and both parties 
appealed for foreign support. Civil war was averted chiefly owing 
to the mediation of the Primate, who induced the King to order the 
withdrawal of the royal troops from Dubno' and the Lubomirski then 
ceased their warlike preparations. Everything now turned on the 
elections to the Diet which took place in August with more than the 
customary disorder and bloodshed.2 
The Ostrog affair was a heaven sent boon to France and especially 
to Prussia. Since France had refused to accept his plans Frederick 
had been compelled to return to his old negative policy of prevent- 
1 Rzewuski; he owed his position to the Czartoryski, but had 
gradually moved away from them and now openly sided for the 
first time with their enemies. 
2 Williams to Newcastle 18 September; Poniatowski 132. 
:ing the success of the Diets. The Ostrog affair set the nobles 
by the ears and made it certain that Brühl's plans for continuing 
the Polish crown in the Saxon house could not be brought forward 
in the Diet of 1754 with the slightest chance of success. Moreover, 
it was certain that the Diet would be broken without foreign inter - 
:vention,l and Frederick therefore could dispense with the bribes 
usually given to the Polish. nobles.2 Maltzahn's instructions`' 
prove that Frederick's only real fear was that party spirit in 
Poland might provoke confederations and therefore European war. 
Itlaltzahn therefore had to steer a middle course between encouraging 
the Franco- Prussian partisans and being so reserved as to discourage 
them - the latter policy might have allowed the Saxon court to carry 
through its projects by a sudden stroke. 
By April the British government was informed by Laurence4 of the 
danger of civil war in Poland, but they apparently failed to realise 
the importance of the crisis, and especially the effect which the 
Ostrog affair would have on the already strained relations of BrïIhl 
with the Czartoryski. Their main concern was still the designs of 
France upon the Polish throne in the event of a vacancy, and inter- 
cepted correspondence gave ample proof that France was doing her 
utmost to strengthen her system of alliances in eastern Europe.5 
France had renewed her alliance with Sweden and was arranging a 
treaty between Prussia and the Porte, while her ambassador at Dres- 
:den was openly at the head of a large and growing party in Poland. 
The supineness, or worse, of Britain's allies was in glaring con 
:trast with the activity of France. In spite of all Keith's efforts 
Austria refused to commit herself to any definite Polish policy,6 
1 Pol. Corr. X 286. 2 Ibid 310, 421, 436. 
3 Ibid 395 -9. 4 Laurence to Newcastle 24 
March. 
5 See especially Holderness to Keene 25 January in Add. MSS 
32848 
f. 186; Newcastle to Keith 1 March in Add. MSS 35477 f. 
163; 
Scheffer to Conti (intercepted) 28 January in Add. 
MSS 32848 
f. 194: Orlick to Havrincourt (intercepted) 13 May 
in Add. MSS 
32849 f. 142. 
6 Holderness to Keith 5 July in Add. MSS 35478 f. 26. 
Among the 
Memoranda for the King dated G August 1754 is the 
point: "the 
"backwardness of the court of Vienna about Poland (in 
Add. 
MSS 32736 f. 159) . 
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while Russia, by making impossible demands, virtually suspended 
the subsidy negotiation with Britain. Guy Dickens was openly at 
loggerheads with the Great Chancellor, who was the sole support of 
British interests at the Russian court,' and there were even rumours 
of a reconciliation between Russia and France.2 The divisions and 
lukewarmness of the An lo-Imperial alliance were the more serious 
because of a dispute between Russia and Turkey over Russia's erec- 
tion of a new fortress on the frontier which seemed likely to 
cause a war between the Porte and Russia.3 
aether war broke out in the east over Polish affairs or over the 
building of Fort St. Elizabeth, or in the west between Britain and 
France owing to colonial disputes, the existing system of alliances 
would almost certainly make it a general European war. In this 
event Poland occupied a pivotal position, and the French government 
shared in a less extreme form Broglie's design to form a great north -: 
:ern coalition with Poland as its centre, which would effectively 
cut off Russia from Europe and prevent the intervention of Austria 
on any considerable scale in the western war. On the other hand, 
if Poland were to be attached to the Austro4 ussian alliance it would 
open up a road for Russia into the heart of Germany, would complete 
the encirclement of France's only important ally, Prussia, and would 
prevent France's remaining allies, Sweden and Turkey, from making 
more than mere diversions against the imperial courts. 
The French government, while remaining entirely pacific in inclina- 
tion acted on the maxim si vis pacem para bellum. The British 
government was less far sighted in Polish affairs and continued to 
devote its main attention to securing in advance the succession to 
the Polish. throne in order to prevent, as Newcastle and Williams 
fondly hoped, the outbreak of war. They continued to press the 
1 Guy Dickens to Hold rness 12/23 July in Add. MSS 32849 f. 362. 
2 Holderness to Guy Dickens 29 March in Add. MSS 35477 f. 193. 
3 Pol. Corr. X 326, 414, etc., XI 9 -11, 42. 
4 Newcastle to Yorke private, 6 April 1753 in Add. MSS 32844 
f.54. 
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desirability of some such scheme upon the two imperial courts, I 
neither of which was prepared to tie its hands in favour of the 
Saxon house, which was daily proving itself a weak and half -hearted 
ally. The restiveness of the Porte was a grave menace to Austria, 
and Kaunitz wished to avoid taking any step which might alarm the 
Turks and fling them into the arms of Prussia, since he was fully 
informed of Frederick's schemes to induce the Porte to attack 
Austria and Russia and divert their attention from Poland.2 
The question of the Polish succession was doubtless the main point 
discussed by Newcastle and °dilliams on the eve of Williams's depa.r- 
:ture for Warsaw; but it was impossible to separate the Polish 
question from the general politics of eastern Europe, and the in- 
structions which Holderness drew up, on the lines agreed upon by 
Newcastle and Williams, made Williams a kind of minister for the 
general affairs of eastern Europe .3 These instructions were sup- 
4 
:plemented by "private and secret instructions" dated 20 June 1754, 
which authorised him to urge BrLthl to favour the well intentioned 
Poles, since this was the best way to defeat the schemes of Prussia, 
and to assure the Czartoryski party of the King's "affection for 
"their Republic" and readiness to use his good offices in conjun_c- 
:tion with his allies to support them in their rights. On the 
initiative of the King,Williams's commission was extended still 
further by verbal instructions in regard to the long drawn out 
negotiations for a treaty of subsidy with Russia.5 The King was 
1 Holderness to Keith 5 July 1754 in Add. LISS 35478 f. 26. 
Cf. Holderness to Keith in Add. I.SS 35478 f. 105; Holderness 
to Guy Dickens apart in Add. I:iSS 35478 f. 34. 
2 Pol. Corr. IX 381 -399. 
3 Holderness to Newcastle 16 June in Add. i ,SS 32735 f. 474. 
Cf. Holderness to Williams 8 October; Williams to Holderness 
6 November. 
4 F.O. 90 vol. 47. 




Williams should set out at once to execute these orders, 
but Williams secured a postponement of his journey in order to be 
present at the marriage of his daughter.l 
Ultimately he set out early in August, probably with more or less 
definite assurances from Newcastle of the reversion of Guy Dickens's 
2 
post at Petersburg. ':'Then at last he reached ',Warsaw on 10 Septem- 
:ber his first business was to execute the King's verbal instructions. 
Gross readily agreed to write to the Great Chancellor and invite him 
to resume in secret at Warsaw the negotiation for a subsidy treaty 
which had virtually broken down at Petersburg, and to promise him 
ample rewards from the British government if the negotiation came 
to a successful conclusion. 
3 
The negotiation, however, was shortly 
afterwards resumed at Petersburg and the answer which Williams re- 
ceived to his overtures at the end of February 1755 was a profound 
disappointment, since it contained no new proposals and left the 
British government to take the next step forward in the negotiation 
At Warsaw Williams found when he arrived in September that the posi- 
:tion had altered completely within the last few months. Bruhl 
received him with a marked coldness, the King no longer discussed 
business with him, but talked of indifferent subjects 5 Yet Brúhl 
and Broglie were on worse terms than befo re,6 and there was no ques- 
tion as yet of Saxony's reversion to the French alliance of 1746 -50. 
In Poland the Czartoryski alliance with the court was at an end, and 
court favour had been almost wholly transferred to the Potocki party 
in the hope of cementing the coalition between them and the small 
but powerful clique already detached from the two great parties by 
1 Williams to Newcastle 6 August in Add. MISS 32736 f. 162. 
2 Williams to Newcastle (private) 25 January 1753 in Add. MSS 
32842 
f. 262; Newcastle to Williams 11 April 1755 in Add. MSS 32854 
f. 97. 
3 Williams to Holderness 6 November. 
4 Williams to Iolderness 26 February 1755. 
5 Williams to Holderness 14, 18, 21 September. 
6 Pol. Corr. X 441. 
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the intrigues and bribery of Mniszek and Brüh1.1 
Williams and Gross, who was acting on the express orders of his 
court, 
2 
concentrated their attention upon effecting a reconcilia- 
:tion between the court and the Czartoryski by securing both parties' 
acceptance of a compromise on the Ostrog question.3 Brúhl was 
still wavering between the novel and risky policy advocated by his 
son -in -law and a return, before it was too late) to his old system 
of alliance with the Czartoryski. He approached the palatin of 
Russia and offered to restore the Czartoryski leaders to court 
favour if they could agree vdth him on a plan for regulating the 
Ostrog ordination.4 This overture was probably not sincere, but 
due merely to Brühl's habitual duplicity. The Great General de- 
cided after some hesitation not to support the compromise on the 
Ostrog question proposed by the Czartoryski, and since his accept- 
ance of it was essential Brühl threw over the settlement, which he 
had previously accepted,ó and redoubled his efforts to build up a 
rival party to the Czartoryski. 
The Diet met on 30 September and, as usual, contemptuously put 
aside the business suggested by the King for its deliberation. 
The Czartoryski protested against the continued occupation of Dubno 
by the royal troops and refused to proceed to the election of a 
Marshal of the Diet until Dubno was evacuated. This move forced 
Brúhl to magnify the constitutional powers of the Great General, 
who had ordered the occupation of Dubno on his own authority, and 
thus placed. Brü.hl in a false position, since the office of Great 
General was one of the main obstacles to effective government of 
1 "without Priniszek's interest the French party would have 
found 
no favour at court; and without the junction of 
the French 
"ambassador's friends Mniszek would have had but a very 
slender 
"party in Poland ". Williams to Holderness 29 January 
1755. 
2 Pol. Corr. X 420. 
3 Williams to Holderness 18 September. 
4 Williams to Holderness 25 September. This step was 
possibly 
due to the intervention of the French Government (Scheffer 
to 
Hopken 13 September 1754, intercepted, in Add. ISSS 32850 
f.313). 
5 Pol. Corr. X 430. 
6 Williams to Holderness 2, 5 October. 
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Poland by the crown. But Br 1 had now gone too far to draw back 
and the tactics of. the Czartoryski merely cemented the coalition 
of their enemies. Bruhl was furious at their opposition and told 
Broglie, towards the close of the Diet, that if the Czartoryski 
thought that by breaking the Diet they would prevent the decision 
of the Ostrog affair against them, they had taken the very step 
which convinced the King of the need for giving the administration 
of the Ostrog to the Potocki leaders. 
1 
The first result of the 
Brúhl- Potocki coalition iras the election with the avowed support of 
the court and in the presence of large numbers of the royal troops,2 
of Count Potocki, Chief Butler of the crown and a leading member of 
the French party, as Marshal of the Petrikau tribunal. 
Nniszek began to act openly with the French and Prussian ministers3 
and a few weeks later Brithl accepted a pension of 10, 000 ducats from 
France. 
4 
The Princes Czartoryski now posed as the champions of the 
ancient liberties of Poland and attributed to their opponents the 
design to form a Diet of confederation, which their opponents had 
attributed to them in 1752. This project had actually been advo- 
cated by some of the Potocki leaders in 1753 and warmly approved 
by Broglie, 5 but had been frowned upon by the French government, 
the policy of which was simply "to lie by and abstain from action, 
"but without discouraging the well intentioned" Poles.6 The 
Czartoryski therefore refused to allow the election of a Marshal 
until the Ostrog ordination was settled by a compromise;7 and, after 
1 Pol. Corr. X 454. 
2 This, the Czartoryski protested, was unconstitutional (Williams 
to Holderness 12 October, 14 November). Bruhl alleged that 
the large bodyguard which the Czartoryski took with them made 
the presence of the troops of the crown necessary to Preserve 
peace. 
3 Williams to Holderness 16 October. 
4 Broglie: Secret du Poi I 92; Pol. Corr. XI 66 -7. 
5 Broglie: Secret du Roi I 87 -8; Williams to Holderness 2 De- _ 
:cember 1754. 
6 Scheffer to Höpken (intercepted) in Add. MSS 32851 f. 20. 
7 Pol. Corr. X 453. 
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three weeks of futile and increasingly vehement orations, the 
activity of the Diet was stopped in the customery way by the l iberu i 
veto of an obscure member of the Czartoryski party, Stravinski,2 
the deputy for Upita, who alleged that the attempted intervention 
of the Diet in a question of private property (the Ostrog affair) 
was contrary to the constitution and endangered the liberties of the 
Republic. Driven into opposition, the Czartoryski had no difficulty 
in adopting the tactics, and even the very catchwords, of their op- 
:ponents. 
Similarly the new court party played to its sorry conclusion the 
solemn farce ordained by precedent. The Diet continued in session 
awaiting the return of the protesting nuncio; it sent deputations 
after him to entreat him to return and withdraw his protest; finally, 
on 31 October the Marshal of the last Diet closed the proceedings 
with the customary valedictory address in which he deplored the spirit 
of faction which rendered Diet after Diet fruitless, and prophesied, 
as his predecessors had done for the best part of a century, the 
speedy destruction of the Republic. 
Perhaps there is no clearer sign of the decline of Poland in the 
first half of the eighteenth century than an incident which occurred .
during this Diet. The intervention of neighbouring great powers in 
the internal affairs of Poland Was notorious and was soon imitated by 
the lesser neighbouring potentates. A special envoy of the Cham of 
Tartary declared to the King and the Polish officers of state that 
his master had heard of a project for altering the Polish constitu- 
:tion and disturbing the peace of the Republic and looked therefore 
upon the advocates of this design as enemies to their country.3 
This flagrant interventión of an insignificant neighbour in the 
1 Mniszek raised but did not insist upon the constitutional point 
that no numcio could break the Diet until after the election of 
a Marshal since the nuncio's mandate had not yet been pronounced 
legal (Pol. Corr. X 454). 
2 Pol. Corr. X 453. 
3 Vil_liams to Holderness 21 September. 
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internal affairs of Poland was received by both Polish factions as 
a mere matter of course. 
Immediately after the dissolution of the Diet the Kinglon the peti- 
:tion of a majority of the senators, sequestrated the Ostrog estates, 
assigned a pension to Prince Sangusko) and appointed a large body of 
commissioners, drawn entirely from the Potocki party, to administer 
1 
the estates, out of the revenues of which their salaries were to be 
paid. As the commissioners were to be responsible to the Diet, 
notoriously impotent to exercise control over them, they became 
virtually life renters of the estate. The sequestration was as 
illegal as the contract of sale between Sangusko and the purchasers, 
since the Republic had no claim upon the estates except the service 
401 
of 600 knights. By alliance with. the Potocki BrhhlAsucceed.ed where 
Augustus II had failed in asserting the royal authority, but the 
spoils of victory had to be handed over to his allies and the crown 
gained no material advantage. The Czartoryski, who had broken up 
the Diet on the plea that its intervention in a question of private 
property was illegal, now declared that only the Diet could legally 
settle the Ostrog affair, but their protests were in vain and their 
followers saw vanish their last hopes of making good their claims to 
the Ostrog ordination. 'The family, who for so long had dominated 
Poland, had been defeated and humiliated by a coalition of their. 
enemies. Many of their adherents had been already won over by the 
court, others were only waiting a suitable opportunity to desert to 
the winning side. Brillhl had successfully shaken off the galling 
yoke of an overpowerful family, although he was soon to find that 
he had only exchanged one servitude for another. Moreover the V 
solid kernel of the Czartoryski, strengthened rather than weakened 
by the desertion of their adventitious followers, remained unbroken 
1 Cf. on sequestration Pol.. Corr. X 469, 471. Maltz,p.rrn con- 
:eludes his despatch of 7 November gleefully; "Le me-centente- 
":ment du ministre de R1 sie et de celui d'Angleterre est 
"extréme; le dernier ne sort pas de sa chambre ". 
17. 
in, opposition. Its organisation and cohesion made it a more 
dangerous obstacle than the weak and divided Potocki party had 
been, to the execution of Brií`hl's schemes in. Poland. In Russia 
the new opposition had a near and potent friend, whereas the Potocki 
had been compelled to look for support to a distant and officially 
lukewarm France. 
Brïal>1's attempt,therefore,to assert the royal authority in Poland 
was at best a temporary and Pyrrhic victory. He had thrown to the 
winds the only chance of securing such a reform of the constitution . 
as would have really strengthened the crown. He had fatally alien - 
:ated the Czartoryski and, to a less extent, Russia, whose support 
was essential for the maintenance of the Polish crown in the house 
of Saxony. The Czartoryski,formerly content to place the question . 
of the succession after that of constitutional reform, now seriously 
turned their attention to securing the election of a member of their 
family as the necessary preliminary to constitutional reform. Final- 
:ly Briáhl had embittered the strife of parties within Poland and had 
taken the first step towards forcing Russia to adopt the Prussian 
policy of destroying the link between Saxony and Poland by the elec- 
tion of a Piast. In all of these respects Brühl's triumph of 1754 
brought the partition of Poland, so long prophesied by her friends, 
a step nearer to realisation. His reckless reversal of policy was 
of advantage only to the man he most hated - Frederick II of Prussia. 
Briáhl's motives for this foolish reversal of policy are obvious. 
tie_ 
He had long been jealous of the overbearing attitude of,,Czartoryski 
and the sarcasms of the Cato -like Chancellor of Lithuania on his 
maladministration aggravated his resentment at the Czartoryski yoke. 
It did not require much persuasion on his son -in -law's part to con- 
vince him that as "th.e Czartoryskis were the immediate creatures of 
"the court of Petersburg and not the friends of his Polish. Majesty... 
18. 
"it was necessary for the King of Poland to form a party of his own 
"on which he might rely independently of any foreign power ".1 This 
policy was spasmodically followed by Brübl from 1750, at first 
secretly and with little success, but openly after the middle of 
1753. Since Poland had long been (mutatis mutandis) in the unhappy 
state of Sweden, as depicted in the Memoirs of Frederick II, of hav- 
:ing a Russian party and a French party, but no Swedish party, 
Brahl's pursuit of his aim under Mniszek's guidance conducted him 
insensibly into alliance with the French party in Poland. 
Possibly Brlihl may have been deceived by Frederick II's assertions 
that Austria was eager to secure the election as successor in Poland 
of Charles of Lorraine and have believed that Austro- Russian support 
would not be given to the Saxon candidate at the next election; and 
he may even have hoped that France would support the candidature 
either of the electoral prince or of one of the younger sons of 
Augustus III. More probablyihowever,Brúhl did not trouble himself 
about these contingencies, and his volte face may be explained mere - 
:ly as the result of his jealousy of the Czartoryski and his desire 
to secure a larger share of lucrative offices for himself and his 
relations. In any case, whether his change of attitude was a deep 
laid scheme or a momentary expedient, the French pension of 10,000 
ducats a year doubtless had a considerable share in his final deci- 
:siori. The King's influence, although normally negligible, possibly' 
n 
contributed to the decision. Broglie claimed that he had convinced 
the King that the Czartoryski were in the wrong in the Ostrog ques -- 
:tionand that when Briihl tried to secure the royal consent to the 
compromise arranged with the Czartoryski, Augustus III shouted at 
his astonished minister -favourite: "Brúil, you are deceiving me ".2 
1 Williams to Holderness 6 November. 
2 Williams to Holderness 2 December. 
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The critical question now was whether Russia would intervene by 
arms to support her partisans in Poland, who had at once appealed 
for her support and were content in the meantime to remain upon the 
, 
defensive. 
1 Bruhl also hastened to give explanations of his con- 
:duct to Russia, and tried to justify himself by pointing to the 
overweening power wielded by the Czartoryski and the illegal use 
they had attempted to make of it in the Ostrog affair.2 Doubtless 
these arguments were supported by money bribes to induce Bestuzhev 
to connive at Brúhl's treatment of the Russian party in Poland, and 
Brihl could also count on the influence which Funcke, the Saxon 
resident at Petersburg, possessed over the Great Chancellor. The 
British government on the other hand exerted its influence at Peters - 
:burg to defeat Brúhl's int.rigues,3 but its influence, owing to the 
acrimonious negotiation of the treaty of subsidy and the personal 
quarrel between the Great Chancellor and Guy Dickens, cannot have 
been great. The court of Petersburg proved as dilatory as usual 
in making a decision; but, if it were to decide upon armed inter- .; 
:vention, there would be no difficulty in finding a pretext. The 
action of the Great General in the sequestration of the Ostrog and 
in the election of the Petrikau tribunal manifestly violated the 
treaty of 1716, which had placed Augustus II on the Polish throne 





was a party. Moreover, the Czartoryski represented the 
of 1754 as a step towards changing the constitution in favour 
monarchy. Fundamental Russian interests dictated that 
should be kept weak in order to serve as an open door for 
Russia's entrance to Europe. A reformed Poland as Williams points 
out "in close alliance with Prussia and both supported by French 
"money would become the most formidable enemy Russia has ever yet 
"known and would turn the scale of the North ".4 
1 Williams to Holderness 
2 Williams to Holderness 
3 Holderness to Williams, 
4 Williams to Holderness 
Broglie's schemes. 
13 November, 12 December. 
11 November. 
secret, 2 January 1755. 
6 November - a correct anticipation of 
20. 
Broglie shared Williams's opinion and sought to turn his victory 
to account by the restoration on a firmer basis of Argenson's 
northern system - a natural reversal of French policy when the 
menace of war with Britain, presumably supported by her continental 
allies, approached nearer day by day. The first step was to draw 
closer the bonds between Poland and Turkey, and the Great General 
accordingly arranged to despatch an envoy to the Porte under the 
auspices of France in order to concert measures against their com- 
mon enemy, Russia.' Shortly afterwards a Turkish ambassador with 
letters to the Great General arrived in Poland, was received by him 
2 
in kingly state, and at once became the focus of Prussian and "pat- 
:riot" intrigue. The next step was obviously to win over Saxony to 
the French alliance, since Saxony- Poland was the pivot of the whole 
scheme. Broglie proposedItherefore) that Saxony should be secured 
by a treaty of subsidy, and among the conditions of the projected 
treaty Saxony would certainly demand some guarantee of the maintien- 
:ance of a member of the Saxon house on the Polish throne after 
Augustus III's death.3 Broglie must have decided already in his 
own mind to sacrifice the "King's secret" and his patron's candida- 
ture to the manifest interests of France, the official policy of 
which was not unfavourable to the election of the electoral prince 
on the death of his father . 4 
BriLhl)however9was still far from ready to play the part assigned to 
him in Broglie's schemes. While accepting the help of the French 
party in Poland he wished Saxony to remain in the Anglo- Imperial 
alliance. Why should not the king of Poland and the elector of 
Saxony follow different policies ? Legally there was no obstacle, 
1 Williams to Holderness 18 November, etc. 
2 Pol. Corr. XI 81, 158. 
3 Broglie and the queen of Poland were already discussing 
the 
election of Prince Xavier (A.E. Saxe). Significantly 
Brühl 
spent two hours in explaining to Williams that the 
union of 
Saxony and Poland was of no real advantage to the elector 
of 
Saxony, but was a serious drain on the resources of 
the elec- 
torate. 
4 Pol. Corr. X 244. 
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but duality of policy was in practice impossible. Brühl,however 
refused to admit that his conduct in the domestic affairs of Poland 
could not but affect the international system of Saxony. He de- 
:clared that Williams, owing to his personal friendship for the 
Czartoryski, was misleading the Maritime Powers by his biassed re- 
:ports1 and assured them that his conduct in the Ostrog affair . was 
constitutionally correct and had been forced upon him by the law - 
:less insolence of the Czartoryski. His eagerness to convince the 
Maritime Powers on these points is to be explained by his desire to 
secure the renewal of the treaty of subsidy of 1751. He had al- 
:ready sounded the United Provinces and in the middle of November 
he broached the subject to Williams. Brühl's insinuations failed 
to convince the British government, which was so annoyed at the cold 
reception given by its allies to its proposals for securing the Pol- 
ish succession3 that it tried to use Brühl's eagerness to renew the 
subsidy treaty to influence directly his Polish policy. When Brizhl 
on 18 January 1755 again mentioned the renewal of the treaty to Wil- 
:liams, the latter asked for a conference, which took place on 25 
January.4 in accordance with his instructions, at once 
turned the discussion upon Polish affairs and denounced Briihl's 
policy there in the strongest terms, as serving the interests of 
France and Prussia. Brühl, however, was not in a mood to be con - 
:vinced that "his present party in Poland are but so many friends, 
"which the French and Prussian ministers have lent him for their 
"own use, and who will abandon him whenever ordered so to do by 
'these ministers ". He doubtless consoled himself with the reflec- 
tion that, if his new Polish friends would desert him for France, 
his old with equal alacrity would have sacrificed him to Russia. 
1 Holdérness to Williams 20 December 1754. 
2 Yorke to Hardwicke 24 September 1754, in Add. MSS 35356 f. 253. 
3 Holderness to Williams 20 December. 
4 Williams to Holderness 29 January; Geheimnisse I 238, which 
gives 24 January as the date. 
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Later when the conference reached the more detailed discussion of 
his Polish policy he fell back upon the plea that each step of 
which Williams complained had been dictated by the King, whose ac- 
:tions Williams dared not censure. The conference was therefore 
entirely fruitless. Brahl, although somewhat shaken by Williams's 
arguments,1 refused to modify his policy in Poland at the behest of 
his British paymaster. 
On this occasion Britain's allies followed her lead. Austria, al- 
:though she had for some time followed a policy of extreme reserve 
in Poland and was soon to offer her support of the Conti candidature 
as a bribe to France, protested to Brúhl against his treatment of 
the Czartoryski.2 Shortly afterwards the Russian oracle, which had 
maintained an unbroken silence for nearly five months, . declared it- 
:self in no uncertain language. After receiving fresh instructions 
Gross, in company with Williams, had a long and stormy conference 
with Briíhl on 31 Ilarch.3 Gross first read a long verbose Note drawn 
up by his court, which was full of complaints that Bri l had neglect- 
ed the friendly advice of the Tsaritsa; that he was oppressing the 
Czartoryski, the tried friends of both courts, and giving all his 
favour to the partisans. of France; and that these proceedings were 
necessarily a blow to the interests of Russia. The Note then de- 
:clared that Russia was resolved to maintain her guarantee of the 
treaty of 1716 and to intervene by force if necessary to maintain 
any party which was oppressed contrary to the constitution. Finally, 
the Note renewed once again in stronger and indeed minatory terms 
the advice repeatedly given in 1753 -4 by Russia that the king of 
Poland should return to his old system in Poland, restore the Czar - 
:toryski to favour, and thus avert a civil war in which Russia 
would 
be reluctantly compelled to intervene. 
1 So Saul assured Williams (Williams to Holderness 29 January). 
2 Pol. Corr. X 457. 
3 Williams to Holderness 6 April; Williams to Keith 11 
April in 
Add. MSS 35479 f. 109; Roepell 107 -3 (based on 




Brühl, who had continued to believe that Russia would allow his 
work in Poland to pass with at the most a formal protest, was at 
first struck dumb; but as Gross proceeded from article to article 




protest. "His Polish Majesty" he declared "made no 
of persons while they were attached to him and the 
"The Czartoryski" he added "during the whole time 
"of their favour had never done His Polish Majesty any good service 
"in the Diets, 
"advancement". 
was still more 
but had made 
Furious as 
indignant at 
king of Poland, he declared 
"receive laws from others ", 
was giving counsels and not 
"court had ever given counsels that smelt so strongly of threats ". 
To the threat of Russian intervention Brüh1 replied that if Russia 
intervened so would France and Prussia. Even his rage at Russian 
dictation can hardly have blinded him to the fact that, whichever 
party won, the king of Poland would be the great loser by such a 
struggle. 
Brìhl, by adopting a new Polish policy and refusing to alter it to 
oblige Saxony's allies, had again placed himself in a difficult posi- 
tion between the rival leagues. His jealousy of the Czartoryski 
use of their credit only for their own 
he was at the nature of the advice, he 
the tone in which it was given. The 
"would sooner abdicate his crown than 
to which Gross replied that the Tsaritsa 
laws. Brúhl retorted that "no allied 
had led him to take steps in Poland 
:ance with Britain and the imperial 
:though the French party had become 
Poland, no assurance 
Prussian camp. The 
:ly the difficulties 
which endangered Saxony's a_lli- 
courts, while he had still, al- 
the supporters of the court in 
that Saxony would be welcomed in the Franco - 
events of 1754 -5 in Poland bring out very 
clear - 
in the sphere of foreign policy which the per- 
:sonal union of Saxony and Poland involved for the common sovereign. 
1 Williams to Holderness 29 January. 
2 There was, he had said on an earlier occasion "no such 
thing 
"left an Poland] as a French or Prussian party": Williams 
to Holderness 20 February. 
th 
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Brúhl sought to evade these difficulties by making advances to 
both European leagues and leaving the ultimate decision to the 
logic of events. He did everything, short of changing his Polish 
policy, to conciliate the Maritime Powers, since he much preferred 
t 
to continue in the Anglo- Imperial alliance and did not wish to re- 
:sume his awkward balancing policy of 1746 -50.1 A general well- 
disposed to Britain was appointed to take command of the 6,000 
Saxon auxiliaries in case their services should be required by 
Britain,2 while Flemming and Wiedmarckter bombarded the British 
government with letters and notes denouncing Williams's partiality 
for the Czartoryski, and pointing out that it was ridiculous to 
accuse their master of being guided by Broglie since they were still 
complaining of his conduct to the French government.3 Similar 
attempts were made to convince the Dutch government that Brahl's 
Polish policy was not inspired by Franc e and ought not therefore 
4 
to be an obstacle to the renewal of the treaty of 1751. Neither 
of the Maritime Powers, however, in spite of the imminence of war, 
desired to renew the treaty,5 the sole object of which had been to 
secure the election of a king of the Romans. The United Provinces 
had no intention of taking part in the war; the British government 
had decided to purchase the assistance of 55,000 Russian auxiliaries 
and regarded a paltry 6,000 ill -equipped and half- trained Saxon 
troops as not worth buying at the price demanded by Brúhl, especially 
in view of the Parliamentary opposition to subsidy treaties. 
1 Cf. his instructions to Vitzthum, the new envoy to Versailles, 
dated 7 September 1755 in Geheimnisse I 245 -7, 251 -5. 
2 Pol. Corr. X 107, 134. 
3 Flemming to Newcastle 4 March 1755 and Bruhl to Wiedmarckter 16 
March, in Add. MSS 32853 f. 85 and f. 307 respectively; 
Holder - 
:ness to Williams 11 April (third ordinary letter); Geheimnisse 
1 238 -42. 
4 Yorke to Newcastle 22 April (1) 1755 in Add. MSS 32854 f. 212. 
5 Newcastle to Keene 28 April and Newcastle to Flemming 28 
April, 
in Add. MSS 32854 f. 299 and f. 317 respectively. 
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Crïahl's simultaneous overtures to France were more successful. 
The reply of France to his first overtures through his envoys at 
the Hague 
1 
and at Versailles for the restoration of the Franco- 
Saxon. subsidy treaty was discouraging, but negotiations continued 
throughout the summer of 1755.2 Men Broglie returned to Dresden 
after a prolonged visit to France where he had exerted himself to 
secure the French government's acceptance of his plans for a great 
Northern system, he brought with him the project of a treaty of 
subsidy and was warmly welcomed at Dresden. Briihl and Broglie 
were now personally on excellent terms,3 but Brühl soon discovered 
that the conditions upon which France insisted were quite unaccept- 
able. At the end of 1755 he was still clinging to the Anglo- 
Iriperial alliance and could not promise a. corps of subsidy troops 
unconditionally to France, still less agree to co- operate with the 
French party in Poland to resist the entry of Russian troops.4 
Saxon policy was not, however, the only obstacle to Bríáhl's complete 
co- operation with the "patriots ". The very completeness of its vie - 
:tory tended to dissolve the Mniszek- Potocki coalition. Brizhl's 
Polish policy was twofold (1) to secure the maximum pecuniary advan- 
:tage for himself and his relations (2) to maintain as far as pos- 
sible the equilibrium of the two great parties. 
5 Under ,'lilliams's 
guidance he had momentarily abandoned the second part of his policy 
in favour of an exclusive alliance with the Czartoryski; but, without 
giving the experiment a fair trial, he had in 1754 reverted to his 
former policy, and, with the aid of the Potocki, restored the equili- 
brium of parties. The strenuous efforts of the now dominant Potocki 
1 Stuhr Forschungen I 21. 
2 Pol. Corr. XI 119, 168, 243. 
3 "Frone rude and obstinate as he [Lrogliel was before he is now 
"become very civil and polite ". Laurence to Holderness 24 
December 1755. 
4 Schafer T 119 -21; Geheimnisse I 281; Laurence to Holderness 
14 September, 24, 28, 31 December. 
5 Poniatowski 144. 
completely to 
suspicions. 
fortress of Dubno 
: toryski. 
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crush. the Czartoryski awakened Brühl's fears and 
The Great General had taken up his residence in the 
(belonging to Prince Sangusko) and was behaving 
sovereign,1 there as an independent 
with the Tartars 
legal forms were 
Brulil 
openly intriguing against Russia 
and the Porte, while his myrmidons with a mockery of 
revenging themselves upon the partisans of the Czar - 
could not but see that he had merely exchanged one 
servitude for another. He feared that Russia, roused by the Great 
General's intrigues, might put her threats into force, while the Czar - 
:toryski might be provoked by their enemies' proceedings to form a 
confederation and, with Russian support, begin a civil war.2 This 
was the more to be feared because public opinion among the Polish 
nobles, which had been alienated from the Czartoryski by their con- 
:duct in the Ostrog affair, was now turning once again in their 
favour, partly owing to the still more violent and selfish conduct of 
their opponents, but chiefly because only a small proportion of those 
who had hoped to share in the administration of the Ostrog estates 
had actually secured recognition of their claims.3 
Williams hoped that Brúhl's fears, combined with the remonstrances 
of Saxony's allies, would cause a speedy change in his Polish policy. 
In this he was disappointed. Brúhl did indeed give the Czartoryski 
some share in the distribution of offices,4 but the Potocki remained 
the court party. When `filliams, in accordance with his instructions 
1 Williams to Holderness 26 March, etc. 
2 Cf. Brúhl's conversation with Williams reported by Williams 
to Holderness on 5 Larch; Rulhiére I 222 -3. 
3 The ordination of the Ostrog was finally annulled and Prince 
Sangusko restored to his estates in May 1755; (Stormont to 
Keith 17 May, in Add. MSS 35462 f. 100). 
4 Williams to Holderness 11 June S.P.F. Russia: `1illians and Gross 
were now using the discarded arguments of France, during the 
period of Czartoryski ascendancy, that the king of Poland ought 
'pour ainsi dire diner dans un camp et couper dans l'autre 
.... 
"il n'est pas de la bonne politique de pousser bout 
une maison 
"puissante ". (A.E. Saxe 41: Despatch of Boyer 29 July 
1751). 
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offered shortly before leaving Dresden to a.rréinge a reconciliation 
between Briihl and the Czartoryski, he was mortified by the snub 
which. Brtihl hastened to administer.' Furious at Brïzhl's obstinacy 
and at the ruin of his ambitious plans to become the King maker of 
Poland, he quarrelled violently with Briif[ l2 and left Dresden in May 
1755, as he had left Berlin and Vienna, on thoroughly bad terms with 
the controller of the foreign policy of the court at which be had 
resided. A few months after his departure the rupture of the 
Franco- Prussian alliance in consequence of the convention of West- 
minster destroyed the main obstacle which had hitherto prevented 
Saxony- Poland's alliance with France. Soon afterwards the Prussian . 
attack upon. Saxony drove France and Russia into alliance and enabled 
Brühl for a time to bring Saxon policy in. European questions into 
harmony with his policy in the domestic affairs of Poland. The 
work of Williams's eight years at Dresden had rested from the begin- 
ning on an insecure foundation and perished completely in the 
cataclysm of the Diplomatic Revolution. 
1 Holderness to Williams 11 April (3rd letter); Williams to 
Holderness 28 April, 4 May. 










Petersburg f the Anglo- Russian subsidy treaty of 1755.' 
"It is persons and passions that govern (at the court of Russia] 
and without keys to both a minister must be two or three years tat 
Petersburg before he is able to do His Majesty any service ". 
Sir C.H. Williams to the Earl of Holderness 30 August 1757. 
Williams appointed ambassador at Petersburg - Sketch of the 
negotiations for an Anglo- Russian treaty of subsidy since 1749 - 
Williams's instructions - His recetntion at the Russian Court - He 
departs from his instructions - Character of the Great Chancellor - 
Williams secures Bestuzhev's acceptance of the British terms - 
Attitude of the Vice Chancellor - The Empress insists on the 
addition of two separate and secret articles to the subsidy treaty 
Williams proposes a voluntary increase of the first instalment of 
subsidy - A question of etiquette - The British government rejects 
the additional articles but offers a compromise - Signature of the 
convention on 30 September - Tension between Russia and Turkey 
owing to the building of Fort St. Elizabeth - The Russian court 
under Elizabeth - Character of the Empress- Her illness - The young 
court - Character of the Grand Duke Peter and the Grand Duchess 
Catherine - Bestuzhev's relations to the young court - Rise of the 
Shuvalovs - Threat to the Great Chancellor's position - Beginning 
of Williams's friendship with the Grand Duchess. 
a 9 April Williams received formal intimation that he had been 
ppointed H.M. ambassador at Petersburg and his instructions reached 
im ten days later. The relations of Guy Dickens with the Great 
1 
aancellor had gone steadily from bad to worse until at last he had 
pplied for his recall. 
12y years ", he wrote2 the infirmities I fell creeping upon me, the 
atemperancy of this climate I hope will justify me in desiring 
7 release from this station... the good of the King's service requires 
aat H.M. should have at this court a minister in the full strength 
ad vigour of his age as in their way of thinking here they look upon a 
preign minister not missing a court day ball masquerade play opera or 
ay other public diversion to be the chief and principal object of his 
fission which I cannot do and yet is absolutely necessary ". 
illiams had from the beginning of his diplomatic career coveted 
ae title of ambassador and was overjoyed at the realisation of 
is ambitions after so many disappointments. Quite apart from the 
itle which tickled his inordinate vanity, promotion to the onurt 
E one of the Great Powers gave him a chance to display on a 
ider field his talents as a diplomatist and influence the general 
(fairs of Europe. He had, it is true, contrived even in his 
ibordinate position at Dresden to engage the British government 
pon the ill -fated election question, but he himself had had but a 
all share in the attempt to execute it. Subsequently the imminence 
f a general war and Brühl's adroit balancing policy had given Saxony - 
oland an adventitious importance, and Williams had become the central 
ink in the chain of British diplomacy in eastern Europe. But he had 
ailed to secure the British government's adoption of his scheme for 
lecting a successor to the king of Poland. This failure and the quarrel 
1 Dickens to Holderness assim especially 10/21 September. 
2 Dickens to Holderness 7 1 February in Add. MSS. 32852 
f 525, partly printed in Raumer Frederick II 214. cf. 
Dickens to Holderness 28 February /11 march -In Add. MSS. 
32854 f 224. 
2. 
of Bruh1 with the Czartoryski reduced Williams to the part of a 
mere spectator in Poland. At Petersburg he would be at the 
veritable centre of the affairs of eastern Europe, whereas Warsaw 
was at best the most important point on the circumference. And he 
would no longer be a mere spectator at a second rate court but one 
of the leading actors on the European stage. It is upon his work 
at Petersburg that Williams's reputation as a diplomatist must stand 
or fall. 
1 
The "secret instructions" which he received before leaving 
Dresden on 14 May prescribed the conclusion of the subsidy treaty 
as "the chief and principal object" of his attention. This treaty 
in one form or another had been the central point in Anglo- Russian 
relations since 1749. Bestuzhev had been the first to propose it, 
and the Empress Queen had strongly urged it upon the British 
government. In its earlier stages it had been closely connected 
with the negotiation of Britain's accession to the treaty of the 
two empresses, Bestuzhev demanding a subsidy of £150,000 a year 
for 30,000 troops, since the terms of the British accession 
bound Russia (and Austria) to defend Hanover, although George II 
did not accede as elector of Hanover.2 Chiefly owing to the insup- 
-erable Parliamentary opposition to ordinary treaties of subsidy 
concluded in time of peace and to the largeness of the sum required, 
Newcastle had turned a deaf ear and had embarked instead upon 
the 
election of a king of the Romans, which soon proved to be hardly 
less expensive than the proposed subsidy treaty with Russia 
would have 
been. Britain's acceptance of the policy urged upon her by 
Austria 
1 In S.P.F. Russia (endorsed 11 April 1755). 
2 Dickens to Newcastle, January - February 1750 
passim; 
O.S. II 49 ff. 
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would have conciliated both Austria and Russia and have streng- 
-thened enormously the old system, whereas the adoption of the 
election project at the expense of the Russian treaty of subsidy 
offended Bestuzhev and ultimately caused considerable friction 
between Britain and Austria. Moreover, partly owing to the 
election project but chiefly owing to the quarrel over the 
Silesian loan and the Prussian ships, Britain's relations with 
Prussia grew steadily worse, and George II's fears for the safety 
of his electorate made him a convert to the policy of subsidising 
Russia. Newcastle also began to see that the princes he had hired 
in Germany would hardly dare to give their votes unless they were 
assured against Prussian resentment1 by the presence of a 
Russian army of observation on Prussia's exposed eastern frontier. 
The king of Prussia's appointment of the ex- Jacobite Lord Marshal 
as his ambassador to the French court was an additional cause of 
much exaggerated alarm to Newcastle. The countenance given by 
this appointment to the Pretender would, he wrote,2 "make the 
Russian subsidy as popular heré, as I, in my conscience think it 
makes it necessary". 
The British government was therefore forced to take up, in a 
modified form, the scheme it had rejected in 1749, and to try 
and 
combine it with the election project. Bestuzhev was delighted 
at 
the turn of events and determined to press his advantage 
to the 
uttermost. His demands astonished the British government, 
which 
had already dipped deeply into the Exchequer to provide 
luxuries 
for the princes of Germany. The Russian government 
then tried to 
1 Dickens to Newcastle 4 May O.S. 1751 S.P.F. 
Russia. 
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke 6 September 1751 
in Pelham 
Administration II 406. 
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enforce its demands by threatening, now that the Swedish crisis of 
17+9.51 was over, to withdraw its troops from the frontiers to the 
interior where they could be more easily and more cheaply fed, 1 
but would no longer paralyse the military action of Prussia. Con- 
-sequently the negotiation made little progress,2 especially as the 
British government soon after reluctantly dropped the election 
project, which had been one of the main motives on the British side 
for taking the negotiation seriously. The other main British motive - 
fear of a Prussian attack on Hanover - continued, but was gradually 
reduced from its place of primary importance to that of a mere 
incident in a world conflict between Britain and France, supported by 
their respective allies. In view of this impending conflict which 
would tax to the utmost the resources of the British crown, it was 
essential to secure the maximum possible support from our continental 
allies, especially as British politicians assumed that Prussia, the 
intimate ally of France and on the worst terms with Britain, would 
join without hesitation in the struggle. Doubtless George II's 
fears for his electorate, a tempting bait to Prussia, gave an added 
zeal to their approaches to their allies, but it was their manifest 
duty, in view of the prospect of a maritime and colonial war, to 
consolidate Britain's system on the continent. Austria when approached 
gave the usual vague assurances of support but insisted more strongly 
than ever that Britain - no matter what it cost - must buy the 
assistance of Russia.3 Still less satisfactory was the response 
of 
1 Dickens to Newcastle 4 May O.S. 1751 S.P.F. Russia. 
2 V. "General State of the negotiation with the court of 
Russia 
for a treaty of subsidy and of the conditions concluded 
in 
September 1755" (in S.P.F. Russia 61 ad. fin.) cf. 
Dickens's 
correspondence with Newcastle and Holderness in S1P.F.Russia: 
Pol. Corr. X 22 -5, 76 -101 etc. (based on the 
desp,ftches of 
Funcke, Bestuzhev's confidant, to Brühl and including 
copies of 
the various official documents). 
3 Austria, quite apart from the Kaunitz policy of 
rapprochement 
with France was unwilling to be dragged into 
war at the heels of 
her ally at'a time when the Ottoman Porte 
was restive and the 
Croats were in revolt. (Pol. Corr. XI 127, 159). 
5. 
the United Provinces, where an influential and growing party, 
intimidated by the Franco -Prussian alliance, which placed the 
United Provinces with their dilapidated barrier, ill- disciplined 
troops, and ruinous constitution between two fires, openly 
threatened to desert Britain and make terms with France unless 
Britain took effective measures with Austria and Russia for their 
defence . 
1 
The Russo -British treaty of 1742 obliged Russia to send 12,000 
men to the defence of Great Britain if attacked, but it was 
highly doubtful if (in the event of a war arising out of a 
quarrel between Britain and Prussia) Russia would be obliged to 
march these troops to the assistance of Hanover. Even if Russia 
agreed that such an attack was comprised in the casus foederis, 
the slow concentration and leisurely advance of Russian troops 
across Poland and Germany would cause a delay which would 
almost certainly prove fatal. In any case a paltry 12,000 troops, 
even co- operating with other subsidiary corps and the Hanoverian 
forces, was obviously inadequate for the defence of Hanover 
against the finest fighting force in Europe. The only effective 
way of defending Hanover seemed to be a prompt and powerful 
Russian diversion on Prussia's weak eastern frontier which would 
force Prussia to fight simultaneously in the east and in the 
west and cripple, if it did not avert, the attack on Hanover. 
Thus early in 1755 the subsidy negotiation with Russia had 
become a matter of life and death to Britain. The Tsaritsa 
was 
1 W. Bentinck to Newcastle 22 April 1755 in Add. 
MSS. 
32854 f 210. cf. Yorke to Newcastle, Private, 
3 June in 
Add. MSS. 32855 f 312: "This country alone...will 
never be 
engaged single- handed or even be the first to 
resist 
France in the Netherlands ". 
F. 
well aware 
of the strength of her position and was in no hurry to 
conclude the 
treaty, since the nearer the approach of war Between 
Britain and France the more vital it became for Britain and the 
better the terms which could be extorted from her. 
The main concrete differences between Britain and Russia were (1 ) 
the wide difference between Russian pecuniary demands and British 
offers and (2) Russia's insistence upon the exclusion from the 
casus foederis of an attack upon Britain's allies and even at times 
of an attack upon Hanover as a result of a Franco -British quarrel, 
since the protection extended to Hanover at the time of Britain's 
accession to the treaty of 1746 was valid only against an attack 
Henhaine de cet accession ".1 Williams's instructions enabled him 
in the last resort to come near to compliance with the pecuniary 
demands of Russia - unless, as was not improbable, Russia's 
favourable position for bargaining induced her to raise her terms - 
on condition that Russia gave way on the second point. 
The second object of Williams's instructions3 was less urgent, but 
hardly less important - the renewal of the general treaty of def- 
ensive alliance of 1742 between Britain and Russia, which was 
'the basis and foundation of our alliance with the Court of Russia "3 
and expired in 1757. Closely connected with the question of its 
renewal was the commercial treaty of 1734 which would have expired 
1111754 "had it not been expressly renewed by the treaty of 1742 to 
be of equal duration with the treaty itself. "3 The British 
O.S. II 57. 
Holderness to Williams 11 April "Very Secret". On this ground 
this letter authorised Williams to make "some small extension" 
of the provisional subsidy but on no account to increase the 
large subsidy. 
3 Holderness to Williams 11 April (second ordinary letter). 
7. 
gi 
government was eager to secure renewal of the political part of the 
treaty; buys the Russia Company had certain objections in detail 
to the commercial treaty of 1734 which was now blended with the 
political treaty, Williams was to find out from Baron 
Wolff, the British consul at Petersburg, what alterations, if any, 
the British merchants at Petersburg wished to have made in the 
treaty, and not to engage himself "too far as to the renewal of 
the treaty of 1742 in its present shape until he received more 
i 
explicit instructions. 
These two points were the sole but vitally important objects of 
Williams's negotiation at Petersburg. To attain them he was 
instructed to avoid the mistake of his predecessor, Guy Dickens, 
and to "take all proper methods of cultivating an intimate and 
confidential friendship with the Great Chancellor and be extremely 
cautious of giving him any, the least cause of jealousy from 
Chas] connections with any other favourites or ministers in Russia ". 
In order to get the Chancellor to exert his influence at Petersburg 
to conclude the convention, Williams was authorised3 to offer him 
not more than £10,000 conditional on exchange of the ratifications, 
and if absolutely necessary to promise him a regular pension for 
the future. 
Williams was welcomed with open arms at Petersburg. He had the 
character of ambassador, and ambassadors at Petersburg were rare 
and therefore highly esteemed. His reputation had preceeded him 
1 Orders to secure renewal of the treaties of 1734 and 1742 
unaltered were despatched on 24 July (Holderness to Williams 
Separate). 
2 Holderness to Williams 11 April, Very Secret. 
3 Holderness to Williams Most Secret 11 April, 1755, (in Newport 
Papers). Subsequently Williams was ordered to make his offers 
by degrees, "particularly the personal part ". Holderness to 
Williams (Private) 17 June, in Newport Papers. 
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and the semi -barbarous 
Russian court was curious to see this 
finished product of the 
civilisation of the west which they admired 
and copied without understanding. But the chief reason for the 
warmth of his reception at Petersburg was that everyone shared the 
Great Chancellor's idea that Williams had "in his train a large 
waggon loaded with nothing else but ducats "1 and all were eager to 
share in the spoils. The two chancellors vied with each other in 
professions of friendship towards him and of zeal to secure the 
conclusion of the convention; the other members of the college of 
foreign affairs and the hangers -on of the Chancellor flocked 
around him with visibly itching palms. Williams - a true follower 
of Walpole in this respect - had always been too ready to offer 
bribes and he foolishly accepted the assurances of the venal 
courtiers and politicians, although not quite at their face value, 
atmuch more than their real worth. Within a fortnight of his 
arrival before he could possibly be sure of the ground, especially 
as the Dutch minister Swart avoided him and Esterhazy, his former 
colleague at Dresden, was on the worst of terms with the Great 
2 Chancellor, he asked Holderness for "some small additional helps" 3 
which were "absolutely necessary for carrying on His Majesty's 
business at this Court with despatch as well as with success. "4 
Olsuviev, who combined the post of master of ceremonies with 
1 Dickens to Holderness 6/17 May, S.P.F. Russia. 
2 Keith to Holderness reporting a conversation with Kaunitz, 
in Add. MSS. 32851 f 6, and Williams to Holderness 23 June /4 
July. 
3 These were at once granted. (Holderness to Williams 24 July, 
Most Secret). Williams was merely following the example of his 
predecessors, but his bribes were very much larger than those 
of Hyndford and Dickens. 
4 Williams to Holderness 23 June /4 July. Short extracts from the 
Holderness -Williams correspondence after this date have been 
published in Raumer: Frederick II 220 -43, 260 -5, 294 -7 etc; 
after Mitchell's arrival at Berlin there are longer extracts 
in Pol. Corr. XII, XIII, XIV. 
9. 
membership of the college of foreign affairs and was the confidant 
and director 
of Voronzov; Funcke, 
1 
who held the hardly compatible 
posts of Saxon minister and confidential secretary to the Great 
Chancellor; and Volkov, another of Bestuzhev's secretaries, were 
the three candidates selected by Williams from the crowd of applic- 
-ants. Soon afterwards he suggested that the Vice Chancellor himself, 
if he acted up to his professions, should be handsomely rewarded. 
Thus instead of following his instructions, which were to depend 
exclusively upon the Great Chancellor, Williams, whose head was 
turned by the interested flattery paid to him on all sides, tried 
to win over Bestuzhev's enemies. It is true that he had Bestuzhev's 
approval and even encouragement in this policy, and his main 
reliance continued to be placed upon the Chancellor, who had so long 
been the bulwark of British interests at the Russian court. Adroit 
rather than capable, a past master in the arts of dissimulation and 
intrigue, Bestuzhev preferred to gain his ends by the most tortuous 
methods. Avarice and the lust for power, were his ruling passions. 
Alow forehead, little beady eyes, and a shifty mouth composed a 
most unattractive exterior but gave a not unfair indication of his 
character. His quarrelsome and suspicious disposition, determination 
todo things in his own way, and insistence that his friends should 
share his numerous personal vendettas, made it difficult to co- 
-operate successfully with him 
1 
and the envoys of Russia's closest 
allies frequently suffered from his vindictive spite. His long 
tenure of office was due mainly to the fact that he, alone of Russian 
ministers, 
had a clearly defined system and the resolution to follow 
It out, and to overcome, by a mixture of cajolery and coercion, the 
cf. Dickens to Newcastle 1? October, 1751 in S.P.F. Russia. 
10. 
hesitations of the Empress, which were due partly to natural 
indolence and partly to suspicion of his interested motives. Even 
his friends could not deny his many failings: but added that if 
he was an implacable enemy he was also a steady friend. 
Williams first found out from Funcke and Volkov the smallest sums 
2 
which Bestuzhev would accept, and then on 1 July he had a lengthy 
private conference with Bestuzhev and Funcke. He began by making 
offers less than the minimum indicated by Funcke and Volkov. These 
were refused without hesitation. Williams then handed in his 
ultimatum, which ̂t e Great 0hancellor.a.g.44.0e4.74fid promised to do n 
his utmost to secure the Tsaritsa's acceptance of the British 
project of convention in exchange for a provisional subsidy of 
£100,000 a year, to be raised to 2500,000 a year after the troops 
had crossed the frontier.3 This was 2100,000 a year less by 
way of provisional subsidy than Bestuzhev had previously asked for, 
but the imminence of a conflict between Britain and France made it 
almost certain that the troops would be requisitioned by Britain 
very soon after the ratification of the treaty and the amount of 
1 Herzen Memoir 7. 
2 Williams to Holderness 31 July /11 August. 
3 Holderness and Robinson accused Williams of 
exceeding his instructions in agreeing upon 
these terms, but they were undoubtedly in 
the wrong and Newcastle strongly supported 
Williams's interpretation of his instructions. 
(Holderness to Williams, Secret, 24 July; 
Williams to Holderness 31 July /11 August; 
Newcastle to Hardwicke 26 July in Add. MSS. 
32857 f 384b.) 
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the provisional 
subsidy became therefore of less importance. 
Bestuzhev's acceptance of Williams's ultimatum was,however, chiefly 
1 
due to the larger bribe now offered to him by Britain. Dickens had 
offered £5,000; Williams on previous occasions had gone as far as 
1 
£8,000 without success; now he raised the offer to £10,000. "Such 
public and private offers made at once" Williams reported 1 "struck 
him and with joy in his face he told me .... he would accept and 
support what I had offered". Williams regarded the private offer as 
"the spring which gave motion and success to the public ones ", but 
both were necessary, since the Great Chancellor's influence with the 
2 
Empress was just reviving after a serious decline and would not have 
been sufficient to secure her acceptance of lesser offers. The bribe 
would free Bestuzhev from the pressure of his debts, while the 
arranging of the subsidy, which he could represent as extracted by 
h s astute diplomacy from an unwilling ally, would greatly strengthen 
his credit with the Tsaritsa. 
tthis public conference on 19 July with the chancellors3Williams, 
byprevious arrangement with the Great Chancellor, at once handed in 
his ultimatum. The Vice -Chancellor first tried to extract an addit- 
ional £50,000 a year on account of the galleys which the Tsaritsa 
Sas to supply if the troops were requisitioned; failing in this he 
demanded a declaration, about which Williams promised to write for 
Instructions, that the troops would not be requisitioned in the event 
ofa war confined to America or Italy only. Both chancellors then 
1 Williams to Holderness 31 July /11 August. 
2 Williams to Holderness 31 July /11 August; Titley to 
Holderness 11 March in Add. MSS. 32854 f 226; Pol. Corr. 





advise the Empress to sign the convention. 
Tt remained to secure the Empress's consent - no empty formality. 
Elizabeth's distaste for business was notorious, and she was at the 
moment at one of her country palaces enjoying the society of her 
latest favourite, Ivan Ivanovitch Shuvalov, freed from the formalism 
Hid_ restrictions of court etiquette. Williams after his arrival had 
lost no time in getting into touch with Shuvalov and cultivated his 
acquaintance so successfully that he boasts to the Secretary of 
State that he and Shuvalov "are at present in a correspondence of 
1 
letters together" . The Great Chancellor co- operated loyally and 
sent the draft convention and other necessary papers to Shuvalov, 
who persuaded the Empress to read them and then to send for the 
chancellors. She accepted the British draft without any important 
change although the Great Chancellor ,in accordance with her orders 
pressed Williams to increase the preliminary subsidy. Williams 
refused the request but promised after the conclusion of the con- 
-vention to recommend his court to make some additional payment on 
account of the heavy expenses incurred by the Empress, and with 
this promise the Chancellor professed himself satisfied. But 
although the Empress made no alterations she insisted upon adding 
two new separate and secret articles of vital importance. On the 
ground that as she was to have so large a share in the war, she 
ought also to have some share in the peace, the Empress,with 
1emories of the ignominious exclusion of her plenipotentiaries from 
Aix,insisted upon the inclusion of clause XVII of the Russian 
project: 
1 Williams to Holderness 31 July /11 August. 
2 Williams's Note appended to his despatch to Holderness of 
31 July /11 August. 
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'Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent et se promettent 
de ne faire 
avec l'ennemi commun aucune paix separement l'une sans 
l'autre et par conseciuent de n'entrer avec lui en aucune negotiation 
sans le consentement prealable de l'autre part..." 
Secondly, she inserted a separate and secret article which Williams 
believed was due to her desire not to promise more than she could 
actually perform. Its effect was, however, to destroy the whole 
1 
value of the convention to Great Britain, since it virtually post- 
-poned the marching of the Russian troops stationed in Livonia 
across the frontier until three months after the date of the British 
2 
requisition, although it was expressly stated in the body of the 
convention that the general commanding the Livonian corps was to 
march across the frontier immediately on receipt of the British 
requisition, without waiting even for orders from Petersburg. 
failed to appreciate the vital of articles 
and signed them sub spe rati after the feeblest resistance. He 
excuses his action by alleging the urgent nature of his instructions, 
the imminence. of war between Britain and France, and the imposs- 
-ability of altering what the Empress had inserted without post- 
poning the conclusion of the convention perhaps for months. The 
convention was accordingly signed on 9 August. 
The insertion of these articles ought to have given Williams 
furiously to think, but he was still in the honeymoon of his ministry 
and blind to the realities of the situation at Petersburg. 
rlizabeth' s j It version to France and Prussia" he reports "grows daily 
stronger and her attachment to the King and his allies increases so 
fast that I will en 
g 
a help of those little 
assistances which Ihave asked of the, King, to put this Court into 
H.M. hands more than ever it was yet in those of any other sovereign 
and that nothing shall be done here that shall be contrary to 
H.M. 
inclinations 
or different from what he shall dictate." 
Holderness to Williams 28 August. 
2 Martens IX 184. 




one fear was that Voronzov was insincere, and he proposed 
to present 
him with a ring (of the value of £500) on the exchange of 
ratifications, 
although in the same despatch he assured Holderness 
that the 
Vice Chancellor "knows his interest too well to dare at 
this time to 
whisper anything that has the appearance of an opposition 
to an English measure at this Court". 
1 
It is not difficult to reconcile Williams's optimism with his con- 
tinual demands for money since he believed that if he paid a high 
Hough price everything and everybody at Petersburg, including the 
press, could be bought. In a separate and very secret letter to 
o1derness3, sent along with the convention, he proposed to extend his 
8ysten of bribery to the Empress herself by increasing the first 
Nment of the provisional subsidy from 2100, 000 to ~150, 000. This, 
°ostuzhev assured him, would be "a sort of personal obligation to Her 
: perial Majesty" since the first instalment was destined to the 
4press's privy purse, which had been drained by the cost of building 
d rebuilding some of her country palaces. If this could be done the 
Great Chancellor promised that it "would put both this Court and the 
âipress entirely into H.11. ' s management". The treaties of 1734 and 
1142 would be immediately renewed and Russia would exert all her 
fluence at Vienna to persuade the court of Austria to "act with more 
ordiality towards the Maritime Powers than they have lately done". 
British government, although they thought Williams had not haggled 
i'afficiently over the subsidy and bribes, was delighted with the 
speedy 
onclusion 
of the convention, especially as Boscawen's attack upon 
the 
Contra Archives Voronzov V 25. 
2 s Th was the accepted view in diplomatic circles. cf. Keith to 
Newcastle, Private, 23 July 1754 in Add. MSS. 32849 
f 364 and 
Flemming to Newcastle 24 July 1754 ibid. f 372; Yorke to 
Newcastle 18 June 1756 in Add. MSS. 3G865 f 339. 
3 Williams to Holderness 31 July /11 August. 
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11cß and the Lys, 
and the resultant rupture of diplomatic relations 
rich France made war practically certain. Former experiences, however, 
Dade them much more suspicious of the Russian negotiators than their 
credulous 
ambassador and his preliminary indications1 of the additional 
c 
articles 
insisted on by Russia intensified these suspicions. When the 
eagerly expected convention actually arrived at Hanover it was at once 
seen that Williams had prejudiced the honour of the British crown by 
giving the precedence to Russia both in the text of the treaty and in 
the manner of its signature. The King was furious "' and the ministers 
suspected that the Russian court was trying (despite express provisions 
to the contrary in the treaty of 1742) to take advantage of Britain's 
recognition of the imperial title of the Tsars to usurp the ceremonial 
ore- eminence granted by long established precedents by even the 
haughtiest of royal courts to the successor of imperial Rome at Vienna. 
part from this gross and apparently inexcusable blunder, the British 
government objected to the second and third secret articles. The second 
secret article the government would not accept as it stood, but sent a 
codified version which, after the outbreak of war had given rise to the 
casusfoederis, bound the contracting parties to communicate confid- 
entially to each other any negotiation with the common enemy and to 
co- operate in procuring a peace honourable and advantageous to both 
parties. The third secret article could not possibly be ratified since, 
1 Williams to Holderness 14/25 July. 
2 Holderness to Williams 19 August. 
3 Holderness's censure in the first draft of his reply was not 
strong enough to please the King who insisted upon its being 
strengthened.(Holderness to Williams, Private, 18 November, in 
Newport Papers). cf. Holderness to Newcastle, entre nous, 27 
August, in Add. MSS. 32856 f 302. "I never saw the King more 
offended in all my life ". 
4 The British government's interpretation of the text it proposed 
is clearly given in the 'General State': "By another secret 
article the Contracting Powers engage in case a war should break 
out to communicate to each other any negotiation they may either 
of them set on foot with the enemy and to endeavour to procure 
for each other honorable and advantageous terms of peace". T. 
:c.L 6 3.wß,.. W.G,.. dim f 3 . 
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as Holderness pointed out, it permitted a delay of three months after 
the date of the requisition before the Russian troops marched to the 
assistance of Britain. Finally, the secret declaration excluding from 
the casus foederis a war confined to Italy or America was denounced 
as "quite unnecessary ", although Williams was given permission to 
sign it if the Russian ministers insisted. 
That the British government was seriously alarmed by the obstacles 
raised by the second and third secret articles and feared that the 
rupture of Franco- British diplomatic relations would make the Russian 
government still more intractable is proved by the permission given to 
Williamsl to add S25,000 to the first instalment of the provisional 
subsidy, on condition that the third article was cancelled and the 
second altered to conform to the British version, and also that the 
Great Chancellor engaged to renew without further delay the treaties 
of 1734 and 1742. Although less optimistic than Williams, his govern - 
-mwnt shared his views as to the best road to success at the court of 
Petersburg. 
Williams's chagrin on receipt of these despatches may be easily 
0 
imagined.` He hastened to inform his government that there had really 
been no deviation from the usual ceremonial, but that the original 
copy of the treaty which ought to have remained in the Russian chancery 
and which therefore gave precedence to Russia had been despatched by 
himto London, while the original copy destined to be ratified by the 
King and giving precedence to Britain had been retained by the 
chanceliors.3 
Williams then saw the Great Chancellor privately and 
1 This power he did not require to use. (Williams to Holderness 
21 September /2 October.; 
2 Poniatowski, who was with Williams when he opened the despatches, 
described to Coxe (during Coxe's tour in Poland) his extravagant 
behaviour after he had read them. (Coxe, Historical Tour in 
Monmouthshire II 275). 
3 Williams to Holderness 13 September N.S. 
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.obtained his promise to use his influence with the Empress to annul 
1 
the 
third and modify the second secret article. At first the Vice 
Chancellor insisted that a secret declaration to the same effect as 
the proposed third separate and secret article should be added, but 
ultimately this demand was withdrawn and the convention was signed 
on30September on the terms desired by the British government without 
any alteration or addition, and at the same time the original copies 
of the unratified convention of 9 August were exchanged "with shame 
an both sides". 
Williams had now accomplished his main business at Petersburg. During 
the summer of 1755 his only other task was to avert the danger of 
Aar between Russia and the Porte over the old question of the Ingul 
fort.3 The fear of a rupture between Russia and Turkey at a time when 
Britain wished Russia to play a large part in a general European war, 
alarmed the British government, 
4 
since it would divide and distract 
Russia's attention and would certainly involve Austria either as an 
auxiliary or as a principal. The revival of the Ingul fort project, 
Rolderness wrote "would bring about what France and Prussia have 
hitherto in vain attempted and destroy at once the possibility of 
forming such a system as might enable us to make head against those 
Powers in Europe ". If Russia would unconditionally abandon the 
building of the Ingul fort Williams was authorised to increase the 
Preliminary subsidy to 2125,000 per annum. These increased offers 
were due only in part to the British government's fear of a Russo - 
Turkish war; more influential was Austria's refusal to send 
reinforcements to the Low Countries till the subsidy treaty with 
1 Williams to Holderness 16 September N.S. 
? S.P.F. Treaties 438; copies in S.P.F. Treaty Papers 62; printed 
in Martens PC 191 -200. 
3 Porter to Holderness 17 May etc. in S.P.F.; Porter to Williams 
25 July in Ada. MSS. 35482 f 48. 
Holderness to Williams, Separate, 17 June. 
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Russia was concluded. Newcastle, Hardwicke, and Robinson accordingly 
1 
met at Powis House and agreed upon the increase in the proposed 
subsidies,and Holderness sent fresh instructions to Williams in 
2 
consequence. Williams, as he was ordered to do, took up the question 
of the Ingul fort with a high hand and treated the Great Chancellor 
to a long, ranting oration3 on the stupidity of Russian policy in 
exciting Turkey to war. The Great Chancellor protested that he had 
always been an enemy to the scheme, which he attributed to Olsuviev, 
and after some hesitation agreed to write a private letter to the 
Russian resident at Constantinople ordering him not to take any 
further steps in the affair and nothing more was heard of it. 
In these early months Williams, in spite of ill health and in marked 
contrast to his predecessor, entered with zest into all the 
hversions of the extravagant and profligate court. The belief that 
the British government and Williams himself hoped that he would 
captivate the fickle Empress and attain thereby a control over 
Russian policy such as had been exercised at one time by La Chetardie 
finds no support in any official document.4 This is no proof that 
such an intention did not exist, but if it existed it seems a foolish 
hope. Apart from her earliest lover and reputed husband, Ras'umcvski, 
nearly all Elizabeth's favourites had been .mere. boys. It was hardly 
likely that she would be fascinated by a fat and pompous roue, well 
on ;in the forties, and prematurely aged by the life he had led. 
"illiams's elaborate flatteries, although their novelty doubtless 
made them for a time attractive to her, could hardly seduce the 
1 Memorandum in Add. MSS. 32855 f 314. 
2 Newcastle to Holderness 6 June,in Add. MSS. 32855 f 353b; 
Holderness to Newcastle 18 June, in Add. MSS. 32856 f 21. 
3 Reported in Williams's letter to Holderness of 23 June /4 July. 
4 The appointment of Yorke chiefly on this ground had,however, 
been seriously considered at one time - March 1754. (Yorke to 
Hardwicke in Add. MSS. 35356 f 232 and f 234) . 
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lignorant and illiterate Empress. Such education as she acquired had 
1 
been picked up in the servants' hall, and the favourite diversions of 
her youth - amorous intrigues and drinking parties - were enjoyed in 
company with the troopers of the imperial guard, to whom chiefly she 
owed her elevation to the throne. Until the last few years of her life, 
ín spite of her love of feminine finery, she was more at home in the 
saddle than at court and in the barrack room than in the council 
chamber. In point of fact although Williams was enraptured at the 
Empress's "graciousness" to him in these early months,- her behaviour 
towards him personally was never more than the ambassador of one of 
Russia's two principal allies had the right to expect. On all occasions 
however, she professed the keenest anxiety not only for Britain's 
success in the American war, but for the personal safety of George II. 
'Her Majesty asked me" Williams reported on one occasion "where I 
thought the King might then be? To which I answered it was probable 
ïisMajesty might be in his passage over to England; she replied she 
ïid not like to have the King upon the sea and that she should not be 
;asy till she heard that he was safely landed and desired I would 
Send her that good news the very moment I received it ".3 
the Empress's health was already giving anxiety not only to her 
cedical advisers but to the whole court. The bad relations subsisting 
cetween the "old court" of the Empress and the "young court" of the 
;rand Duke and Duchess made certain that the death of the Empress 
lould be followed by great changes of personnel, if not of measures, 
it Petersburg. The leading officials and courtiers were already 
J 
1 Kluchevsky IV 35k. 
2 Williams to Holderness 27 Junei7 July; 6 September N.S. 
This remark would appear to disprove the popular belief (Bain 
137) that Elizabeth's ignorance of geography was such that she 
believed Britain was part of the Continent. 
4 Williams to Holderness, Separate and Most Secret, 21 September/ 
2 October. Williams reports that she was suffering from chronic 
asthma and dropsy and refused to submit to the directions of her 
physicians. "There is" he adds "actually a machine making to carra' 
Her Imperial Majesty from one floor to another without obliging 
e toelorts , Th mos  elaborate the young court is to be found in 
Waliszewski,Le Roman d'une Imperatrice, Part I. 
20. 
ccupied with the difficult task of retaining the favour of the 
ppress without offending the "young court" and this crisis in the 
olth of the Empress redoubled their exertions by impressing upon 
tiemfor the first time that the change of rulers might come at any 
oment. The Grand Duke Peter, Elizabeth's heir designate, was a 
eedy and feeble -minded young man whose education had been badly 
1 
glected. He was far from being entirely evil and could show on 
ccasion flashes of nobility, but his mental development had been 
crested at the stage of a moderately intelligent child of twelve. 
vacillated between a childish fear of the Empress and a sincere 
ìmiration for his brilliant wife, Sophia of Anhalt Zerbst, the future 
;therine the Great. Left to himself he would spend hours playing with 
)ysoldiers 
3 
in the quiet hours of night in the grand ducal bed, 
111e Catherine lay by his side in a cold fury of loathing and 
4 
mtempt. In the early months of Williams's stay at Petersburg, the 
llassorted couple, thanks to Catherine's marvellous self control, 
All contrived to live without open discord, although Catherine had 
[ready sought consolation for her husband's neglect in the arms of 
iefirst of a long series of lovers.5 Her intellectual ascendancy over 
6 
;rhusband was still undisputed and no one could doubt that "Her 
special Highness is the person who in case of accidents, will rule 
;re ".7 The position of the grand ducal couple was, however, by no 
;ans secure since there were persistent rumours that Elizabeth meant 
)disinherit them in favour of Prince Ivan,who had been imprisoned 
la fortress after Elizabeth's accession had driven him, while still 
1 Herzen Memoir 6, 43. 2 Kluchevsky IV 358 -59; Bain 190 -1. 
3 Herzen Memoir 233. 4 Herzen Memoir 79. 
5 Catherine Memoirs 247-9. 
6 "The Grand Duke's confidence in the Grand Duchess is so great 
that sometimes he tells people that though he does not understand 
things himself yet his wife understands everything". (Williams 
to Holderness,Separate and Most Secret,21 September /2 October;) 
cf. Herzen Memoir 239. 
7 Williams to Holderness,Separate and Most Secret,21 September/ 
2 October. cf. W lliams to Newcastle, Private, 19 February, 1756 
in Add. MSS. 32863 f 25. 
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aninfant, from the throne. Ivan's claims were, it was said, secretly 
supported by Austria, but Catherine had already removed one cause of 
the Empress's displeasure with herself and her husband by giving 
birth to a son - Paul I. It was doubtless to diminish still further 
the danger that the Empress might make Ivan her heir that Catherine, 
who during her early years in Russia had suffered much from Bestuzhev's 
1 
enmity and had been closely associated with the Shuvalovs, had now 
become reconciled to the Great Chancellor and was, Williams believed, 
entirely governed by him. Bestuzhev had made sure as far as was 
humanly possible that he would be continued in office after the death 
of the Empress, but his preparations, furtive and carefully concealed 
asthey were, can hardly have escaped the Empress's notice and must 
have indisposed her against him. On the other hand,the Vice Chancellor 
and his party depended entirely upon Elizabeth's recovery since the 
basis of their power was "the solid interest" of the Vice Chancellor's 
wife with the Empressfand they doubtless represented Bestuzhev's 
relations with the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess in the blackest 
colours to her. 
eantime a new force appeared at Petersburg which complicated the 
perennial rivalry of the two chancellors. Hitherto, with the exception 
UfRasumovski3 upon whom Bestuzhev counted to balance the influence 
ofthe Vice Chancellor's wife over the Empress, Elizabeth's favourites 
had enjoyed very short spells of favour and had never played that part 
inpolitics which Bestuzhev's enemies had hoped. Now in 1754 Ivan 
Zvanovitch Shuvalov had become and long remained the established 
favourite. He belonged to an important family and two of his cousins, 
thebrothers Peter and Alexander Shuvalov, held high military and civil 
1 Catherine's Memoirs 125, 173, 183 -6. 
2 Catherine's Memoirs 251. 3 Bain 142 -6. 
22. 
offices under the crown. 
1 
Soon he added to the duties of favourite those 
of confidential secretary and adviser hitherto discharged by Rasumovski, 
the ally of Bestuzhev, and on this dual basis a third party virtually 
grew up at the Russian court. This new party would naturally tend to 
oppose the Bestuzhev -Rasumovski faction, although at first the oppos- 
2 
ition was not irreconcilable. 
It was doubtless Bestuzhev's fear of the increasing suspicions of the 
Empress and of a final junction of the Shuvalovs with Voronzov and his 
on brother, 
3 
which induced him to change his tactics completely and 
urge Williams to bribe his enemies and thus lessen the opposition to 
his attempts to carry the measures Britain required from the Russian 
4 
court. Although he thought it wise to try to disarm his enemies by 
means of the accomodatingly generous British ambassador, Bestuzhev was 
not yet seriously alarmed at the cabals against him. Throughout his 
tenure of office he had had to fight hard to maintain his hold upon the 
Impress, who, it appears, had a personal distaste for him, and was well 
aware of his intrigues and corruption,5 but believed rightly that he 
was more competent to direct Russian foreign policy than any of his 
enemies. Voronzov,throughout Elizabeth's reign was maintained in office, 
not merely because his wife was one of the Empress's cronies, but 
because he was an invaluable spy upon his colleague. 
The conclusion of the convention, however, was a great advantage to 
Bestuzhev since he, as Williams reported, "is the declared father of 
this child [the convention which is at once to feed both the wants and 
1 cf. Arneth V 43 -4; Bain 155 -7. 
2 Catherine's Memoirs 183 -4. 3. Pol, Corr. XI 284. 
4 Williams to Holderness, Separate and Private, 21 September /2 
October. Bestuzhev recommended a present of £500 to the Vice 
Chancellor and approved heartily of the bribe already offered to 
and accepted by Olsuviev. 
5 Dickens to Holderness 11/22 February 1755 in Add. MSS. 32852 
f 572. 
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the vanity of the Empress; it has already enabled him to talk in a 
iífferent tone to his Imperial mistress from what he has lately dared 
Godo and has given him a great superiority over the Vice Chancellor 
rhich no man in Europe knows how to make a better use of than 
1 
himself" . 
lilliams, like everyone else at the Russian court, was faced with the 
choice between the old and the young court and did not take long to 
lake up his mind. °- _1'.1*__'_ rank placed him next to the Grand Duchess 
}tsupper, and they were soon on cordial and confidential terms2which 
ripened into intimacy when young Poniatowski, whom Williams had 
rought to Petersburg to strengthen the bonds between the Russian 
ourt and the Czartoryski party in Poland, became Catherine's lover.) 
',etween the oddly assorted couple there grew up a genuine affection as 
yell as a political alliance. Catherine,amid the ignorant, illiterate, 
ndgrossly superstitious court of Petersburg found in the elderly 
liplomat a kindred spirit, irreverent, sceptical, and endowed with a 
superficial culture and a gift for "witty expression of a few trite 
!àeas - in short, enlightened as "enlightenment" was understood in the 
:ighteenth century courts. Political motives reinforced natural 
finity. Catherine had indeed got over the worst pitfalls which surr- 
ounded her on her arrival at the Russian court in 1744, but she was 
iellaware of the possibility that she and her husband might still be 
ieinherited in favour of Ivan; and the greater the power of the 
huvalovs, who, after Catherine's reconciliation with the Great 
Ihancellor, had become the deadly enemies of her husband and herself, 
fhegreater the danger. Catherine, as she confessed to Williams and as 
1 Williams to Holderness 31 July /11 August. 
2 Herzen Memoir 230. 3 Poniatowski 153 et seq.; Rulhiere 1 274. 
4 Williams's attainments as a classical scholar were, however, 
extolled by Voltaire - Oeuvres complètes (Paris, 1827) Vol.iii 
page 1181. 
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ubsequent events were to prove, would stop at nothing in order to 
lace herself on the throne of the Tsars, and in the event of a 
isputed succession British support would be of considerable value. 
eantime, Williams could be very useful to her,both by the control 
hich he as Bestuzhev's paymaster exercised over her new ally, the 
Nat Chancellor, and by procuring for her direct from the British 
overnment ready money to supplement the allowances which she received 
rom the Empress and which were quite inadequate for a young woman 
ithCatherine's expensive tastes. 
atherine, therefore, set out to captivate the susceptible ambassador. 
lot content to exploit her personal charms, she adroitly penetrated 
lilliams's armour by professing boundless hostility to Frederick of 
c o-.^ -444- 
° tassia whose ea +me + while he was at Berlin Williams could neither 
forget nor forgive. "She is Williams reported "not only convinced 
thatLthe King of Prussia is the natural and formidable enemy to Russia, 
MI find she hates him personally". Williams succumbed without 
Hesitation. His personal vanity was flattered and no ambassador could 
reject advances from Elizabeth's apparent successor, especially when 
the health of the Empress was so precarious. 
1 Catherine's Memoirs 94 gives information as to the amount of 
her debts. 
2 Williams to Holderness, Separate and Most Secret, 21 September/ 
2 October. 
i Orders were sent to him on 18 November to ingratiate himself 
with "the apparent successors to the Russian throne ". 
CHAP'l'ER XI. 
Europe: the Anglo- Russian treaty and the Diplomatic Revolution 
(April 1755-May 1756) 
Beginnings of the rapprochement between Britain and Prussia - 
Breach between Britain and Austria - Importance of the Russian 
treaty of subsidy for British plans - Views of the British and 
Hanoverian ministers as to the use to be made of it - Newcastle 
forestalls parliamentary opposition to the treaty by bringing Fox 
into the Cabinet - Parliamentary debates on the treaty - British 
overtures to Prussia - Attitude of Frederick II - He attempts to 
mediate between Britain and France - He accepts the British over- 
tures to preserve the peace of Germany - Signature of the conventio 
of Westminster - The British government attempts to reconcile 
Austria and Prussia - Austria pushes on her negotiation with France 
French indignation at Prussian desertion - Fredericka independent 
attitude towards France and gradual rapprochement with Britain - 
Austria and France conclude the first treaty of Versailles - Its 
terms and their significance - Divergent views of Austria and 
France. 
 
During the summer and autumn of 1755 the attitude of the British 
government towards the Russian treaty of subsidy had changed complete- 
ly. As the crescendo of offers sent to Petersburg showed, they were 
more eager than ever to have the treaty signed and ratified, but they 
proposed to employ it in.a way entirely different from that contem- 
plated in April 1755. The originator of the new policy was appar- 
ently Newcastle. When Keith reported Austria's "flat" refusal1 to 
send reinforcements to the Low Countries until some general plan of 
campaign was formed, Newcastle realised more clearly than Holderness 
and his other colleagues that this was virtually Austria's last word 
"Holderness writes to Keith" Newcastle wrote "to insist upon their 
sending 25,000 or 30,000 men into Flanders. He might as well whistle. 
- they won't send a man till our treaty with Russia is upon the point 
of being made and a general plan formed ". Just at this time, when 
Newcastle realised that Austrian assistance against France could be 
bought - if at all - only at a monopoly price, the king of Prussia 
took the first step towards a rapprochement with George II by asking 
for an interview with him. George II was not yet ready to grant the 
request, but, in alarm at the Austrian refusal to send troops into the 
Netherlands,3 he allowed his ministers to make a gracious reply and to 
arrange that a salute should be fired as the king of Prussia passed 
Hanover on his return from Amsterdam. This Prussian feeler su'ggestedi' 
to Newcastle that if Austria continued to be recalcitrant some under- 
standing might be reached with Prussia. Consequently when Austria 
gave her definitive reply to Britain's appeal for help this possibil- 
:ity influenced the decision of the Cabinet. 
The conditions on which Austria was willing to come to Britain's 
1 Iolderness to Newcastle 28 May in Add. MSS 32855 f. 236. 
2 Newcastle to Yorke private 30 May in Add. MSS 32855 f. 256. 
3 "I never saw the King more uneasy than at this event ": Holder - 




were indeed "very burdensome to England- 
"2 
- so burdensome 
that Hardwicke believed that Kaunitz intended them to be refused. 
"The answer to the King" he wrote` "is indeed very extraordinary. 
They will send 20,000 men into the Netherlands provided certain things 
are done which they know will never be done ". He doubted,however, 
whether Austria was in earnest and suspected that her real intention 
was to extort subsidies from Britain as the price of assistance. 4 
Holderness, the minister in attendance at Hanover, regarded the Aus- 
trian answer as not entirely impracticable; but, acting on Newcast1.ets 
hints, he showed to the King "the difficulty if not impossibility of 
"bringing to bear the extensive scheme lately thrown out [by Kaunitz] 
"and consequently the necessity of cultivating the least good disposi- 
":tion in the King of Prussia, and [his] representations [had] not 
"been ill -received ".5 The Cabinet meantime had decided that it would 
not, at the request of Austria, transform the colonial struggle with 
France into a general European war, but would concentrate on the mari- 
time aspect of the struggle and limit its continental activities to 
providing for the defence of Hanover by a system of subsidy treaties. 
The main reason for the British refusal to accept the Kaunitz plan 
was its expense, but the fact that Austria virtually demanded their 
assistance against Prussia in exchange for help against France exer- 
cised hardly less influence on their decision. When Keith, with the 
comment that the court of Vienna "have the King of Prussia always in 
1 The gist of the Austrian ultimatum with lengthy quotations is 
given in Coxe: Austria III 357 -9. 
2 Holderness to Newcastle 29 June in Add. MSS 32856 f. 348. 
3 Hardwicke to Newcastle 5 July in Add. LffSS 32856 f. 484. 
4 Holderness shared this opinion: "England must bear the burden 
"of the expense [of the Austrian scheme and the] House of Austria 
"must in the end have a pecuniary assistance from thence ". Hol- 
:derness to Newcastle 29 June (second letter) in Add. MSS 32856 
f. 378. 
5 Holderness to Newcastle 9 July second P.S. entre nous in Add. 
MSS 32856 f. 601. 
6 Newcastle to Holderness 11 July in Add. MSS 32857 f. 1; Cabinet 
Minute dated 30 July in Add. MSS 35870 f. 254. 
;1 
3. 
"their eye ", reported that Kaunitz had remarked to him that the 
balance of power had been upset "by the rise of Prussia: Russia was 
"necessary to restore it: he [Y.aunitz] seemed even to think that 
"this was but a palliatory remedy and that nothing would work a per- 





commented that this was "a pretty remarkable expression ";2 and sub- 
:sequently Holderness in a despatch to Williams3 informed him that 
"if the Court of Vienna did ever entertain hopes that His 
"Majesty would ever have joined in so wild and extravagant a view 
"as that of making the destruction of the King of Prussia's power 
"the condition upon which the House of Austria would have afforded 
"their assistance to the Maritime Powers against France it was high 
"time they should be undeceived. "4 
The decision of the British government to abandon the continent was 
in complete accordance with popular opinion in England. "Sea war, 
no continent, no subsidy &as) almost the universal language ".5 The 
decision of the ministers to conform their action to public opinion 
had, however, been due not to popular clamour, but chiefly to the 
extent of the Austrian demands. The leading ministers still cher- 
:ished the hope of a modification of the Austrian ultimatum whicl, . 
would enable them to reverse their decision. The conclusion of the 
Russian treaty was vital from this point of view. "We can do no- 
":thing without the Dutch, the Dutch nothing without the Austrians, 
"nor the Austrians anything without the Russians. When we are mas- 
":ters of the latter we may take the part we Please ".6 
If, however, the rupture with Austria became definitive, the Russian 
treaty was even more essential. It could be used as a threat to 
1 Keith. to Newcastle private 22 May in Add. MSS 32855 f. 100. 
2 Newcastle to Holderness 6 June in Add. MSS 32855 f. 353b. 
3 Holderness to Williams 6 February 1756. 
4 Cf. Pol. Corr. XI 328. 
5 Newcastle to Holderness entre nous 25 July in Add. MSS 32857 
f. 362b. 
6 Robinson to Newcastle 27 July (misplaced under June) in Add.LISS 
32856 f. 268. 
4. 
induce Prussia to refrain from attacking Hanover and was the only 
weapon which offered the least chance of success; while, if it failed 
to restrain Prussia and avert the continental war, the prompt inter- 
vention of Russia was the only hope of a successful defence of Han- 
:over against the combined forces of France and Prussia. In the hope 
that leisure would bring with it reflection, Newcastle decided to 
return no answer to the Austrian project and to concentrate on the 
alternative policy of negotiating with. Prussia. His scheme is clear - 
:ly outlined in a letter to Múñchausen:1 
"Le Roi de Prusse craint par dessus toutes choses la Russie et 
"l'accomplisement de notre traité avec elle. Ce traite "une fois 
"fait, ne peut on faire sentir au Roi de Prusse qu'en cas que Sa 
"Majesté Prussienne ne prenne pas aucune part dans la guerre entre 
"l'Angleterre et la France; et qu'elle ne permet pas que les états 
"allemands du Roi fussent attaqués en consequence de ces brouilleries:] 
"les trouppes que Sa Majesté est en droit de demander en vertue de 
"son traits' avec la Russie ne seront point requises: mais tout res- !) 
":tera a cet egard sur le pied ou il est a present. On epa rgnera par 1 
la la dépense immense des trouppes russes si elles etoient a notre 
"solde: et on procur -eroit (à ce que me semble) unes-arete la plus 
"solide et la plus reelle pour les états allemands du Roi ...." 
Pltúnchausen and Steinberg before they received this letter had already 
written to Newcastle2 suggesting vaguely that the only hope of saving 
Hanover was "disposer le Roi de Prusse à un activité en faveur de ces 
"pals" and therefore warmly welcomed Newcastle's proposal,3 which 
was equally approved by the leading members of the British cabinet. 
Robinson's only doubt was whether, if Prussian inactivity was secured 
by the promise not to use Russian auxiliaries, Britain would have 
sufficient troops to defend Hanover against France.4 Granville 
"approved so much that he said [at a Cabinet meetina that if we could 
'keep the King of Prussia quiet for one year only it would be worth 
"everything to ús ". Hardwicke approved also in principle, but pointed 
1 25 July in Add. MSS 32857 f. 348. 
2 26 July in Add. MSS 32857 f. 376. 
3 Münchausen to Newcastle 2 August in Add. MSS 32857 f. 514; 
Newcastle to Hardwicke 15 August in Add. MSS 35415 f. 40b. 
4 Robinson to Newcastle 27 July in Add. MSS 32856 f. 268. 
5 Newcastle to Holderness entre nous 1 August in Add. MSS 32857 
f. 506. The addition of Prussia to the old system had long 
been the idée fixe of Granville's policy (W. Bentinck's note 
in Archives II 281). 
t; 
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out practical difficulties: - 
"I am anxious about [the Russian] treaty in our present circumstances. 
I don't see how we can do withoia.t it ob' with it. When it is finished 
it will be made the foundation of further schemes on the continent of 
which the whole expence will be thrown upon England. How this can be 
accepted I know not and yet if it should become necessar to make the 
requisition it will be thought a prodigious burden for y defence of 
Hanover merely. I therefore extremely wish that some such scheme 
could take place as Your Grace has hinted to Múïnchausen and yet I fear 
for the practicability. The King of Prussia may lye by and yet France 
may send such a force that way as may strike so much terror that ye 
King may insist on ye requisition being made. On the other hand may 
not the Czarina be revolted or disgusted when she hears such a private 
bargain is struck up with the King of Prussia; for she certainly 
flatters herself with the expectation that the great subsidy of 
500,000£ p.a. will come into her coffers ".l 
Holderness, whose opinions were of weight at this time since he was 
the link between the King at Hanover and the Cabinet in London, still 
2 
hankered on 30 July after the acceptance of the Austrian plan, but, 
after receiving full details of Newcastle's plan he gave a hint of it 
3 4 
to Colloredo and Flemmingiand added his voice to the approving chorus: - 
"...I quite agree in opinion with Yoietr Grace that no better use could 
be made of the Russian Treaty in the present circumstances I say in the 
present circumstances because if there had been any possibility of 
engaging England in great and wise schemes for the continent I could 
not have approved thisstep but-FEg moment we cannot make up our matters 
with Vienna the only thing left is to keep -rerms with. Prussia. It 
seems of the utmost importance in order to bring this to bear that the 
secret of our coldness with Vienna should be strictly kept. I have 
therefore pressed the King to look more favourably upon Colloredo: 
if His Prussian Majesty thinks us still well with our old friends he 
must see the possibility of his having the two Empresses and Saxony 
upon his back at a time and will the more readily hear reason when he 
has much to fear and little to hope from a general crash " 5 
Accordingly,on British initiative,a serious negotiation was opened at 
Hanover for an understanding with Prussia to localise the war by the 
exchange of a formal guarantee of each other's dominions in Germany. 
While Holderness was carrying on this negotiation with Prussia, 
Newcastle exerted himself to undermine in advance the Parliamentary 
1 Hardwicke to Newcastle 28 July in Add. MSS 32857 f 396 
2 Holderness to Newcastle entre nous 30 July in Add MSS 32857 f446 
3 Beer Hist. Zeitschrift. XXVII 329 -32. 
4 Geheimn Aise I 239 -42. 
5 Holderness to Newcastle 2 August entre nous (2) in Add. MSS 
32857 f 555. 
6. 
1 
opposition to the proposed suThdidy treaty with Russia. The choice 
2 
lay between Pitt and Fox. Newcastle, on had terms with Fox, 
attempted at first to secure the support of Pitt by the promise of a 
3 
place in the Cabinet, but Pitt proved quite intractable in his 
4 5 
opposition to the Russian treaty. Fox was more accomodating and 
came into the Ministry as Secretary of State for the Southern 
6 
department in place of Sir T. Robinson, a professional diplomatist, 
who in his eighteen months' tenure of the secretaryship had proved a 
competent bureaucrat but had gained lasting notoriety owing to the 
feebleness of his powers as a speaker in the Fouse of Commons. Fox's 
prowess as a debater in the Commons gave the government a suptcrt 
there which it badly needed and made practically certain the passing 
7 
of the Russian treaty of subsidy. 
Although despatched by Williams on 2 October the treaty did not reach 
London until the 31st as the messenger was delayed at Helvoetsluys by 
contrary winds. The treaty being now entirely satisfactory to the 
British government was ratified by the King and the documents required 
for the exchange of ratifications were despatched to Petersburg on 
18 November. On 10 December the debate on the treaty took place in 
8 
both Houses. In the Lords the treaty was passed by 85 votes to 12; 
in the Commons, after a violent altercation between Pitt and the 
government spokesmeniiume Campbell and Fox, the treaty was referred 
1 '`Jalpole; George II II 39 -44. 
2 Yorke II 189 -200 
3 Hardwicke to Newcastle 9 August in Add. MSS 32858 f 74, 
printed in Yorke II 230 ft; Williams Pitt I 265 -6. 
4 Newcastle to Hardwicke 3 September in Ada.-MSS 32858 f 408 
printed in Yorke II 237 ff. The only argument which made 
any impression on him was that Russia would restrain Sweden 
from lending h -r men of war to France (Hardwicke to 
Newcastle 15 September in Add. MSS 32859 f 86) 
5 WalpoleLetters III 351. 
6 V. Newcastle to Lady Katherine Pelham 26 September (in Add. 
MSS 32859 f 219) for an account of Newcastle's motives in 
bringing in Fox and for his way of doing it. 
7 Pol. Corr. -L 326 -7, 363 -4 
8 Reports by West and Stone of the debates in Add. MSS 32861 
f 271 and f 275; Cf H. Digby to Williams 23 December in 
Stowe MSS 263 and also Walpole George II II 103 -38. 
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8. 
subsisting quarrels,and in fact Newcastle, when he first \roached the 
scheme to his colleagues, spoke consistently of "present management for 
be 
the King of Prussia: The overtures were however too tempting to /put 
aside without mature deliberation, and the more Frederick considered 
2 
them the more attractive they seemed. Their attraction lay in the 
chance which they offered of preventing the Franco- British struggle 
from extending to continental Europe - a danger constantly in 
3 
Frederick's mind from the end of 1754. After the war of the Austrian 
succession Prussia needed time to recuperate and was for the time being 
a satiated state. Frederick was fully occupied not only in incorpora- 
ting Silesia but in developing the administrative and military system 
of Frederick William jwhich was gradually welding a miscellaneous 
collection of scattered estates into a centralised and despotic monarchy. 
4 
to his efficient espionage system, Frederick secured a copy of 
5 
the treaty of the two empresses and discovered that one of its secret 
articles went beyond the bounds of a defensive alliance and was 
definitely directed against himself; subsequent discoveries confirmed 
his belief that Austria, with the connivance of Russia and Saxony was 
merely waiting for a suitable opportunity to declare war upon him and 
renew the struggle for Silesia. Frederick was therefore as anxious to 
avert an Austro- Russian attack upon his dominions as his uncle George 
6 
IIwas to preserve Hanover from attack by Prussia. Should the Franco - 
British struggle spread to the continent Prussia would be faced with a 
choice of evils. If she supported France she would be open to attack on 
all sides - by the Russians on the east, the Austrians and Saxons on the 
south, the Hanoverians and probably other German troops subsidised by 
1 eg. Newcastle to Holderness 
32857 f 506. 
2 Cf. analysis of Frederick's 
3 Pol. Corr. X 485. 
4 Menzel, the Saxon chancery 
of these from April 1752 
were numerous others. 
5 Pol. Corr. IX 328. 
6. Waddington 444. 
entre nous 1 August in Add. MSS 
motives in Lodge 83 -86. 
clerk, was by far the most valuable 
onwards (Pol. Corr. IX 84) but there 
9. 
Britain on the 1 -est, ;hile her coasts might be blockaded and bombarded 
by British and Russian squadrons in the Baltic. In this struggle 
Prussia would be fighting on behalf of an ally in a quarrel which did 
not concern her, and out of which even if she were successful she 
could gain practically nothing. Moreover, Frederick already 
appreciated the decadence of France as a military power which 
Rossbach revealed to the world; the influence of the Pompadour on 
1 
French policy filled him with contempt; and France's inactivity in 
the face of British insults and aggression confirmed his belief in 
2 
the Military weakness and political indecision of his ally. "Never" 
he wrote "would Louis XIV have postponed making a decision in 
deference to. the possible action of an English parliament; on the 
contrary, the English parliament was then obliged to make its 
3 
decisions in consequence of the acts of Louis XIV': France, he 
believed, if war extended to the Continent would probably involve him 
with the Anglo- Imperial coalition, and then abandon him to his fate, 
4 
as he contended she had done in the*Second Silesian war, or at least 
give him inefficient and inadequate support. He was confirmed in 
5 
this belief by Rouill's reply to his suggestion that France should 
occupy Hanover if England extended the war to the Continent. Houille 
replied that if Britain's allies interfered in the war between 
Britain and France, he would expect Prussia to make herself 
responsible for the attack on Hanover. Finally, Frederick had 
always resented the condescending attitude of the French government 
,,Lmards him and would be glad to assert his equality in the alliance 
with France, provided this could be done with safety to the interests 
of Prussia. At this time he was particularly anxious to prove that 
he was not the "slave" of France, since he resented the renewed 
attempts of France to include Saxony in the Franco- Prussian alliance 
1 Pol. Corr. IX 420. 
2 Cf. Tuttle II 244; Pol. Corr. XI 240 -1, 274 -5 etc. 
3 Pol. Corr. XI 375. 
4 Pol. Corr. .XI 144, 232. 
5 Pol. Corr. XI 103 -7, 143 -4, 143 -9. 
10. 
in direct opposition to his declared wishes. 
This alternativethen,was extremely risky and offered little pro- 
spect of gain even if Prussia were successful. But the other 
alternative - to refuse to come to the assistance of France if 
attacked on the Continent - was even less attractive. Firstly, it 
would be a breach of treaty obligations, but this counted for little 
with Frederick. It would also mean in all probability the final 
rupture of the Franco- Prussian alliance, which had proved so useful 
to Prussia but had several times already been strained almost to the 
breaking point by Frederick's selfishness. The rupture of tiuis 
alliance would undermine Prussia's Position in the Empire, and would 
remove the one great obstacle which had hitherto prevented Austria 
and Russia from carrying out their hostile plans against her. 
'Ahichever alternative Frederick chose, ruin stared him in the face. 
1 
Therefore he suddenly became a fanatic for peace and exerted himself 
to the utmost to preserve peace on the Continent. If this could be 
done, he would not need to choose between these two dire alternatives, 
His first idea was that war might be averted by the submission of 
t} e disputes between Britain and France to the joint mediation of 
2 
Austria and Prussia. France would willingly have accepted tbis 
3 
proposal, but it was not at all to the taste of the British govern - 
3 4 
ment; Frederick therefore abandoned it and began to consider serious- 
ly the possibility of reaching an understanding with Britain to keep 
5 
the war out of Germany. As the autumn of 1755 wore on this possi- 
bility seemed more and more to offer Frederick a means of escape from 
1. Pol. Corr. XI 256. 2. Pol. Corr. XI 233. 
3. Pol. Corr. XI 281,293,387. 
4. He proposed after the convention of Westminster to mediate 
alone between Britain and France (Pol. Corr. XII 36,38) and 
the hope of success in this was possibly a subsidiary 
inducement to conclude the convention. 
5. Pol. Corr. XI 287,289,303 etc. 
11. 
1 
his precarious position. He guessed correctly that while the directors 
of French policy wished to avoid continental war, Austria had refused 
to support Britain. There seemed, therefore, at first glance no 
reason why Prussia also should not contribute her share to the localis- 
ation of the conflict, and by reassuring Britain as to her designs on 
Hanover, make practically certain the preservation of continental peace 
and extricate herself from a dangerous situation. 
The renewed British overtures to Prussia after the despatch of the 
British ratifications of the Anglo- Russian treaty were exactly on the 
lines which Frederick desired. Britain and Prussia had now a common 
interest - the preservation of the peace of Germany. The weak conduct 
2 
of the French government, Frederick argued, forced its allies to provide 
for their own security as best they could. A mutual guarantee of their 
territories by Britain and Prussia while it would thwart the schemes of 
the imperial courts and lengthen the faces of the Austrian and Russian 
3 4 
ministers, of whose military preparations he was already informed, and 
5 
thus give Prussia security for the time being at least, need not involve 
the breach of the Franco- Prussian alliance, since Frederick was now 
informed on good authority that France did not propose to extend the 
colonial and maritime struggle to the Continent. Knyphausen wrote from 
Paris: "Le penchant qu'on a ici pour une guerre maritime paraît augmenter 
de jour en jour. Ce parti est .... selui qui est le plus conforme aux 
désirs de la maîtresse, qui craint qu'une guerre de terre n'éloigne le 
6 
Roi de sa personne..." . 
7 
BUnge, the Swedish minister at Versailles, was even more emphatic: 
1. Pol. Corr. XI 377. 2. Pol. Corr. XI 426, 430; XII 62. 
3. Pol. Corr. XI 427,457. 4. Pol. Corr. XI 434,452. 
5. Pol. Corr. XI 453. 6. Pol Corr. XI 267 -8: cf. XI 371. 
7. Bunge to Hópkèn 8 December 
s 
intercepted,in Add. MSS. 32861 f 218. 
12. 
"...the King of France determined from the beginning to have a sea 
war only for the following reasons (1) however successful diversions 
in the Netherlands have been they have not hindered England from 
pursuing her plans (2) land and sea war at once are impracticable 
without exhausting the kingdom of men and money and sea war is 
already inevitable (3) France required her whole strength by sea to 
thwart the aggressive views of England in the colonies (4) once a 
land war was begun it would by degrees spread further an} further 
and France would no longer have it in her power to restore peace 
without being brought under the necessity of going through with an 
expensive war in order to fulfil engagements contracted in the mean- 
time. To which must be added that as all treaties France has with 
other courts are only defensive she might easily be abandoned by her 
allies and thus left to bear the whole load of the war alone "; 
The French government believed that Britain desired a continental 
war, the burden of which apart from subsidies would fall chiefly on 
her allies, since a land war would hamper and distract the energies 
of France from the maritime struggle. They believed also that 
Britain wished to arrange matters so that the appearance of 
aggression would fall upon France and enable her to call upon her 
2 
allies for assistance in a defensive war. Commonsense, therefore 
dictated that France should disappoint the views of her enemy by 
abstaining from continental war. 
Newcastle was delighted to find from intercepted correspondence that 
Prance had no immediate intention of attacking Hanover. Bunge's 
letter in particular, since it was from "the most favoured minister 
and the most favourite court that is now connected with France and 
3 
consequently one which the court of France would not deceive ", 
convinced Vim of Frederick's sincerity and encouraged Ithtm to 
3 
conclude the convention of Westminster. The coldness between 
4 
Austria and Britain, on the other hand, gradually became known, and 
1 These letters and others cited by Waddington (Louis XV 
241 -9) show that, although the French goverinne- nt was 
in its habitual state of irresolution, Knyphausen had 
on the whole correctly gauged the attitude of the 
dominant section. 
2 Waddington 445 -8. 
3 Newcastle to Hardwicke 28 December in Add MSS 32861 f 487. 
4 Holderness to Newcastle entre nous 17 August in Add MSS 
32858 f 191; Pol. Corr. XI 209,236 Etc. 
12 a. 
1 
helped to convince Frederick that Britain was in earnest. After 
reassuring himself on this point, he waited only until he was . 
certain that Britain had actually concluded her subsidy treaty with 
2 
Russia and then intimated to the British government his readiness 
to conclude a convention on the basis already indicated by 
Iolderness. Britain promptly submitted a draft treaty, which 
i ?rederick accepted with one important alteration suggested by 
Podewils - the exclusion of the Low Countries from the area the 
neutrality of which was guaranteed by the convention. Frederick 
3 
had already pointed out how easy it would be for France to conquer 
the Netherlands in a single campaign, and he therefore left France 
free to operate there, if, contrary to his and her own expectations, 
she subsequently desired a land war as well as a sea war. The 
convention, 
1 Pol. Corr. XI 351, 398. 
2 Pol. Corr. XI 387; Waddington Louis XV 154. 
3 Pol. Corr. XI 260. 
13. 
1 
thus modified, was signed at Whitehall on 16 January 1756. It was 
purely an ad hoc agreement to preserve the neutrality of Germany, but 
soon produced effects on the delicate, diplomatic balance which were 
entirely unexpected by the two contracting parties. Frederick had 
2 
always exaggerated Russia's dependence on Britain and France's 
dependence on himself, while both to British and Prussian diplomatists 
the reconciliation of Austria and France seemed an impossibility. 
In Newcastle's view the convention of Westminster was the first step 
towards the addition of Prussia to the Anglo- Imperial alliance, as he 
3 
explained in a letter to W. Bentinck, who had protested that he "did 
not understand [nor conceive to be possible" the "taking in the King 
4 
of Prussia at the same time with Russia" and still more by implication 
with Austria. Hitherto,Newcastle replied, 
"the King of Prussia acts with great fairness....Surely we should make 
the best use of it we can not to destroy the old system but to strength. 
en and maintain it in opposition to its natural enemy France....If now 
Lthe court of Vienna.] will really consul their own interests and not 
their passions and their hauteur our Treaty with Prussia may be a most 
happy thing to them ". 
The arguments with which Newcastle sought to combat the passions and 
hauteur of the court of Vienna are set forth at length in Holderness's 
5 6 
official despatches to Vienna and Petersburg: 
"The Court of Vienna having positively declared that un &ess they were 
secured from the power of His Prussian Majesty in Germany they could 
never think of diminishing the number of their troops actually in those 
parts of their dominions that lay exposed to the attack of that 
formidable power. In what manner then could this be brought about? 
Only by one or other of the following methods, vizt by the joint forces 
of the two Empresses maintained as they must haveen by the money of 
England; or by an amicable proceeding and by finding means to induce 
the King of Prussia to see his true and lasting interests and showing 
him that he might rest in secure and quiet possession of his acquisitims 
by contracting new engagements with or under the influence of great 
Britain. Which of the two of these methods was the most eligible for 
the general good of the common cause it is easy to determine Yet 
1. I have adopted the name convention of Westminster by which the 
treaty is best known. Text in Wenck III 84 ff. and Schaefer 
1 582 -4. 
2. Pol. Corr. VI 118,123. 
3. Newcastle to W. Bentinck 10 February 1756 in Add MSS 32862 f 433. 
4. ? "1. Bentinck to Newcastle 31 October 1755 in Add MSS 32860 f 256. 
5. Holderness to Keith 23 March S.P.F. Germany (Empire). 
6. Holderness to Williams 6 February. 
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in order to be provided against all events and to be enabled to defeat 
such schemes as the King of Prussia might possibly have entered into 
in con. junction with France, the King took those measures with the 
Court of Russia which are now publicly known to the whole world but 
vhich were never meant to be put into execution offensively unless 
necessity should oblige the King to it. And if which is probable the 
apprehensions of the consequences of this treaty have contributed to 
influence His Prussian Majesty's present resolution the continuance and 
existence of that treaty is by the same way of reasoning a pledge for 
the good faith 'gin which His Prussian Majesty will keep his new 
engagements with the King and will be a sure and solid basis for any 
steps that may be taken by the King's allies towards Prussia. It is 
not difficult to conceive that the Court of Vienna might have had other 
hopes from the Rmssian Treaty but had any other use been made of it it 
would no longer have been a pacifick or preventitive measure but on r 
the contrary have immediately drawn on a most dangerous war which if y 
successful Haight indeed have been beneficial to the House of Austria 
but could never have produced any solid advantage to His Majesty or at 
least not sach as could have been in any ways adequate to the immense 
n P 1- ence and hazard of such an u dertaking. And so a exp  s to jealousies 
the Court of Vienna may conceive that there will now be a predilection 
for the Prussian alliance in preference to that with the House of 
Austria and that this new Treaty may have taken place as much from 
pique and resentment as from other motives That Court has been positive- 
ly assured that it was far from being His Majesty's intention to alter 
or diminish his attachment to his antient and natural allies but that 
by the Court of Vienna's own confession the defection of the House of 
Brandenburg from the antient system had so totally altered the face 
of affairs in Europe that the House of Austria found themselves unable 
to take measures for the security of the distant parts of her dominions 
the preservation of which immediately concerned the maritime powers 
unless she could obtain from them a previous security against the 
King of Prussia which would have been both more costly and perhaps more 
precarious than the utmost efforts which have at other times been made 
in a joint and well connected opposition to France. But a predilection 
or preference is widely different from the view of the present alliance 
with Prussia, which is undertaken upon the sane principle that forced 
the 1hing in former times to advise the House of Austria (disagreeable 
as that counsel was) to yield what they could not Defend and without 
which concession the whole had been in the most imminent danger. The 
sane motive that convinced the Court of Vienna of the necessity of 
complying with what was then proposed ought still more strongly to 
operate in the present circumstances and deter them from attempting 
forcibly and unjustly to regain possession of a territority which by 
repeated treaties has been confirmed to a prince whose power they 
respect to such a degree as scarce to venture to vindicate their own 
rights against France or comply with their former engagements with . 
those powers to whom they owe.more than it is necessary to mention. 
The present Treaty with the King of Prussia puts them in a possibility 
of repairing that breach in the system of Europe which the union 
between France and Prussia had so fatally made; and they may now with 
out running any risk of being attacked in Germany detach some consider- 
able reinforcements into the Low Countries as has been fully explained 
to them but if they will still look upon that Prince as their irrecon- 
ciliable enemyjand act towards him as such, they cannot wonder that His 
ñajesty should decline joining in views which must carry ruin and 
inevitable destruction with them." 
Such arguments as these were more calculated to offend than to 
conciliate 
the Austrian court. That two electors should, without 
15. 
previous consultation with the Emperor,, take it upon themselves to 
arrange for the peace of the Empire was in itself regarded as an insult 
1 
by the haughty court of Vienna. Moreover, the arguments of -the British 
government showed a complete misunderstanding of the attitude and aims 
of Austria. 
Raunitz, receiving no repl 
2 
o his conditional acceptance of British 
3 
demands, had in August 1755 opened negotiations with France, but these 
negotiations had made little progress and in January 1756 were practi- 
tally at a deadlock owing to France's refusal to renounce her alliance 
with Prussia. VIhen the convention of 'estminster was known at 
Versailles it provoked an outburst of indignation, which mddified 
considerably the attit1de of the French government towards Kaunitz's 
overtures. It was in vain that Frederick contended that he had 
concluded the convention in the interests of France, since it would 
prevent the Russian auxiliaries and a large part of the Austrian 
5 
armies from acting against her, or at least crushing her allies in the 
uipire. He pointed out also that he had carefully refrained from 
hampering French action' in the Netherlands - the obvious field on 
which France could obtain compensation for defeat in the maritime and 
6 
colonial struggle. 
The key to France's indignation at the convention of Westminster is to 
be found in a conversation between Rouillé and Knyphausen a few days 
i 
before news of the convention arrived at Versailles. Rouille stated 
that at present France had no intention of acting in Germany and agreed. 
that an attack on Hanover would be a very difficult operation, 
.]_though he added that failure at sea might render necessary some 
1. Pol. Corr. XII 325. 
2. "Ever since the end of June last I have had no more to do in 
business with the ministers of this court than with the 
officers of the Seraglio at Constantinople ": Keith to 
Williams 29 November in Add MSS 35492 f 83. 
3. Arneth IV 383 -97; Broglie: L'alliance autrichienne 172 -87. 
4. Waddington Louis XV 308. 
5. Pol. Corr. XII 8 -9, 49 -50; cf. Luynes XIV 401; Argenson LX 181. 
6. Pol. Corr. XI 455. 
16. 
military operations in Germany and that it would be extremely 
humiliating for France to have her hands tied in this matter by 
conventions between Britain and the princes of Germany. The con- 
clusion drawn from this conversation by Knyphausen was that France, 
If properly approached, would consent to stipulations for the 
1 
neutrality of the Empire. France's objections were to the method 
of Frederick's conclusion of the convention without consultation 
2 2 
with her rather than to the terms of the convention. 
3 
Although French ministers were careful to conceal their indignation = r 
except very foolishly/from Austria - the convention appeared equival- 
ent in the eyes of Europe to the base desertion of France by her one 
4 
important ally. The Franco- Prussian alliance was about to expire 
and the French government had announced that the duc de Nivernois, 
an envoy of exalted rank specially selected as a compliment to 
5 
Frederick would go to Berlin to discuss the renewal of the treaty of 
5 
alliance. Nivernois arrived at Berlin just in time to-_receive from 
Frederick the draft of the convention of Westminster, accompanied by 
the information that it was in all probability already signed; and 
he was thus placed in a ludicrous position which offended the pride 
6 
of France. Moreover) Rouille argued that Prussia had no legal right 
to make the convention while Britain was waging an offensive war 
upon France; since, even if the treaty of 1741 was on the point of 
expiry, the tripartite treaty of defensive alliance of 1747 between 
Prance, Prussia, and Sweden was still in force, while the secrecy 
w?ith which the convention had been concluded led him to suspect the 
7 
existence of secret articles attached to the convention. 
1. Pol. Corr. XII 71, 94 -5. 
2. Pol. Corr. XII 105 -6, 116; Lodge 85 -6. 
3. Bunge to H8pken intercepted 31 January in Add MSS 32862 f 299; 
cf. Pol. Corr. XII 117 -9. 
4. Pol. Corr. XI 170 etc. 
5. Tuttle II 252 -3. Full details of Nivernois's mission in 
Lucien Perey: Un petit -neveu de Mazarin. 
B. Pol Corr. XII 9471-V4. 
7. Pol. Corr. XII 116,159, 161. 
17. 
Naturally therefore, in order to preserve the dignity of France, the 
1 
French ministers after considerable hesitation quietly dropped the 
2 
negotiation for the renewal of the treaty of 1741, on the ground that 
4 
the triple alliance of 1747 remained in force. That the negotiation 
eras not ostentatiously broken off was a tribute to the strength, even 
after the convention of Westminster, of the Prussian party at 
5 
',rersailles, headed by Argenson, Belleisle, and curiously enough 
Thrernois, the ambassador whom Frederick was accused of insulting 
Frederick, even after he saw that his convention had seriously 
impaired his intimate relations with France, was too proud to disarm 
French resentment by adopting a submissive and apologetic attitude. 
He adopted instead a defiant attitude, arguing that (1) he was legally 
entitled to do what he had done, (2) he had made the convention in the 
interests of France, thus implying that he stood at least on equal 
terms with his ally in the alliance, and (3) if France did not like 
the convention and broke off her alliance with him, he would have to 
avoid isolation by transforming the entente with Britain into an 
7 
alliance. Further, he insisted upon what must have been a sore point 
rith the French government that while he had tried according to his 
lights to help France, their other allies, and particularly Spain, 
pad shown no disposition whatever to come to France's assistance. 
aunitz was fully informed of the dissatisfaction of France with her 
Prussian ally, and was encouraged to reject the British attempts to 
grin his approval of the convention of Westminster. He argued that 
1 See Valori's instructions in Waddington 472 -4; Cf. Valori I 
39-40. 
2 Cf. Bernis' remarks to Stahremberg, cited in Waddington 
Louis XV 315. 
3 In April Valori at Berlin suggested the renewal of this 
treaty, probably without orders from his government. The 
proposal was shelved by Frederick (Pol. Corr. XII 259 -60). 
4 Pol. Corr XII 161 -2. 
5 Pol. Corr. XII 119. 
6 Pol. Corr. XII 145 -6. 
7 Pol. Corr. XII 56 -7. 
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to Austria the promise of Prussian neutrality was a snare and a 
delusion, since as soon as Austria had moved part of her troops into 
the Netherlands, Frederick would throw off the mask and attack 
Bohemia. If this fear was real and not assumed it was far out- 
weighed in Kaunitz's mind by advantages of which he was careful to 
say nothing to Britain._ Privately he declared that the convention 
1 
was a decisive event for the salvation of Austria, since it would 
greatly facilitate the creation of the anti -Prussian coalition for 
which he had worked since 1749. He sent on the British note explainin 
the convention of Westminster to Russia, with the comment that 
2 
Britain was clearly useless as an ally against Prussia, in order to 
alienate Russia from Britain and poovide additional justification for 
his rapprochement with France. At the French court Stahremberg worked 
zealously to rouse the abger of the French government still further 
at the convention of Westmins tGr, and to win the active support of 
France for the anti -Prussian coalition. He failed, however,in this 
object, and during Bernis' illness it seemed not unlikely that the 
3 
Austro- French negotiation would break down completely; ultimately, 
thanks to the desire of the French government and particularly of 
Louis XV,to avenge the humiliation which they believed had been 
iì.flieted on France by the convention of j'estmins tern and to the 
Austrian threat that, if France entirely rejected her overtures, she 
4 
would join with the enemies of France, the first treaty of Versailles 
5 
was signed on 1 May 1756. This trPatjr consisted of two distinct 
conventions. The first was closely modelled on the convention of 
Westminster. Austria promised to remain neutral in the Franco - 
British war, while France agreed to refrain from attacking any of the 
1 Arneth IV 419. 
2 Pol. Corr XII 382. 
3 Waddington Louis 1XV 322. 
4 . Bernis I 264; Broglie; L'alliance autrichienne 338- 42,368 -9. 
5 Text (but without the secret articles) in Wenck III 139 -47. 
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Empress- O?Ueen's dominions. The second instrument went further than 
the convention of Westminster, since it was a formal treaty of 
defensive alliance, b hich if one of the contracting, parties were 
attacked in its European possessions, the other would send to its 
assistance a corps of 24,000 men. From the casus foederis of this 
second convention the Franco- British war was expressly excepted. 
Five secret articles were attached to this treaty, three of which are 
of importance. Article I provided that the casus foéderis would arise 
for Austria if one of Britain's allies attacked France even as an 
auxiliary, presumably referring to Prussian assistance to Britain 
under the terms of the convention of Westminster, to resist a French 
2 
attack on .Hanover. By the third article, in order to render permanent 
the good understanding between them, France and Austria agreed to 
continue negotiations for the completion of the work of the congress 
of Aix -la- Chapelle and settle finally all territorial and other dis- 
putes which were dangerous to the peace of Europe and in particular 
to the tranquillity of Italy. The fourth secret article placed 
difficulties in the way of the renewal of the Franco- Prussian alliance, 
since each party bound itself neither to make nor to renew any treaties 
without the consent of the other. Eone or these articles hsup_Jorts the 
contention that France had been won over to connive at an attack by the 
imperial courts upon Prussia. Doubtless France, according to article 
Ivould have welcomed Austrian assistance had she been 'coripelled at 
some future date by failure at sea to attack Hanover and had Frederick 
assisted Britain; but this has no bearing on a proposed attack by 
Austria, Russia, and France upon Prussia. The terms of Article III 
Provide positive proof of divergence between Austria and France, since 
the main feature of the treaty of Aix, confirmed by the article had beer 
the European rQco,gnition of the incorporation of Silesia in Prussia) 
Text in Schaefer I 584 -5. 
Tuttle II 270 n. 
20. 
and the main territorial dispute which endangered European peace was 
the desire of Austria to recover Silesia. The two parts of this clause 
were, therefore, inconsistent with each other. Probably for France the 
real point of the third article was the reference to Italy which 
implied some kind of establishment in the Netherlands for Don Philip, 
the husband of Louis XV's favourite daughter. 
Ratever differences of opinion there may be as to the ultimate signifi- 
cance of the terms of the first treaty of Versailles, there can be . no 
doubt that for the time being it registered the failure of Kaunitz to 
secure the active participation of France in the anti -Prussian coal- 
ition. More than this, the treaty of Versailles was based on a 
misunderstanding between the contracting parties. Louis XV, the 
Pompadour, and the leading French ministers all regarded it as complete 
in itself, and as securing the peace of Europe so far as France was 
concerned, although they were willing to consider Austria's offers for 
French neutrality in a war between Prussia and the two imperial courts, 
and, had these offers been high enough, they might very probably have 
accepted them. To Kaunitz, on the other hand, the first treaty of 
Versailles was a mere milestone on the road to war. It was valuable 
to him chiefly because it registered the breach of the Franco- Prussian 
alliance, and assured to Austria the support of France as an auxiliary 
if Prussia attacked Austria. From this to the promise of French 
neutrality if Austria attacked Prussia did not seem a great step to 
Kaunitz, since a diplomatist of his ability and caution need never fight 
an "offensive" war, and Kaunitz therefore was not prepared to pay much 
for what he regarded as a thing of little value. What he needed and 
intended to get was the promise of the active participation of France, 
bYpaying subsidies and sending auxiliaries, in the projected attack 
upon Prussia. That this manifest divergence of ideas did not prove 
fatal to the Austro- French alliance was due rather to the folly of 
aunitz's antagonist, Frederick of Prussia, than to his own diplomatic 
ability, but it is to the credit of the Austrian negotiators that 
21. 
at the moment the first treaty of Versailles was signed they had 
accurately estimated the king of Prussia's character and foresaw the 
probability of his mistakes. "We will succeed" Stahremberg wrote 
"sooner or later in our great scheme and perhaps the king of Prussia 
1 
himself will be our most effective helper ". 
1 Cited in Broglie: L'alliance autrichienne 361. Cf. the 
conversation of Kauritz with Flemming in Poi. Corr. XIII 
152. 
CHAPTER XII. 
Petersburg: Russia's attitude towards the Diplomatic 
Revolution (October 1755- August 1756) 
" La marche des événements en Russie, pleine de contra- 
dictions et d'imprévu, était une véritable énigme pour les cabinets 
de l'Europe. Les décisions les plus importantes dépendaient de 
tant de facteurs d'un poids si variable, qu'il était difficile d'en 
démêlerr es motifs et encore plus d'en prévoir les suites. L'état 
de sante de la souveraine, ses fantaisies, les intrigues d'anti- 
chambre ou d'alcove, la venalite bien commue des fonctionnaires les 
plus haut placés, les intéréts privés de toute sorte et de tout 
ordre, étaient autant de considerations dont il fallait tenir 
compte, autant de causes qui agissaient sur la boussole politique 
de la cour de Pétersbourg, et qui en faisaient constamment changer 
la direction ". 
R. Waddington: Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances pp 507 -8. 
Hostility of the Russian court to Prussia - Beginnings of the 
rapprochement between France and Russia - Delays in the exchange of 
the ratifications of the convention of 30 September at Petersburg - 
Underlying causes of this delay - Bestuzhev extorts the consent of 
the Empress - The declaration secretissime - Ambiguity of the 
convention - Divergent interpretations of Britain and Russia - 
Reception of the convention of Westminster at Petersburg - 
Bestuzhev remains loyal to Britain - His motives - Attitude of the 
;I 
Shuvalovs and the Vice Chancellor - Anger of the Empress - The'anti- 
Prussian resolutions of the state councils of March - Austrian 
overtures to Russia for an attack on Prussia - Britain demands the 
suppression of the declaration secretissime - Second visit of the 
French agent Douglas to Petersburg - Bektyeev's mission to France - 
Partial success of Douglas's negotiation - Newcastle's plans to 
recover Russia - Holderness refuses to receive the declaration 
secretissime but offers to open a fuesh negotiation for Russian 
assistance against France - Decline of Bestuzhev's power - Attitude 
of Kaunitz to the Russian rep l to his overtures - The divergence 
between France and Austria and the unreliability of Russia compel 
him to postpone acceptance of the Russian offers and to moderate 
the anti- Prussian zeal of the Russian government - Cessation of 
Russia's military and naval preparations - Russian dissatisfaction 
with the first treaty of Versailles - Revival of the Great 
Chancellor's influence - His plan of operations - Danger to Franco - 
Russian rapprochement from civil strife in Sweden - Newcastle 
summons Russia to choose between Britain and Austria - Weakness of 
and division of opinion in the Russian government - Indolence and 
irresolution of the Empress - Political influence of the young court- 
The Grand Duchess acts as a British agent and keeps the peace 
betleen Bestuzhev and Williams for the time being - 7illiams seeks 
to reconcile Russia and Prussia and warns Frederick not to take the 
offensive. 
Between the signing of the subsidy treaty and the arrival of the 
British ratifications two important events occurred at Petersburg. 
In October a series of Councils were held at which the Empress and 
the Grand Duke were present. 
1 
The Councils took as the basis of 
their proceedings, the advice given to the Empress by the Senate of 
14 May 1753 - that Russia should oppose further increase of Prussian 
power and take the first opportunity to reduce Prussia to impotence. 
After prolonged discussion it was unanimously decided in principle 
to take the first opportunity to reduce the over great power of 
Prussia; and, to render Russian intervention rapid and decisive, 
elaborate plans of campaign_ were drawn up and arrangements made to 
establish magazines for provisioning an army of 80,000 men near the 
Prussian frontier. 
2 
The other event was the arrival of a certain I, . Douglas, who travel- 
:led ostensibly for the sake of his health and claimed to be a rela- 
tion of the earl of Morton. He was in fact a Jacobite exile and an 
agent of the French government, and the object of his visit to Peter- 
sburg was to explore the possibilities of the restoration of normal 
relations between France and Russia.3 With an effrontery which com- 
pels admiration he called on Williams4 and asked to be presented 
at court. Williams, however, was on his guard, civilly refused 
the request, and prevented Douglas from being presented to the Em- 
:press by the Swedish minister to whom he had introductions from 
Paris. Williams had his visitor well watched during the remainder 
of his short stay at Petersburg and warned the Great Chancellor 
1 Williams to Holderness 7, 11, 18 October. 
2 Williams to Holderness 25 October; Pol. Corr. XI 430 -1, 
439 -40; XII 220. 
3 Interrupted since 1748: Ra.mbaud II 15. 
4 Williams to Holderness 7 October, 2 December; Letter from 
Douglas in A.E. Russia, supplément 8, f. 87. 
2. 
against him, but could not prevent Douglas from forming a liaison 
with the Vice Chancellor 1 which was soon to bear fruit. 
On 11 December the British ratifications arrived at Petersburg2 and 
Williams at once informed the Great Chancellor that he was ready to 
exchange ratifications. At first it seemed that there would be no 
delay - all that was required to complete the transaction was the 
signature of the Empress. Curiously enough the Empress suffered a 
series of mishaps, all of which - still more curiously - affected 
her right hand and prevented her from signing the necessary docu- 
ments. A few days before the arrival of ratifications she had 
fallen downstairs and bruised her right shoulder 3 Then she "catched 
"a violent rheumatism which is very unluckily fallen into her right 
"arm'' .4 A few days later, while the Empress was in the grand ducal 
nursery, the pole by which the cradle was suspended fell down and 
would have hit the Empress on the head, had she not, with great 
presence of mind parried the blow with her right arm! 
5 
When on 31 December `Jilliams was summoned to a conference with 
the chancellors he discovered that it was not to exchange rati- 
fications but to receive a paper.6 The Empress wished to know 
what Britain would do if the king of Prussia took part in the 
Franco- British war by attacking one of Britain's allies. What 
forces did Britain have to assist the ally who was attacked ? 
Would Britain then be prepared to attack the king of Prussia 
in his own territories ? and with what forces ? Similar 
questions were addressed to Esterhazy on the same day. Williams 
brusquely refused to enter into any of these questions until after 
the exchange of ratifications, although he indicated that in 
1 A.E. Russie Mémoires et documents V f. 172; Poniatowski 149. 
2 Williams to Holderness 12 December. 
3 Williams to Holderness 11 November, 30 December. 
4 Williams to Holderness 27 December. 
5 Williams to Holderness 30 December: "Though yesterday was her 
"birthday her subjects had not the honour of kissing her hand 
as usual since even that must have given Her Imperial Majesty 
some pain". 
6 Appended to Williams's despatch to Holderness 
of 19 February: 
(Paper No. 1). 
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principle he found no serious objection to the Russian Note. 
i 
These inquiries and the holding of the Privy Council show clearly 
that the Empress, who had been "jockeyed" by Bestuzhev into accept- 
ance of the subsidy treaty of 30 September, had not even yet decided 
to conclude the convention and wished to have assurances of British 
support against Prussia. She was not satisfied with the conditions 
on which the subsidy was promised by the treaty of 30 September, 
and the French party at court animated by Douglas's mission, short 
and apparently unsuccessful as it had been, eagerly attacked the 
treaty. It was, they said, dishonourable to the Empress to sell 
her troops for a subsidy like a German princeling. They played on 
her resentment of the manner in which the Maritime Powers had 
treated the Russian auxiliaries in 1748 and had failed to secure 
Russia's representation at the congress of Aix- la- Chapelle.2 They 
aroused the Empress's amour propre by pointing out that the treaty 
had been printed in the Dutch Gazettes before she had given it her 
august ratification. 
3 
They pointed out that the terms of the 
treaty of subsidy did not specifically limit the employment of 
Russian troops to a diversion against Prussia. Above all, they 
argued, was it not foolish, just when Douglas's mission proved the 
good disposition of France towards Russia - to involve herself in 
British hostility to France ? This argument had great weight with 
the Empress who had always been anxious to establish good relations 
with France. 
Even the Great Chancellor wished to learn how the treaty had been 
received by the English Parliament before ratifying it,4 and was 
dissatisfied that the additional £100,000 had not been granted, nor 
the first instalment of subsidy remitted to Petersburg.5 It was 
1 Solovev XXIII 308. 
2 Pol. Corr. XII 262. 
3 Pol. Corr. XII 172. 
4 Pol. Corr. XI 431. 
5 Pol. Corr. XII 66 -8. 
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apparently during the discussions on these points between Bestuzhev 
and Williams, of which Williams says nothing in his despatches, 
that the first open divergence between them occurred. Williams, 
according to Funcke, tried to get over the difficulties by assuring 
Bestuzhev that his friend Fox would soon be at the head of the Bri- 
:tish government and everything would then be nut right. The false- 
:ness of Williams's prophecies awakened the lasting distrust of the 
Great Chancellor.1 Even after these difficulties had been overcome 
the Russian ratification of the treaty was delayed from week to 
week owing to the intrigues of the French party and the notorious 
aversion of the Empress to business. When Williams's patience was 
exhausted the Great Chancellor had one of his convenient illnesses2 
and employed his leisure in drawing up a memorandum for the Empress 
in which he boldly denounced the intrigues of his enemies, which had 
delayed the ratification of the convention, and threatened resigna- 
:tion if the Empress did not soon ratify it. He appealed partly to 
Elizabeth's vanity, exaggerating the importance which Russia had 
gained among the Powers, thanks to the Empress and Great Chancellor, 
a 
but chiefly to her hatred of Frederick of Prussia.- To declare 
the convention null and void would cause an open breach between 
Britain and Russia, which would at the very least enable the ene- 
mies of Russia to deprive her of her influence in the general 
affairs of Europe. Finall y Bestuzhev jeered at his colleagues, who 
in the Privy Council and Senate clamoured for the humiliation of the 
king of Prussia and yet opposed the giving of assistance to the king 
of Great Britain, the bitter enemy of Frederick II. 
Once again Bestuzhev had his way - the Empress ordered the two 
chancellors to proceed immediately to the exchange of ratifications. 
1 Pol. Corr. XII 85 -7. 
2 Williams to Holderness 20 January. 
3 Extracts in Martens IX 186 -8; Cf. Pol. Corr. XII 151. 
4 This he actually stimulated by private arrangements that the 
Tsaritsa's ministers should send her false intelligence of the 





that the ambiguity of the convention must 
be removed by the addition of a secret declaration that the Russian 
troops should not be sent to the Rhine, Hanover, or the Low Countries, 
but solely employed in a diversion against Prussia. Accordingly 
when ratifications were exchanged on 12 February,WIlliams was forced . 
to accept a "declaration secretissime ",2 which explained that the 
diversion provided for in the treaty, would only be made in case of 
a Prussian attack upon His Britannic Majesty, or one of his allies. 
This, the declaration contendediwas the manifest intention of the 
treaty itself. Article VII in particular stated that Russia being 
particularly interested in preserving the tranquillity of the North, 
and the status guo in her neighbourhood, and considering also the 
close proximity of the country where the diversion must in all pro- 
bability be made, and the ability of her troops to forage for them- 
selves in the enemy's country, undertakes the sole charge of supply -' 
:ing with munitions, provisions, etc, the troops which are to make 
the diversion. Further, although Britain bound herself to obtain 
if necessary, free passage through Poland for the Russian troops, no 
arrangements were made in the treaty for securing a passage for the 
Russian troops through the Empire as had been done in 1747, and cer- 
tainly ought to have been done if Russian troops were to go to Han- 
over or the Netherlands. Finally,the clauses providing for sea 
transport of 10,000 men in Russian galleys and for the despatch of 
a British squadron to the Baltic strengthen still further the Rus- 
sian case. The British government at first made no attempt to 
answer it, but simply appealed to Bestuzhev to get the declaration 
3 
suppressed. When this failed they had no difficulty in making 
1 Martens IX 188; Williams to Holderness 19 February. 
2 Appended to Williams's despatch of 19 February (Paper No. 2), 
and printed (with verbal differences) in Martens IX 201 -3. 
Williams apparently failed to appreciate the full significance 
of this document: (Williams to Newcastle, private, 
19 February: 
in Add. MSS 32863 f. 25) . 
3 Holderness to Williams 30 March. 
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out a good case for their interpretation of the treaty. They 
pointed out 
1 
that the text of the treaty expressly and repeatedly 
stated that it was an extension of the general treaty of defensive 
alliance of 1742. This implied that the casus foederis would arise 
if any power whatsoever attacked the European possessions of Great 
Britain or (Article V) the electorate of Hanover, if attacked in 
consequence of a British quarrel. 
The greatest share of blame for this unsatisfactory and dangerous 
ambiguity of the convention must rest on Holderness, although New - 
:castle and Williams share the responsibility. The negotiation of 
the treaty had been set on foot solely in view of a possible Prus- 
:scan attack on Hanover. When this original object had been over- 
shadowed by the danger of an attack from France, the text of the 
various articles ought to have been carefully revised. Still more 
when the British government in the summer of 1755 changed completely 
the use it intended to make of the convention, ought it to have con- 
sidered the applicability of the old clauses to the new conditions. 
No such revision was in fact undertaken and the treaty therefore 
bore unmistakable impress of its original motive. Holderness indeed, 
although well aware of the use intended to be made of the treaty by 
Newcastle, made matters still worse by sending to Petersburg the 
second secret and separate article,2 which, although the official 
British interpretation made it inoperative until after the actual 
outbreak of war,3 was interpreted at Petersburg as debarring Britain 
from negotiating, without the full concurrence of Russia, with "the 
"common enemy ", a phrase which, the Russian government said, could 
only mean Prussia, especially as in the negotiation of the treaty , 
1 Holderness to Williams 25 June. 
2 Martens IX 209.Waddington Louis 153, 223, gives a wrong idea 
of its contents by quoting only its second half. 
3 See "General state of the negotiation with the Court of Russia, 
etc." in S.P.F. Russia 61 ad fin. Cf. Holderness to Williams 
25 June. 
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it had frequently been stated in official communications to the 
British government that the objective of the Russian auxiliary 
c'orps would be to attack the king of Prussia.' The contention 
of the British government on this point is, however, probably 
correct, since, as Holderness wrote subsequently to Williams,2 
"there was no war in which Her Imperial Majesty had taken any 
"share, consequently no common enemy; no peace to be made, nor 
"any reason upon earth to be given why His Llajesty should not make 
"such treaties as he thought proper with any prince equally in 
"amity with the Bing and the Empress of Russia ". 
The root of the trouble between Britain and Russia goes much deeper 
than a mere difference in the interpretation of words. The British 
government, disguise it as they might, had completely altered their 
attitude in the course of 1755. In April they had instructed :"il- 
:liams to convince Russia that she "would be no better than an 
"Asiatic power were they (sic) to remain inactive and give the King 
"of Prussia an opportunity of putting in execution his ambitious, 
"dangerous, and long concerted schemes of aggrandisement ".3 In 
:c 
January 1756 they had themselves, by making the Convention of Jest- 
:minster with this aggressive prince, given him a foot both in the 
British and in the French camp, and therefore, so far as they could 
foresee, placed him in a better position than before to take the 
first opportunity of executing these ambitious plans. Indeed, 
since the convention of Westminster guaranteed the neutrality of 
Germany, it might even be argued that it not only left Prussia free 
to display her aggressive tendencies outside of Germany, i.e. against 
Russia, but by securing her rear actually encouraged her to do so. 
However this may be, it cannot be denied that the Russian government 
had substantial justification for their contention that the conven- 
tion of Westminster was in contradiction to the Anglo- Russian con- 
vention of 30 September. The former treaty expressly excluded 
1 e.g. Bestuzhev's letter appended to Williams's letter of 19 
February 1755, to Holderness in S.P.F. Poland. 
2 25 June. 
3 Holderness to Williams 11 April very secret (partly printed 
in Raumer Frederick II 217.) 
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all foreign troops from Germany, whereas the latter was intended 
to secure the intervention of Russian troops in a war in. Germany, 
although the British government were so far correct in their con - 
:tention that both treaties were part of the same policy, since the 
activity of the Russian troops was to be dependent on a British 
requisition. 
That this change in the British attitude took place was, as has 
been shown in the preceding chapter, the work of Newcastle. He was 
appalled at the cost of the land war upon which Austria insisted 
before she would consent to defend Hanover and the Netherlands. The 
nearer danger - the rejection of the demand for subsidies by an in- 
:dignant House of Commons, intent on the maritime war and careless 
of the Continent - loomed so large in Newcastle's short- sighted gaze 
that it obscured the much greater danger of the breakdown of Bri- 
:tain's system of continental alliances in the midst of the life and 
death struggle with France. An understanding with Prussia was the 
line of least resistance and Newcastle drifted along it, without 
considering seriously what effect his change of policy might have 
on his allies. Once again he showed what was perhaps his cardinal 
defect as a diplomatist - an insular inability to appreciate the 
point of view of the other European states, and particularly of 
his own allies. Now that Russia had accepted British subsidies, 
Newcastle and his colleagues regarded Russia as on the same footing 
as a German princeling. "As we pay the piper" Holderness wrote to 
\Nilliamsl it is not unreasonable for us to have the tune we like ". 
They had secured an "option" on the Russian troops and intended to 
make use of that option in any way which they considered desirable 
in the interests of Britain. The Empress of Russia, on the other 
hand, had not forgotten the taunts of the other powers at Aix -la- 
Chapelle, during the currency of the last treaty of subsidy with 
1 Private 26 December in Newport Papers. 
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Britain, that Russia was a mere "mercenary" with no interest in the 
terms of peace. She had only concluded the new treaty because she 
believed that the British government would use it in a way in con- 
sonance with Russian policy, and the one maxim common to all direc- 
tors of Russian policy at the court of Elizabeth was Delenda est 
Borussia. 
Two days after the exchange of ratifications news of the convention 
of Westminster arrived at Petersburg,1 where its terms, and still 
more the suspicions entertained of additional secret articles, natur- 
ally produced a sensation. It placed the Great Chancellor in an 
awkward position since he had extorted the Empress's ratification 
of the treaty of subsidy by emphasising the value of Britain as an 
ally against Prussia, and the danger that Britain, if Russia refused 
the assistance Britain demanded, would be driven in despair to make 
terms with Prussia which would leave the latter secure on her western 
frontiers and free to attack Russia.2 The Empress had accepted the 
Chancellor's advice and concluded the subsidy treaty, but Britain had 
none the less come to an understanding with Prussia. It was now 
plain that Britain would certainly be no party to the projected at- 
:tack on Prussia and might even join Prussia to resist it. The 
Chancellor's enemies who had insisted on the declaration secretissime 
were accordingly justified in their distrust of British policy and 
the Chancellor's prestige with the Empress and her camarilla of 
favourites of both sexes3 suffered a rude shock. Naturally Bestuz- 
:hev reproached Williams with having kept him in ignorance of the 
change in British policy. ':Williams himself had not received infor- 
i: 
1 Waliszewski(408 n.l)criticises Waddington (Louis XV 225) for 
stating that the convention of Westminster was -known at Peters- 
:burg before the exchange of ratifications and promptly errs 
himself, in company with Waddington, by stating that the most 
secret declaration was intended as a reply to the convention of 
Westminster. The ratifications had been exchanged and the de- 
claration accepted by Williams two days before the Anglo- 
Prussian convention was known at Petersburg. 
2 Martens IX 183. 
3 Kluchevsky IV 355 -6. 
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:mation of the use which his government proposed to make of the 
Anglo- Russian convention until the middle of January.' Even then 
his instructions2 were to keep the information to himself, unless 
and until news of the Anglo- Prussian convention reached Petersburg 
from other sources; and the secretiveness of the Great Chancellor, 
who persistently told him that the delay in exchanging ratifications 
was entirely due to the Empress's indolence, gave him no motive to 
defy his instructions and take the Chancellor into his confidence, 
as he would doubtless have done had he known of the tactics the 
Chancellor was employing to overcome the Empress's reluctance to 
ratify the treaty. 
Williams himself had vied with the Chancellor in denouncing Prussia 
and was in the same dilemma as his ally. Unlike the Chancellor, he 
failed to realise the seriousness of the situation; end, instead of 
warning Newcastle, he assured him that the convention of 1.'estminster, 
which he was stupid or insincere enough to call "a masterpiece of 
"politics ", would have no bad consequences at Petersburg.3 His 
ingenuity asserted itself in his public attempts to justify and 
explain the sudden change of his government's and his own attitude 
towards Prussia. As the ally of France Prussia was Russia's dead - 
:liest enemy; once united to Britain Prussia became the natural 
ally of Russia. The mental acrobatics by which he sought to estab- 
:fish this contention might have been effective in a London drawing - 
room, but made no impression at Petersburg. iiuch more effective 
was his payment to the Great Chancellor of the promised bribe of 
£10,000 a few days after the exchange of ratifications in spite of 
the Russian declaration secretissime. This payment wss made on 
1 William- to Holderness 17 JaruamT. This omission is the more 
curious since other British ministers were informed (Newcastle 
to Keene 28 August 1755 in Add. MSS 32858 f. 318). That Wil- 
:liams was informed even at this late date was due to the 
ini- 
:tiative of George II ( Holderness to Newcastle 21 December, 
in 
Add. MSS32861 f. 383) . 
2 Holderness to Williams 20 December, most secret - printed 
from 
the copy in the Newcastle Papers by Satow, 412 -416. 
3 Williams to Newcastle 19 February, private, in Add. 
MSS 32863 
f. 25: Williams to Holderness 19 February. 
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condition that Bestuzhev would do everything in his power to reduce 
the bad impression which the convention of Westminster would make 
on the Empress, and, as a first step in this directionjWilliams and 
he drew up together a letter to be sent to the Empress along with 
Galitzin's despatches announcing the conclusion of the convention. 
The £10,000 which he had just received and the prospect of more to 
come were not the only arguments which determined Bestuzhev to ad- 
here to the British connection. He was on bad terms with Ester - 
:hazy, the Austrian ambassador, and his rival, the Vice Chancellor, 
was in increasingly close touch with Austria. Even if Britain was 
useless as an ally against Prussia, she remained hostile to France 
and use could doubtless be made of this even to increase the amount 
of British subsidies and bribes and to raise the influence of Russia 
in Europe. Finally the health of the Empress being still very un- 
certain Bestuzhev would do nothing to alienate the young court in 
whose favour Williams was firmly established. 
"The Great Chancellor" Williams reports "begins to be extremely 
"jealous of my credit with the Grand Duchess at which Her Imperial 
"Highness is offended and told me the other day that whenever I 
"pleased she would tell the Great Chancellor that if he expected to 
"live well with her he must live well with me, but in a conversation 
"I have lately had with that minister .... we have settled that af- 
":fair to each other's perfect satisfaction ".1 
Bestuzhev 
) 
therefore continued to support British interests at Peters- 
:burg with all his might,2 and the influence of the Grand Duchess 
effected a temporary reconciliation between him and the Shuvalovs. 
When the Vice Chancellor3 attempted to secure the denunciation of 
the convention of 30 September on the ground that Britain had vio- 
lated its terms by concluding the Anglo- Prussian convention, his 
1 Williams to Holderness most secret 19 February. 
2 Martens IX 205. 
3 It might have been expected that the Vice Chancellor, who had 
formerly been the leader of the Prussian party, would now have 
supported Britain, but he no longer received bribes from 
Fred- 
erick (Pol. Corr. XIII, 34) and was anxious to 
win the confi- 
dence either of France or Austria (Arneth V 45). 
In any case 
the Great Chancellor's support of British interests 
would have 




proposal was defeated in the council by six votes to four. 
1 
Although Britain's enemies had failed to make an overt and immediate 
breach in the Anglo- Russian alliance, that alliance had been shaken 
to its foundations. The real danger lay not in the opposition of 
the Vice Chancellor, whose personal influence with the Empress had 
declined with the rise of the Shuvalovs, hut in the risk of a final 
breach between the Great Chancellor and the Shuvalovs, and., above 
all, in the Empress's personal hostility to Frederick II. It is 
said that her first inclination on learning of the convention of 
Westminster, had been to revoke her ratification of the Anglo- Russian 
treaty of subsidy.2 She stormed at the Great Chancellor, denounced 
him as e traitor who was sold. to Britain,3 and told Esterhazy that 
far from expecting George II to treat amicably with Prussia she "had 
"expected that the King and the Court of Vienna would have formed 
"some .system for reducing the King of Prussia's po ever, which she was 
"very ready and desirous to do at all times" .4 
The convention of Westminster _was a clear indication that Britain 
would be no party to the projected attack on Prussia, and the Empress 
summoned the council of ministers to debate, in view of this fact, 
the most effective methods of crushing the Prussian power. The 
council met on 25 March under the presidency of the Empress and came e 
to the following decisions. To encourage Austria to attack Prussia, 
Russia should offer to assist her with 80,OOC troops and promise not 
to lay down her arms until Austria had recovered Silesia and Glatz. 
Realising that the main obstacle to the execution of this programme ' 
was Prussia's alliance with France, the council further decided that 
:x' 
Russia should attempt to procure a promise of the neutrality of 
France in the Continental war.5 A féw days after the council had 
1 Williams to Holderness 27 March, 11 April; Ranke XXX 165. 
2 Pol. Corr. XII, 262. 
3 Ranke XXX 162 -3. 
4 Williams to Holderness 19 February: Cf. Swart's despatch of 
23 March in Add. MSS 6871, f. 57. 
5 Solovev XXIV 26 ff. 
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reached these decisions Esterhazy received instructions from 
Kaunitz to inform the Russian government, under the seal of the 
utmost secrecy,1 of Austria's negotiations with France, and to 
inquire whether Russia was ready to attack the king of Prussia 
whenever circumstances should permit. Further councils then met 
at Petersburg, approved in principle Kaunitz's negotiations with 
France, and promised that Russia would accede to the treaty between 
Austria and France if it should be successfully concluded. Further 
Russia offered, in accordance with the resolutions of the council 
of 25 March, if Austria was willing to do likewise, to attack Prus- 
:sia during the year 1756 with 80,000 men and not to lay down her 
arms till Maria Theresa had recovered Silesia and Glatz.2 Kaunitz 
had thus, before concluding the first treaty of Versailles, taken 
Russia into his confidence and secured the full approval of the 
Empress. Britain's conduct in concluding the convention of West- 
:minster behind the backs of her allies appeared the more offensive 
at Petersburg. 
3 
At subsequent conferences to which Esterhazy was 
admitted Russia's share in military operations in the projected war 
was actually discussed,4 and various portions of Prussian territory 
were assigned to Russia, and, if they took part in the war, Saxony 
5 
and Sweden. 
Bestuzhev, however, did his best to remove the E/Lpress's displeasure 
with himself and to distract her attention from the unsatisfactory 
conduct of the British government,by setting up an extraordinary 
council, composed of the ten persons who formed the ordinary council 
with the addition of the Empress, who intended to preside in person, 
which waz to meet twice a week to discuss means of preventing the further 
growth of Prussian power and of strengthening the bonds between the 
1 Martens I 190. 
2 Arneth IV 434 -5; Vandal Louis XV et Elizabeth 273 -4. In_ a 
letter to the Grand Duchess Bestuzhev explained that Austria 
was "so much out of humour with England that Cussiaj was ob- 
liged to soothe and flatter the Empress Queen lest she might 
"be provoked to take engagements with the Court of Versailles ". 
Williams to Holderness 11 April). 
3 Coxe Lord Walpole II 421 n. 
4 Esterhazy to Maria Theresa 22 April in Arneth V 47. 
5 Arneth V 46 -7. 
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two imperial courts and Britain. The creation of this council was 
probably due in part to Bestuzhev's desire to attack Prussia while 
France was occupied in the war with Britain, but it was also intended 
to compel his enemies to show their hands openly1 and to weary the 
Empress of business; and in fact the Empress rarely appeared after 
the first few meetings of this council. Williams rejoiced to see 
the Empress's aversion to business reasserting itself and reported 
that "though it is a hard task to determine Her Imperial Majesty 
to anything yet it is a very easy one to prevent her taking any 
resolution: Her whole ministry can hardly do the first: and almost 
the weakest of them can do the latter ".2 
So long as Prussia adhered to the convention of Westminster and 
France to her determination to avoid taking part in a land war all 
that Britain really required of Russia was inaction. Unfortunately 
the British ministers were not content with this. They grudged pay - 
:ing £100,000 a year merely to intimidate Prussia and guarantee her. 
observance of the convention of Westminster, especially as they were 
' 
now fairly confident that Frederick was sincere in his desire to pre- 
:serve the peace of Germany. Newcastle was determined to obtain all 
the advantages he had promised himself from the subsidy treaty with 
Russia and the resulting convention of Westminster. Keith was in- 
:structed3to try and bully Austria into accepting Britain's lead and 
coming to an understanding with Prussia, not with France; but New- 
:castle began to see, what he ought to have known from the beginning, 
that Austria's attitude would prevent the addition of Prussia to the 
old system, and might even lead to a Franco- Austrian rapprochement.3 
In view of this possibility it was essential to make sure of Russia, 
and in spite of Galitzin's vigorous protests that the convention of 
Westminster ought to have been communicated previously to Russia and 
1 Bain 195. 
2 Williams to Holderness ll April. 
3 Newcastle to Keith 23 March in Add. MSS 32863, f. 461 b. 
4 Newcastle to Yorke 23 March in Add. MSS 32863 f. 467; Newcastle 
to Williams 2 April in Add. MSS 32864 f. 125. 
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that Britain's failure to make the communication violated the subsidy 
treaty, 
1 
Newcastle was misled2 by Williams's despatches into the be- 
:iief that it was safe to treat Russia in the high handed way which 
was Newcastle's idea of diplomacy when an ally refused to accept his 
policy unreservedly. 
"The most secret] declaration" he wrote "must be returned and looked 
"upon as non avenue: the court of Russia must explain themselves 
"(and immediately that if the King is attacked in his German domi- 
"nions or any French troops should enter into Germany with that in- 
"ten_tion .... we shall have the troops stipulated in our treaty with 
"them". 
3 
In accordance with these and other instructions, Williams on 8 May 
returned to the Chancellors the most secret declaration and asked 
specifically whether Russia would fulfil her obligations under the 
treaty of subsidy if, as was currently reported to be their intention 
France attacked Hanover and Cleves, while Austria made a diversion 
4 
against Silesia. The Russian reply was to send the most secret 
declaration to Galitzin with orders to return it to Holderness - an 
implied refusal to assist Britain in the event of a French attack on 
Hanover, When he heard of what had been done Williams had already 
received further instructions informing him that France had actually 
attacked Minorca, and ordering him to invite the Russian ministers' 
acknowledgment that the casus foederis had arisen. 
5 
In the circum- 
:stances it would have been futile to renew his application for 
assistance and he therefore frankly acknowledged - for the first and 
last time in his diplomatic career - that he was at a loss to know 
what to do. The Empress, he reported,6 was as hostile as ever to 
Prussia, but -there were strong military and financial arguments 
against war with Prussia. If the first instalment of the British 
subsidy was not immediately paid, Russia would declare that Britain 
1 Newcastle to Williams 2 April in Add. MSS 32864 f. 125. 
2 Newcastle to Devonshire 13 March in Add. MSS 32863 f. 273. 
3 Holderness to Williams 30 March; Newcastle to Williams private 
2 April in Add. MSS 32864 f. 125. The departure of the messenger 
was postponed until 2 April to enable Newcastle to write the pri- 
vate letter of instructions to Williams. The relations between 
Newcastle and Holderness during Newcastle's premiership show 
a 
notable and hitherto unremarked advance towards the effective 
control of foreign policy by the Prime Minister. 
4 Williams to Holderness 5 June; Martens IX 206 -7. 
5 Holderness to Williams 11, 18 April. 
6 Williams to Holderness 5 June. 
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had broken the Anglo- Russian treaty of subsidy; if it was paid 
it would possibly be used to wage war on Prussia. 
Williams, with that lack of balance which distinguished him through- 
out his career, rushed from an unjustifiable optimism to a more 
justified but much exaggerated despair. This reaction was inten- 
:sified by personal mortification. At the end of April1 the French 
agent Douglas, at the invitation of the Vice Chancellor2 had re- 
:appeared at Petersburg - this time with officia]. instructions from 
the French government and a credential letter from Rouillé to Voron- 
3 
:zov. The objects of his mission were primarily to arrange for the 
resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two courts; 
and secondly, to increase the bad feeling between Russia and Britain 
and purchase the neutrality of Russia in the war between France and 
Britain by compensating her for the loss of British subsidies.4 
Douglas was received with open arms at Petersburg by the entourage 
of the Empress, who regarded his appearance as a favourable omen of 
French neutrality in the projected attack by Austria and Russia upon 
Prussia, and entertained also the idea that Russia might win prestige, 
cheaply by mediating a peace between Britain and France.5 
Immediately after his arrival Douglas informed Voronzov of the first 
part of his instructions 
n 
and on 18 May he received from the Vice 
Chancellor the reply of the Empress,7 in which she agreed to his re- 
:quest for the exchange of ministers of equal rank as soon as pos- 
sible between the two courts. This reply was sent to the Russian 
1 On 20 April (Rambaud II 18). 
2 V. Voronzov's letters to Douglas of 24 and 27 Febrt.ary, 16 March 
(all O.S.) in A.E. . Russie Supplément 8 f.174, f.177, f.194. 
3 Copy appended to Williams's despatch of 28 September, secret/ 
France to Holderness (Paper No. 2). 
4 Rambaud II 18 -27. Cf. Tercier to Douglas 11 May (printed in 
Archives Voronzov III 578 -81). 
5 Catherine to Williams 12 August O.S. in GoriaTnow 36. 
6 Williams to Holderness 28 September, secret /France, (Paper 
No.1) 
7 A.E. Russie Supplément 8 f. 234; another copy 
appended to Wil- 
:liams's despatch to Holderness of 28 September, 
secret /France 
(Paper No. 9). 
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minister at the Hague and handed by him to the French ambassador 
there to be transmitted to Versailles, but shortly afterwards 
Bektyeev, one of the Vice Chancellor's dependants, was sent to 
Versailles as charge d'affaires. Bektyeev's instructions throw 
a clear light on the attitude and intentions of the anti -British 
party at Petersburg, since they were drawn up without Bestuzhev's 
knowledge .2 The "principal object" of his mission was simply to 
convince France that Russia was ready to renew her former friend- 
ship and good relations with her. In addition he was to find out 
the exact situation of France with regard to England and the other 
powers "and above all. the King of Prussia ". It was also particu- 
:larly recommended to the envoy to discover what the French govern- 
ment really thought of the convention of Westminster, which the Vice 
Chancellor's faction actually suspected might have been concluded 
with the connivance of France. Bektyeev's supplementary instruc- 
:tions3 - in the form of question by the envoy and answer by Voron- 
:zov - are drawn up in vague and indefinite terms,4 but it is clear 
that the envoy was to inform the French government that Russia had 
not, as yet, accepted the advantageous offers of Britain in the be- 
lief that the Austrian ministers were correct in their assertion 
that France was more willing than Britain to concur in the execution 
of Russia's plans. If the French ministers asked for details of 
these plans he was to refer them to Stahremberg, the Austrian ambas- 
: saclor at Versailles. 
1 Solovev History of Russia XXIV 70 -1. 
2 A.E. Russie supplément S f. 236. 
3 Copy appended to Williams's despatch to Holderness of 28 
September secret /France (Paper No. 11); printed in Archives 
Voronzov III 422. 
4 Cf. especially point No. 4 of these instructions: "si on me 
"demande de notre convention conclue avec l'Angleterre? Ce 
"point est fort delicat et quoique la France souhaite avidement 
"de le savoir il ne faut [pas] entrer dans aucune explication, 
"mais on peut dire que par des circonstances des affaires et du 
"tems il se fait beaucoup de ,detours dans monde s le  en ajoutant 
"que S.M.I. est un fidel ami a ses allies et sais extremite il 
"ne lui platt pas d' er hanger". 
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In spite of the reserve of the Vice Chancellor towards his envoy 
there can be, in view of the anti -Pr'Issian resolutions of the 
councils of March and Anril, no doubt as to the nature of Russia's 
plans; and the intentions of the Voronzov clique are made still 
clearer in subsequent despatches from Douglas, in which Voronzov 
openly tries to arouse French hostility to Prussia. Douglas urged 
his government1 to inform the court of Petersburg directly of the 
progress of its negotiations with Austria and, above all, to say 
frankly what their attitude was towards Prussia. Rouille, before 
he received this letter, knew the ambiguous and to him unsatisfac- 
tory nature of Bektyeev's instructions.2 In his reply to Douglas 
he refused, somewhat brusquely, to say anything further about the 
French negotiations with Austria, emphasised the determination of 
the French government to preserve the peace of Europe, and therefore, 
by implication, rejected the plans of Russia to wage war upon Prus- 
:sia. 
Nothing indeed was further from Rouillé's mind than to subsidise 
and cooperate with the imperial courts in their attack upon Prussia., 
His aims in negotiating with Russia are adirably interpreted by 
the Swedish minister at Versailles in one of his despatches: 
4 
"France's measures with Russia" Bunge wrote "have no other views 
but to confirm more and more the peace of the North and to be 
"secure that Russia may not attempt anything against France or her 
"allies in favour of England. The accounts hitherto received from 
"the court of Russia are agreeable to the wishes of France and they 
"seem here to grow more and more sanguine in their hopes that by 
"the interposition and endeavours of the court of Vienna, Russia may 
"be prevailed with to sit quite still in the present war with 
"England ". 
There were therefore even greater divergencies between Russia and 
France than between Austria and France and up to the invasion of 
Silesia by Frederick II, the net result of Franco -Russian negotia- 
1 A.E. Russie Supplement 8 f. 270; Douglas to Tercier 26 May/ 
5 June. 
2 Cf. Bunge to Höpken 22 July (intercepted) in Add. I?SS 32866 
f. 243 for the decline of French belief in Russian sincerity 
which followed Bektyeev's mission. / 
3 A.E. Russie Supplément 8, f. 334, Rouille to Douglas 10 August. 
4 Bunge to Höpken 18 June (intercepted) in Add. MSS 32865 
f.358 
(translated). Cf. Pol. Corr. XIII 74. 
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:tions had been an agreement for the resumption of regular diplomatic 
intercourse between the two states.1 
Douglas's mission and the Franco- Russian_ rapprochement, coming so 
soon after the first treaty of Versailles, gravely alarmed the 
British government. Austria had broken up the old system by the 
treaty of Versailles; Russia seemed to be on the point of following 
her into the French camp.2 Not only had Douglas been well received 
at Petersburg but the Russian ministers at foreign courts had re- 
: ceived orders to live on better terms with those of France, 3 and 
Yorke had discovered the secret correspondence between the Russian 
and French governments through their ministers at the Hague.4 The 
situation at Petersburg appeared worse than ever when reports arriv- 
ed from Swart that the Great Chancellor, on whom all Newcastle's 
dependence was placed, was at loggerheads with Williams and desired 
a change of ambassador. 
5 
Similar reports from Berlin 
6 
and Freder- 
tick's growing suspicions that British influence at Petersburg would 
not be strong enough to curb the Empress's hostility to Prussia,7 
increased the anxiety of the British government. The fuller instruc- 
tions which Galitzin had lately received from his court did little 
to calm these apprehensions. The Russian government refused to 
take back the most secret declaration, although they did not declare 
the treaty void: 
1 Williams to Holderness 28 September secret /France (based on 
Russian State papers procured by the Grand Duchess). 
2 Newcastle to Mitchell 28 May in Add. LiSS 32865 f. 128. 
3 Yorke to Holderness secret 23 May in Add. MSS 32865 f. 93; 
Champeaux to Rouille (intercepted) 4 June in A.d. MSS 32865 
f. 200. 
4 Yorke to Holderness secret 23 I'ay in Add. MISS 32865 f. 93; 
Yorke to Holderness private 15 June in Add. MSS 35436, f. 656. 
5 Yorke to Holderness private 13 April in Add. MSS 35436, f. 506 
and enclosed despatch from Swart of 23 March (Add. I "SS 6871 
f. 57); Newcastle to Yorke 11 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 257. 
6 Mitchell to Holderness most secret 3 June in S.P.F. Prussia 
(partly printed. in Ellis Original Letters 2nd series IV 371); 
Pol.. Corr. XII 362, 373, 419. 
7 Mitchell to Newcastle 14 May in Add. MSS 32864 f. 550; Mitchell 
to Holderness 22 June in Add. MISS 32865 f. 378. 
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"by which" Newcastle wrote plaintively to Yorke "I suppose they will 
"accept the subsidy and the presents co the Chancellors and their 
subordinated. They fling out that though they are by this under 
no engagements against France, they may by a new treaty take such 
"an engagement, which I think is a plain proof that they are to be 
"had, but they will cost dear ". 1 
It was, however, imperative in Newcastle's view to form a counter - 
system to the first treaty of Versailles, "and the first power to 
"be secured and without which we can do nothing is Russia''.1 Indeed 
without Russia even the loyalty of Prussia to the convention of 
Westminster was doubtful and Britain would not have a single ally 
in Europe or America.2 Mitchell did his best to conceal from 
Frederick the worst features of Williams's reports,3 but deception 
was not his forte. His attempts merely served to confirm Freder- 
:ick's belief that the intelligence of the decline of British in- 
:fluence at Petersburg which he had received from other sources4 
was well founded. He declared that if Russia attacked him he 
would .attack the Empress Queen,5 and urged the British government 
immediately to recall Williams and "replace him by some man of 
"temper and conduct who might be able to restore our affairs at 
"that court by acting cordially and confidentially with the Great 
"Chancellor ". 
6 
The crucial question,th.erefore, in the view both of Britain and of 
Prussia, was how to secure Russia. Newcastle as usual was full of 
expedients. He thought at first of trying to use Saxon influence 
at Petersburg by appealing for assistance to his old friend Count 
Flemming - a convinced partisan of the old system. Another of his 
schemes was to win the confidence of Galitzin, Keyserling, and 
Golowkin (the Russian ministers at London, Vienna and the Hague 
l Newcastle to Yorke 11 June, in Add. MISS 32865 f. 257. Cf. 
Newcastle to Hardwicke 12 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 277. 
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke 12 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 277. 
3 Mitchell to Holderness 27 May (S.P.F. Prussia 65) and 22 
June 









Holderness most secret 3 June, secret 7 June, 
in S.P.F. Prussia 65. 
Holderness private and secret 24 June in Add. 
I,MSS 
32865 f. 406. 
6 Mitchell to Holderness 22 June in Add. MSS 32865 
f. 378: 
Cf. Archives III 191 -2. 
21. 
respectively) and persuade them to exert their influence at Peters- 
:burg in favour of Britain.' Both schemes were futile - the first 
because the Saxon court had long desired the reconciliation of 
Russia and France and was as eager as Russia and Austria to have a 
war with Prussia, and therefore used all its influence at Petersburg 
against and not in favour of Britain; the second because the com- 
bined influence of Galitzin, Keyserling, and Golowkin was negli- 
gible, and Keyserling's complaisance2 towards Newcastle nearly led 
to his recall.3 The third device of the ingenious Premier was 
worse than futile - the sending of a British squadron to the Baltic. 
A 
This, Newcastle thought, "would contribute more to secure us Russia 
"than anything [else] which we can do". In fact, although the step 
now contemplated by Newcastle for the first time and subsequently 
pressed upon the British government by Frederick II, was never exe- 
cuted, the mere rumour that it was being considered at London of- 
:fended the Russian government and increased the tension between 
Britain and Russia. 
The only method which afforded any hope of regaining Russia was to 
offer an increase of subsidy if the obnoxious declaration was with- 
:drawn. 
5 
Accordingly when Galitzin called on Holderness, insisted 
on returning the most secret declaration, and finally flung it on 
the table, where Holderness allowed it to remain with the remark 
that he "neither accepted nor rejected it ",6 Holderness definitely 
offered to increase the subsidy if the declaration was withdrawn. 
1 Newcastle to Holderness 20 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 373; 
Holderness to Mitchell 27 July in S.P.F. Prussia. 
2 Keith to Holderness 2 June in S.P.F. Germany (Empire); Keith 
to Holderness, private, 7 June in Add. MSS 35480 f. 181; Hoi- 
:derness to Keith, private, 11 June in Add. MSS 35480 f. 188 
and subsequent correspondence. 
3 Williams to Holderness 26 June, 9 July, private and secret. 
4 Newcastle to Holderness 20 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 373. 
5 Holderness to Williams 25 June. This offer would have been 
more likely to be accepted had it been accompanied by the offer 
of bribes to the Vice Chancellor and the Shuvalovs (Yorke to 
Newcastle 18 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 339). 
6 Holderness to Williams 25 June. 
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The choice of Galitzin as the channel of communication with Peters- 
burg was due psrtly to Newcastle's idea that Galitzin, if concil- 
:iated and flattered, would be able to exercise considerable influ- 
:ence at Petersburg in favour of Britain, 
1 
but chiefly to the fact 
that Williams had entirely lost the confidence of his government, 
which desired to give the Great Chancellor another means of communi- 
cation in case the reports of his quarrel with Williams were well 
founded. 
2 
At first Newcastle's intention was to leave Williams in 
complete ignorance of the new overtures to Russia; but, in conse- 
quence of Holderness's representations that this would be most un- 
:businesslike, Williams was informed3 and the option of replying 
either through him or through Galitzin was left to the Russian 
government. 
4 
The main arguments on which the British government 
relied to prevent Russia joining Austria and France5 being based on 
the assumption that France was the "common enemy'', carried as little 
weight at Petersburg as at Vienna, because both courts regarded 
Prussia as the enemy, and to them France was the power to be con- 
ciliated, detached from'ussia,and if possible induced to join in 
an attack upon Prussia. Holderness's chief subsidiary argument - 
that the commercial interests of Russia demanded peace and the pre- 
servation of the British alliance - carried as little weight with 
the Shuvalov party, which was momentarily in the ascendant at Peters- 
burg, because they failed to see why Britain should have a virtual 
monopoly of Russia's foreign trade and were eager to conclude a com- 
mercial treaty with France.° 
1 Newcastle to Galitzin 25 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 423. 
2 Holderness to Newcastle 23 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 397. 
Already on 28 May Holderness had written privately to '.illiams 
asking him to explain the origin of the rumours that he had 
quarrelled with the Chancellor. 
3 It appears that similar instructions were secretly sent to Wolff 
this fact being carefully concealed from Williams's friends in 
in the Ministry (Pol. Corr. XIII, 32) . 
4 Holderness to Newcastle 23 June in Add. MSS 32865 f. 397. 
5 Holderness to Williams 25 June. 
6 Douglas to Tercier 12/23 May in A.E. Russie Supplement 8, f.236: 
Cf. ibid f. 2'70, 26 Kay/5 June. 
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The alarm of the British government was fully shared by their 
ambassador at Petersburg, who was mortified) by the cordial recep- 
:tion given at court to Douglas. He exaggerated the danger to 
British interests of the apparent Franco- Russian ra crochement and 
did not attach sufficient weight to the much more dangerous secret 
negotiations of Austria at Petersburg, of which he was very i:mper- 
:fectly informed.2 One good result however did follow Douglas's 
mission. The Great Chancellor was struck dumb when he was at last 
informed of the Vice Chancellor's negotiation_. with Douglas. He had 
not forgotten his struggle with La Chétardie and his alarm was in- 
:creased when he discovered that the first act of Douglas had been 
to present a note to the Vice Chancellor pressing him to acquaint 
the Empress with Bestuzhev's corruption and treachery and then to 
secure his dismissal. 
3 
Bestuzhev's loyalty to Britain could not 
but be confirmed,4 although on the other hand, the way in which 
the rapprochement with France had been settled by the Empress and 
Vice Chancellor behind the back of the Great Chancellor was a strik- 
ing proof of the decline of his influence at Petersburg. 
The situation at Petersburg,however, now took a favourable turn. 
Kaunitz had failed for the meantime at least to secure the con- 
currence of France in an attack upon Prussia. He had too much 
respect for Frederick and Prussia to attack them, as the Empress 
Elizabeth might possibly have been ready to do, even without assur- 
:antes of French support.5 He was well aware of the corruption and 
inefficiency of the Russian bureaucracy and army; he knew that 
1 Deon to `Percier 13/24 August, A.E. Russie Supplément 8, f.363; 
Williams to Holderness 12 June, secret; 26 June, etc. 
2 Williams to Holderness 6 July. 
3 A.E. Russie Supplément 8, f. 208: There were rumours at Peter - 
:sburg that Bestuzhev's agents had tried to assassinate 
the 
French minister (Rambaud II 18). 
4 Williams to Holderness 26 June, 9 July, private and secret. 
5 Arneth V 47, based on Kaunitz's letter to Esterhazy of 22 :'ay: 
If Russia's plans for an offensive war were accepted Kaunitz 
pointed out that perhaps even France, and certainly 
Britain 
and other Powers, would support the King of Prussia. 
Cf. 
Waddington Louis XV 337, 353. 
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subsidies would be required to maintain the Russian troops in the 
field - subsidies which Austria was quite unable to pay, as all her 
financial resources would be needed to maintain the efficiency of 
her own troops; 
1 
finally the uncertain health of the Empress Eliza- 
) 
:beth and the notorious admiration of the Grand Duke for Prussia 
made the continuance of Russian support - inefficient and dearly 
bought as it would be - uncertain. He was alarmed therefóre, 
rather than gratified, when Esterhazy informed him of Russia's 
enthusiastic reception of the overtures he had made upon receipt 
of the news of the convention of Westminster.2 It was essential 
for his plans that France should take part in the Austro- Russian 
war with Prussia,3 not merely with the auxiliary corps of 24,000 
men conditionally promised by the first treaty of Versailles, but 
by providing Russia with a large subsidy. And since only if Prus- 
sia took the offensive was France bound in any way whatever to 
Austria, it was still more essential to the ultimate success of 
Kaunitz's negotiations that Russia should not display too openly 
her aggressiveness towards Prussia. Esterhazytherefore, was 
instructed to moderate the warlike ardour of the Empress until the 
result of Austria's further negotiations with France was known.4 
The first result of his representations was the countermanding of 
the orders which had already been given for the concentration of 
additional troops in Livonia,5 and the cessation of naval prepa.ra- 
:tions.6 The Empress was naturally piqued' at Kaunitz's cool 
1 Pol. Corr. XII 403. 
2 Kauritz to Esterhazy 22 May 1756: "Der Russische Hof gehet 
"allzu geschwind und hitzig zu Wercke, ehe noch die sachen reif 
"find, wodurch alles verdorben werden könnte ", in Arneth V 476, 
n. 66. 
3 Lodge 92. 
4 Raffe XXX 195. 
5 Williars to Holderness 15 June: Pol. Corr. XIII 15: Williams 
attributed it to the cost of forage in Livonia. Cf. Arneth V 
47; Rouille II 35. 
6 Williams to Holderness 6 July; Pol. Corr. XIII 41. 
7 Williams reports (to Holderness 29 June) that he had been much 
more graciously received at court by the Empress than for six 
months past. Cf. 'Williams to Holderness 13 July. 
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reception of the Russian overtures which he had himself provoked 
and the first treaty of Versailles did little to remove her dis- 
satisfaction. Kaunitz's masterpiece was indeed rather a disappoint - 
:ment to the court of Petersburg, although the disappointment was 
mitigated by the knowledge that negotiations between France and 
Austria were still proceeding. Nevertheless it showed conclusively 
that France at least for the present was a.s little inclined as Bri- 
:tain to connive at, far less to participate in, an Austro- Russian 
attack upon Prussia, and thus dashed the hopes raised at Petersburg 
on the inadequate foundation of Douglas's mission. The Empress who 
for the last few months had raged against Prussia now began to storm 
at the perfidy of France. 
1 
Just at this time too the £100,000, be- 
:ing the first instalment of the subsidy under the convention of 30 
September, was received by Wolff,2 the British consul at Petersburg, 
through whom remittances were made. The prospect of this sum being 
immediately paid into her coffers was a bait more attractive to the 
Empress, whose extravagance left her in constant need of ready money, 
than the best turned political arguments of Newcastle and Holderness. 
The Great Chancellor, whose illnesses throughout his career coincided 
with singular accuracy with the periods at which his influence was on; 
the decline had now recovered. At one of his meetings with .il- 
:liams the latter pointed out that Russia would doubtless be invited 
to accede to the first treaty of Versailles. 
khe Great Chancellor answered "that he did not doubt the French party 
at court would do everything to promote it. But for his part he 
"would never abandon the system which he had introduced and supported, 
"at this court for fifteen years and upon which he thought the liber- 
ties of Europe depended: he owned that at present his credit was 
"not so great as it had been but as he was sure his system was a 
"right one he did not doubt of prevailing in the end: to this he 
"added that I had nothing to do at present here but to keep myself 
"quiet and have patience .... I begged him to chalk out the methods 
"which he thought would be the most effectual for bringing back this 
"court to a right way of thinking. To this the Great Chancellor 
J. Williams to Holderness 23 June, 7 August. 2 
Williams to Hol- 
3 Pol. Corr. VIII 151; X 477. derness 
19 June. 
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"answered that his whole thoughts had been employed about what I 
"had proposed for some time past: but that considering how strong 
"the present torrent here was against us the best advice he could 
"give me was to lye still: that all the plans of his opposers at 
"court were so wild that he hoped they would never take place, but 
"that if they did they never could be of any duration " 1 
Bestuzhev then inquired anxiously as to Britain's relations with 
Austria, urged the British government "to accommodate matters with 
"the House of Austria" and assured Williams that "the Austrians did 
"not push things on here so violently as Lief imagined ".1 A few 
days later Williams again saw the Great Chancellor2 who was still 
more emphatic in his assurances: 
"you must give me time" he said "and you must take patience, but 
"you may assure the King from me that I am now able and resolved 
"to bring this court back into a right way of thinking and I have 
"no doubt of doing it in six months at furthest ".2 
As his price Bestuzhev, with his customary frankness in these 
matters, named an annual pension of £2,500, which, together with 
his official salary of seven thousand roubles, would "enable him 
"to live independently of everybody but the King and the Empresse 
These emphatic assurances raise two fundamental questions (1) was 
the Great Chancellor sincere? (2) was there a reasonable chance 
of his being able to fulfil his promises? Both questions must be 
answered in the affirmative. Bestuzhev's reasons for adhering to 
the British connection have already been examined, and it is note- 
:worthy that he asked not for a lump sum but for a pension, which 
obviously would only be paid so long as his good intentions pro- 
duced tangible results at Petersburg.4 Catherine, and Bestuzhev's 
confidantsKeyserling,5 Prasse and Swart,6 are unanimous in their , 
1 Williams to Holderness 6 July. 
2 Williams to Holderness 9 July. 
3 Williams to Holderness, very secret, 9 July. 
4 Holderness to Williams 6 August, most secret. The pension was 
granted on this condition. Bestuzhev was surprised at this 
ready compliance with his demands: ('Williams to Catherine 23 
August O.S. Goriainow 73 -4) and his zeal was immediately 
quickened (Catherine to Williams 27 August 0.S. Goriainow 87). 
5 P.S. from Steinberg in Add. T,iSS 32865 f. 453, dated 30 June. 
6 Pol. Corr. XII passim. 
s 
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statements that the Great Chancellor was still the loyal adherent 
of Britain, although Swart suspected that the Chancellor "had a 
"mind to make France join the King of Prussia. by Russia's attacking 
"him " ,l and this conjecture finds some support in the anti- Prussian 
intrigues of the Chancellor in the early summer of 1756,2 and in 
the Chancellor's remark to Williams that if by the first treaty of 
Versailles "the King of Prussia's power could have been lessened 
"without prejudice to the interests of Great Britain, he should not 
"have disapproved of it " .3 The unsatisfactory nature of the first 
treaty of Versailles gave Bestuzhev an additional reason to cling to 
the British alliance. 
In regard to the second question there is ample evidence of a reviv- 
:al of Bestuzhev's influence at Petersburg. Esterhazy at this time 
repeatedly complained of Bestuzhev as a grave obstacle to success in 
his negotiations4 and, by intriguing to secure the dismissal of the 
Great Chancellor, alienated him still further.5 At Vienna, where 
the ministers had formerly boasted that Russia was "absolutely at 
6 
"their command ", Keith reported that "they are much come down in 
"their stile and those who pretend to be in their secret own that 
"it will be a difficult matter to induce the Czarina to enter into 
"offensive measures ".7 At Versailles also the revival of Bestuzhevis 
influence was clearly felt. Bunge recorded:8 
"Great as the appearances were at first of engaging the Court of 
"Russia in a formal convention with France and Vienna, more diffi- 
":culties have occurred from the subsidy treaty between England and 
"Russia than were to be expected from the language and I may say the 
"assurances of the Court of Petersburg [Sc the Vice Chancellor" . 9 
1 Yorke to Holderness private 30 July) 13 August, in Add. I +ISS 35436 
f. 87 and f. 906; Pol. Corr. XIII 126. 
2 Pol. Corr. XII 420, 484. 
3 Williams to Holderness, private and secret 9 July; Cf. the 
anti- Prussian remarks of the Chancellor at this time in Waliszew- 
:ski 412. 
4 Arneth V 48-9. 5 Williams to Ho lder' ss 23 July. 
6 Keith to Williams 19 June, in Add. MSS 35492 f. 90. 
7 Keith to Williams 25 August, in Add. I,7SS 35492 f. 94b. 
8 Bunge to H6pken 22 July (intercepted) in Add. PISS 32866 f. 243. 
9 Cf. the reports from Petersburg of Prasse (Pol. Corr. XIII 41) 
and Swart (summarised by Yorke in private letters to Holderness 
of 9 and 13 July in Add. I,ISS 35436, f. 80 and f. 82) . 
28. 
He hoped that these difficulties would ultimately be overcome, but 
believed that in the mea.ntime'Russia will observe a strict neutral - 
' :ity .... and carry on in the most secret manner the negotiation 
with France". 
Not merely was the Great Chancellor's prestige reviving but his 
enemies faltered in their stride. The Vice Chancellor was jealous 
of the Shuvalovs and eager to share British bribes. Although for 
months past he had ostentatiously neglected and insulted Williams 
he now made several attempts to secure a reconciliation with him 
and solicited a contribution towards the completion and furnishing 
of his Petersburg mansion,' which was ultimately to be fitted up - 
a nine days wonder at Petersburg - with the discarded furniture of 
the Pompadour.2 Simultaneously Ivan Shuvalov made approaches to 
Williams and although these advances were insincere they show a 
lack of selfconfidence in the leaders of the anti -British party. 
Encouraged by the irresolution of his enemies the Great Chancellor 
had now devised a plan of campaign and communicated it to Williams. 
".... our enemies are such silly fellows that they will soon commit r 
"such faults as will give me great advantages over them: I shall 
"watch them with the utmost diligence and don't doubt that the King 
"your master will soon be convinced that I serve him with all the 
"fidelity, gratitude, and attachment that His Majesty can expect 
"from me. That can any Russian mean by thinking of an alliance 
"with France? and of even preferring it to that of England? Don't 
"they see that Swedish and Polish affairs must be an eternal quarrel 
"between us and can France be of any service to us on any occasion 
"whatever? .... our misfortune is that at present we have a young 
"favourite at this court who can talk French and is fond of the 
"French and their fashions; and he wants to see a French ambasse- 
":dor with a large train arrive at this court: his power is so 
"great that there is sometimes no resisting it, but though I cannot 
"always carry my points I am generally able to spoil such projects 
"as I don't approve of. But our Monsieur Pompadour has set his 
"heart upon having a French minister here and I am afraid he will 
"prevail, though while I continue to be Her Imperial Majesty's 
"minister nothing essential shall be done against the interests of 
"England" . 4 
1 Williams to Holderness, private and secret, 9 July. 
2 Herzen Memoir 251. 
3 Williams to Holderness 13 July. 
4 Williams to Holderness 9 July, private and secret. 
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This policy of masterly inactivity had served Bestuzhev well in 
similar crises in his past career,1 and although it did not appeal 
to the impetuous British ambassador he had no option but to accept 
it. Almost at once an opportunity to carry out the Chancellor's 
declared policy was provided by troubles in Sweden,2 where the Frencl 
party dominated the Senate and were trying to reduce still further 
the royal power, already narrowly circumscribed by the constitution 
of 1719. Adolphus Frederick of Sweden owed his throne to Russia,3 
and, although the Empress was disinclined to intervene to support 
the brother -in -law of Frederick II,4 Russia was bound in order to 
maintain her prestige, to defend her proté_é, while her interests 
compelled her to prevent the further weakening of the royal author- 
: ity, the only barrier to the complete control of Swedish resources 
by France. Already in January and February 1756 rumours of Sweden's 
naval preparations had alarmed the Russian government and caused the 
despatch of threatening instructions to Panin, the able and energetic 
Russian minister at StoCkholm.5 The king of Sweden secretly appeal- 
:ed to Russia for assistance in defeating the French party and under 
the pretext of informing the Russian court of the death of his mother 
sent a special envoy,. Count Horn, to Petersburg.6 While Horn's nego- 
:tiation was proceeding at Petersburg, a few royalist partisans, 
probably with-the secret encouragement of the Queen, engaged in a 
futile conspiracy which was detected and the ringleaders executed. 
The Ring was now at the mercy of the senatorial party; Russia alone 
could save him and on the maintenance of the royal authority depended; 
1 Holderness to Mitchell 13 July S.P.F. Prussia 65. Holderness 
was less optimistic in writing to Williams (6 August, private 
and secrets) when he remarks that it was "but a melancholy pros - 
":pect to think that our best chance of bringing back the court 
of Russia to a right way of thinking arises from the errors of 
"those who have an interest in carrying on measures destructive 
"to the interest of their sovereign and it seems doubtful whet - 
":her even the blunders he may commit may be sufficient to des- 
":troy the credit of a decided favouriteY' . 
2 Williams to Keith 13 July, in Add. MSS 35481, f. 4; Holderness 
to Mitchell 10 August S.P.F. Prussia 66. 
3 Mernoires de Frederic II 1 173 -4; E.H.R. (October 1928) XLIII, 
554-70. 
4 Pol. Corr. XII 152. 
5 Williams to Holderness 6, 9, 16 March; Pol. Corr. XII 151 -2,419. 
6 Williams to Holderness 2 March etc; Pol. Corr. XII 297, 
etc. 
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her influence et Stockholm and her predominant position in the 
Baltic. The Russian {_;overnr_ment immediately sent instructions to 
Panin to inform the Senate, flushed with victory and anxious to 
complete the humiliation of the monarchy, that Russia as guarantor 
of the constitution of 1719 was resolved to maintain it with all 
her power. 
1 
A situation had arisen which brought Russia and France 
face to face at Stockholm; and the Great Chancellor seizing the 
opportunity won a slight victory over his enemies in the Council 
and felt strong enough to advise Williams to ask for the conference 
with the two chancellors which had hitherto been postponed on vari- 
ous pretexts.2 
The British government meantime had rejected Frederick's suggestion 
of an alliance on the ground that this would alienate further the 
court of Petersburg3 and was delighted to learn that the situation 
at Petersburg was by no means as bad as they had been led to believe. 
This revulsion of feeling doubtless made them the readier to believe 
Williams's assurances that he possessed the entire confidence of the 
4 
Great Chancellor, especially as Bestuzhev, when questioned by Wolff, 
had expressed the utmost astonishment at the reports that he desired 
to get rid of Wil lia.ms .5 Bestuzhev certainly had sufficient reason 
to desire Williams's recall since he was intensely jealous of Wil- 
:liams's intimacy with the Grand Duchess and feared that his influ- 
:ence might induce the grand ducal couple to ruin themselves and 
their friends by futile schemes to thwart the will of the Empress. 
But, faced with a direct demand of the British government, Bestuzhev 
did not care, particularly in view of Williams's intimacy with the 
Grand Duchess, to speak openly and therefore disavowed the actions 
of his agents. Almost immediately afterwards he resumed his under- 
i Williams to Holderness 17 July: Cf. Prasse's earlier report 
in Pol. Corr. XII 141. 
2 Williams to Holderness 23 July. 
3 Pol. Corr. XIII 65 -6, 98. 
4 Williams to Holderness private 9 July: Holderness to Williams 
private and secret, 6 August. 
5 Wolff to Holderness 20 June 0.S. 
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:hand intrigues to secure Williams's recall. 
1 
For the time being,however, Williams had recovered the confidence of 
his government and Holderness inquired confidentially whether it 
might not be possible through the Chancellor or Grand Duchess to gain 
the favourite Shuvalov. If this could be done "anything in reason 
"(by way of bribes] would be complied With .2 In regard to the pay- 
:ment of the first instalment of the subsidy Williams was to follow 
the Great Chancellor's advice - always assuming that if the sum was 
paid over the Empress would tacitly withdraw the most secret declara- 
:tion, agree to send troops to defend Hanover if attacked by France 
during the present war, assist Great Britain against Sweden if the 
latter intervened in the war, and, if Austria attacked Prussia in 
order to facilitate a French attack on Hanover, remain neutral in 
the Austro- Prussian war and send the stipulated succours to Britain 
against France. This last demand raised a question which had not yet 
been squarely faced at Petersburg. Britain was drifting into alli 
:ance with Prussia,4 Austria had already made a defensive alliance 
with France which would permit an offensive war against Prussia. 
The old system being irretrievably destroyed, Russia was called upon 
to choose between her two former allies, Britain and Austria, and to 
abandon her hostility either to France or to Prussia. 
There was little chance of the Russian government reaching a speedy 
decision on this fundamental issue. What the Bestuzhev party lacked 
in numbers was to some extent repaired by the greater adroitness of 
their leader. Moreover, long experience in the conduct of foreign 
affairs had given him a self -confidence which his enemies lacked. 
The Empress had a genuine respect for her Chancellor's opinion, and 
knew that, although he was corrupt,his enemies were almost as much in 
l Mitchell to Holderness 12 August, Particular, S.P.F. Prussia 66 
reporting a conversation with Swart. 
2 Holderness to Williams, private, 6 August, in Newport Papers. 
3 Holderness to Williams 6 August; Holderness to I,Ritchell 
6 
August, in S.P.F. Prussia 65. 




the pay of foreign powers' and were less competent to direct Russian 
foreign policy. The ultimate decision rested with the Empress - 
always suspicious of the interested advice offered by her ministers. 
Her preoccupation with her pleasures left her little time to form a 
personal opinion, even had her feeble and frivolous mind been capable 
of grasping the intricacies of European diplomacy - which it emphati- 
cally was not.2 Her dominant motive seems to have been a personal 
hostility to Frederick II, long carefully fostered by Austrian 
and British diplomatists. But this motive was weakened by a genuine 
repugnance to shed the blood of thousands of her subjects and by 
a taste for subsidies, without which indeed the Russian army and navy 
was in no state to enter upon war.4 What the ultimate decision of 
the Empress would have been had Frederick II not invaded Silesia must 
remain a matter of conjecture.5 If she were following any settled 
policy at all, which is more than doubtful, it was probably to await 
the result of Kaunitz's negotiations at Versailles. If Kaunitz had 
succeeded in securing French support against Prussia she would almost 
certainly have joined in the proposed attack; if the negotiation had 
broken down she would probably have contented herself with extracting 
large subsidies from Britain as the price of assistance against 
France and would have refrained from an attack on Prussia. 
The complete breakdown of the health of the Empress6 whose robust 
1 Peter Shuvalov's and the Vice Chancellor's support of France 
was largely due to their interest in a contract for supplying 
France with naval stores (Holderness to Williams 31 August) and 
they hoped also to secure a monopoly to sell tobacco in France 
(Herzen Memoir 251). 
2 Kluchevsky IV 355. 
3 Williams to Mitchell 27 November 1756, in Add. MSS 6824 f. 76; 
Keith. to Holderness 12 May 1758 in S.P.F. Russia; Archives 
Voronzov V 31. 
4 Williams to Holderness 9 July, private and secret. 
5 The above analysis of the situation suggests that the generally 
accepted view that the Empress had already decided against Brit- 
ain requires modification; the contention of Ilchester (I 302) 
that Williams and the Prime Minister (sic) Bestuzhev had been 
successful in pacifying the Empress and persuading her not to 
attack Prussia finds no support in any official documents. 




constitution had at last been ruined by a life of unbridled licence 
increased her constitutional indolence' and tendency to procrastina- 
tion. And the longer the Empress procrastinated the greater the 
chance that Bestuzhev, especially after his zeal had been animated 
by Britain's promise of a pension,2 would find some means of .defeat- 
:ing his enemies and recovering his ascendancy. Moreover, the con - 
:tinued ill -health of the Empress introduced a new factor by giving 
to the "young court" a political importance it had not hitherto had. 
The Shuvalovs and their timorous ally, the Vice Chancellor, were 
afraid to push matters too far since at any moment the death of the 
Empress might leave them at the mercy of the "young court ".3 
The Grand Duchess was no longer the disinterested friend, but the 
heavily bribed adherent and spy of the British government.4 In 
August she received a "loan" of £10,000 on the understanding that it 
would be used for "the King's service ". Catherine with her usual un- 
scrupulousness used the bulk of it to reduce her debts, but display- 
:ed that generosity towards her lovers which was to characterise the 
future Empress by making Poniatowski a present of £500.5 Her secret 
correspondence with Williams enables one to follow from hour to hour 
the ever changing interior of the Russian court, and in spite of the 
fulsome compliments exchanged by the two correspondents, leaves no 
possible doubt of her sincere admiration of Williams and devotion to 
British interests.6 Catherine's power to help was, however, by no 
1 Bain 137. 
2 Catherine to Williams 27 August O.S. Goriaïnow 87; Williams to 
Catherine 28 August O.S. Goriainow 93. 
3 Yorke in his private letter of 17 January 1758 (Add. MSS 35437 
f. 120) quotes Swart's remark that "his court barometer made 
him think [the Empress] very ill indeed, because he saw the 
Vice Chancellor and Shuvalov very assiduous in paying their 
court to the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess." 
4 Williams to Holderness, most secret, 9 July; Holderness to 
Williams, most secret, 6 August. 
5 Catherine to Williams 31 August 0.S. Goriainow 110. 
6 This correspondence as published by the Russian Imperial Histor- 
ical Society commences at 31 July - the earlier letters (Wil- 
:liams to Holderness, private and secret 9 July) are apparently 
lost. A few letters from Catherine subsequent to 31 
July but 
not printed either in the Russian or the English edition of 
the 
correspondence are to be found in the Public Record Office 
and 
the British Museum. 
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means equal to her inclinations; and all her efforts to secure more 
than professions of devotion from the Shuvalovs,1 although sometimes 
they seemed on the point of success, were destined to end in failure. 
Apart from the unsettling effect which she exercised on the policy of 
the Shuvalovs, Catherine was e valuable ally. She procured reliable 
information on all kinds of subjects and on one occasion at least "sat 
"up all night to translate [a despatch from Constantinopla out of 
"the Russ language" which gave an account of Turkish uneasiness at 
the Austro-French alliance.2 Her shrewd common sense steadied the 
mercurial spirits of the British ambassador and saved him from more 
than one gross blunder, while she contrived to smooth over the con- 
tinual friction between her two advisers - Williams and Bestuzhev. 
Williams had had on 26 July a conference with the two chancellors 
in \inich, in accordance with his instructions of 25 June, he offered 
to increase the war subsidy, if Russia would admit that the treaty 
extended to an attack by France upon the British or Hanoverian domin- 
ions in Europe, and tried to convince the Russian ministers that 
their interest was to adhere to Britain and not to Austria, which 
was bound to the chariot wheels of France. "Things here" he report- 
": ed have a very good appearance but never will I answer for the suc- 
z 
": cess of anything at this court beforehand " - a remark which one 
would be glad to regard as a sign that Williams was at last learning 
wisdom. Unfortunately the sequel prevents one from drawing this 
inference. Although he was informed by the Grand Duchess that the 
Chancellor had secured a vote of the Council in favour of giving some 
kind of guarantee of I .anover, 4 and though the Chancellor himself dis- 
:cussed the details of the proposed guarantee with him a few days 
later, "Williams was so impatient at the inevitable delays5 that he 
1 Correspondence of Williams and Catherine passim. 
2 Williams to Holderness 28 September, Secret /Prance. 
3 Williams to Holderness 27 July, also 7 and 17 August. 
4 Catherine to Williams 3, 8 August 0.S. Goria .now 2, 19. 
5 Williams to Catherine 6 August 0.S. Gorier now 16. 
jumped to the conclusion that the Great Chancellor was betraying him, 
and, in a panic, sought to persuade the Grand Duchess to break com- 
:pletely with. Bextuzhev and find new friends for herself and him.1 
Where the ambassador expected to find new friends it is impossible 
to say. Catherine's reply2 although sympathetic and tactful was 
like a douche of cold water and for the time being restored the am- 
:bassador to his senses; but, knowing that the Great Chancellor was 
being approached by France and. Austria,` he still cherished doubts 
4 
of his entire devotion to British interests, believing that he 
intended to keep the British government in suspense until the arrival 
of a French ambassador would enable Russia to name her own price for 
the guarantee of Hanover.5 
Meantime, urged on by his own government6 and by his old. enemy Freder 
:ick the Great, Williams was feeling his way towards the improvement 
of the relations between Russia and Prussia. This was obviously 
a delicate task and Williams was rightly disinclined to do anything 
officially until Russia's attitude towards Great Britain had been 
definitely cleared up, 
9 
because "the French and Austrians at this 
"court make all their push against the King of Prussia and endeavour 
"to blend the King's affairs with those of His Prussian Majesty in 
"order to make the Empress still more cold in our interest and with 
"these insinuations they have done us the most harm at this court "10 
When he privately invited the Great Chancellor to assist in restor- 
:ing normal diplomatic relations between Russia and Prussia, the 
Great Chancellor in spite of his eagerness to accept the proferred 
i Williams to Catherine 9 August 0.S. Goria.li.now 23. 
2 Catherine to Williams 9 August 0.S. Goriainow 25 -6. 
3 Williams to Holderness 9 July. private and secret. 
4 Williams to Holderness 17 August. 
5 Williams to Holderness 4 and 7 September.. 
6 Holderness to Mitchell 13 July, S.P.F. Prussia; Pol. Corr. XII 
414 -5. 
7 Mitchell to Williams 30 July in Add. MSS 6804 f. 72 b; Mitchell 
to Holdern.ess 30 August, S.P.F. Prussia 66. 
8 Williams to Holderness 7, 10 August. Newcastle had already 
spoken on this subject to Galitzin. 
9 Williams to Catherine 13 August 0.S. Gorialn.ow 40. 
10 Williams to Holderness 17 August. 
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bribe was held back "by some higher power"' and refused to do any - 
:thing until the Vice Chancellor had been won over. At this stage 
Williams was tardily informed by Mitchell of Frederick's resolution 
2 
to forestali. his enemies. He at once wrote to Mitchell3 warning 
him that a Prussian offensive would have fatal consequences to the 
interests of Britain and Prussia at Petersburg, since it would auto- 
matically end the irresolution of the Empress. Quite apart from 
her desire to reduce Frederick's power, an attack on Austria would 
bring into operation the fourth secret article of the treaty of the 
two Empresses, which bound Russia to assist Austria if attacked by 
Prussia and not to lay down her arms till Maria Theresa had recover - 
:ed Silesia and Glatz. In the,hope of inducing Prussia to remain 
quiet he added emphatic assurances which can hardly be justified 
that Russia would remain neutral if Austria attacked Prussia. Warn - 
:ing and assurances were alike too late since the Prussian army was 
in Saxony a fortnight before Williams's letter arrived at Berlin. 
Even had it arrived in time it would not have turned Frederick II 
from his purpose, since, as the next chapter will show, prophets in 
much higher repute at Berlin had already warned him in vain. 
1 Williams to Catherine 10 August O.S. Goriainow 30. 
2 Mitchell to Williams 19 August in Add. MSS 6804 f, 105 b; 
Williams to Holderness 4 September. 
3 Williams to Mitchell 4 September in Add. I!'1SS 6824, f. 15. 
CHAPTER XIII 
Europe: Outbreak of the Seven Years ':lar 
(June- October 1756) 
Russian military preparations alarm Frederick - Relations 
of Britain and Prussia - Frederick insists that Russia and 
Austria will attack him in the spring of 1757 and makes pre- 
parations for war - Against the advice of Finckenstein and 
Podewils he determines to anticipate his enemies - Britain 
in vain begs Frederick not to take the offensive - Attitude 
of France to the prospect of continental war - Progress of 
the negotiations between France and Austria - France warns 
Prussia to remain quiet - Frederick invades Saxony and drives 
France into the arms of Austria and Russia - George II wishes 
to disavow Prussian action and obtain neutrality for Hanover, 
but is prevented by his cabinet - Frederick's guiding motives. 
Just as Russia's conclusion of the subsidy treaty with Britain had 
been the immediate cause of the Diplomatic Revolution, so the anti - 
Prussian resolutions of the Russian Councils of March and April, 
1756, and the consequent military preparations of May and June led 
directly to the outbreak of the Seven Years War, since they were the 
main factor which determined Frederick the Great to take the off- 
ensive. The gradual growth of this determination can be clearly 
traced in the twelfth and thirteenth volumes of his political corr- 
1 
espondence . 
The British government after following a "policy of deception or 
optimismi2 for over three months chose a singularly inauspicious 
eoment to inform Frederick frankly of the differences between 
themselves and Russia. Had they told Frederick the truth at the 
beginning the shock would not have been as great; had they waited 
another ten days Mitchell would have been able to accompany the 
communication with assurances that things were improving at 
Petersburg. When Mitchell handed to Frederick the Russian 
declaration secretissime "he read [it) over unmoved and observed 
Pith great calmness that it made our treaty with Russia quite use - 
1ess; that as to himself he wondered why the Empress of Russia had 
aostrong an aversion to him: that he had never done anything to 
deserve it Cand that he imputed it to the influence and arts of 
the Court of Vienna ".3 Frederick's worst suspicions of Russia and 
1 His motives have been subjected. to the most minute analysis 
with the most divergent results by German historians 
following on the publication in 1894 of Lehmann's Friedrich der 
Grosse nd 1er Ursprung 1E2 Siebenjáhri en Krieges. 
2 Tuttle II 279. 
3 Mitchell to Holderness 9 July in Add. MSS. 32866 f 80. 
2. 
rrticularly of the motive of the Russian military preparations 
1 
are thus confirmed. In this frame of mind he accepted uncritically` 
0 rumours that Austria and Russia had decided to attack him in 
4e spring of 1757. The chief source of this story is not, as is 
sua.ily assumed, the despatches copied by Menzel in the Saxon 
rchivas, but the despatches of Swart,3 the Dutch envoy at Peters- 
burg, who was closely associated with Bestuzhev and may quite 
possibly have written these despatches as part of Bestuzhev's anti - 
'russian intrigues in order to alarm Frederick and provoke him to 
Ake the offensive. When Frederick failed to find confirmation of 
this story in the Dresden archives he attributed his failure to the 
4 
deception of Saxony by the two Imperial Courts and was, to quote 
5 
As own words, none the less determined =c:111ire guam nreveniri . 
?e had immediately replied to the Russian demonstrations in Livonia 
counter-preparations in East Prussia, and soon followed these 
Oy preparations against Austria, because he was determined to 
W. with the Austrians first if the Russians, for whose generalship 
adequipment he had a colossal contempt, attacked him.6 
!twas in vain that his two ministers of state severally protested 
against the hasty actions of their King. Finkenstein, a former 
,nvoy to the Russian court, pointed out that Bestuzhev was so 
Superior to Voronzov in ability, faculty for intrigue, and know- 
, 
ledge of affairs that he F inkenstein) would never despair of 
A 
°stuzhev's recovery of his supremacy until he was actually dismissed 
1 Memoire Raisonné enclosed in Mitchell's letter to Holderness 
of 9 July - also Pol. Corr. XII 441, 474; XIII 65 -6. 
2 Pol. Corr. XIII 117. 
3 Pol. Corr. XIII 95, 114 -6. 
4 Pol. Corr. XIII 153. 
5 Pol. Corr. XIII 113. 
o Mitchell to Holderness, Private and secret, 24 June in Add. 
MSS. 32865 f 406. 
3 
nom office; if resolutely supported by British money, Bestuzhev 
ght utterly defeat his enemies and then, urged on by his vindict- 
,ve spite, strive with as much zeal as he had formerly shown to 
.senate Russia from Prussia to effect their reconciliation.1 
)dewils, impressed by the fact that Prussian aggression would 
Free Russia and France to fulfil their respective engagements with 
Istria, "took the liberty to point out" that the evidence hitherto 
stained of the plans of Austria and Russia to attack Prussia early 
11757 was quite inconclusive. He and his arguments were contempt- 
uously dismissed by Frederick with a sneer - "Adieu Monsieur de 
a timide politi que. "- 
rederick's decision to anticipate his enemies is the more inex- 
cusable because in good time he recéived hints that the design of 
aunitz, now that Prussia had set Austria the example of mobilis- 
ation and war might break out at any moment, while the Prussian 
preparations were bound to offend France, was probably to alarm 
im into taking the offensive, since at the very least this would 
enable Austria to claim 24,cnn auxiliaries from France under the 
'Ant treaty of Versailles3 and would almost certainly lead France 
give greater assistance. Yet when Mitchell at the end of July 
rged this point of view upon Frederick, he made no impression 
4 
»cept to provoke an outburst of Fredericks hasty temper. Mitchell 
ported: "The discovery the King of Prussia has made of UAustria' 
''reaty with the Russians has provoked him to a great degree and his 
oaentment will carry him every length: nothing but His Majesty's 
Iterposition could have prevented him being already in motion ". 
Pol. Corr. XII 427. 
2 Pol. Corr. XIII 105 -6. 
3 Pol. Corr. XII 469; XIII 152, 215. 
4 Koser I 598-9. 
5 Mitchell to Newcastle 30 July in Add. MSS. 32866 f 313; cf. 
Mitchell to Holderness 23 July S.P.F. Prussia 65. 
Unfortunately the interposition of the British government was of 
1 
the feeblest description. The King alone, actuated by jealousy of 
the possible aggrandisement of Prussia2 and fear that Hanover would 
be left at the mercy of France while Prussia was engaged with the 
two Imperial Courts, wished to make a resolute attempt to restrain 
Frederick.3 Owing to Frederick's reticence it was not until some 
time after the Prussian invasion of Saxony that the British gov- 
4 
ernment was informed of the actual plan of campaign, and they may 
therefore be absolved entirely from complicity in this criminal 
blunder; but they had ample warning of the projected Prussian 
offensive and made no very resolute attempt to prevent it. To 
satisfy the conscience of his ally Frederick agreed to ask the 
Empress Queen for an assurance that she did not intend to attack 
him, - a fatuous proceeding which played into the hands of Kaunitz. 
But he refused to make any substantial alteration of his plans and 
when Mitchell urged that British influence at Petersburg was 
reviving, he argued that though Bestuzhev might quite probably 
prevent Russia's accession to the first treaty of Versailles, this 
would not prevent the launching of an Austro- Russian attack against 
Prussia in 1757.5 On this fundamental point Frederick's declarations 
are in manifest contradiction with his subsequent acts, since he 
behaved for months after the invasion of Saxony as if he believed 
tturas still possible for British influence to prevent Russia 
co-operating against him as a principal, even perhaps as an auxil- 
iary. If Frederick believed that British influence .after his 
1 Holderness to Mitchell 13 July, 6 August; Llichell's reports 
in Pol. Corr. XIII 247 -8, 311. Subsequent despatches were 
slightly more vigorous in tone but arrived too late at 
Berlin to modify Frederick's decision. 
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke 11 October in Add. MSS. 32867 f 200. 
3 Hardwicke to Newcastle 18 July in Add. MSS. 32865 f 208. 
4 Mitchell to Holderness, Very secret, 30 August. 
5 Pol. Corr. XIII 127, 193. 
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ruthless behaviour in Saxony might still secure Russian neutrality 
how much greater would the chance of success hace been had 
Frederick remained on the defensive? 
The remaining factor which must be examined in an analysis of the 
European situation in the summer of 1755 is the attitude of France, 
after the conclusion of the first treaty of Versailles, to the 
prospect of a continental war. At the court of Versailles the 
Pompadour influence, which was in the ascendant at the beginning 
of 1750,1 certainly did not diminish during the summer of that year. 
The Pompadour's enthusiasm for the Austrian alliance was due chiefly 
to her desire to avoid a continental war which would separate her 
2 
from the King, and might prove as disastrous to her influence and 
osition as the Austrian Succession War had proved to her prede- 
cessor. Her interests therefore were now opposed to the further 
designs of Austria and Stahremberg automatically lost his most 
powerful coadjutor, although she remained on excellent terms with 
him and gave him general assurances of her desire to maintain and 
strengthen the Franco- Austrian alliance. According to Stahremberg's 
mn despatches he could expect no support from the Council. 
trgenson, the war minister and the ablest and most experienced 
umber of the Council, was resolutely Prussophil; Rouillé, the 
foreign minister, was timid and irresolute but anxious to avoid a 
breach with Prussia and inclined therefore to find objections to 
the Austrian alliance; Machault, Minister of Marine, a protégé of 
the Pompadour and the enemy of Argenson, and therefore at first 
favourably disposed to the Austrian alliance, was now inclined to 
Pol. Corr. XII 140, 424; Luynes, Li-17 j 
Argenson, M" 13, 1 gis -(, . 
2 Pol. Corr. XII 424; /lit-.-50w Ig I't 




and make difficulties, chiefly because a continental 
4 
gar would fatally hamper his ambitious naval plans; while little 
assistance could be expected from the fourth member, Saint 
Florentin. Even the defensive alliance with Austria was unpopular 
in the country and especially among the army officers, who were 
always influential at court and had spokesmen in the inner circle 
of Louis XV's intimates. 
!'oreover, the great advantage, according to Bernis,2 which the 
iustrian negotiators had possessed was the threat that if France did 
riot accept their overtures they would join the enemies of France. 
le first treaty of Versailles prevented the further use of this 
Threat, since Austria had bound herself to remain neutral in the 
? ranco- British struggle. To use the threat now would awake in an 
cute form the suspicions naturally retained by France of the 
sincerity of her new friend and fling away the substantial gains 
itch Austria had obtained from the first treaty of Versailles. 
Iunitz and Stahrember; although they still, in contrast to the 
:rifting and by no means unanimous policy of France, possessed the 
great advantage of a clearly defined objective, no longer held the 
hip hand. 
here can be no doubt of the sincerity of the assurances, with 
shich Rouillé accompanied his communication of the first treaty of 
lersailles to Knyphausen and other ministers, that the great aim 
sIFrance in concludin5; the treaty had been to preserve the peace 
ßthe continent, which seemed to the French government more 
riously threatened than ever by British intrigues since Britain 
Pol. Corr. XIII 61j T 32. 1. 
Memoires I 264. 
1 
wdproved so unsuccessful at sea. Continental war would involve 
7 
the 
curtailment of French efforts against Britain.- Least of all 
mad the interests of France be served by the annihilation of 
?russia for which Kaunitz instructed Stahremberg to press, since 
tis would allow Austria to recover her hegemony in Germany and 
gravely weaken the lesser German states, on which France depended 
for the maintenance of her Westphalian role,3 which she had 
rpressly safeguarded in the first treaty of Versailles and had no 
Intention of abandoning. 
?henegotiation, therefore, which followed the ratification of the 
first treaty of Versailles4 made little if any progress for two 
:onths, and the divergence of views between France and Austria 
:ecame manifest. Louis XV intended to make Austria give him a 
thstantial bribe in the Netherlands for promising merely not to 
mist Prussia against the two Imperial Courts; Austria demanded 
ilitary co- operation and subsidies, insisted that Prussia must 
otmerely be made to disgorge Silesia and Glatz but must be part- 
itioned, and offered in the Netherlands much less than France 
Oseted.5 
einclination of the French Council was at first opposed even to 
;o1ng as far as the King was prepared to go to meet Austria's 
fishes; but Frederick's restiveness, as evidenced by his threats 
einst the senatorial party in Sweden,e his increasingly close 
i Pol. Corr. XIII 133. 
2 Pol. Corr. XII 412 -3; Lodge 91. 
3 cf. Lodge 91; ;Waddington Louis XV 529. 
4 Details in Arneth IV 464 -73; '+ addington Louis XV 464 -77. 
Practically the only primary authority is the Kaunitz- 
Stahremberg correspondence and after their brilliant success 
in securing the first treaty of Versailles they were 
naturally optimistic and inclined to underestimate 
difficulties. 
5 Waddington Louis XV 466. 
6 Pol. Corr. XII 293 -4; XIII 129. 
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relations with Britain, and finally rumours of his military 
preparations, caused a change in the atmosphere at the French court 
each was at once noted by the Swedish envoy: 
"[The French Court seem to be convinced that the Court of Vienna 
may with the assistance of Russia very easily execute their plans 
against Prussia and reduce H.P.M. within his ancient bounds 
again without a general war being to be apprehended on that 
account.... The plan of the Court of Vienna is not of a nature to 
be immediately carried into execution partly because of the 
engagements which still subsist between France and the King of 
Prussia, and partly because the Court of Vienna by manifesting 
their resolution too soon might raise doubts in H.T. C.T. of the 
sincerity of their pacific professions. It is probable however 
that the present situation of affairs will lead sooner or later 
to the Court of Vienna's end and they are endeavouring in the 
meantime by all possible ways and insinuations to increase the 
coolness between this court and the Kind; of Prussia, to which his 
own conduct and his connecting himself more closely to England 
may very much contribute." 
Even now Stahremberg had to reject a Note containing the French 
proposals, which had been discussed in Council and approved by the 
King, on the ground that, although it accepted in principle an 
Austrian attack on Prussia in the belief that this would not lead 
to a general war, the offers of French assistance were so guarded 
and the rewards demanded for this derisory assistance so exor- 
bitant that he could not submit it to his court. The contention 
that France had agreed, before the invasion of Saxony, to attack 
Prussia rests entirely on Stahrember3's report of a series of 
confidential and quite unofficial discussions between himself and 
Perris, the leader of the Austrophil party, during the court's 
2 
residence at Compiegne in August. Bernis in his Memoirs expressly 
(tellies this and contends that on the French side the obligations 
of the projected offensive alliance were intended to come into 
torce only if Prussia had previously broken the peace of Aix. Thus 
1 Bunge to Höpken (intercepted) 25 June in Add. MSS. 32865 
f 425. 
2 I 285 -7. 
9 
the proposed accord between France and Austria would have been an 
exact parallel to the treaty of the two empresses of 1746. It is 
true that Stahremberg certainly did not understand that there was 
this preliminary condition to the execution of the arrangements he 
and Bernis elaborated together in the August evenings of 1755, but 
this misunderstanding might easily arise in informal discussions. 
Even if Bert-lists contention is rejected as an ex ?post facto attempt 
towhitewash his own character and policy, there is apparently no 
evidence that the points of Stahrem berg' s programme informally 
accepted by Bernis had the approval of Louis XV and it is clear 
that they had not been sanctioned by the Council. And even if we 
assume that the King, who though indolent was not devoid of 
intelligence, and the mistress, who was well aware of what the 
consequences of a land war might be to her own position, had actually 
approved, and that the Council would not have ventured to oppose the 
Wad will,» it must be pointed out that there were still some 
points of divergence between Stahremberg, and Bernis which would 
certainly have postponed and might ultimately have prevented the 
ttainment of Kaunitz's ends. Thus even the complaisant abbe 
refused to allow a French auxiliary corps to act against Prussia, 
clthough he was willing to place at the disposition of the Empress 
3ueen 25,0 ̂ 0 to 30,000 German mercenaries, and in addition to pay 
aonetary subsidies. Another point in dispute was the partial or 
complete repayment of these subsidies, should Maria Theresa fail to 
recover Silesia and Glatz and the transfer of the Netherlands, which 
In this very despatch of 20 August in which Stahremberg 
announces with unjustified optimism the virtual conclusion 
of the accord Kaunitz desired with France, he admits that 
Rouill6's jealousy of Bernis "cause actuellement plus 
d'embarras et plus de confusion que jamais ". (Arneth IV 558). 
Q cc o r di.ti 11- p... s m1(GC 301,-7) c"--A fee, ,4a..Lc- n....s -A Í I m C [J 
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gas conditional on this, accordingly not take place; while there 
was still a wide gap between the share of the Netherlands de- 
.nandea by France, as ui s 6inc L. from the share to be assigned to 
Don philip and his wife, anti the share offered by Austria. 
Further, anu this lends colour to Bemis's contention, Bernie nad 
not yet consented to the partition of rrussia by a Hostile 
coalition ana even Stahremberg believed that it would be impract- 
icwóle to secure France' s t ̂ ,ri t,ten consent and advised Kaunitz 
to dispense wi Ln it, since :!-3ernit:5 had. already aromi sec. so mucn 
that Austrian success was assured. Further, there is no evidence 
that France naa abandoned her demand that Austria should assist 
her against Britain if she assisted Austria against Prussia. 
Finally, Stahremberg carefully concealed the fact that Russia, 
the third member of the proposed coalition, expected territorial 
randisement as well as subsidies as the reward for her services, 
but with the resumption of diplomatic relations between Russia and 
?rance, France's discovery of this, to her, extremely unpleasant 
retension, was merely a matter of time. 
the Bernis and Stahremberg were striving to bridge the differ - 
laces between France and Austria, Rouill6, alarmed by the mil- 
itary preparations of Prussia and Austria, was earnestly trying 
to avert war. Throughout 1756 Knyphausen, one or the ablest of 
?Magian üiplomati sts, 1 and on good terms vvi tai influential 
tasters, courtiers, and soldiers at Versailles, had sought to 
onvince his master that the only safe policy for Prussia was to 
lain on the defensive, since to begin a war on the continent 
oald complete the alienation of France from Prussia, force 
cf. Tuttle II Igo. 
4rance to send at least 24,0vù auxiliaries to the Empress Queen, 
and would probably offend France so gravely that she would enter 
flnoleheartedly into the Austrian schemes for the partition of 
Prussia. When Prussian armaments became notorious the envoy's 
conjectures became certainties. Rouillé twice warned him that 
France, if Prussia attacked Austria, would assist the Empress 
1 
ueen. These warnings were conveyed in a more ofricial manner to 
2 
!rederick at Berlin by Valori on 26 July and repeated on 2 August. 
!lough on each occasion the warning was given in the friendliest 
cossible manner, and was accompanied by assurances that Prussia 
ad nothing to fear if she abstained from aggression, the inter - 
ention of France to support the advice of his own ministers and 
'ae humble entreaties of Britain had an irritating and not, as 
3 
rance had hoped, a calming influence on Frederick. 
ewarning was categorical; Frederick deliberately ignored it and 
seam actually to have aeluded himself into the belief that France 
ght not take up arms even in defence of Saxony, against which 
Late he had now decided to launch his first attack. Tais aecision) 
e partly to Frederick's experience in the Austrian Succession 
sr of the double -dealing of Saxony but chiefly to strategic 
,axons, which were indeed overwhelmingly in favour of the occup- 
ation of Saxony before attempting to conquer Bohemia, was an 
'ditionai blunder. Frederick's unprovoked attack upon a neigh- 
tiring state seemed to justify Kaunitz's argument that Prussian 
ressiveness was a standing menace to European peace and drove 
nee to accept Austria' s scheme for' "the partition of Prussia. 
Pol. Corr. XIII 128 -3 Bunge to Höpken 15, 22 July (intercepted) in Add. MSS. 32866 f 185, : 243. 
2 Pol. Corr. XIII 133, 169; Valori II 121 -8. 
3 Mitchell to Holderness 3U July S. P.F. Prussia. 
4 Pol. Corr. XIII 341. 
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Worse still, since the elector of Saxony' s daughter was the wife 
of the Dauphin while Saxony was regarded by Russia as a client 
state, Frederick's invasion and. brutal treatment of Saxony gave 
1 
Russia and France a common grievance against him, which overcame 
the obstacles which had hitherto retarded and might perhaps have 
prevented the co- operation of Russia and France. Immediately the 
Prussian invasion of Saxony was known at Petersburg, instructions 
were sent to Bektyeev to inform the French court of the indig- 
-cation with which the Tsaritsa regarded Prussian treatment of 
the electorate. "Nous aurons ", the rescript continued "une 
satisfaction particulière d' agir en cela [ i. e. in regard to 
Saxony) de concert avec Sa Majte T.C. ne doutant nullement 
qu'Elle n'assiste efficacement ces deux Puissances Austria and 
Saxony] si injustement attaquges... hand will employ toutes ses 
forces pour lui LSaxonyj procurer une satisfaction éclatante et 
convenable. Que si les desseins de Sa Majeste T.C. s'accordoient 
en cela avec les Notres cela seul rendra Notre union avec Elle 
invariable, independament de tout autre engagement et que 
d'avance Nous faisons dé já fond la dessus. "2 
France fully shared these sentiments and expressed her readiness 
to co- operate with Russia.3 Frederick had hoped by a reckless 
coup de main to prevent the creation of an anti- Prussian coal- 
ition, or if, as he pretended to believe, it was already 
formed, to dissolve it. The actual result of nis acLi.on was to 
cement the coalition he intended to destroy. 
4 
Tne formai,ion of the league for the partition of Prussia does 
not exhaust the disastrous consequences which followed from Fred- 
Brick's foolish attack on Saxony. Frederick's action was tant- 
-amount to the repudiation of the convention of Westminster.5 It 
brought about the invasion of Germany by French troops to fulfil 
France's duty as a guarantor of i.he Imperial Constitution and 
1 Lodge 94. 
2 A.E. Rus si e 51 f 366. 
3 Pol. Corr. XIII 424 -5. 
4 Waddington Louis XV 527. 
5 Lodge 95 -6. 
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lade it impossible for rrussia, involved by Frederick in a war 
with the three great powers of the continent, to assist in the 
defence of Hanover. He thus risked losing the support of Britain 
and for months the British decision hung in the balance. Fort - 
.mately for Frederick, Newcastle and most of his colleagues 
grossly overratea the strength of Prussia and expected the 
assistance of 11,000 Prussian troops for the defence of Hanover1 
at a time when Prussia was at war with the whole forces of the 
(sperial Courts, backed by Saxony and by French and German 
auxiliary forces. Their chief fear therefore was that the King 
would disavow, if he did not actually denounce, Prussian action 
and throw over Prussia, "our only ally". 
2 
So great was their fear that it loosened the purse strings and 
tel offered, if the King who continued "in the utmost 
easiness at Frederick's "violent proceedings "3in Saxony, did 
sot dissociate himself from Prussia, to allow him to conclude 
rzbsidy treaties with any German princelings whose troops were 
411 available for the defence of Hanover, the whole expenses 
be paid by Britain.4 Frederick's ill treatment of the Polish 
royal family greatly accentuated George II' s "uneasiness" and 
ven Prussian victories, which the ministers hailed with jubil- 
ation, had a doable -edged effect upon the King. After the battle 
1 Meals. for the King, dated 12 September, in Add. MSS. 
32867 f 28u; Waddington Sept Ans 16+x. 
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke 16 September in Add. MSS. 32867 
f 317; cf. Hardwicke to Newcastle 19 September in Add. MSS. 
32867 f 339: "Your Grace judges rightly we ought to be 
very cautious not to disoblige the King of Prussia, the 
only ally from whom we can hope for any relief ". cf. 
Ruville II 38 -9. 
3 Holderness to Newcastle 20 September in Add. MSS. 32867 
f 345 . 
4 Mems. for the King, dated 12 September, in Add. US. 
3286-r f 286; Waddington Sent Arts I 160. 
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1 
of Lobositz Newcastle reported to Hardwicke: "I found the King 
at first much pleased with this success: but in discourse many 
things passed which I didn't like - great apprehensions of 
future increase of the King of Prussia's power:- expecting 
advantages for himself as the King of Prussia would certainly 
have new acquisitions from the war: and in short that things 
;light go to that degree that the King himself might call in France 
against the King of Prussia in the Empire." 
In these circumstances the overtures of kaunitz, who was seeking 
to complete the isolation of "Prussia, for the neutrality of 
Hanover had a fascination for the King and the Hanoverian min- 
-asters. Once again the British ministers came into conflict 
with the King since, glad as they would have been to get rid of 
the burden of defending Hanover, they knew that the conditions 
attached to the offer would fatally alienate the king of Prussia, 
2 
our only ally". It was not until months after the invasion of 
Saxony that the British point of view wa. s finally adopted by our 
Hanoverian King,3 and meantime the Anglo- _r°russian entente 
by a c,hread. 
Frederick's action is probably to be explained by the idea that 
Ma single campaign, before France and Russia could interfere, 
he might crusn the forces of Saxony and of Austria and force 
these two irreconcilable enemies of Prussia to conclude peace. 
'This shows an exaggerated opinion of his own ability and a serious 
underrating of the military strength and political resolution of 
his antagonists. An even more fundamental criticism of Frederick's 
statecraft at this crisis in his career is that he allowed himself 
to be carried away by military considerations4- particularly that 
1 11 October in Add. MSS. 32668 f 2CU, partly printed in 
Yorke II 318. 
2 Hardwicke to Newcastle 11, 12 October in hdd. MSS. 32868 
f 203; f 221. 
3 Waddington Sept Ans I 174 -94. 
4 Waddington Louis XV 526. 
1 5 . 
Prussia was ready for war while her enemies were not, and even by 
academic theories - particularly that an offensive war is the 
only kind of war which can be profitably carried on. The 
pernicious influence of Winterfeldt - a typical Prussian milit- 
1 
.arist who loved war for its own sake - combined witn Frederick's 
impetuous and headstrong character rendered fruitless tn.e 
endeavours alike of his own ministers and diplo=matists and of 
hie old and new ally to convince him of his folly. He persisted 
in walking into the trap set for him by the greatest of eighteenth 
century diplomatists - the Imperial Chancellor Kaunitz, whose 
foresight, circumspection, and perseverance in the face of 
apparently overwhelming difficulties were at last deservedly 
crowned with success. 
1 Tuttle II 2¡?2 -3. 
CHAPTER XIV. 
Petersburg: Russia's decision (September 1756 -March 1758) 
Williams invites Russian mediation between Prussia and Austria - 
Rejection of his proposal - Russian indignation at Prussian treatment 
of Saxony - Dilatory reply of Russia to British offers to begin a 
fresh negotiation for Russian assistance against France - Attitude 
of Russia towards Britain - Change in the character of Williams's 
mission after the Prussian invasion of Saxony - Irresolution and 
declining influence/of the Great Chancellor - Quarrels between him and 
Williams - Williams's work as a Prussian agent - Accession of Russia 
to the first treaty of Versailles - Arrangements for Austro- Russian 
military and political cooperation against Prussia - Ministerial 
crisis in Britain - Williams openly champions Prussian interests at 
Petersburg - His second proposal for Russian mediation - Its con- 
sequences - Williams applies for his recall - Other causes of friction 
between Britain and Russia - Frederick urges that Williams should 
remain at Petersburg - Williams's last months at Petersburg - His 
activities at Stockholm and Copenhagen - His return to England - 
Arrest of Bestuzhev and submission of the Grand Duchess to the Empress - 
Conclusion. 
6 
The Prussian attack on Austria and Saxony ended automatically the 
irresolution of the court of Petersburg. Williams was under no 
1 
delusions on this point and when he discovered that his warnings to 
Prussia not to take the offensive would in all probability arrive 
too late, he resolved to make use of Frederick's offer to accept 
2 
Russian mediation between himself and Austria. Russia's acceptance 
of this offer seemed to Williams to afford the last possible chance 
of preventing Russian support of Austria. 
Needless to say this overture was contemptuously rejected by the 
Empress. Prussia's military preparations were already known at Peters- 
-burg3- as was also the second Prussian note to Austria which openly 
accused Russia of having formed an offensive alliance with Austria in 
January,1756, and then added insult to injury by attributing the non - 
4 
execution of the project to the military inefficiency of Russia. This 
naturally provoked a fresh outburst of imperial indignation and 
Williams added fuel to the flames by informing the Vice Chancellor of 
his opinion of what "the consequences of this war [between Austria and 
Prussia might be to Russia n ,soft& Voronzov represented to the Empress 
that Williams's action was a threat to coerce her to accept the invit- 
ation to mediate lest she too should be attacked by Prussia. But these 
royal and ambassadorial blunders did not seriously affect the Russian 
decision. Klingraffen's proceedings at Vienna clearly meant war and a 
Tar of the kind for which Kaunitz had schemed since 1753 - a defensive 
xar. Prussia was now, save for a somewhat precarious entente with 
1 Mitchell to Williams 28 August in Add. MSS. 6805 f 9b. 
2 Williams to Holderness 11 September. 
3 As early as 27 August there were rumours at Petersburg of a 
battle in Moravia between Austria and Prussia (Catherine to 
Williams 27 August 0.S. Goriainow 87.) 
4 Williams to Mitchell 7 September. 
5 Williams to Holderness 11 September. 
2. 
3ritain, isolated in Europe. The day of vengeance had dawned and 
the two Empresses were free to execute their long cherished plan 
of campaign against Prussia. Williams was therefore informed that 
the Empress would not mediate between Austria and Prussia but as 
the quarrel was entirely begun on the Prussian side shw would fulfil 
1 
her engagements to the Empress Queen. 
By this time it was known at Petersburg that Frederick had launched 
his armies not against Austria, but against Saxony which had become 
under Brühl almost a client state of Russia. The Empress's indig- 
o 
.nation knew no bounds.` Orders were immediately given for military 
and naval preparations for a diversion against Prussia3 and the 
Empress even spoke of taking command in person of the Russian 
armies in the field. 
4 
Assurances were sent to Dresden and Vienna 
that Russia would support them with all her forces. 
he confusion into which Frederick's invasion of Saxony threw the 
ssian court delayed still further the Russian reply to the over- 
tures Williams had made to the Chancellors at the conference of 26 
fly but hardly, if at all, modified its contents. The Empress 
,efused to receive the first instalment of the smbsidy under the 
Convention of September, 17556 which, being based on a misunder- 
standing between the contracting parties, had become obsolete owing 
1 Williams to Holderness 18 September; Williams to Mitchell 18 
September in Add. MSS. 6824 f 22; copy of the Russian note 
printed in Arneth V 477 note 79. 
2 v. her remarks to Esterhazy in Arneth V 477 note 75. 
3 Williams to Holderness 14 September, 28 September and 28 
September Private. 
4 Catherine to Williams 6 September 0.S. Gorialnow 121. 
5 Williams to Holderness 21 September, 28 SeptemberjArneth V 
49 -51. 
6 Williams had been very pressing that the Russian government 
should receive the instalment in the belief that once this 
was accepted Russia would be bound to Britain; his government 
disapproved of his eagerness to pay over the instalment without 
definite assurances that Russia accepted the British interpretatio] 
of the convention:- Holderness to Williams 24 September 12 
November) 31 December. 
3 
to the changed condition of Europe. She did not however expressly 
denounce the treaty of subsidy,but declared that she had already 
sent instructions to Galitzin to negotiate with the British min- 
isters for an additional sum to be given for forage in case the 
Russian troops marched to defend Hanover. If this and other points, 
including the renewal of the treaty of defensive alliance of 1742 
and the making of a treaty between the Empress and the elector of 
Hanover,were satisfactorily adjusted the Empress would accept the 
first instalment of subsidy. To soften the dissatisfaction of the 
British government, which had declared that it would regard delay as 
equivalent to a refusal the Chancellors informed Williams that they 
sere now ready to negotiate with him the renewal of the treaty of 
1 
commerce. The Russian government, therefore, using the option 
offered to them by Holderness and Newcastle had chosen to negotiate 
atLondon rather than at Petersburg, chiefly no doubt to gain time; 
and the vagueness of Newcastle's overtures much facilitated the 
attainment of their aims. Despite the assurances given to Williams, 
,alitzin had been instructed merely to find out the details of 
ewcastle's scheme and report them to his court which would then 
give its reply to Williams.2 
This reply - the main lines of which had been laid down before the 
Russian government anticipated an immediate outbreak of war - in- 
dicates that the Russian government had not at that time reached a 
final decision between Britain and France. Their desire was 
obviously to spin out the negotiation until the general situation 
1 Williams to Holderness 28 September. The Russian government 
was alread 
y 
w ne otiati -with Douglas on commerce. (Rouillé 
to Douglas 4 SeptemB6F; ussie supplément 8 f 373 ; 
Williams to Holderness 28 September secret / France.) 
2 IJlémoire dated 1 October of a conversation with Galitzin 




of Europe had become clearer. The outbreak of war on the continent, 
although it made little essential change in the letter of the 
answer, changed its spirit completely. Russia's attitude was now 
decided to all intents and purposes, but even now she had no desire 
to commit herself to French antagonism to Britain, and the Vice 
Chancellor offered Williams the good offices of his court to dis- 
suade France from attacking Hanover. The Empress herself was 
anxious to draw a distinction between the interests of Prussia and 
those of Britain and seems to have entertained the hope that 
Prussian frightfulness in Saxony might cause a reaction in Britain 
iagainst Prussia 
3 
and destroy the entente between Britain and 
Prussia before it could harden into an alliance. Williams's answer 
to her insinuations of this possibility must,however have dashed any 
hopes she may have entertained. In the new circumstances therefore the 
intention underlying the Russian reply was to annul the treaty of 
subsidy with the minimum hurt to British self esteem. This would 
leave her free to concentrate her forces against Prussia and to 
enter into subsidiary engagements with France. If possible, Russia 
could conciliate Britain and at the same time secure a greater con - 
centration of forces against Prussia 
4 
by dissuading France from 
an attack on Hanover, but she had no intention of guaranteeing 
ianover from French attack if France insisted on attacking it. Thus 
1 The Russian government was pressing Austria to give a definite 
reply to the overtures made in April (Esterhazy's reports of 
17, 26 August in Arneth V 49.) 
2 Williams to Holderness 28 September. 
3 Williams to Holderness 2 October, reporting a conversation 
with the Empress. 
4 These were the underlying motives of the joint Austro- Russian 
attempts in 1757 to arrange for the neutrality of Hanover on 
conditions which varied from time to time, e.g. the least 
offensive being that George II did not support Prussia against 
her enemies, and the most objectionable being that George II 
allowed French, troops to traverse his electorate. (Williams to 
Holderness 8 January; Holderness to Williams 15 February; 
Williams to Holderness 20 January) 8 February) 22 March; Pol. 
Corr. XIV 446 -7; Waddington Sept Ans 1 174 -95.) 
5 
Russia at first proposed that since France desired the exclusion of 
the Ottoman Porte from the Russian accession to the treaty of 
1 
Versailles, France should make a similar exception of Hanover, 
but when France refused, Russia gave way without much difficulty. 
Frederick's invasion of Saxony, since it ended the irresolution of 
the court of Russia, altered fundamentally the character of 
Williams's work at Petersburg. "The King of Prussia" Williams wrote 
has passed the Rubicon and all my business is to inform your 
2 
lordship what steps this court is taking against him ". Henceforth 
his duties as British ambassador were overshadowed by his work as 
a Prussian spy. His main task in this new capacity was to bribe the 
Great Chancellor to abandon his life -long hostility towards Prussia. 
Frederick sent him 100,000 crowns for this purpose 
3 
along with an 
additional 10,000 ducats for distribution among the confidants of 
the Chancellor. He was the less likely to be successful in this 
task because at the beginning of September W4...1.1.4.941Q.4 suspicions 
of Bestuzhev's secret hostility and Bestuzhev's jealousy of 
;Rimg43+6' influence with the Grand Duchess resulted in violent A 
1 Despatch to Douglas 27 November A.E. Russie 51 f 102. 
2 Williams to Holderness 28 September, Private. 
3 Frederick to Mitchell 2, 4, September in Add. MSS. 6843 f 15, 
f 17; Mitchell to Williams 4 September in Add. MSS. 6805 
f 24. 
4 Frederick to Mitchell 17 October in Add. MSS. 6843 f 33; 
Mitchell to Williams 24 October in Add. MSS. 6806 f 11. 
5 "I1 me tend des piéges sur toutes choses tous les jours" 
Williams wrote to Catherine (8 September O.S. Goria`inow 126). 
It is clear that by this time Williams was suffering from 
"persecution mania ". cf. Poniatowski 152, 220. His 
subsequent despatches show signs of incoherence, but this 
is largely to be explained by the extraordinarily unstable 
position at Petersburg. (cf. Swart's despatches in 
La Cour de Russie 83 ff .) 
6. 
1 
altercations between them in one of which the Chancellor had act- 
ually urged Williams to ask for his recall,--a material fact 
which Williams concealed from his own government. 
Two incidents may be mentioned in order to illustrate the increasing 
friction between the Great Chancellor and the British ambassador. 
Forseeing the futility of the Grand Duke's protest against the 
exchange of ambassadors with France, Bestuzhev tried to persuade 
him to give way before the Empress's anger was aroused2; but Williams 
foolishly used his influence over Catherine to stiffen the Grand 
Duke's feeble resistance and thus aroused j uite uselessly,the 
Empress's anger3at this attempt to oppose her wishes, not only ag- 
-ainst the Grand Duke but against Bestuzhev and Britain. A few weeks 
later when Bestuzhev found it difficult to secure the return of 
Poniatowski to Petersburg, Williams urged Catherine to make it a 
test case of the Chancellor's loyalty and strove to impress upon 
Catherine the contrast between his own single- hearted devotion and 
Bestuzhev's lukewarmness by offering, it is to be hoped for his own 
honour insincerely, to destroy the credit of Bestuzhev with the 
4 
British government if he did not comply with Catherine's demands. 
Williams therefore was heavily handicapped in his attempt to convert 
the Great Chancellor to friendship with Prussia. Again and again he 
broached the subject to the Chancellor, who told him quite frankly 
°that [Frederick's precipitate march had not only disconcerted 
all his [ Bestuzhev's] schemes but had thrown this court into such 
a rage against His Prussian Majesty that it was impossible at 
1 Williams to Catherine 6,9 September O.S. Goriainow 122, 137. 
2 Bestuzhev to Catherine enclosed in Catherine's letter to 
Williams of 18 August O.S. 
3 Catherine to Williams 11 August O.S. Goriainow 33 -4. 
4 Williams to Catherine 11 September O.S. Goriainow 150. 
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1 
resent to say one word in his favour." Williams reports of a 
,ter more convivial meeting: "On dit que le vin fait sortir la 
srite; si cela est, il [Bestuzheg est furieusement autrichien et 
acore plus saxon."2 Williams however did not despair- especially 
hen Bestuzhev showed his fear that Frederick would make revelations 
f his intrigues from the Saxon archives,' and actually pretended 
hat the delay in the preparations of the Russian troops was de- 
liberately contrived by him.5 Although the retention of Bestuzhev's 
ervices was essential to British interests, Williams failed to 
,ppreciate the decline of the Great Chancellor's influence and be- 
lieved that his reconciliation with Peter Shuvalov ° - partial and 
.nsincere as it was on both sides - was a sign of strength, not,as 
.n fact it was,of weakness. At the moment Bestuzhev, although his 
'Lnfluence might still revive, was not in a position to direct the 
larch of events at Petersburg. His superiority over the Empress was 
gone and the remnants of his influence were being rapidly destroyed 
by his enemies; Funcke, his confidential secretary and in some 
measure director, had been recalled from Petersburg; above all he 
1 Williams to Holderness Private 28 September; cf. Williams 
to Holderness 12 October. 
2 Williams to Catherine 1 October 0.5. Goriainow 157. cf. 
Poniatowski 191. 
3 Williams to Mitchell 26, 28 September in Add. MSS. 6864 
f 30 and f 31. 
4 Catherine to Williams 23 October O.S. Goriainow 221; Williams 
to Mitchell 2 November in Add. MSS. 6824 f 58; Mitchell to 
Williams 20 November (Newport Papers); Pol.Corr.XIII 413,455. 
5 Williams to Holderness 19 October. 
b Williams to Catherine 20 August O.S. Goriainow 55 -6; Williams 
to Catherine 28 August 0.,S. Goriainow 94. The chief motive on 
the Shuvalov side was apparently the idea that the Chancellor 
controlled the Grand Duchess. Since their attempts to reach a 
direct understanding with her had failed they now hoped to 
insure themselves against the death of the Empress by an 
agreement with the Chancellor. (Williams to Catherine 9, 10 
September. O.S. Goriainow 137 -8, 142 ff. ) 
7 Williams to Catherine 14 October 0.S. Goriainow 202. 
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no longer the advantage over his enemies which a clearly defined 
etem ", pursued even by the most tortuous methods, gives. Best - 
hev was undoubtedly tempted by the Anglo- Prussian offers of 
bes and pensions which far exceeded anything he had hitherto 
eived, but he knew well the instability of his position and the 
emence of the Empress's hatred of Prussia,which he himself had 
nted in her breast and assiduously watered. Moreover he had a 
uine repugnance to abandon his life -long hostility to Prussia, 
ugh this was weakened by the fact that he had to choose between 
endship with Prussia and friendship with his other enemy, France. 
drifted therefore with the torrent. "Neither he nor anyone else 
this Court" he told Williams "dared at present attempt to per - 
ode the Empress to alter her designs ".1 Sometimeslat the instig- 
'fion of Williams and the Grand Duchess he made feeble attempts to 
3tpone the accession of Russia to the first treaty of Versailles 
ito make difficulties in the Austro-Russian negotiations for 
opepation against Prussia - at others, moved by a desire to re- 
office and its profits,he tried to conciliate the dominant 
zvalovs by submission to their wishes and to extract bribes from 
tria and France by convincing them of his good intentions.3 
liams was more successful in his other attempts to serve his old 
V, the king of Prussia, than in his attempts to bribe Bestuzhev. 
sent full and accurate accounts of the Russian military and naval 
1 Williams to Holderness 12 October. 
2 Arneth V 67. 
3 In the middle of August he had assured Douglas that he would 
do his best to promote the union of Russia and France (Rouille 
to Douglas 4 September A.E. Russie supplément 8 f 373). This 
was probably mere diplomatic courtesy as understood at Peters- 
-burg but later approaches were probably more sincere 
(Waddington Sept Ans Ir Waliszewski 42 5) and certainly more 
fruitful. 
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eparations; prophesied correctly that the Russian armies would not 
able to enter Prussia until June,1757; and employed the Grand 
chess not only to find out from Apra #in, the commander -in- chief, 
,e Russian plans of campaign 
1 
but to try and bribe him to postpone 
aerations against Prussia.2 How far Catherine was successful cannot 
definitely ascertained, but it is obvious that the knowledge of 
le sentiments of the grand ducal couple must, consciously or uncon- 
iously,have had some influence on the actions of Apragin. Further, 
Llliams was on excellent ter_ns3with the Grand Duke Peter and acted 
3the intermediary between the king of Prussia and his "ape" 
4 
the 
rand Duke, while it is at this period that the idea of a triple 
lliance of Britain, Prussia, and Russia first established itself 
gong the political notions of the Grand Duchessa, and predisposed 
,er to accept the Prussian alliance offered by Frederick the Great 
it the end of the Seven Years War. Frederick II was soon to give 
one most convincing proofs of his satisfaction with Williams's ser- 
gives . 
pile Williams was endeavouring to recover his hold over the Great 
lancellor and to use the influence of the Grand Duchess in the 
interests of Britain and Prussia, the first step towards the form- 
ation of the great anti -Prussian coalition had been taken at Peters - 
'burg by the accession of Russia to the first treaty of Versailles. 
urged on by Austria, Rouille had on 14 August sent instructions to 
6 
uglas to invite, in conjunction with Esterhazy, Russia's accession. 
I Catherine to Williams 30 September O.S. Goriainow 185 -6. 
2 Williams to Mitchell 20 January in Add.MSS. 6824 f 122. 
3 See letter from Grand Duke to Williams incorporated in 
Williams's letter to Holderness of 28 September Secret; France. 
4 The phrase is l'Hópital's. 
5 Williams to Holderness Most Secret 28 September. 
Rouillé to Douglas 14 August A.E. Russie suppl4ment 8 f 345. 
Full powers were not sent until 4 September. 
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predominant faction at Petersburg after Frederick's invasion of 
)ny was anxious to accept the invitation ,but difficulties arose 
to the conditions of the Russian accession. The initial diffic- 
ty was the Russian demand for a subsidy of five million roubles. 
nce refused to give any subsidy at all directly to Russia. Then 
ace was suspicious that Russia had some secret engagements with 
tain and was not convinced by mere assurances This second diff- 
ulty was,however.,easily surmounted by the communication to France 
a copy of the declaration secretissime2 A more serious obstacle 
that France was extremely unwillin 3 to sacrifice her ancient 
ies, particularly Poland, Sweden,and Turkey to Russia, while 
Ritz feared that the accession might enable Britain and Prussia 
induce the Porte to attack the two Empresses,especially if the 
d- Russian Poles formed a confederation to resist the march of the 
isian troops across Poland and appealed to the Porte for assist - 
4 
ice. In the end a compromise was arranged - France, recognising 
:necessity for effective Russian co- operation against Prussia, 
ve up her opposition to the Russian violation of Polish territory 
ter receiving assurances, which were soon to prove worthless, 
iatRussia would not abuse this right to the detriment of the lib- 
¡titles of Poland, while she expressly preserved her ancient all- 
'ance with Turkey and insisted that any subsidy Russia received 
at pass through the hands of Austria. Before this solution was 
;ached there had however been friction. French agents in Poland 
1 Douglas to Tercier 26 May/5 June in A.E.Russie supplément 8. 
2 A.E. Russie supplément 9 f 79. 
3 See Broglie's instructions of 25 April, 1757, in Farges II 
190-3. Cf . \Vaddington Sept ns I 1 12 . 
4 Arne th V 55. 
Despatch of 20 November to Douglas in A.E. Russie 51 f 91. 
Rescript to Bektyeev 3n September O.S. in A.E.Russie 51 f 32. 
ntenanced1 if they did not actually stir up the agitation against 
proposed march of Russian troops through Poland and this nat- 
'ally was very badly taken at Petersburg. Still more serious, 
Lglas on 11 January, 1757, was induced by the two Chancellors and 
,erhazy to sign the act of accession by Russia -with a most secret 
l separate clause by which in the event of war between Turkey and 
Isis., France would give no assistance to Turkey beyond the payment 
subsidies. The French government absolutely refused to accept 
.s clause and severely censured Douglas. 
4 
Louis XV in a personal 
Ater to the Empress appealed to her not to insist on the clause 
i the Empress then gave way.5 The union of the three great powers 
Europe was now an accomplished fact, although there was as yet 
offensive treaty against Prussia. 
Altaneously with this negotiation ,however,Russia and Austria had 
an arranging the political and military conditions of their co- 
eration against Prussia . The chief obstacle to agreement here 
sat first Russia's insistence upon territorial aggrandisement. 
e renewed the demand made for the first time in accordance with 
.e resolutions of the council of 25 March, 1755, that the kingdom 
Prussia (i.e. the detached fragment of Hohenzollern territory 
)rming an enclave in Poland and sometimes called East Prussia) 
hould be restored to Poland and that Poland should in exchange 
1 Broglie Secret._du Roi I 150 -1, 224; Waddington Sept Ans I 
113, 116 -7; Broglie apparently warned the Poles of the use- 
-lessness of resisting the Russians; his colleague Durand 
tried to organise opposition to the Russian march.(Ilchester 
and Langford Brooke, Correspondence of Catherine, translated, 
154, 157-8.) 
2 Williams to Holderness 9,1p October; A.E. Russie s.nplements 
8 f 394 and f 419 ,(Rouille to Douglas 17 October); f 8 
tDouglas to Rouille 9 November. 
3 Printed in Martens I 191-201. 
4 Waddington Sept Ans I 121-2. 
5 Vandal Louis XV et Elizabeth 277; Rambaud II 29 -30. 
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urre11aer 
the duchy of Courland to Russia. Atstria was extremely 
vdlling 
to permit the westward extension of the Russian frontiers. 
he feared the growing influence of the House of Romanov in the 
nire and suspected that Russia, aggressive and owing to her enorm- 
ous extent 
of territories invulnerable,would prove an uncomfort- 
ble neighbour to herself. Further at this particular time Austria 
;d a special reason for rejecting Russian schemes of expansion 
cause they would alarm France, still in her heart unswervingly 
posed to the strengthening of Russia which would endanger her 
aient states in eastern Europe, and might induce her to withdraw 
1 
together from the coalition. Finally, if betrayed to Turkey 
ssia's schemes would intensify the alarm of the Porte and of the 
elish "patriots" at the Franco -Austro- Russian alliance and might 
silt' provoke the outbreak of a war in soúth- eastern Europe which 
Auld fatally hamper the Austro- Russian campaign against Prussia. 
spite bf all these objections to the Russian demands Kaunitz 
red not reject then since Russian co- operation was essential. He 
s prepared to accept a compromise (to be kept secret from France) 
which the duchy of Courland, while remaining in theory a fief of 
land, would be added to the Russian empire, while the kingdom of 
uSSia :ould be restored to its feudal dependence on Poland but 
Auld become a secundogenitre of the House of Hapsburg Before 
'ese instructions ,after a delay of over seven months from the date 
f the original Russian proposals; arrived at Petersburg the Russian 
nisters, abandoning their attempts to secure subsidies directly 
om France, had changed their batteries. At first they had actually 
Arneth V 69 and notes. 
2 Arneth V 57 -61. 
3 Arneth V 57. 
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refused to take subsidies from Austria, partly because they under- 
-estimated Russia's financial weakness, but chiefly because they 
were jealous of the intimacy of Austria and France1 and believed 
that to accept subsidies from Austria would reduce still further 
Russia's share in directing the forces of the coalition and weaken 
her claim>to territorial rewards for her exertions. They now treated 
the prospect of Russian territorial expansion as of minor importance 
and pointed out that these gains were conditional on success against 
Prussia. Esterhazy was instructed if possible to compel Russia to 
choose between the subsidy and the conditional promise of Courland. 
This at first proved impossible but he was able, owing to the com- 
-plaisance of his court in regard to Courland, to reduce the pecuniary 
demands of Russia to an annual subsidy of one million roubles - a much 
smaller sum than Kaunitz had dared to hope - and a convention on 
2 
these lines' was signed at Petersburg on 2 February, which bound the 
contracting parties to wage war against Prussia with at least 80,000 
regular troops each, not to treat separately with the common enemy, 
and not to lay down their arms until Maria Theresa had recovered 
Silesia and Glatz. France, Sweden, and Denmark were to be invited to 
accede to the treaty and the partition of Pru sia, laid down as a 
principle in the treaty was to be settled in detail, between theee 
1ersand the king of Poland. The separate and secret declaration 
A 
by which Austria promised to obtain the duchy of Courland or some 
equivalent reward for Russia on the conclusion of peace was annulled 
on the exchange of ratifications. Elizabeth allowed herself to be 
convinced that the declaration by alienating France would certainly 
1 Willias to Holderness 12, 16 October; Waliszewski 425. 
2 Printed in Martens T 201 -212. 
3 Printed by Arneth V 480 note 98. 
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weaken and might even break up the anti -Prussian coalition, and 
accepted in its place an entirely informal promise that Austria as 
a loyal ally on all occasions would advance the interests of the 
Russian empire. 
Thus the negotiation of Russia's accession to the first treaty of 
Versailles and the arrangement of Austro- Russian action had been 
successfully accomplished in each case by a surrender on the part 
1 
of the empress of Russia. Nothing can show more clearly her frantic, 
indignation at the Prussian invasion of Saxony, which had turned her 
former hostility to Prussia into an overmastering passion which 
directed her actions until the day of her death. 
Vhile the anti- Prussian coalition was being formed at Petersburg 
Britain had been in the throes of a ministerial crisis. Fox, who had 
2 
never been comfortable in the Newcastle cabinet and feared to be 
involved in its unpopularity ^the loss of Minorca, accused New- 
-castle of not observing the conditions on which he had consented to 
enter the Cabinet, and announced to the King on 15 October his 
intention of resigning.3 Pitt refused absolutely to act with 
Newcastle ,and an acute ministerial crisis followed which ended in 
the middle of November with the formation of the Pitt- Devonshire 
cabinet, in which Holderness at the express desire of the King 
1 Lavish bribery of the Russian ministers had even now been 
found necessary by Austria and France to secure the speedy con- 
-elusion of their negotiations at Petersburg (Williams to 
Holderness 30 November; Pol. Corr. XIV 184). 
2 Yorke II chapter XXIII - Illustrative Correspondence; Archives 
III 220; Ruville II 51 -53. See also details of a dispute be- 
-tween Fox and his colleagues in Add. MSS. 32866 f 208, f 217, 
f 219. 
3 Yorke II 275, 31 9 
4 Yorke II 326; Williams: Pitt 283. 
5 Ruville II 60, 62. 
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emained as secretary for the Northern Department, while Pitt took 
he Southern Department and supreme control. The new ministry had 
1 
either internal cohesion nor a working majority. It adopted in 
2 
he main the foreign policy of its predecessor against which its 
.eadin& member had inveighed in order to create confusion and force 
its way to office and power. It was however too weak and too much 
)ccupied with domestic intrigues and preparations for the maritime 
Ind colonial war, to arrange for effective co- operation with 
Prussia - still less to make any real impression on the anti -_ 
Prussian sentiments of the King, who disliked its leading member 
and was therefore not inclined to listen to its advice. Holderness 
spoke the truth when he told Newcastle at the very end of 1756: 
"It is but too true my lord that nothing is done and that much 
precious time is lost....I found H.np. more perplexed and less re- 
-solved what tc do than when I saw him last, but less willing than 
ever to enter roundly into measures with the King of Prussia..the 
pusillanimity of the Hanoverian rep ency Lover Austrian and Russian 
proposals of neutrality for Hanover has made a great impression 
this last fortnight 
wring this period of uncertainty Willia.m;2 was left at Petersburg 
Tactically without instructions fro_a his government.4 He had, 
ocvever,no hesitation in following a line of his own. Before the 
Ilnisterial crisis became acute he had received despatches in- 
itructing him to point out to the Russian ministers that Prussia 
a attacking Saxony was really acting on the defensive "lilliams in 
1 H. Fox to 7illiams 26 December in Stowe MSS. 263. 
2 Ruville II 54, 89 -94. 
Holderness to Newcastle 29 December in Add.MSS. 32869 f 422. 
cf. Newcastle to Hardwicke 4 January 1757 in Yorke II 380. 
See on the negotiation for the neutrality of Hanover supra 
chapter XIII p.14- p,t...,( 4t-r Wa.0 4-. 
Williams to Mitchell 4 January 1757 in Add. MSS.6864 f 108. 
Holderness to Williams 8 August. 
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his new found zeal for the king of Prussia went far beyond this. 
Unfortunately for himself, he failed to realise the strength of the 
Empress's indignation against Prussia and believed that when she 
discovered the difficulties and expense of moving her troops her 
crusading zeal would cool rapidly - especially if in the meantime 
Prussia won one or two striking victories at the expense of the 
1 
Saxons and Austrians. Exaggerating the influence of the Great 
Chancellor and the effect of scoffers of money on him, Williams 
became openly the champion of Prussia at the court of Petersburg, 
defended Frederick's indefensible proceedings in Saxony, rejoiced at 
his victories, grossly exaggerated their importance,and expressed 
the opinion that Austria would soon be forced to make a separate 
peace which would leave Russia face to face with the redoubtable 
armies of Prussia, flushed with triumph over the Austrians and 
Saxons- and led by the outstanding military genius of the age. This 
identification of the interests of Britain and Prussia at a court 
notoriously hostile to. Prussia was a gross blunder and is the less 
defensible since Williams had clearly pointed out to Holderness, 
immediately after the Prussian invasion of Saxony, the danger of the 
course which he himself pursued and had emphasised the necessity of 
maintaining in public an "exact neutrality ".4 Naturally the Austro- 
French party at Petersburg made the best use of Williams's indis- 
cretions to arouse the Empress's hostility to Williams himself as 
1 "Depend upon it my lard the tone of this court is quite 
changed since the news of the King of Prussia's victory at 
Lobositz] ": Williams to Holderness 19 October. cf. Williams to 
Holderness 30 October. The Great Chancellor, possibly with the 
treacherous idea of getting rid of his rival in the favour of 
the Grand Duchess,encouraged Williams in his opinion saying 
that the only way to procure peace was for Prussia to win "a 
new and complete victory over the Austrian forces ".(7illiams 
to Holderness 30 October;cf.Williams to Mitchell 28 September 
in Add.MSS. 6824 f 3 1) . 
2 Williams to Catherine 27 September O.S.Goria'irripw 181; Wi,lliams 
to Mitchell 16 October in Add.MSS. 6824 f 46x23 Octobeill f 53. 
3, Williams to Holderness 2 November. 
4 Williams to Holderness 18 September. 
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;11 as to the British government.1 They had an additional weapon 
IWilliams's intimacy with the grand ducal couple and with sub- 
;tantial accuracy attributed to his influence over them the oppos- 
Ltion of the Grand Duke to various measures which lay close to the 
apress's heart.2 
18 November Williams found an unexpected opportunity of putting 
Ls theories to the test. On going to pay a call he found the 
npresss coaches at the door. Before he could get away a messenger 
uramoned him to return to the house, where he had a lengthy con- 
versation with the Empress and also with the favourite. In these 
onversations3 Williams walked blindly into the trap. He reproduced 
is stock defence of Prussian aggression, spoke of "the gentle and 
enerous manner" in which Frederick had treated the electorate of 
axony,and then, encouraged by the apparently favourable reception 
f what he had said,he renewed the proposal for Russian mediation 
ointly with Great Britain between Austria and Prussia, which had 
lready been decisively rejected. Finally,he e= home his proposal 
iyextolling the superiority of Prussian troops, pointing out that 
Lustria would probably be forced to make a separate peace, which 
4 
could have serious consequences for Russia. Williams followed up 
this step by talking in the same strain to both chancellors. "I have" 
1e reported "flattered their vanity with the great figure H.I.7. 
aight make as mediatrix in conjunction with the King: and suffic- 
r 
1ently alarmed their fears with the terror of the Prussian arms ". 
1 Williams to Holderness 23 October. 
2 The Empress was so annoyed at this opposition that the Grand 
Duke was henceforth excluded from the Council.(Catherine to 
Williams 5 November O.S.;Williams to Holderness 9 December) . 
3 Very full accounts in Williamss;,to Catherine 27 October O.S. A- 
Gorialnow 233; Williams to Holderness 9 Nov tuber. 
4 Williams to Holderness 9 November. 
5 Williams to Holderness 13 November. 
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They severally declared that they would propose the mediation to the 
Empress and promised to support the proposition with all their power. 
The insincerity of the Vice Chancellor at least ought to have been 
patent to Williams, since he overacted his part so far as to inquire 
whether "in case the Empress accepted the mediation" Williams would 
write "to His Prussian Majesty's commander in chief in Prussia to 
prevent his coming forward with his army". 
Obviously,the whole incident was due originally to the Empress's 
desire to see for herself how far Williams would go in advocacy of 
Prussian views, and was then exploited by the Shuvalovs to draw 
Williams still further into the trap by renewing officially the 
proposal for Russian mediation. For a few days Williams deluded 
r. 
himself in the idea that his proposal would certainly be accepted 
and justified Frederick's conduct everywhere. He had lost sight 
entirely of the realities of the situation at Petersburg. He be- 
-lieved that Russia would not only accept the task of mediation but 
would refuse to accede to the first treaty of Versailles and told 
the Grand Duchess that if the Great Chancellor would not support him, 
je romps en visiere avec lui, et je pousserai mon jeu ailleurs ". 
For the second time he had been gulled by the Shuvalovs and the Vice 
Chancellor. From his day dreams he was rudely awakened when he 
heard that the Empress publicly censured his conduct,5 saying that he 
had become a Prussian and meddled too much in the king of Prussia's 
affairs. The Shuvalovs and Voronzov at once threw off the mask. 
1 Williams to Holderness 13 November. 
2 Williams to Mitchell 16 November in Add. MSS. 6824 f 62. 
3 Williams to Catherine 1 November O.S. Goriainow 237. 
4 Williams to Catherine 27 October O.S. Goriainow 233. 
5 Catherine to Williams 4 November O.S. Goriainow 243. 
1 
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liams attributes the changed attitude of the Russian court to the 
s of the king of Prussia's troops retiring from Bohemia and going 
o winter quarters "which is" he reports "looked upon as a sort of 
eat to the King of Prussia". 
1 
He refused in his despatches to 
it that he had been duped by the anti -British party at Petersburg 
tried to persuade his government that the step which he had taken 
Lid have been a brilliant success but for circumstances beyond his 
trol. P)1114 He could not conceal from himself that his support of 
IA 
Lssian interests in season and out of season,culmina.ting in this 
h step had compromised his position at Petersburg.2 In future he 
resolved to keep quiet and meddle as little as possibl e at least 3 
.1 he received fresh orders from London. 
.liams's mortification was increased when he received - with 
rorited celerity - a formal Note4 containing the Russian reply to 
overture. This document, drawn up in the strongest language 
isistent with diplomatic terminology, expressed astonishment that, 
'ier the decided negative which he had received on his first prop - 
lal of Russian mediation Williams should have repeated the over- 
, 
we and should actually have tried to coerce Russia to accept it 
threats that Prussia would attack Russia if Russia persisted in 
refusal to mediate.5 The tone of this note and its communication 
a still more offensive commentary to all Russian foreign 
iisters6, confirmed by information he received from the Grand 
1 Williams to Holderness 16, 23 November; Williams to Catherine 
5 November O.S. Goriainow 250. 
2 Douglas to Tercier 27 November A.E. Russie 51 f 106. 
3 Williams to Holderness 16 November. 
4 Dated 23 November 0.S.(appended to Williams's despatch to 
Holderness of 1 December and printed almost in full in Martens 
I 204 
5 Williams denied (to Holderness 9 December) that he had ever 
even thought of using threats, but this is contradicted by the 
language of his own earlier despatches. cf. Williams to 
Catherine 0.S. 1 November Goriainow 236. 
6 Copy in A.E. Russie 51 f 96. 
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Duchess of the personal feelings of the Empress towards him,con- 
1 
vinced him that the Russian givernment would soon demand his recall. 
'o anticipate this demand Williams himself asked to be recalled on 
he ground of bad health. this was no mere pretext.3 For weeks to- 
gether he had been unable to leave his room; his despatches had 
)ecome meagre and self contradictory; the refusal of his second 
)roposal of mediation and the manner of it brought on a complete 
.e 
)reakdown and according to his own account Awas now "almost 
Lncapable of writing or reading ". 
En addition to the displeasure of the Empress and the state of his 
Zealth Williams had another reason for insisting upon his recall, 
since even the Grand Duchess had found it impossible to keep the 
peace between the Chancellor and him. Williams on insufficient 
grounds blamed the Chancellor for arousing the Empress's hostility 
4 
to him, while Bestuzhev complained to Catherine that Williams was 
his enemy - as indeed he was, since more than once he had urged 
upon Catherine the suicidal policy of throwing over the Great 
o 
Chancellor and trusting herself entirely to the Shuvalovs. Fort- 
-unately,before he could push Catherine far along this perilous 
course,the Russian reply to his second mediation proposal convinced 
him that he had once again been the dupe of the Shuvalovs.7 Char- 
-acteristically Williams sought to take a personal revenge upon the 
Great Chancellor for the real or imagined injuries Bestuzhev had 
1 Williams to Catherine 1C November O.S. Goriainow 258. 
/ Williams to Holderness Private 9 December. 
3 Williams to Holderness Private 6 July; Williams to Catherine 
10 November O.S. Goriainow 258, 26 November O.S. Goriainow 
287. 
4 Williams to Catherine 5,6 November O.S. Goriainow 250 -1. 
5 Catherine to Williams 7 November O.S. Goriainow 253. 
6 Williams to Catherine 10 November 0.S. Goriainow 258 -9. 
7 Williams to Catherine 23 November 0.S. Goriainow 284. 
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inflicted upon him; once again Catherine proved his guardian angel 
&nd persuaded him to give up futile intrigues) which could only have 
recoiled on his own head and might have produced a complete rupture 
'Detween Britain and Russia. Suspect to the Empress, hated by the 
Treat Chancellor, despised by the Shuvalovs who advised the Empress 
otreat him "more as a Prussian spy than an English ambassador ", 
d mocked at even by the timid and double -faced Vice Chancellor, 
twas indeed time for Williams to leave Petersburg. He consoled 
imself for his failure with the reflection that once Catherine was 
nthe throne she would at once recall him to Petersburg3 where he 
2 
ould reign, according to Catherine's promise, as "virtual viceroy of 
ssia" . 
is request to be recalled was immediately granted by his government4 
d he was instructed,5 though without any censure of his recent 
onduct, to avoid entering upon business in his audience of leave 
ith the Empress so as not to indispose her still further against 
itain by a parade of his admiration for Prussia. The British min- 
istry had at last realised that the most they could expect from 
ssia, if they insisted upon supporting Frederick II, was bare 
eutrality so far as Britain was concerned. Apart from the odium 
ncurred by Britain as the accomplice of Prussia and increased by 
illiams's injudicious conduct, difficulties had already arisen 
)etween Britain and Russia over Britain's use of her sea power to 
revent contraband being imported into France. This was the more 
erious because Peter Shuvalov and the Vice Chancellor were both 
1 Catherine to Williams 8 January O.S. Gorialnow 31. 
Williams to Catherine 22 December O.S. Gorialnow O5. 
3 Williams to Catherine 11 December 0.S. Gorialnow 298. 
If Holderness to Williams 14 January. 
5 Holderness to Williams 25 January. 
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personally interested in this trade and "their notions here are so 
wild about the laws of commerce that they think that any goods that 
belong to Russia though taken on board a French ship ought immed- 
1 
-Lately to be released". And the danger of a conflict was the 
greater because the treaty of commerce between Britain and RusFia, 
which had to some extent regulated this and other disputed poi4ts,, of 
maritime law, was about to expire and the Russian government, 
presumably in order to keep their hands free to assert their "wild" 
notions of maritime law, by repeated delays practically refused to 
renew it.. The Great Chancellor still nade feeble efforts to improve 
Russia's relations with Britain, but he had become a mere figurehead 
without either the power or the will to oppose the dictates of the 
Shuvalovs, who retaliated upon George II for Britain's interference 
tith their lucrative trade with France by refusing to allow the 
7 
export of grain from the Baltic provinces to Hanover. The Empress's 
hostility to Prussia increased rather than diminished and so eager 
ms she to see her troops in action that in February she sent orders 
to Apraksin to march at once no matter how defective his prepar- 
ations were and freed him from responsibility for any disaster 
ahieh might happen owing to his obedience to her orders Since the 
Empress was in this mood the passage of the King's speech at the 
opening of Parliament in which Britain's determination to assist her 
'good ally" Prussia against the coalition was stated, aroused con- 
3iderable resentment at Petersburg, especially as the earlier 
Indecision of the British government on this point had not escaped 
lalitzin's notice and had perhaps raised hopes at Petersburg. When 
Williams to Holderness 26 October;Archives III 225 -6. 
Holderness to Williams 10 December 1756; Williams to Hold - 
-erness 25 January 1757. 
Williams to Holderness 8, 19 February 1757; Yorke to 
Hardwicke 4 February in Add. MSS. 35357 f 94; Pol. Corr. 
XIV 244. 
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alitzin reported that British support of Prussia would take the 
)rm of a British squadron in the Baltic for the defence of the 
russian coast and British trade,1 Russia's indignation was acute; 
nd the Russian government retorted by declaring a blockade of the 
o 
russian coast.- Had the British government carried out their 
ntention an open breach between Britain and Russia could hardly 
ave been averted, and the realisation of this fact, along with the 
.errands of the colonial and maritime war,caused the British gov- 
ernment to drop the scheme in spite of the protests of their ally 
'rederick, and to deny that ids had been thoi.r i _t_nt;_ : 3 
then Frederick learned from Mitchell that the British government 
iad recalled Williams from Petersburg he induced Mitchell to send 
uack the messenger to London with a request that Williams should be 
urged to remain at his post4in order not merely to continue his 
reports of Russian military preparations and plans and to delay the 
parch of the Russian troops if this were possible,5 but to advise 
the grand ducal couple, and to act as intermediary between them and 
1 Williams to Holderness 26 March. This idea was originally 
proposed by Newcastle as a means of recovering Russia (supra 
chapter XIII p.1.1 ) and was at first not pressed by Frederick 
"who did not wish to be a burden to his allies" (Mitchell to 
Holderness 9 July in Add. MSS. 32866 f 80). After Russia had 
certainly been lost Frederick renewed the scheme and pressed 
it very strongly upon the British government.(Frederick to 
Mitchell 20 February, 7 April in Add. LESS. 6843 f 80, f 88; 
Pol. Corr. XIV 239, 297, 446, 502.) The British government's 
virtual refusal caused considerable resentment at Berlin. 
(Memás. 15 July in Add. MSS. 32872 f 204; Holderness to 
Mitchell Most Secret 17 July f 232; Mitchell to Holderness 
Most Secret f 322). 
2 Williams to Holderness 10, 24 May. 
3 Holderness to Mitchell 5 July. 
4 Frederick to Mitchell 5 February in Add.MSS. 6843 f 65; Pol. 
Corr. XIV 247; Mitchell to Holderness 8 February S.P.F.Prussia. 
5 Mitchell to Williams 18, 26 December 1756, 8 January 1757, in 
Add. MSS. 6806 ff 516, 606, 57: Pol. Corr. XIV 166, 225. 
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1 2 
and Frederick. The health of the Empress was increasingly pre- 
-carious; the end, it was generally believed, could not be long 
delayed and Frederick desired Williams to be on the spot to assist 
the grand ducal couple to seat themselves on the throne and gain 
the maximum advantage for British and Prussian interests, or, should 
the Empress survive, to take advantage of any revulsion of feeling 
at Petersburg caused by Prussian victories. The British government 
readily complied with the request of their ally,and asked Williams 
to remain at Petersburg if he could possibly stay there without 
ruining completely his constitution.3 
Apart from an improvement in his health all the reasons which had 
led him to ask for his recall still existed. Even the Grand Duchess 
advised him, in his own interests as well as in those of his court, 
to leave Petersburg at least for some months,4 while his friends at 
home urged him in view of his health to return to England at once 
even if the Empress were on the point of death.5 Williams, therefore, 
advised his government to allow him to leave Petersburg, assuring 
them that his successor would have the assistance and full con- 
fidence of the Grand Duchess. If, however, they still wished him to 
remain as a minister to the government in posse rather than to the 
government in esse, he begged them to give him as little business as 
possible to transact with the latter since he believed he would be 
sure to receive either a refusal or no answer at all. The soundness 
1 Mitchell to Williams 18, 26 December, 1756, 8 January, 1757, 
in Add. MSS. 6806 ff 51b, 60b, 67; Pol. Corr. XIV 80, 149 -50, 
165 -6, 225. 
2 Williams to Holderness 28 September Private, 30 October, 9 
December, Secret; Catherine to Williams 30 September, 4,15,17 
October, 10 December, all 0.S.ß Goriainow 185,191,204,209 -10,297. 
3 Holderness to Williams 22 February; Holderness to Williams, 
Private, 22 February (Newport Papers). 
4 Williams to Holderness 22 March and 22 March, Most Secret. 
5 Fox to Williams 26 December 1756, Stowe MSS. 263. 
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of this opinion was proved shortly afterwards when the Russian 
ministers ignored Williams and made proposals to Wolff for the re- 
1 
-newal of the Anglo- Russian treaty of commerce. 
Williams's despatch did not reach London until after the King, by 
dismissing Pitt on 6 April,2 had caused a complete paralysis of the 
government at the moment when immediate and resolute action was 
essential for the defence of Hanover and the establishment of the 
Anglo- Prussian alliance on a firm basis. Not until 29 June was the 
3 
new ministry - the famous Pitt -Newcastle administration - formed, 
4 
just in time to hear of the defeat of the Prussians at Kolin on 
18 June and to assume responsibility for the ominous retreat of the 
duke of Cumberland and his composite army, which began in June and 
terminated on 8 September with the disastrous capitulation of 
Kloster Zeven. The Cabinet crisis caused delay in the final decision 
of the British government on the Petersburg embassy, and it was not 
until 5 July that Williams received leave to return to England. 
7 
The last months of his residence at Petersburg proved extremely 
disagreeable. One by one Britain's remaining friends at Petersburg 
fell away from the discredited ambassador. The Great Chancellor, 
over- rating his ability and his prestige, tried to carry on two 
inconsistent policies. In spite of his professions to Austrian and 
French6 diplomatists he remained hostile to the French alliance? 
1 Wolff to Holderness 15 March O.S; Williams to Holderness 26 
March, 9 April. 
2 The King's motives are analysed in Williams Pitt I 310 -11; 
Ruville II 108 -9. 
3 Williams Pitt 1 321 -3. 
4 Williams Pitt 1 337. 
5 Holderness to Williams 31 May. 
6 Douglas to Rouillé 29 March, 1757, in A.E. Russie. 
7 Williams to Holderness 30 August, 1756, 22 March, 1757; Yorke 
to Holderness, Private, 31 May, 1757, in Add. MSS. 35436 f 144. 
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effected by the Shuvalovs. But all Williams's attempts to induce 
1 
him by lavish bribes to support the interests of Prussia, failed. 
Bestuzhev now sought to regain the favour of the Empress by vig- 
-orously pushing on the war against Prussia, with the idea that so 
long as the war lasted he was indispensable. Once Prussia was 
crushed Bestuzhev hoped to restore the old system of Europe in its 
full vigour and efficiency.3 
Even the young court was now drifting away from Williams. By an 
intrigue of the Shuvalovs the Grand Duke had been partially alien - 
4 
'ated from the Grand Duchess, and Austria, aided by Poniatowski5, 
attempted with some success to convert him from his Prussian inclin- 
6 
ations by making a treaty of subsidy with him as duke of Holstein. 
Even the Grand Duchess,now that her lover Poniatowski had returned 
to Petersburg as the agent of the king of Poland ,gradually lost 
touch with Williams and their secret correspondence languished, 
although Catherine was as profuse as ever in assurances of personal 
and political esteem when she did write. Williams was therefore in 
1 Williams to Holderness 13 June; Williams to Cumberland 14 
June 1757 in Newport Papers. 
2 Williams to Holderness 8 February, 7 Juiie 1757. 
3 Havrincourt to Rouille 11 November 1756 in A.E. Russie 51 f 
69; Williams to Holderness 15 February 1757; Yorke to Hold- 
-erness Private 1 March 1757 in Add.IffSS. 35436 f 131; Keith 
to Holderness 19/30 March 1758. 
4 Herzen Memoir 238, 256 -63 etc; Catherine to Williams (undated)a-cL 
2 July O.S. Coriainow 334, 341; Cour de Russie 174. 
5 Poniatowski 210. 
6 Williams to Holderness 26 July. Keith reported on 19/30 March 
1758 that "the Grand Duke is absolutely in the hands of the 
French party ",but this conversion was not lasting. (Keith to 
Holderness 29 September /0 October). 
7 Although the editionsof the letters i admittedly incomplete, 
the correspondence seems practically to have ceased in January 
1757: two hitherto unpublished letters from Catherine to 
Williams subsequent to this date are printed in Appendix F. 
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these last months a niere spectator at Petersburg, and at the same 
time he was cut off from western Europe by the stoppage of posts 
1 
and couriers on Russia's frontiers. He was delighted to receive 
permission to leave Petersburg and lost no time in taking his 
audience of leave2 of the Empress, who replied by proxy to his 
flowery oration in a style that was cold to the verge of incivility. 
Even now, however, he was loathe actually to leave the court of 
Petersburg and his departure was in fact postponed partly by 
accident, partly by design' on part to remain at Peters- 
-burg as long as possible in the hope of the Empress's death. Illness, 
real or assumed, at first delayed his preparations for his departure. 
At one time he had decided to go through Poland but was deterred by 
news that bands of Russian irregulars were still maintaining a reign 
of terror in Lithuania; but he actually set out by way of Finland on 
1 September. Before he had gone forty miles he was seized with an 
attack of fever and returned to Petersburg extremely ill. Land travel 
being out of the question for some time,he then hired an English mer- 
-chant vessel to convey him to Copenhagen. Contrary winds detained the 
vessel at Cronstadt)and,after waiting on board for "near a fortnight" 
the impatient ambassador again returned to Petersburg,where he arrived 
shortly after it was known that the Empress had had an apoplectic 
1 Williams to Holderness, Private, 1 July (Newport Papers). 
2 Williams to Holderness 12 July. 
3 "I took my leave of this court last Saturday but not with 
an intention of quitting it I fully intend to be 
here till 1 September ": Williams to Mitchell 12 July in 
Add. MSS. 6824 f 166. This letter refutes the Ilchester- 
Langford- Brooke contention,in their translation of 
Catherine's Correspondence with Williams 22 note, that 
Williams's delay in leaving Russia was involuntary. 
4 So contemporaries thought: Holderness to Mitchell 14 
October in Add. MSS. 32375 f 94; Goriainow XXVI. 
28. 
it and that Apraksin had retreated from Prussia2 and thus con- 
firmed the rumours that his delay was due to design and not to 
xcident. Finally,he left Petersburg on 8 October and travelling 
,hrough Finland and Sweden reached Stockholm on 30 October. 
)nce safely out of the Russian dominions Williams's spirits re- 
vived and he bustled about at the Swedish court with all his 
3ustomary activity visiting the chief ministers and dining with 
them along with "ce qu'il y'a de plus distingué ici dans les deux 
4 
sexes ". Britain had for long had no regular representative at 
Stockholm, but depended for news of that court upon occasional 
letters from a certain "Wilkinson ". Williams, apparently on his own 
authority, arranged for the transmission by this man of regular news 
in a special cipher and himself carried a copy of the cipher to 
7Titley (through whom future communications were to pass) at Copen- 
hagen, where he arrive: on 15 November. There he made a more 
prolonged stay6in the expectation of meeting Keith, his successor 
lesignate, to whom he was very anxious to give full lights on the 
xourt of Petersburg. During the five weeks of his stay at Copenhagen 
'itley communicated to him his instructions to try and secure a 
efensive alliance with Denmark. Williams had frequent conferences 
1th the Danish ministers awl dined once a week in private with the 
ingland made such an impression that Titley had some hope that his 
sit,in conjuncjtion with Prussian victories in Germany,might lead 
1 Rinekinr, to Holderness 27 September S.P.F. Russia. 
2 Williams to Holderness 4 October. 
3 Full reports of his activities from Lieutenant Robert 
Campbell and "Wilkinson" in S.P.F. Sweden 103. 
4 "Wilkinson's"letterf11 November in S.P.F. Sweden 103. 
5 Titley to Holderne ,,s 11 LZarch Apart /Private 1758. 
6 Full reports grow Titley in S.P.F. Denmark. 
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to Denmark's acceptance of a defensive alliance with Britain, which 
had been rejected earlier in the year,l but was now more eagerly than 
ever desired by the British goverment. Williams's mood character- 
-istically had changed from deepest depression to uncritical opt - 
-imism, and his reports of his private conversations encouraged 
Titley to propose formally the conclusion of a defensive alliance 
between Denmark and Britain. Titley fortunately discovered his 
mistake in time and, to avoid the bad effect of a second refusal of 
British overtures, withdrew the proposition he had made while under 
Williams's influence. This last episode in Williams's diplomatic 
career is entirely unimportant, but shows that to the very end his 
eagerness to serve his King, and thereby to increase his own import- 
Lance, led him into officious meddling with matters not merely 
beyond his instructions but beyond his competence. Williams had 
graduated from the hard school of experience at Petersburg with 
This vanity and self- confidence apparently unimpaired. 
By the end of December he was at Hamburg2 awaiting Keith's arrival. 
after giving his successor full information e' the interior of the 
Russian court) he left for Cuxhaven where a warship was waiting to 
convey him to England. Ice, however, prevented his departure and he 
had to return to Hamburg on 27 January and spent another three 
eeks there before leaving for England, which he reached at the end 
)f February. It was apparently during the period of his second res- 
idence at Hamburg that his mind gave way completely.3 
1 S.P.F. Denmark; cf. Holderness to Newcastle 4 September in Add. 
MSS. 32873 f 462. 
Philip Stanhope to Holderness 27 December etc. in S.P.F. Germany 
(States). 
See his letters of 5 February, 1758 to Frederick II and ï.2itchell 
in Add. MSS. 6864 f 23 and f 20 respectively; cf. Walpole 
Letters IV 128; Chesterfield Letters (ed. Bradshaw) III 1211 -13; 
Wortley Montagu Letters (ed. Wharncliffe) III 160. On the last 
months of his life see Locke Hanbury Family 220 -1; Coxe 
Monmouthshire II 278 -9. 
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By this time the court of Petersburg had changed almost beyond 
recognition. The Grand Duke, through his enmity to the Grand 
Duchess, was apparently a convert to France and Austria. Poniat- 
owski had been recalled from Petersburg. The Great Chancellor 
during the acute phase of the Empress's illness had thrown off the 
galling yoke of the Shuvalovs, had perfected the plans for securing 
the succession of the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess1, and had even, 
it is said, recalled troops to Petersburg to strengthen his hands 
against them.2 Shortly after the recovery of the Empress he was 
arrested, stripped of his decoratiotis)and imprisoned.3 The Grand 
Duchess, deprived simultaneously of her lover and her mentor and 
dreading the discovery of compromising documents among the Great 
Chancellor's papers; had no alternative but to crave the Empress's 
r 
5 
mercy and to simulate a complete submission to her will. The 
'young court" had ceased to exist as a political force and the only 
consolation which Williams may have felt at the failure of his 
mission to Petersburg disappeared with it. 
After a brilliant beginning his embassy to Petersburg had proved as 
futile and unsuccessful as his earlier missions to Dresden and 
Berlin, Warsaw and Vienna. Few diplomatists have such a record of 
unmitigated failure. At every court to which he was sent Williams 
sooner or later rendered his recall imperative. He quarelled with 
Frederick the Great; he wrangled with Maria Theresa and Kaunitz; 
after some years ' residence at Dresden wadwilidowlie he broke 
1olently with Bríhl; at Petersburg he offended the Empress, 
1 Catherine:Memoirs 258. 
2 Yorke to Newcastle 29 November in Add.MSS. 32876 f 168. 
3 Herzen Memoir 299 -300; Bain 239 -40. 
4 Catherine: Memoirs 258. 
5 Herzen Memoir 3237 41; Cour de Russie 174. 
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quarrelled with the Great Chancellor, and, but for the sound advice 
of the Grand Duchess, would probably have followed a line of conduct 
which would have led to his own expulsion from. Russia and would have 
embroiled the relations of Britain and Russia. The mere enumeration 
of these facts proves that Williams was pre -eminently unsuited for 
the diplomatic life. No matter how bad the relations of his govern- 
ment were with the courts at which he resided) it was surely 
unnecessary for the British minister, by quarrelling personally 
with the sovereigns and ministers with whom he had to transact 
business, to make relations worse. A distinction must, however, be 
drawn between his failure at Berlin and Dresden, which was due 
almost entirely to his own fault, and at Vienna and Petersburg,for 
which his government was largely responsible. His mission to Vienna 
was a fool's errand and no good could have come of it no matter how 
skilful the envoy. At Petersburg, after success appeared to be 
within his grasp the volte face of his own government deprived him 
of it, and the rashness and folly of the king of Prussia made failure 
irremediable. The growing coldness between Britain and Russia lay in 
the logic of events after Frederick had invaded Saxony and Britain 
had definitely decided to support Prussia, which Russia, with the 
help of Austria and the connivance of France, was determined to crush, 
Williams's conduct intensified this coldness but did not exercise a 
decisive influence on the relations of Britain and Russia, and the 
coldness increased rather than diminished after Williams had been 
superseded by Robert Keith. 
1 
The longer the Seven Years war lasted and the more desperate the 
situation of Prussia, the greater was the danger of an open rupture 
1 v. Keith's reports in S.P.F. Russia. 
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between Britain and Russia. This danger was averted by the moderation 
and caution of Robert Keith; by the repeated refusal of the British 
government, at the expense of gravely indisposing Frederick II 
against them, to send a squadron to the Baltic; and above all by the 
commercial interests of Russia which would have been seriously 
affected by a breach with Britain. The death of Elizabeth in Jan- 
1762, saved Frederick II and ended this period of unusual 
tension in the relations of Britain and Russia. Russia under Peter 
III and later Catherine II became the ally of Prussia, but the un- 
- swerving hostility of Frederick to the Tory government, which he 
believed had basely deserted and betrayed him, prevented the def- 
inite inclusion of Britain in the alliance, as Catherine and 
Williams had planned. Nevertheless Catherine was consistently well 
disposed towards Britain and her early association with Williams 
was undoubtedly one factor - though not a major one - which contrib- 
uted to her friendship with Britain and her alliance with Prussia. 
By introducing Poniatowski to the future Empress.,Williams gave her 
a personal interest in the affairs of Poland which showed itself 
in the foreign policy of the early years of her reign. Catherine's 
persistent intervention in Poland brought about a crisis which 
otherwise might not have come until considerably later, when the 
peculiar diplomatic circumstances which produced the first partition 
of Poland would not have been operative. Into this realm of spec- 
-ulation it is unnecessary to enter, since nothing is further from 
my purpose than to suggest that Williams's stay at Petersburg was 
the final cause of the partition of Poland. My intention is merely 
to indicate that his contribution to the political education of the 
Grand Duchess was not entirely without influence upon the foreign 
33. 
policy1of the future Empress, while Poniatowski's contribution to 
her "sentimental education" had indirect political results of which 
2 
Williams never dreamed. 
Little lasting influence upon the affairs of Europe can be assigned 
to the schemes which jostled each other in Williams's fertile 
imagination. His plans for preserving the peace of Europe by sec- 
uring the election of a king of the Romans and of a successor to 
the king of Poland both came to nothing. In their attempt, however, 
to secure the former the British government alienated still further 
their Austrian ally and increased the enmity of the king of Prussia 
towards them; and both of these results were accentuated by the 
behaviour of Williams at the courts of Vienna and Berlin. Zia Neither 
61 10,r, 
- his plan nor his conduct a decisive factor in the future 
relations of Great Britain with Austria and Prussia. But his 
ingenuity in suggesting the election of a king of the Romans as a 
reason for subsidising foreign princes had enabled Newcastle to 
overcome the opposition of his colleagues to the establishment of a 
system of subsidy treaties in time of peace. This innovation in British 
foreign policy, of which Pitt was the bitterest opponent, seemed at 
the time mere waste of British money,and had no direct result except 
to add to the existing causes of dispute between Britain and France 
a fruitless competition in purchasing the venal princes of Germany. 
The payment of subsidies on a small scale in time of peace may, 
however, have helped to familiarise the British Parliament and public 
1 Poniatowski 178. 
2 Williams prophesied to Catherine (26 November 0.S. 1756 
Goriainow 287) "Je me flatte qu'un jour vous, Monsieur, 
et le roi de Prusse pour votre lieutenant le;kferez roi #04f++ 
de Pologne". A merciful providence kept him in ignorance 
of subsequent developments. 
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with the idea of giving subsidies to continental allies, and 
probably made it easier for Pitt to obtain parliamentary sanction 
for the enormous war subsidies which he paid to Prussia in order to 
conquer a colonial empire on the battlefields of central Europe. 
In another and much more direct way Williams may be claimed as an 
unconscious architect of the British empire. His one great achieve- 
ment was the Anglo- Russian subsidy treaty. No single clause of 
this treaty was ever executed, but it had momentous consequences 
for the history of Europe and of the world, since it induced 
Frederick II to make the convention of Westminster and thus set the 
stage for the Diplomatic Revolution and the Seven Years war. Had 
Williams failed to conclude the Anglo- Russian treaty, Britain would 
have had to face her life and death struggle with France without 
the assistance of any important continental ally. The conclusion by 
Williams of the treaty was the first and certainly not the least 
important of the steps which extended the maritime war to the 
continent, and gave Britain the alliance of Prussia. Contrary to 
the probabilities in 1756, Britain after seven years of war won a 
decisive victory over her maritime and colonial rival, thanks to 
the resources built up by Walpole, to the organising genius of the 
elder Pitt, to the ability of British generals and admirals, and to 
the bravery and devotion of humbler men; but above all to the fact 
-, 
that the energies and resources of France were fatally distracted 
by the double war which she was compelled to wage in Europe and 
beyond. 
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Manuscripts in the British Museum 1836 -1910 
and relevant indices (London 1843 -1912). 
(a) Dayrolle Papers - 
Add. MSS 15869 -75 Official diplomatic correspondence 
of James Dayrolle and Solomon Day - 
rolle (1747 -57 
15881 -82 Letter Books of James and Solomon 
Dayrolle (1747 -57) 
15887 -88 Transcripts of letters in the cor- 
respondence of Solomon Dayrolle 
includes some letters not included 
among the other Dayrolle Papers in 
the British Museum 
A3 
(b) Hardwicke Papers - 
Add MSS 35355 -57 Correspondence of Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of 
Hardwicke,witb Sir Joseph Yorke (1749 -59) 
32363 -64 Correspondence of Philip Yorke, 2nd Earl of 
Hardwicke with Sir Joseph Yorke (1742 -58) 
35385 Correspondence of Charles Yorke with Sir 
Joseph Yorke (1742 -69) 
35409 -18 Political Correspondence of Philip Yorke, 1st 
Earl of Hardwicke with the Duke of NewcastlE 
(1747 -59) 
35423 Political Correspondence of Philip Yorke, 1st 
Earl of Hardwicke with Mr Pelham (1743-54) 
35432 Letters of Sir Joseph Yorke to H.V. Jones, 
Under Secretary of State (1752 -54) 
35433 Political Papers &c of Sir Joseph Yorke. 
35435 -37 Letter Books of Sir Joseph Yorke (Private 
letters ) ( 1753 -58) 
35439 -42 Letter Books of Sir Joseph Yorke (Official 
despatches) 01753 -58) 
35445 News- Letters 1750 -54 
35461 -82 Correspondence of Robert Keith, Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Vienna (1748 -59) 
35486 -93 Diplomatic Letter Books of Robert Keith, 
Minister Plenipotentiary at Vienna /1748 -6 
35496 -99 Diplomatic Letter Books of James Porter, 
Ambassador to Constantinople (1748 -57 
J 
35602 [Correspondence between Sir C.H. Williams anc 
the Lord Chancellor 1745] 
36056 Notes on cases Cf 17 Williams's suit against 
his wife 
(c) Hyndford Papers. 
Add MSS 11383 -87 State papers, diplomatic Instructions and 
Letters,,,,, relative to the public affairs in 
which the Earl of Hyndford was engaged 
1747 -9 
(d) Keith Papers V. Hardwicke Papers 
Add MSS 35461 -82 and 35486 -93. 
(e) Mitchell Papers. 
l 
Add MS3 6804 -06 Letter Books of Andrew Mitchell (1756 -57 
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Add. MSS 6811 -13 Despatches to Andrew Mitchell from the 
Earl of Holderness (1756 -57) 
6823 Despatches to Andrew Mitchell from the 
Under Secretaries of State (1756 -57) 
6824 Letters addressed to Andrew Mitchell by 
English Ambassadors in Russia (1756 -57) 
6832 Letters addressed to Andrew Mitchell by 
the Duke of Newcastle and the Earl of 
Holderness (1756 -57) 
6843 -44 Letters from the King of Prussia to 
Andrew Mitchell (1756-58) 
6864 Letters from Sir Charles Hanbury Williams 
and Eichel to Andrew Mitchell with 
relative enclosures 
6871 Letters to the Earl of Holderness 
(f) Newcastle Papers. 
Add. MSS 32704 -37 Home Correspondence (1745 -54) 
32806 -51 Diplomatic Correspondence (1746 -54) 
32852 -87 General Correspondence (1755 -59) 
32993 -97 Memoranda of the Duke of Newcastle (1748 -58) 
33009 -25 Diplomatic Papers (1746 -60) 
(g) Porter Papers V. Hardwicke Papers Add. MSS 35496 -99 
(h) Robinson Papers 
Add. MSS 23824 -29 Original Despatches and Letters addressed 
to Thomas Robinson &c (1747 -50) 
23874 -77 Robinson's Letter Books &c (1747 -50) 
(i) Miscellaneous Papers 
Add. MSS 28727 Original Letters addressed to Peter 
Collinson [f' 56 Letter from Sir Charles 
Hanbury Williams dated 16 July 1750 
32271 Prussia 1724 -69 
32278 Saxony and Poland 
1726 -75 
32288 Russia 1719 -1807 
Deciphers of Despatches 
passing between foreign 
governments and their 
ministers in England &c. 
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(2) Egerton MSS. 
See Index to the Egerton Collection (London 1849) 
and subsequent volumes of the List (Catalogue) of 
additions to the Manuscripts in the British Museum 
(London v.y.) 
Eg. 1732 Journal of W. Bentinck for 1751. 
2694 [Letter from Colonel R. .Campbell re the 
health of Sir Charles Hanbury Williams 
dated 7 May 1758] 
2695 Diary of Walter Titley, Envoy to the 
King of Denmark 
(3) Stowe MS S . 
See Catalogue of the Stowe Manuscripts (London 1895 -6 
Stowe 253 [Various extracts from the papers of Sir 
and 256 Charles Hanbury Williams (1751 -56)] 
263 [Copies of various letters addressed to 
Sir Charles Hanbury Williams by H. Fox, 
H. Digby, and G. Hanbury (1756-57).] 
III Archives de la Ministère desJLffaires Etrangeres, Paris. 
Axe -InvehitRiro Sommaire is in process of publication, but 
iras not yet reached the countries mentioned below. 
(1) Correspondance politique Saxe 1746 -54 
n 
" Pologne 1750 -54 
n << Russie 1755 -58 
(2) Saxe Supplément 2 and 3 
Russie Supplément 8 and 9 
(3) Memoires et documents Russie 5 
IV Newport Public Library, Newport (Mon.) 
See Report by the present writer in the Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research II 61 -2. The papers 
preserved at Newport apparently formed part of Sir C.H. 
Williams's papers, which, according to Shelburne (Fitz- 
maurice: Life of Shelburne I 132) were returned to his 
family after his death by a French mistress with whom he 
had left them. Shelburne's memorandum is however so 
inaccurate in other respects that his statement on this 
point may be regarded with some suspicion. Another part 
of Sir C.H. Williams's papers is in the possession of 
Mr. Fenwick, Thirlestane House, Cheltenham, who refused 
to allow the present writer to examine them. 
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(1) Letters and instructions from the Earl of Holderness 
to Sir C. H. Williams (1754 -57) 6 vols. [contains 
a few autograph letters from Lord Holderness, copies 
of which are not included in the State Papers Foreign 
nor in the British Museum MSS.] 
(2) Sir C. H. Williams's letter books (1752 -57) 4 vols. 
(3) Letters received by Sir C.H. Williams from Andrew 
Mitchell (1756 -57) 1 vol. 
(4) Letters written by Sir C. H. Williams to Andrew 
Mitchell (1756 -57) 1 vol. 
(5) Etats des finances de la France et mémoires et lettres 
touchant la Barriére recu á Vienne (1748 -52) 1 vol. 
. s 
(6) Journal begun at Berlin in June 1750 and carried on 
to 4 March 1751 by Sir C. H. Williams 1 vol. 
(7) Diplomatic and other papers received by Sir C. H. 
Williams and bound up in January 1753 1 vol. 
[contains (a) papers relating to the Steuer and to 
Polish affairs. 
(b) drafts of letters from Sir C.H. Williams 
to the Duke of Newcastle 
(c) miscellaneous letters and paper 
Original autograph letters to Sir C. H. Williams from 
Horace Walpole the elder, Horace Walpole the younger, 
H. B. Legge, Earl of Chesterfield, Sir R. Walpole, H. 
Pelham, etc. 1 vol. 
[The letters from Horace Walpole the younger were pub- 
lished recently in the second supplementary volume of 
the Letters of Horace Walpole ed. Toynbee 
(9) Diplomatic letters and papers received by Sir C. H. 
Williams (1751 -52) 1 vol. 
(10) Letters and papers received by Sir C. H. Williams 
from the Duke of Newcastle (1753) 1 vol. 
(11) Loose original letters from H. Fox and others to 
Sir C. H. Williams. 
(12) Loose papers in a folder, including autograph draft 
of Sir C. H. Williams's speech on the convention with 
Spain (1738 -39) 
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B. Printed Sources 





Archives ou correspondance inédite de la 
Maison d'Orange-Nassau 41.Serie ed. Th. 
Bussemaker (Leyden 1908) 
Archives Voronzov ed. Bartenev (Moscow 
v.y.) 
Chesterfield Letters Letters of Philip Dormer S ±atzhope, Earl of 
Chesterfield ed. Bradshaw (London 1892) 
Cour de Russie La Cour de Russie il a cent ans 1725 -83 
ed. A.I. Turgenev (Berlin 1858) 









Correspondance de Catherine Alexeievna, 
Grande Duchesse de Russie et de Sir Charles 
H. Williams ed. Goriainow (Moscow 1909) 
W. Lippert: Kaiserin Maria Theresia und 
Kurfvrstin Maria Antonia von Sachsen Brief 
wechsel 1747 -72 (Leipsig 1908) 
A selection from the Papers of the Earl of. 
Marcbmont in the possession of the Right 
Honble. Sir George Henry Rose (London 1831 
Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie 
ed. Martens (St. Petersburg v.y.) 
Oesterreichische Staatsverträge: England 
ed. Pribram (Vienna 1913) 
Politische Correspondenz Friedrich's des 
Grossen (Berlin v.y.) 
Preussische Staatsschriften aus der Regie- 
rungszeit Kónig Friedrichs II ed Droysen 
and Koser (Berlin 1885) 
v. Re,`,ueil des Instructions 
Recueil des Instruc- Recueil des Instructions données aux am- 
tions bassadeurs et ministres de France depuis 
les Traits de Westphalie ju'squ' á la Revol- 
ution francaise (Paris v.y.) 
Autriche: Vol. I 
Pologne: Vols. 4 and 5 
Russie: Vols. 8 and 9 



















Memoires de Fréd- 
éric II 
le Comte C. -F. Vitzthum d'Eckstaedt: 
Maurice Comte de Saxe et Marie- Josephe de 
Saxe, Dauphine de France: Lettres et docu- 
ments inédits des Archives de Dresde 
Leipsig &c 1867 
v. Recueil des Instructions 
The Letters of Horace Walpole, Fourth Earl 
of Orford ed. Toynbee (London 1903 -5) 
with supplementary volumes (London v.y.) 
Wenck: Codex juris, pentium recentissimi 
(Leipsig 1781 -95) 
The Works of the Right Honourable Sir 
Charles Hanbury Williams, Ambassador to 
the Courts of Russia, Saxony, &c. 
(London 1822 
. 
Voronzov (A.R.): Notes sur ma vie et les 
événements differents qui se sont passés 
tant en Russie qu'en Europe pendant ce 
temps là 1744 -1805 (Moscow 1872) 
Journal et Mémoires 
ed. E.J.B. Rather 
Mémoires du Cardinal 
(Paris 1878) 
du Marquis d'Argenson 
(Paris 1859 -67) 
de Bernis ied Masson 
Triemoirs of Catherine the Great of Russia 
transi. K. Anthony (London 1927) 
Note: This is an improved edition of the 
Memoirs contained in the twelfth volume of 
the works of Catherine published in 1907 
by the Russian Academy of Sciences. 
Memoirs of the Empress Catherine II 
ed. Herzen (London 1859) 
Mémoires du duc de Luynes sur la cour de_ 
Louis XV ed. Dussieux et Soullé (Paris 
1860 -57- 
Mémoires de Frédéric II ed Boutaric et 
Campardon (Paris 1866) 
j 
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Poniatowski Mémoires du roi Stanislas- Auguste Ponia- 
towski ed. Goriainow (St. Petersburg 
1914) 
Valori Mémoires des négociations du Marquis de 
Valori ed. Valori (Paris 1820) 
Walpole George II Horace Walpole: Memoirs of the reign of 
King George the Second ed. Holland 
(London 1846T 
III London Gazette Occasional reference has been made to 
the files of this periodical. 
APPENDIX B. 
LIST OF PRINCIPAL SECONDARY AUTHORITIES. 
Note. The titles of works cited in one or two places only and of 
all articles in periodicals are given in footnotes at sufficient 







CitXed as Full Title. 
Alfred Ritter von Arneth: Geschichte 
Maria Theresia's (Vienna v.y.) 
R.N. Bain: The daughter of Peter the 
Great (Westminster 1899) 
R. Becker: Der Dresdener.Friede und die 
Politik Brú`hî's (Leipsig 1902) 
A. Beer: Aufzeichnungen des Grafen 
Willem Bentinck (Vienna 1871) 
E.W. Böttiger: Geschichte des Kurstaats 
und Königreiches Sachsen revised by Th. 
Fläthe (Gotha 1870) 
Broglie: Secret du Roi Le duc de Broglie: Secret du Roi; corres- 
pondance secrete de Louis XV avec ses 
agents diplomatiques 1752 -1774 (Paris 1888) 
Broglie: L'alliance Le duc de Broglie: L'alliance Autrich- 
Autrichienne :ienne (Paris 1895) 
Carlyle Thomas Carlyle: History of Frederick II 
of Prussia, called the Great (London 1888 
m Coxe: Austria William Coxe: History of the House of 
Austria from the foundation of the .Mon - 
:archy 1218 to 1792 (London 1853) 
Coxe: Lord Walpole William Coxe: Memoirs of Horatio, Lord 
Walpole, selected from his correspondence 
and papers (London 1808) 
Coxe: Pelham William Coxe: Memoirs of the Administra - 
Administration :tion of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham 
collected from the family papers and other 
authentic documents (London 1829) 
J.G. Droysen: Geschichte der preussischen 
Politik (Leipsig v.y.) 
LC -F. Graf Vitzthum von EckstädtJ: Die 
















Waddington: Louis XV 





Earl of Ilchester: Henry Fox, First Lord 
Holland (London 1920) 
V.O. Kluchevsky: A History of Russia 
transi. Hogarth. (London v.y.) 
R. Koser: König Friedrich der Grosse 
(Stuttgart 1893) 
Sir Richard Lodge: Great Britain and Prus- 
:sia in the Eighteenth Century Oxford 1923) 
Leopold von Ranke: Der Ursprung des sieben 
jáhrigen Krieges (Sammt. Werke XXX, Leip- 
:sig 1875) 
Richard Roepell: Polen um die Mitte des 
18 Jährhunderts (Gotha 187.g7- 
Cl. Rulhiére: Histoire de l'anarchie de 
Pologne et du démembrement de cette Répub- 
:lique (Paris 1807) 
A. von Ruville: William Pitt, Earl òf 
Chatham: transi. Chaytorr. (London 1907) 
Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow: The Silesian 
Loan and Frederick the Great (oxford 1915) 
Arnold Schaefer: Geschichte des Siebenjä- 
hrigen Krieges (Berlin 1867 -70) 
S.M. Solovev: History of Russia (I,"oscow 
v.y.) 
Herbert Tuttle: History of Prussia under 
Frederick the Great (London 1888) 
R. Waddington: Louis XV et le renverse- 
ment des alliances (Paris 1896) 
R. Waddington: La Guerre de Sept Ans 
(Paris n.d.) 
K. Waliszewski: La dernière des Romanov 
(Paris 1902) 
Basil Williams: 
Earl of Chatham 
Philip C. Yorke: 
Life of William Pitt, 
(London 1915) 
The life and correspond- 
ence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, 
Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain 
Cambridge 1913) 
N Denotes a work which contains lengthy and important verbatim 
extracts from unpublished despatches and other documents. 
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APPENDIX C. 
The Cabinet controversy on subsidy treaties in time of peace 
(1749 -50). 
By the summer of 1749 Newcastle had reluctantly come to the conclus- 
ion that subsidy treaties were essential to the maintenance of 
Britain's continental system He was gravely alarmed by the success j 
of France in out bidding Britain for the Danish alliance, and, 
knowing the insistence of his brother Henry Pelham, the Premier, on 
the need for economy he tried to secure the support of the third 
member of the Tri u mvira t Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. In his very 
private letter of 25 August 0.S..1749 (in Add MSS 35410 f126) he 
wròte to Hardwicke: " France has now wisely found out that a 
little money well applied in peace may save millions in war and what 
is worst of all for us enable her to continue the peace or betin a 
new war with almost a certainty of success whenever her interest or (j 
ambition shall incline her to it. France may thus reduce Britain 
to a state of dependency or even by another Jacobite rising overturn 
the constitution. I am sensible in opposition to this reasoning it 
will be said this may be all true and therefore we should not provoke 
to exert the power she certainly has. To that I answer that 
if she certainly has the power she will have the inclination and they 
would imperceptibly reduce us to a state of dependency upon them ....H 
If therefore these imminent dangers are not to be avoided by any 
complacency on our part towards France what other means are there of 
doing it? I do not pretend there are any certain ones but some very 
probable ones (subsidy treaties] which therefore I think ought to be 
tried and which I am sensible if not tried sooner or later the nation 
cry out for and greatly blame those who have not attempted it....i 
France at present is for peace and will not easily be drove from it 
and therefore this is the time to form such an alliance and party in 
Europe as shall enable you to make some stand, or what I would 
principally propose discourage France from beginning a new war 
If they go on in buying up all the powers upon the Continent when the 
bought those which are to be sold they will get the others from 
fear, and therefore France will reasonably then conclude that they mad 
impose what conditions they please upon us without our daring to 
dispute them and therefore in reality run no risk of engaging them- 
selves in a new war; whereas if we had a tolerable system and force 
upon the Continent though by no means equal to France and Prussia the 
experience of the last war shows us France would not wantonly in the 
present circumstances engage in a new war, the event of which might be 
doubtful. For that reason I have got the King's leave to 
learn the sentiments of the Emperor and the Empress Queen what system 
can be formed in our present circumstances. I hope we shall hear 
something from hence and if we could withdraw our general declared 
negative [re subsidies.] we might then go to work ". 
C 2. 
Hardwicke's uncompromisingly negative reply, dated 30 August 1'749, 
is to be found in Yorke Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke II 16 -17: 
Newcastle's rejoinder, dated 2 September (in Add. MSS 35410 f.140) 
proposed more definitely the formation of a system of alliances and 
advocated the accession of Britain to the treaty of the two Empress- 
:es and the payment of subsidies to Cologne and probably also to 
Bavaria and Saxony. 
"... The princes of Germany are to be sure the powers by whom sub- 
sidies may most naturally be expected [Bavaria and Cologne]...., 
".... The King of Poland, Elector of Saxony might make a consider- 
" :able party in such an alliance if the management of his elector - 
":ate were in right hands and the prince disposed to act a clear, 
"uniform, and steady part .... The affairs of Saxony are so entan- 
":gled and their payments [pf interest on George II's loans] so 
"irregular that the King has conceived so great a prejudice to that 
"court that there is rather a disinclination than otherwise to have H 
"aything to do with them: tho' I think elilliams] has stated their 
"affairs in such a light to the King that that disinclination does 
"not seem quite so great as it was. J illiains sa ys there was a 
"letter just arrived from Cologne, which said that if the Maritime 
"Powers did not grant the subsidy demanded Linder £20,000 stg. per 
"annum] the Elector would immediately conclude with France .... How 
"will it sound in our annals that an Elector of Cologne, Bishop of 
"Munster, Paderborn and Osnabrug was lost by the Maritime Powers for 
"a pension of £20171 stg. p.a. for four years? Sure some method 
"should be found out of doinc; it . Dy all means maintain and in- 
":crease the navy but] a naval force, tho' carried never so high, 
"unsupported with even the appearance of a force upon the Continent 
"will be of little use .... France will outdo us at sea, when they 
"have nothing to fear by land .... I have always maintained that our 
"marine should protect our alliances upon the Continent; and they, 
By diverting the expense of France, enable us to maintain our sup - 
":eriority at sea." 
Newcastle's colleagues although they reluctantly consented to 
Britain's accession to the treaty of the two Empresses, because it 
was not to cost them any ready money, would not accept Newcastle's 
scheme for buttressing the resulting Grand Alliance of Britain, Aus- 
:tria, Russia, and the United Provinces by subsidising the German 
princes. At this stage Williams suggested to Newcastle an alteration 
in his scheme, which cut the ground from under the feet of Newcastle's 
opponents. His memorandum (S.P.F. Poland endorsed October ....1749) 
begins by outlining the great coalition which Newcastle had been 
vainly endeavouring to form for more than a year. Towards this 
B 3. 
Britain's accession to the treaty of the two EmpressesInow 
sanctioned by the Cabinet.)is a necessary step, but to procure the 
adhesion of the German princes, subsidies must be given by Britain. 
"I think "the memorandum continues "that for moderate subsidies 
given to the King of Poland and the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne 
not only their entering heartily into the present alliance, but 
other material ends might be obtained in the case of Saxony] 
(1) (2) (which is the great view fo which all my pro- 
jects tend) to oblige the King of Poland to give his vote whë.n 
required for electing the Arch Duke King of the Romans and I should 
think that no Parliament (except some people in it who oppose 
everything) could be against giving a small sum of money in time to 
prevent a general war breaking out as it will infallibly do in the 
present circumstances of Europe whenever the Imperial throne 
becomes vacant The Elector of Bavariar!.nmst also be bought by 
a subsidy treaty] for which the public reason to be given ought to 
be his accession to the treaty of 1746 and the private and real one 
his being obliged to give his vote when required for the Arch Duke 
to be chosen King of the Romans. For a very small sum there might 
be three considerable points gained of the Elector of Cologne the 
first his accessio# to the treaty of 1746, the second his taking a 
coadjutor from His Majesty, and third his giving his vote for trie - 
Arch Duke to be King of the Romans I think in all these cases' 
we ought to try what proportion the Dutch will bear with respect to 
these subsidys. I must own I think the election of the King of the 
Romans so material a thing that I don't see how any reasonable 
project can be framed for the future security of the liberties of 
Europe without making that election one of the principal objects. 
I think the sum requisite is trifling in comparison with the 
desired end and I think the election of a King of the Romans would 
be a satisfactory answer to anything that could be said in 
Parliament against these subsidys. The Electors of Maintz and 
Trier are too well dispos'd not to come into the scheme and the 
whole would be done under His Majesty's auspicies and by his own 
hands. He will have the glory of it and Europe the benefit. But 
I can't help thinking that if something of this kind is not soon 
undertaken it will shortly be out of our power to do it and we may 
in time be obliged to spend millions in order to stop an evil which 
now some few thousands would prevent 
The opposition was far too strong to allow Newcastle to carry out 
this scheme as it stood but he eagerly adopted the idea of securing 
the election of 6 :,king of the Romans as the main point in his 
Continental programme and tried to carry it out piecemeal.- The 
King, anxious to secure the election of the Duke of Cumberland to 
the coadjutorship in Cologne, agreed to pay part of the subsidy to 
Cologne in his electoral capacity and the United Provinces con- 
tributed the remainder. This was certainly a good beginning but 
did not carry Newcastle very far. Throughout the wiñter of 1749 -50 
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he waged an uphill battle in the Cabinet to secure a subsidy for at 
least one other German prince from the British exchequer. In a letter 
to Charles Bentinck (29 December 1749 in Add/ASS 32819 f301) he 
describes his difficulties: 
"....Those who are willing to triumph over me here for being as they 
say the only one who is wild enough to think at present of supporting 
the ancient system You don't at all know how our affairs stand here: 
all the love of peace, detestation of war, which you saw when you was 
last in England is, now turned to the necessity of economy: the 
impossibility of our giving any subsidy in time of peace: the little 
advantage of paying German princes who will leave you tomorrow for a 
better bargain with France: the weakness of the republic of Holland: 
the impossibility of having; any assistance from thence or even of 
making any system or stand against France and therefore nothing was to 
be done but to keep quiet, pay our debts, and not engage. This 
language though very general is and ever shall be constantly opposed by 
me: and if our allies will be reasonable, take their proper share in 
expence: and nothing be asked but what carries certain advantage with 
it, with labour pains perseverance and being reasonable as to the sum 
and pretty certain as to the effect I may perhaps (tho' I can't answer 
for it) be able to do something but in any other shape I dare not 
attempt it ". 
By the spring of 1750 when Newcastle accompanied the King to Hanover 
it had been definitely decided to set on foot the negotiation for the 
election and Newcastle's optimistic reports from Hanover clinched 
Pelham's reluctant consent to give a subsidy to Bavaria, on the 
distinct understanding that this would be the only drain on the British 
exchequer. Pelham's letter of 1 September 1750 to Hume Campbell 
(Marchmont Papers II 388 -9) shows clearly the arguments which had 
convinced Relam the expediency of subsidising Bavaria to secure the 
election: 
"....The expense to us" he writes" is a trifle; and I hope the con- 
sequence of the treaty will sufficiently make up for that. It does 
look as if the King of. the Romans would be chosen, and that the choice 
would fall on the Arch Duke Joseph. If so, our bone of contention is 
removed for two lives; and the House of Bavaria being separated from 
Prance may possibly check and disappoint the turbulent and ambitious 
views of some other German powers. Quiet is what we want; economy is 
necessary; but the one cannot be had without the other. This may be 
one step towards that quiet; and if we do not launch out into other 
expenses this cannot interfere greatly with our economy ". 
APPENDIX D. 
Poland through English Spectacles (1752) 
Letter from Sir C.H. Williams to Mr Capel Hanbury, dated Grodno 12 
October 1752 (in Newport Papers) 
" To come hither I passed through Warsaw which is the only 
town in,.which I saw one house that had in it either mortar, brick, 
stone, lead or iron. Misery reigns over the whole country and the 
wretched inhabitants do with pain keep body and soul together. The 
Republic is governed by about fifty nobles who are insolent to the 
King, slaves to his minister, and tyrants to their countrymen. Among 
this body I know about five or six that are worthy men and don't abuse 
their power. They are excessively rich; they have thirty, forty, 
sixty thousand Pds. sterling p.a. and live after their fashion very 
expensively. I leg .you to imagine a vast house filled at least with 
a hundred servants and as many gentlemen who are retainers and follow - 
ers of the great man. He never sits down to dinner but at a table of 
at least sixty covers ffhen follows an account of the establish- 
ment of the Great General of the Crown It is a good house much like 
Ditchley, Lord Litchfield's, only bigger and the wingsmuch larger; 
there is a large village close by it which is all made up of little 
tenements pretty well furnished for the reception of strangers and 
when I was there it was brim full for we were not so few as eight 
hundred persons lodged and fed by the master of the house. As Great 
General he has his guards like a King. I was lodged in one of the wins 
and before my window there was every morning drawn up a company of 
jannissaires exactly dressed like those of the Sultan and at five 
of the clock I was usually awaked by Turkish music which is very 
bad. On the other side of the courtyard were drawn up a company of 
Cossak tartars and in the midst a troop of Horse Guards. Without the 
gates there was a guard of teo hundred Ulan which are Cossack hussars 
who are not well dressed for light horse there was more cloth in 
one of their breeches than would make me a riding coat. The mornings 
are passed in making visits all over the village and to the different 
appartments of the house. At eleven the mistress of the house (the 
most amiable of women and daughter of the famous Poniatowski who went 
through all the mad King of Sweden's fortunes ) appears and 
everybody assembles in her apartments. There you play gr chat till 
dinner. The Great General's table is of eighty covers perfectly well 
served with wines of all sorts and English beer which is now drank all 
over Poland and I have met with as good here as ever I drank in my 
life. After dinner there are coaches and horses pour la promenade 
and at night generally dancing and play. The whole house is in bed by 
eleven. I fancy John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster kept much such a 
house at his glace of the Savoy in the Strand punting parties 
were arranged] the first consisted of wild bulls and el s, the second 
of bears and wolves - the wild bulls are rather bigger than any ox I 
ever saw in England and very fierce. They are called ourox . They 
with the Elks were enclosed in Toils made of Sail Cloth and baited 
with dogs, but as the dogs could do nothing against them the King and 
Queen shot them and they killed forty two ourox and five and twenty 
elks. The other chasse was more diverting. The bears and wolves were 
enclosed in a wood in which wood there was a rock about thirty feet 
high which hung over a canal and the bears and wolves were forced to 
that precipice and from thence fell into the water where they were 
killed with dogs or shot Usk is a Paris in comparison to this 
capital of the Great Duchy of Lithunia ... ladies have dwarf pages. 
The Palatins come hither travelling like the ancient patriarchs with 
their families, their household, their furniture, their dependents, 
their servants, their herds and their flocks You may visit very 
great people who have not above one chair in their houses... there are 
seventeen churches and convents in Grodno filled with monks and 
other priests. There are about 1500 Jewish and four Christian families 
There is within some miles of Grodno a large district of country where 
the people are still pagans. I think I shall hot be easily persuaded 
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ever to visit Grodno again but I would not but have been there for 
£50 ". 
Note. This letter is given partly for the vivid, if somewhat uncertain 
light which it throws on eighteenth century Poland; but also because it 
shows that Williams the tourist must have been a much more likeable 
person than Williams the diplomatist. 
APPENDIX E. 
"Very secret" despatch from the Earl of Holderness to Sir Charles 
Hanbury Williams and Mr Keith dated 20 April 1753 fin S.P.F . Poland) 
This despatch, taken in conjunction with the documents in Appendix C, 
{ 
shows very clearly how British foreign policy, under the direction of 
Newcastle and largely owing to the inspiration of Williams, moved 
away from the non -interventionist attitude of the '.'Walpole period. On 
the plea of preserving the peace of Europe, Newcastle in 1750 had 
dragged Britain into the politics of the Empire; now in 1753 the 
same plea was to serve as a justification of British interference in 
the general politics of Eastern Europe and even in the domestic af- ÌI! 
:fairs of Poland. The despatch has additional significance since 
it provides a concrete example of the radical divergences between 
Britain and Austria from the Austrian Succession War to the Diploma- 
:tic Revolution. Whenever Britain suggested a method of strengthen- 
:ing the old system or demanded assistance from Austria to thwart the 
designs of France, Austria insisted that Britain should associate 
herself unreservedly with Austria's hostility towards Prussia. This 
Britain steadfastly refused to do. 
Dh.e despatch 'begins by stating what the British government believed 
to be the intentions of France and Prussia in regard to the Polish 
succession.] "By the intelligence the King has received the King of 
"Prussia is for beginning immediately by engaging the Turks to fall 
"upon one or both Empresses, in which case His Prussian Majesty 
"thinks it would be easy for him to execute his designs upon Poland 
and probably would not himself propose to wait for the death of the 
"present King of Poland. Whereas France is certainly not for pre- 
cipitating matters and would stay till the case happens but then 
"would act with vigour and in the meantime would be preparing for the 
"success of these measures which they would then jointly with Prussia 
"infallibly attempt and this they will do by disposing the Ottoman 
"Porte, the Court of Sweden end such other powers as they may be able 
"to engage in their views to cooperate at that time with them. It is 
"known the King of Prussia's great object is to make himself master 
of Polish Prussia or La Prusse Royale. This has been for some time 
"the view of the House of Brandenburg and if it could be obtained 
"would add a great strength and weight even by sea and particularly 
"with regard to the trade of Baltic to His Prussian Majesty's power 
"which we feel but too much at present. France on the other hand 
"will endeavour to have a King of Poland of their own and for that 
"will probably venture a general war. The evil is certain the 
"remedy I am afraid more doubtful. It is therefore for this 
"reason that IIis Majesty would desire to be particularly informed 
"from the Courts of Vienna and Dresden and from the Russian ambassa- 
" : dor at Vienna what the views of their respective Courts are with 
"regard to the succession in Poland. The King supposes the three 
"courts agree in wishing that the crown of Poland may go to the 
"Prince Royal of Saxony upon the death of tL.e King his father. Nis 
"Me ;P Vt u wnulcl therefore desire to be informed what steps 
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steps they have taken or propose to take for that purpose. 7Thet is the 
inclination of the Principal Poles and in what manner they propose 
to act particularly whether they intend to enter into any measures in 
Poland during the life of the present King to secure the succession to 
his son. Whether according to the laws of Poland a Pre --Election has 
ever or can be legally made and if legal whether also practicable. And 
it is upon this head to be consider'd whether such a measure tho' in 
every respect much to be wished might not bring on an immediate 
opposition from France and Prussia and unite those powers in the King of 
Prussia's view of making some present attempt. If nothing is proposed 
to be done now, the next consideration is what preparatory steps may be 
taken in Poland to secure this point, whenever the event happens. And 
I should think that by a proper concert between the two Empresses the 
King of Poland and the considerable well intentioned Poles such eventual 
measures may be taken as might secure beyond all doubt alegal election 
for the Prince of Saxony which was not the case last time and thereby 
take away from France and Prussia the pretence at least 6f only pro - 
tecting the liberty of the Poles and a free Election: when in reality 
they would be sacrificing both the liberties of the Republic of Poland 
and the freedom of Election to their own private ambitious views. When 
the King knows what are the thoughts of the three powers above mentioned 
His Majesty will be better able to form his own judgement on what 
measures if any it may be proper to take. At present all the Court of 
Vienna has proposed as an adequate remedy for all this mischief as what 
would not only enable the respective powers to defend themselves, but 
even discourage the King of Prussia from ma'?ing any attempt upon them is 
the King's accession to the fourth Secret Article and His Majesty's 
acceptation of the King of Poland's accession to the treaty of 1746 
(and I suppose to the fourth Secret Article also) upon the terms pro- 
posed by Russia and Saxony which is the King's giving a general guaranty 
of the Saxon dominions. I have in former letters to you Mr Keith 
acquainted you that His Majesty thinks these proposals are not only 
liable to great objections but insufficient for attaining the end. What 
the fourth article stipulated was that if the King of Prussia attacked 
either of the Empresses or even the Republic of Poland the cession of 
Silesia shall be void and the two Empresses engage to furnish 60,000 
men each to regain it to the 2ueen of Hungary. In the first place the 
two Empresses may if they think proper declare the cession void but it 
cannot be said to be so in any sense whatever: for neither the Empress 
of Russia nor the Republic of Poland were parties to or in any way 
concerned in the cession of Silesia or the conditions upon which it was 
made; so that this would be setting out with a manifest act of injustice 
But if. the King of Prussia should furnish any just cause by an attack 
upon some part of the Empress Queen's own dominions in that case to be 
sure Her Imperial Majesty would be at liberty to fall upon him and 
engage her allies to do the same in any place where it can be done with 
the greatest prospect of success. But that which is the most extra- 
ordinary is the declaration which the Austrian Ministers made to you Mr 
Keith, vizt. that they did not ask or propose that His Majesty should 
enter into any new engagements or take any new burden upon himself tho' 
the King would acquire an additional succour from the two Empresses which 
I suppose is the augmenting their respective contingents to 60,000 [mera . 
Do they or can they call an engagement on the part of His Majesty to 
enter into such measures with the two Empresses against the King of 
Prussia in case of an attack on Poland no new engagement when the King 
has never been under any obligation whatever with regard to Poland. And 
tho' perhaps (which I suppose is the meaning) they would not immediately 
insist upon an increase of the King's contingent above the ordinary one 
stipulated of 12;000 men yet when once His Majesty is engaged in the s7ar, 
the King becomes an original party to it and must therefore do what is 
necessary to support it. So that His Majesty's accession to (for I 
don't well know what they mean by acknowledging -avouer) the article is 
is not only giving a guaranty of the Republic of Polan'a thing never 
dreamt of before but engaging specifically in case Pol nd is attacked 
to join in reconquering Silesia for the Queen of Hungary: such a specific 
stipulation I 4ape do not remember to have seen in any defensive alliance 
now subsisting and what the two Empresses might call an attack on 
Poland is not at present at all clear. As to the Elector of Saxony I 
can easily see the King's guaranty of the Saxon dominions would be a 
very good thing for His Polish Majesty but dort see in return anything 
proposed either for His Majesty or for the immediate service of the 
common cause. For this reason these two proposals hitherto appear to 
the King as very improper. When His Majesty sees more clearly what is 
intended and the practicability of it and in what way they propose to 
prevent France and Prussia from putting their suppostd designs into 
execution when the case happens and how their respective troops are to 
be disposed for that purpose the King will then be better able to judge 
of it. In the meantime His Majesty sees the danger full as strongly as 
the Court of Vienna does. When the case happens I am persuaded the 
King will act that part which the circumstances of his own Kingdoms and 
the general interest of Europe require. If a general defensive alliancE 
could be struck out which should be calculated purely for the preserva- 
tion óf the public peace wherein no particular acquisitions or advantagE 
were to be stipulated for anyone of the contracting parties tho' the 
alliance should have in view the preventing the troubles "to be tappre- 
hended_- upon the vacancy of the Crown of Poland and any attack to he 
made by the Turks: that would be the best and surest way to maintain 
the pubic peace against any of these attempts. In such an alliance 
it is possible both Spain and the Republic of Holland may join and 
other powers who may be equally interested to prevent a new war. I 
fling this out only for consideration; it would be difficult to form 
such a treaty but the object of it I am persuaded would be universally 
approved; and perhaps a negotiation on,.y set on foot with his view 
might have a good effect; and induce France at least either to come 
into some explanation of their future views in case of the vacancy 
of the Crown of Poland or to lay aside the thoughts of entering into a 
general war upon that account when they should see the strength that 
might pmssibly be against them. I have now flung out what has occurred 
to the King and more by way of reasoning in order to put others upon 
explanation than by proposing anything on the part of His Majesty. 
The King takes it for granted that whenever the King of Prussia shall 
kut in execution that plan which we suppose he is intent upon, the two 
mprésses will for their own safety and independancy exert themselves 
_o oppose it. But it is much to be feared that at the s ame time that 
His Prussian Majesty shall begin on side of Poland or the Empire France 
will enter into Low Countries in order to create a diversion for 
England and Holland. One thing should not be neglected and that is fox 
the two Empresses to send orders to their ministers to prevent if 
possible the Ottoman Porte from entering into the views of France and 
Prussia As the only view and intention of this letter is that 
His Majesty should be informed of what may rally be either the present 
or future scheme or plan of the Courts above mentioned with regard to 
the succession In Poland and the preventing the mischief which may be 
apprehended from the powers who may have different views upon such an 
event, the King does by no means intend to make any proposition or even 
to suggest any particular measures for these purposes. You will there- 
fore be very cautious not to give any handle either to the Court of 
Vienna or to the Russian and Saxon ministers to interpret what you may 
think proper to say as a proposal from the King. We find by experience 
that the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg have been very ready to 
publish the King as the author of measures which the King may either 
have only suggested for their consideration or indeed (as was the case 
lately at.Petersburg) where the King could not properly be said to take 
any part at all. You will therefore endeavour as much as possible to 
get these informations as from yourselves and without making use of the 
King's name except where it may be absolutely necessary." 
APPEl`?DIX F. 
Letters (hitherto unpublished) from the Grand Duchess Catherine to 
Sir Charles Hanbury Williams. 
Letter I dated 1 February O.S. 1756 in S.P.F. Russia, attached to 
Williams's "most secret" letter to Holderness of 19 February N.S. 
"Monsieur, c'est avec une véritable satisfaction que je vous felicit 
sur la conclusion de votre traité que j'ai toujours vivement souhait 
comme util et necessaire á. ma patrie adoptive pour laquelle vous 
savez, Monsieur, que je verserois mon sang avec joye. C'est en cor. 
:tinuant un jour (ce que pourtant je prie la providence de reculer 
longues années) l'effet de ce traite de la manière la plus efficace 
que je coute en tems et lieu prouver a Sa Majesté Britannique mon 
attachement pour les interets mutuels des deux cours et la recon- 
naissance que je .dois aux temoignages d'amitié reiteres qu'il a bier 
voulu me donner. Ma confiance que vous vous etes Monsieur acquise 
a juste titre augmente la certitude de ces sentiments que j'exprime 
avec plaisir et que le Grand Duc ne desavouera certainement jamais. 
Je suis avec une consideration particuliere, Monsieur, 
De votre Excellence 
La tres devout et mie 
Catherine. 
The regular correspondence between Catherine and Williams began dur- 
:ing Williams's illness in the spring of 1756 when the Grand Duchess 
sent him the news of the court once or twice a week (Williams to Hol 
:derness 9 July Private and Secret). By August the Grand. Duchess ar 
the ambassador were exchanging letters daily and sometimes several 
times a day. These letters were published by the Imperial Russian 
Historical Society of Moscow in 1909 in the original French with a 
Russian translation. An English translation was published in 1928 
by the Earl of Ilchester and Mrs Langford-Brooke. After the return 
of Poniatowski to Petersburg and the accession of Russia to the firs 
treaty of Versailles the raison d'étre of the correspondence disap- 
peared and the correspondence languished. Catherine's letters to 
Williams on the eve of his departure from Petersburg are printed 
below from the originals in Add. MSS 6864 f. 29 and f. 31. 
Letter II dated 19 August O.S. 1757. An incomplete translation of this 
letter was printed by Raumer in his Frederick II 342 -3. 
"MEnsieuí, J'ai prise la resolution de vous écrire ne pouvant vous 
voir pour vous faire mes adieux. Les regrets les plus sinceres 
accompagnent celui que je regarde comme un de nies meilleures amis et 
dont la conduite s'est attirée toute mon estime et mon amitié. Je 
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n'oublierai jamais les obligations que je vous ai. Pour vous en 
recompenser d'une manière conforme á la noblesse de vos sentiments 
voici ce que je ferai. Je saiserai toutes les occasions imaginabl 
pour ramener la Russie a ce que je reconnais pour son vrai interet, 
qui est d'etre liée intimement á l'Angleterre de donner á celle ci 
par tout les secours humain l'ascendant qu'elle doit avoir pour le 
bien de toute l'Europe et plus en particulier pour celui de la Rus - 
:sie sur leur enemi commun la France dont la grandeur est la honte 
de la Russie. Je m'étudierai á mettre en usage ces sentiments. 
J'en battirai ma gloire et en prouverai la solidité au Roi votre 
maitre. Je suis bien aise que le bien de la Russie m'oblige a 
pourvoir m'acquitter envers l'Angleterre des obligations person- 
:elles que j'ai a S.M. dont je conserverai le souvenir avec la plus 
vive reconnaissance. Je vous prie confidement Monsieur d'arranger 
pour le mieux ce dont vous etes instruit [a reference probably to 
Catherine's request for another £10,0008. Soyez persuadé qu'une 
des choses du monde que je souhaite le plus c'est de vous ramener 
ici en. triomphe. J'espere qu'un jour le Roi votre maitre ne me 
refusera pas la grace que je lui demanderai de vous revoir. Il 
ne lui en reviendra que du profit. Je suis avec une consideration 
toute particuliere, Monsieur, 
de votre Excellence, 
ZR, tres devouée amie, 
Catherine. 
Letter III (dated simply "Mardi ", presumably written immediately before 
Williams finally left Petersburg). 
"Monsieur, Je suis au desespoir d'etre privé du plaisir que j' 
aurois eu á vous voir- vous parler en liberté. Votre amitié 
desinteresse pour Moi et pour le Grand Luc est sans exemple. Mon 
coeur-est ulceré pour la dureté du traitement que vous essuyez, 
mais aussi ma plus vive reconnaissance pour vous sera eternelle. 
Puissent des tems plus heureux me permettre de vous la prouver 
dans toute son étendue elle égale (et c'est tout dire) les obliga- 
tions que je vous ai et l'estime infinie qui est düe a la Beaute 
de votre caractère. Adieu mon meilleur, mon cher ami. 
